Opinion
No. FA08-4008070S
September 22, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This dissolution of marriage action between the plaintiff, Marianne Odell, and the defendant, Kim Odell, came before the court by a writ, summons and complaint returnable to the court on January 1, 2008, and tried to the court on February 5, April 1, April 2, June 16 and June 24, 2009. The extended trial schedule resulted from the parties' efforts to complete discovery and obtain testimony from probate and other legal witnesses. Both parties were represented by counsel.
This is the second action initiated by the plaintiff for the dissolution of this marriage, the first was commenced on May 8, 2002. Soon thereafter, the father of the defendant died and the parties reconciled.
At trial both parties submitted claims for relief. The plaintiff, by way of financial relief, seeks the sale of three pieces of real property owned by the parties and the equal division of the net proceeds, subject to a credit for property taxes paid; 50 percent of the defendant's retirement, annuity and disability benefits; sole ownership of her interest in her father's estate and related trusts; $1,000 per week alimony, subject to credit for income received from the defendant's retirement, annuity and disability benefits; medical insurance for three years; and counsel fees. The defendant, by way of financial relief, proposes that no alimony be paid to the plaintiff and that he receive 50 percent of the marital assets acquired during the marriage including: 50 percent of the funds received by the plaintiff as well as 50 percent of the funds which will be received in the future, by virtue of the plaintiff's trusts, and her interest in her father's estate. In the alternative, the defendant proposes the plaintiff retain her interests in family trusts and the total of her inheritance and the defendant receive the balance of the marital estate.
The trial focused on the attorneys' efforts to value the plaintiff's vested inheritance and family trusts.
In rendering this decision and making the ensuing orders, the court has carefully considered the statutory criteria in General Statutes §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82, regarding alimony and the assignment of the marital estate, respectively, General Statutes § 46b-62 regarding attorneys fees, the case law as it has developed regarding these matters, and other relevant federal and state laws regarding the issues that confront the court. This court has considered the parties' arguments, proposed findings of fact, and revised proposed orders. The court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the parties and the witnesses, Mary Nork, Attorney Robert Engelman, Sharon Sample, and Attorney Stephen Zeche at the time of trial. There were numerous full exhibits, each of which was examined by the court.
Findings of Fact A. Jurisdictional Findings
The plaintiff and the defendant were intermarried on June 8, 1974, in Wallingford, Connecticut. The plaintiff has resided continuously in the state of Connecticut for at least twelve months preceding the date of the filing of the complaint. The court has jurisdiction over the marriage and the parties.
No minor children have been born to the wife since the date of the marriage. The couple have three children. The family has never received public assistance.
For the reasons discussed hereinafter, the court finds that the thirty-five-year marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably and there is no hope of its reconciliation.
B. The Parties
The plaintiff wife, now fifty-six years old, is a graduate of Cheshire High School. After only one year, she left Mt. Ida College in Newton, Massachusetts at the age of twenty-one to marry the defendant. She is in generally good health with the exception of being prescribed the antidepressant Effexor for the last six years. While the latter does not limit her employment capabilities, for the last three decades, the plaintiff's efforts have focused almost exclusively on homemaking. The parties raised three children together. When her oldest child was eleven years old, in 1986, the plaintiff returned to the workplace; her employment history consists of a number of clerical jobs. She has never earned more than $10 an hour. The plaintiff's earning capacity is unproven though clearly marginal. Recently she has worked in coffee shops and food preparation establishments. She is presently employed at a catering business earning $10 an hour for preparation work, a minimum of six and a maximum of twenty-four hours per week. She reports a gross wage of $69 per week from her principal employment. Her only other source of income is derived from the Alexander family trusts which generate $112 per week. The court finds she has a net income of $185 per week. She expresses an interest in obtaining a certificate as a veterinary assistant, but must first obtain her associates degree. After vacating the marital home in October 2008, the plaintiff moved to a small rental apartment.
The youngest of their three children is thirty years old.
By agreement of the parties the defendant has had the exclusive use of the marital home since November 10, 2008.
