Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-CV-3984.
October 13, 2004
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Presently before the Court is the Motion of Defendant Valley Forge Specialized Educational Services, d/b/a The Crossroads School, Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Motion to Dismiss") (Doc. No. 4). For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
This case involves a dispute between John J. O'Brien, III ("Mr. O'Brien") and Valley Forge Specialized Educational Services, d/b/a The Crossroads School ("Crossroads" or "Defendant"), over unpaid tuition. Mr. O'Brien enrolled his son, John J. O'Brien, IV ("J.J."), at Crossroads, a private primary school, for four years. (Am. Compl. ¶ 16.) Mr. O'Brien eventually became dissatisfied with J.J.'s academic performance at Crossroads, and enrolled J.J. in a public school for the 1999-2000 academic year. ( Id. ¶ 17.) After removing J.J. from Crossroads, Mr. O'Brien refused to pay part of J.J.'s tuition for his final year at Crossroads. ( Id.)
B. State Court Proceedings
Crossroads sued Mr. O'Brien and his wife for breach of contract in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, Pennsylvania for the unpaid tuition. ( Id. ¶ 18.) On June 22, 2003, after a bench trial, Judge Thomas G. Gavin ruled in Crossroads' favor, holding that the O'Briens had breached their contract with the school. Valley Forge Specialized Educ. Servs. v. O'Brien, No. 99-9565, slip op. at 1-2, 9 (Pa.Ct.Com.Pl. June 22, 2001). The court rejected the O'Briens' asserted defenses, finding that (1) the contract between the O'Briens and Crossroads was not invalid for failure of consideration, (2) Crossroads had not fraudulently induced the O'Briens to enter into the contract, and (3) Crossroads did not violate state statutes regarding the provision of visual and psychological services to students. Id. at 3-8. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Defendants for $15,134.00, the amount of the O'Briens' outstanding tuition payment.
At the conclusion of trial, the O'Briens also claimed that Defendant was guilty of spoliation of evidence "by failing to produce notebooks containing summaries of conversations between parents and teachers." Id. at 8. The trial court found that the O'Briens had failed to establish that the notebooks were relevant to their case or that Defendant's failure to produce them was prejudicial in any way, and declined to impose sanctions. Id. at 8-9.
The O'Briens filed post-trial motions, which the trial court failed to rule upon within 120 days. Valley Forge Specialized Educ. Servs. v. O'Brien, 828 A.2d 410 (Pa.Super.Ct. 2003) (table). On February 5, 2002, pursuant to Pa. R. Civ. P. 227.4(b), the county prothonotary entered judgment against the O'Briens. Id. The O'Briens then filed a notice of appeal with the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Id. Ultimately, this appeal was quashed. However, because the O'Briens failed to file a supersedeas bond under Pa. R. Civ. P. 3121(a)(2), Defendant proceeded to execute on its judgment. Id. On March 13, 2002, Defendant obtained and served three writs of attachment on bank accounts purportedly held by the O'Briens at First Union Bank ("First Union"). Id.
Pa. R. Civ. P. 227.4(b) allows a prothonotary to enter judgment upon a party's praecipe when the trial court has failed to rule on post-trial motions for 120 days.
The Superior Court quashed this appeal on September 10, 2002, finding that the O'Briens' "rambling" and "largely incomprehensible" arguments precluded meaningful appellate review. Valley Forge Specialized Educ. Servs. v. O'Brien, 823 A.2d 145 (Pa.Super.Ct. 2002) (table).
Pa. R. Civ. P. 3121(a) provides for a mandatory stay of execution of judgment in the following situations:
(1) upon written direction of the plaintiff to the sheriff
(2) upon the entry of bond with the prothonotary, by any person or party in interest, with security approved by the prothonotary, in the amount of plaintiff's judgment, including probable interests and costs, or in such lesser amount as the court may direct, naming the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as obligee, and conditioned to pay the amount due within ninety (90) days of the entry of bond . . .
(3) pending disposition of a third property claim filed by a third party
(4) upon a showing of exemption or immunity of property from execution;
(5) upon a showing of a right to stay under the provisions of an Act of Congress or any Act of assembly.
Pa. R. Civ. P. 3121(a).
On March 22, 2002, counsel for the O'Briens filed a motion with the trial court to vacate and set aside the attachments. (Doc. No. 5 Ex. E). They argued that the attachments were illegally placed on bank accounts held in trust for the O'Briens' children, and that the attachments also violated Pa. R. Civ. P. 3252 because Crossroads had not provided notice or a list of exceptions prior to execution. ( Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) On May 6, 2002, the trial court denied the motion, ruling that the attachments did not "violate any law or rule of court." (Doc. No. 4 Ex. C.) In its order, the court permitted the O'Briens to stay execution of the writ if they posted a bond in the amount of the judgment, plus interests and costs, pursuant to Pa. R. Civ. P. 3121. ( Id.) The O'Briens did not post the required bond, but they did file an appeal on May 14, 2002.