When they met, the defendant husband, now fifty-eight, was a Wallingford policeman, enrolled at the University of New Haven in the LEAP program where he obtained his degree in criminal justice. For a period of five years commencing in 1972, he served as an undercover officer investigating motorcycle gangs in concert with Interpol, the CIA and other federal and state agencies. His career in criminal justice has extended for more than 30 years. While responding to a stabbing incident in 1994, he severely injured three cervical discs requiring fusion surgery and resulting in ever present discomfort and pain. Although he attempted to return to work, his employment was terminated. He enrolled in paralegal studies from 1995 through 1996 at Branford Hall, and obtained employment in Vermont as an adjudicator specialist for National Life. After one year he was hired as a program coordinator for CASSP (Child and Adolescent Service System Program), addressing juvenile support and neglect matters in Middletown Connecticut. On January 10, 2000, he was hired as an investigator for the Client Security Fund Commission with responsibilities for investigating extortion, conversion and fraud by members of the Connecticut Bar. The defendant's income from all sources is $2,267 per week. He earns a gross weekly wage from the state of Connecticut in the amount of $973 per week. He also receives $177 per week from an accident compensation annuity and $1,117 per week in disability pension benefits from the town of Wallingford. The court finds that the defendant's total net income is $1,604 per week.
The defendant intends to voluntarily resign from his employment and retire on January 10, 2010, when he will be eligible for retiree health insurance. Upon normal retirement at age sixty-two, he would be eligible to collect $119 per week as a participant in Tier IIA of the Connecticut State Employees Retirement System.
The parties experienced problems from the beginning of their marriage. Both identified the stress associated with the defendant's employment as an undercover policeman as an initial source of their problems. The plaintiff describes her husband as verbally abusive, threatening and as an individual who often drank to excess and became belligerent when intoxicated. She notes that during the marriage her husband rented a room from a friend and had a relationship with another woman for an extended period of time despite promising, upon the relationship's discovery, that he would terminate it. The defendant describes the plaintiff's claims as fictionalized accounts exaggerated for effect. He believes that, while he was dedicated to the business at hand of raising three children and seeing to their education, the plaintiff failed to contribute meaningfully to their family; instead, he claims, she was self-absorbed in the selfish pursuit of her own interests to the detriment of her marriage and family. The defendant is an industrious man and a hard worker, at the same time, the defendant acknowledged at trial that he had an "emotional affair" with the other woman. Physical or not, his "affaires de coeur" was in every respect a multi-year affair, consisting of deception, betrayal and lies wholly inconsistent with his marriage.
After the relationship was initially discovered (and denied), and after the first dissolution action was withdrawn, the defendant represented that he was looking forward to living "happily ever after" with his wife.
Marital Property
The current marital estate is valued in excess of $2,373,515, including deferred assets in the amount of $1,134,890.
The total marital state excluding the plaintiff's trusts and inheritance is approximately $1,723,515.
The court finds that throughout the marriage, both parties made contributions to the acquisition, maintenance and preservation of the marital assets, including real estate, and that although the evidence supports a finding that the husband's economic contributions were greater than that of the wife, the court also finds that the wife made significant contributions to the husband's career goals and that the wife was the primary homemaker for the family and the primary parent for the children during the course of the marriage.
"There are three stages of analysis regarding the equitable distribution of each resource: first, whether the resource is property within the meaning of § 46b-81 (classification); second, what is the appropriate method for determining the value of the property (valuation); and third, what is the most equitable distribution of the property between the parties." Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 792-93, 663 A.2d 365 (1995). This court finds the following properties to be marital property subject to equitable distribution for the reasons discussed below.
The plaintiff owns five shares of stock in the N.H. Lyons Company with a value of $10,445, shares in Exxon Mobil with a value of $26,640 and has an investment account with Ingalls Snyder with a value of $116,524. She has no deferred compensation. She has two savings accounts and one checking account totaling $3,616. She operates a 2005 Ford Explorer with a value of $15,000, a loan balance of $9,800 and equity of $5,200.
The defendant has a Commonwealth Life Insurance Accident Compensation annuity with a present value of $140,338. His town of Wallingford disability pension discounted to present value is worth $864,472 and his state of Connecticut Tier IIA pension benefit discounted value is $84,618. He also has a state of Connecticut Deferred Compensation 457 Plan with a balance of $45,192. The defendant has four checking accounts totaling $2,700. He owns a Kubota tractor worth $5,500 and operates two 2007 Ford trucks, a F150 worth no more than its $24,000 loan balance and an Expedition worth $1,000.
Real Estate
The parties own three parcels of land: 1) the jointly owned marital residence at 489 Foothill Rd, Higganum, Connecticut, occupied by the husband, which has a value of $370,000, a mortgage of $40,000 and $330,000 in equity; 2) a 50 percent interest, titled in the plaintiff's name, in a lot adjacent to the family residence with a value of $70,000; and 3) a jointly owned residence on 6791 U.S. Rt. 1 in Sutton, Vermont with a value of $190,000, a mortgage of $175,000, and equity of $15,000.
The Plaintiff's Inheritance, Trusts and Expectancies
The plaintiff's father, Wesley Alexander Sr., died on October 20, 2007, forty-five days before the complaint in this matter was served. The estate of Wesley Alexander Sr., is currently being probated in Cheshire, Connecticut and in New York. The terms of the will require that all death taxes be payable by the probate estate as an expense of administration whether or not the taxes are attributable to the probate estate. Approximately 38 percent of the gross taxable estate of $10,100,000 consists of the assets of a trust created in 1987 by the decedent in which he retained a life estate, causing inclusion of the trust assets in his gross estate for federal and state death tax purposes. Accordingly, although the approximate gross value of the probate estate is $5.4 million, the probate estate is responsible for the expenses and taxes which are expected to be approximately $4,423,000. The plaintiff is a one-fourth beneficiary of the amount left, approximately $977,000 (probate estate after payment of all expenses and taxes). It is expected that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will audit the estate. It is unlikely the estate will be distributed in the near future. If the estate was distributed at this time the plaintiff would receive approximately $260,000. The administration of the estate, which is not controlled by the plaintiff, will incur additional expenses. The plaintiff indicates on her financial affidavit that she "believes it is reasonable to value [her] interest at $200,000."
The plaintiff also enjoys a vested interest in two trusts. She has a one-fourth interest in the Nathaniel Lyons Trust established by her great-grandfather who died on June 17, 1946. Ten percent of the great-grandfather's estate was held in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff's father. Her father's 10 percent will be divided among his four children. Accordingly, the plaintiff has a 2.5 percent interest in the whole. She has received some incremental distributions from this trust in the past. The trust consists of various parcels of real estate which are subject to adjustments for existing leases, the impact of the rent stabilization laws in New York, discounts for lack of marketability and minority interests, and other factors. The plaintiff values her interest on her financial affidavit at $350,000.
The plaintiff has an interest in the Gertrude Lyons trust named after her great-grandmother. Her father's death triggered a distribution to her of 2050 shares of IBM stock. After the payment of real estate taxes and living expenses, she converted the remaining IBM stock into an Ingalls Snyder investment account. The plaintiff represents on her financial affidavit that her remaining prorata share of assets, which has not yet been distributed, has a value of $100,000.
In 2008, the plaintiff paid $18,710 in property taxes utilizing proceeds from an inherited IRA.
Finally, the plaintiff is a one-fourth beneficiary of the income of the Wesley Alexander trust. The trust has historically been invested in assets such as real estate and produces $8,000 to $10,000 a year in income. She has received $2,000 to $2,500 per year from this trust. She has no legal interest to the trust principal. This trust is not part of the marital estate. See Tremaine v. Tremaine, 235 Conn 45, 65, 663 A.2d 387 (1995).
The parties are at odds over the value of the estate of Wesley Alexander and related trusts. The plaintiff represents on her financial affidavit that her interest in her father's estate is $200,000 and her interests in the two legal trusts are $450,000, for a total of $650,000. The defendant alleges his wife has failed to disclose income received during the course of this litigation from the various trusts and IRAs approaching $400,000 and believes she stands to inherit $1,700,000 from her father's estate. The plaintiff argues her husband should not be awarded any of the assets associated with her father's estate or any related trusts because their values are too speculative. Eslami v. Eslami, 218 Conn 801, 591 A.2d 411 (1991). In response, the defendant counters that his wife's interests are vested and marital assets; Krafick v. Krafick, supra, 234 Conn. 794; Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224, 228, 527 A.2d 1184 (1987); whose values are difficult to ascertain, solely because the plaintiff has refused to evaluate and disclose the true value of her inheritance. For this reason the defendant maintains that the best way of preventing protracted post-judgment litigation is to give the plaintiff her entire inheritance and give him the balance of the marital estate.
See the defendant's action, Odell v. Alexander, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven, Docket No. CV 08 4032949, (February 27, 2009, Cronan, J.) [ 47 Conn. L. Rptr. 300] In which his appeal of the Probate Court's decree, declaring that he lacked standing to challenge a sale of real property, was dismissed by the trial court.
Discussion
In Standish v. Standish, 40 Conn.App. 298, 670 A.2d 1330 (1996) the court held that the fact that property has not yet come into control of an individual does not make it a mere expectancy. A court must consider an inheritance by a party where the assets had vested, even if he had not yet received them, in the determination of alimony awards. Further, the Standish court discussed the definition of property for purposes of § 46b-81. In Krafick v. Krafick, supra, 234 Conn. 783, the court stated that "the term [property] is used to denote everything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal; everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate. It extends to every species of valuable right and interest . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 794. It is well established that in dividing the marital estate, the court must apply the principles of equitable distribution. Thus, irrespective of actual ownership of property, it is within the power of the court to "assign to either the husband or wife, all or any part of the estate of the other." General Statutes § 46b-81(a).
A number of cases have addressed the issue of what types of potential assets can be considered in entering property and/or alimony orders. In Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224, 527 A.2d 1184 (1987), the issue was whether an order for "the plaintiff husband to pay to the defendant wife a share of the assets he may acquire under his mother's will and on termination of a revocable inter vivos trust created by her" was proper. Id., 225. In ordering that the husband pay to the wife one-third of the net estate that he might receive either from the trust his mother had created or by way of inheritance from her was invalid, the court stated that such an interest was merely an expectancy and therefore could not be divided. "Expectancy is the bare hope of succession to the property of another, such as may be entertained by an heir apparent. Such a hope is inchoate. It has no attribute of property, and the interest to which it relates is at the time nonexistent and may never exist." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 229-30.
In Eslami v. Eslami, 218 Conn. 801, 591 A.2d 411 (1991), the issue was whether the failure to consider the wife's interest as a beneficiary of her father's estate, which estate had not been settled at the time of trial, was error. In affirming the trial court's decision, the Eslami court, citing Rubin v. Rubin, supra, 204 Conn. 232, held that "uncertainty as to the amount that [the wife] would eventually receive militated against consideration of that interest for the purpose of [estate division"]. Eslami v. Eslami, supra, 807.
On the other hand, Bartlett v. Bartlett, 220 Conn. 372, 373, 599 A.2d 14 (1991), considered the issue of whether a ruling by the trial court on a motion to modify a judgment of dissolution excluding evidence of an inheritance because the defendant had not yet received any assets from his mother's estate or from a trust from his mother's estate was proper. In overruling the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court held that proof of the vesting of the defendant's right to his inheritance was sufficient to support the motion to modify the award of periodic alimony. Id., 381-82. It did not matter that "the assets to which the defendant was entitled were temporarily held in a trust, pending settlement of his mother's estate. The trust was merely an administrative vehicle that could not alter in any way the defendant's right to his inheritance, which vested in him at the moment of his mother's death." Id., 380.
In Krafick v. Krafick, supra, the principal issue was whether vested pension benefits constitute property for the purposes of equitable distribution pursuant to § 46b-81. In holding that vested pension benefits constitute property for purposes of equitable distribution, the court stated: "The distribution of assets in a dissolution action is governed by § 46b-81, which provides in pertinent part that a trial court may `assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other . . .' In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party . . . shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the . . . dissolution of the marriage . . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates. This approach to property division is commonly referred to as an all-property equitable distribution scheme . . . It does not limit, either by timing or method of acquisition or by source of funds, the property subject to a trial court's broad allocative power." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 792.
"Interpreting the term property broadly is also consistent with the purpose of equitable distribution statutes generally. It is widely recognized that the primary aim of property distribution is to recognize that marriage is, among other things, a shared enterprise or joint undertaking in the nature of a partnership to which both spouses contribute-directly and indirectly, financially and non-financially the fruits of which are distributable at divorce." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 795.
"Classifying vested pension benefits as property does not run afoul of the limitation, recognized in the context of inheritance and trust interests, that § 46b-81 applies only to presently existing property interests, not mere expectancies . . . As we have stated, vested pension benefits represent an employee's right to receive payment in the future, subject ordinarily to his or her living until the age of retirement. The fact that a contractual right is contingent upon future events does not degrade that right to an expectancy." (Citations omitted; quotation marks omitted.) Id., 797.
As in Bartlett and Krafick, the present matter involves a vested interest in an inheritance and two trusts. This court concludes that it has the right to consider their value and income in the assignment of the entire marital estate and assign to the husband all or any part of the plaintiff's interests in her father's estate, the Nathaniel Lyons Trust and the Gertrude Lyons Trust. See also Sassy v. Sassy, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. FA 07 4027957 (May 29, 2009, Mackle, J.) (discussion on the division of trusts and inherited property).
ORDERS
Based on the foregoing, the court orders the following:
1. The marriage of the parties is dissolved on the basis of irretrievable breakdown.
2. All three pieces of real property owned by the parties (489 Foot Hills Road, Higganum, the adjacent lot, and 6791 Rt. 5, Sutton, Vermont) shall be immediately listed for sale at a fair and reasonable market price with a licensed real estate broker. In the event the parties cannot promptly agree on a price or on any other term for listing or on terms of any subsequent modification of those terms or an acceptance or counter offer to any offer received, either party may apply to the court for a resolution of the dispute, and the court shall retain continuing jurisdiction for the purpose. After payment of the mortgages, taxes and customary costs of sale, the remaining net proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties. Until such time as the properties are sold the defendant shall have exclusive use of the marital home, and shall keep the mortgage, taxes and utilities current on all the properties. Also, and until such time as the properties are sold, the plaintiff shall be given the use of the Vermont property on alternating weekends.
3. The defendant shall pay periodic alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $428 per week. Alimony shall terminate on the earliest of the following events: a) either partie's death, b) the remarriage of the plaintiff, or c) the defendant's retirement from his current employment with the state of Connecticut, with an election of survivor benefits accruing to the plaintiff. The Statutory provisions of Connecticut General Statutes Sections 46b-86(b) shall apply to the occasions of the plaintiff's cohabitation or living with another person. Alimony shall be non modifiable as to term.
4. Pursuant to § 46b-84(f), to enforce security for his alimony and/or support obligations hereunder, the husband shall maintain a life insurance policy with the collective face amount of $400,000 and shall name the wife beneficiary thereof for so long as he has an obligation to pay alimony under the terms of paragraph three of this order.
5. As additional alimony, each party shall pay one dollar per year alimony to the other. Alimony shall continue until the happening of the first of the following events: a) the death of either party; b) the obligee's cohabitation as defined by statute; or c) the remarriage of the obligee. Said Alimony is modifiable as to amount only.
6. The plaintiff shall be the sole owner of her interest in her father's estate, the Nathaniel Lyons Trust and the Gertrude Lyons Trust. The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant 50 percent of the first $300,000 of the assets or proceeds of any kind received from her father's estate, the Nathaniel Lyons Trust and/or the Gertrude Lyons Trust.
This court contemplates that the plaintiff will receive approximately $650,000 from her father's estate and trust. If she receives $300,000 or more, it is the intent of this provision that the defendant shall receive $150,000. On the other hand, if she receives $100,000, for example, it is the intention of this provision that the defendant receive $50,000.
7. The court enters the following orders, pursuant to § 46b-81, for the division of the defendant's pension benefits under the provisions of the Connecticut State Employees Retirement System (SERS): the plaintiff as Alternate Payee shall receive, by domestic relations order (DRO) and SERS, and the defendant is directed to pay benefits to the Alternate Payee as a marital property settlement under the following formula: 50 percent of the gross monthly benefit payable at the date of distribution to the defendant (Member). The amount payable to the plaintiff shall include a proportionate share of any cost-of-living adjustments (COLA's) payable to the defendant.
The court finds and orders that pursuant to § 46b-81 an award of 50 percent of the defendant's monthly retirement benefit entitles her to rights of joint survivors benefits, which are herewith ordered as hers, and the defendant is ordered to so continue that designation to her benefit. The defendant's retained right of designation of the alternate payee is limited by this order. The court has considered the possibility that if the defendant has remarried at the time of his retirement, his spouse could object to the designation of the plaintiff as an alternate payee, and, under the provisions of the plan, such objection would prevent the plan from permitting the plaintiff's designation as an alternate payee. See Order 3c.
The defendant shall not make any election to receive any lump sums from his pension plan, or to roll over sums from his pension plan into an individual retirement account. The court further orders that, in the event that the defendant predeceases the plaintiff, lump sum payments payable under the plan for the defendant's accumulated contributions and interest are ordered payable to the plaintiff.
The parties shall equally share the cost of preparing such order as is required under the defendant's SERS pension plan so as to effectuate the forgoing orders. This court will retain jurisdiction to amend this order only for the purpose of establishing or maintaining its validity and enforceability under the plan. Both parties and their counsel are ordered to sign all documents required to effectuate the forgoing orders.
8. The plaintiff shall receive 50 percent of the gross amount of the defendant's town of Wallingford disability pension plus any applicable future COLAs and other enhancements provided under the terms of the plan. The division of retirement assets shall be accomplished by a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) as necessary and the court shall maintain continuing jurisdiction over this order to implement the intent of this provision. The wife shall be the surviving spouse. The defendant shall pay 50 percent of disability pension proceeds received on a monthly basis until the plaintiff begins receiving her share of the pension directly from the administrator. The parties shall share equally the costs associated with effectuating said transfer. The court shall maintain continuing jurisdiction over this order.
9. The plaintiff shall receive 50 percent of her husband's 457k Plan valued as of the date of dissolution of the marriage. The division shall be accomplished by a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) as necessary. All interests, or investment gains and losses pertaining to the QDRO occurring after the date of dissolution, shall accrue to the recipient of that share. The court shall maintain continuing jurisdiction over this order.
10. The plaintiff shall be the sole owner of the 2005 Ford Explorer, the Connecticut State Credit Union savings account, People's Bank savings and checking accounts, the N.H. Lyons Company stock, the Exxon stock and the Ingalls Snyder Investment account.
11. The defendant shall be the sole owner of the 2007 Ford F 150, the Ford Expedition, the Kubota Tractor, the CNB savings and checking accounts, and the CSE savings and checking accounts.
12. Remaining personal property: Although Mrs. Odell has removed some household furniture to furnish her apartment, the parties have not yet divided all of their personal property. If they are unable to agree upon the distribution of their personal property, they shall exchange a list of the items that they desire. Those items on which they do not agree, shall be the subject of the mediation. The items on which they cannot agree, after the mediation, shall be distributed on an alternating basis. The Wife shall select the first item she desires, then the Husband shall select the item he desires. This alternating selection shall continue until all items in dispute have been distributed. This selection process shall occur no later than ninety days from the date of this decision. The husband and wife shall each retain his or her own clothing, jewelry and other personal effects, including items he or she may have received as gifts from the other party.
13. For so long as the parties have an alimony obligation to each other, the parties shall annually exchange their W-2s, 1099s, K-1s and returns by February 15 of each year, and, shall provide each other with their federal tax returns within five days of filing. The plaintiff shall disclose the receipt of any and all assets or proceeds of any kind from her father's estate, the Nathaniel Lyons Trust and the Gertrude Lyons Trust.
14. The parties shall be individually responsible for their own medical insurance.
15. The parties shall divide equally the 2008 federal and state income tax refund checks and the 2008 federal economic stimulus check.
16. Each party shall be responsible for their respective attorneys fees for to order otherwise would undermine these financial orders.
17. The parties shall be solely responsible for and hold the other harmless from the liabilities and debts shown on their respective financial affidavits.
18. Each party is ordered to sign whatever documents are necessary, and as presented to them by the other party, to effectuate these orders.
These orders are effective immediately.