On March 25, 2003, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision and declined to vacate the attachments. Valley Forge Specialized Educ. Servs. v. O'Brien, 828 A.2d 410 (Pa.Super.Ct. 2003) (table). The court held that the O'Briens failed to establish any of the grounds available under Pa. R. Civ. P. 3121 for a mandatory stay of execution of judgment, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to grant a permissive stay during the appeal. Id. It also rejected the O'Briens' claim that inadequate notice had been provided under Pa. R. Civ. P. 3252, concluding that "since Appellants filed a motion to set aside execution, [they had] actually received notice that the funds were going to be attached." Id. Finally, the Superior Court declined to consider the O'Briens' constitutional challenge to Pa. R. Civ. P. 227.4(b) because the issue had not been raised at the trial court level. Id. The O'Briens then petitioned for a writ of allocatur to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which that court denied on October 27, 2003. Valley Forge Specialized Educ. Servs. v. O'Brien, 834 A.2d 1143 (Pa. 2003) (table).
There apparently has been other related litigation between the parties in Pennsylvania state courts, though the nature of that litigation is not clear from the parties' submissions. The O'Briens assert in their Amended Complaint that on Febrary 26, 2003, Judge S. Gerald Corso, Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County, ordered the consolidation and transfer of three cases involving the O'Briens, their children, and the Crossroads School to the Court of Common Pleas, Chester County, and that this transfer violated Pennsylvania's rules regarding venue. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12-13; see also id. Exs. C, D.) In light of our disposition of this matter, we need not consider these proceedings.
C. Federal Litigation
On July 3, 2003, Mr. O'Brien filed an action in this Court as trustee on behalf of his four minor children, John Joseph O'Brien, IV, Danielle O'Brien, Briana O'Brien, and Simone O'Brien (collectively "Plaintiffs"). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 4-5, 7-15.) Although Plaintiffs' Complaint is not a model of clarity, their primary claim appears to be that the attachment of the minor Plaintiffs' bank accounts without prior notice violated their Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Id. ¶¶ 1, 3-4.) Plaintiffs assert a number of state law grievances, alleging that: (1) Defendant failed to comply with state procedural rules, specifically, Pa. R. Civ. P. 3252, related to the execution of judgments ( id. ¶ 4); (2) Defendant failed to provide notice or a summary of exemptions prior to execution of the writs of attachment ( id. ¶ 5); (3) Defendant failed to deliver a proper interrogatory under Pa. R. Civ. P. 3253 to First Union Bank along with the writs ( id.); (4) the trial court wrongfully refused to vacate the writs of attachment executed against Plaintiffs ( id. ¶ 7); (5) Pa. R. Civ. P. 227.4 violates the Pennsylvania constitution ( id. ¶ 10-11); and (6) the trial court did not have proper jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs ( id. ¶ 7). As a remedy, Plaintiffs request that this Court set aside the attachment and levy of the bank accounts, that Defendant return Plaintiffs' assets, including all applicable interests, costs, and attorney's fees, and award recovery in the amount of $50,000 for past payment of tuition over the preceding four years. ( Id. ¶ 18.) On July 28, 2003, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, which added a claim for punitive damages against Defendant for deliberate wrongful conduct in seizing Plaintiffs' assets. ( Id.)
On August 5, 2003, Defendant moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 4.) Defendant argues that (1) Plaintiffs have failed to allege either a procedural or substantive Due Process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) Plaintiffs' claims violate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they seek to relitigate issues previously decided in state court. ( Id.) On December 3, 2003, we directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing on whether the doctrines of collateral estoppel or res judicata barred any or all of Plaintiffs' claims. (Doc. No. 6.) Both parties filed briefs, and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for consideration.
II. STANDARD
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we must "accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989). The court may dismiss a complaint only if "`it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'" H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989) (quoting Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)); see also Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . is limited to those instances where it is certain that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved."). When considering a motion to dismiss, we need not credit a plaintiff's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
"In determining whether a claim should be dismissed," a court generally "looks only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments without reference to other parts of the record." Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). The Third Circuit has recognized, however, that "`a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.'" Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch. Dist., 377 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002)). Additionally, "a court may consider an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Because the orders and opinions of the prior state court litigation are integral to Plaintiffs' claims in this case, we will consider these documents in evaluating Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
All of the relevant state court opinions, orders, and pleadings are attached either to the Amended Complaint or to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Rooker-Feldman
Defendant's first argument is that Plaintiffs' claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. No. 5.) They assert that because Plaintiffs' federal Due Process claim is "inextricably intertwined" with the prior state court litigation regarding the appropriate notice and procedure for attaching Plaintiffs' bank accounts, Rooker-Feldman prohibits relitigation of these issues in federal court. We agree.
1. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, developed through two Supreme Court cases decided nearly sixty years apart, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), precludes litigants from using the lower federal courts to appeal unfavorable decisions from the state court system. See Gulla v. N. Strabane Twp., 146 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[S]tate court litigants who have appealed an adverse judgment through the state system may seek review [only] in the United States Supreme Court; the lower federal courts may not sit in direct review of the decisions of a state tribunal."). The basis for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine lies in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which states in relevant part that "`final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court. . . .'" Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000)). Because Congress "has never conferred a similar power of review on the United States District Courts, the Supreme Court has inferred that Congress did not empower District Courts to review state court decisions." Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983)). Consequently, "[t]o ensure that Congress's intent to prevent the lower federal courts from sitting in direct review of the decisions of a state tribunal is given effect, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits District Courts from adjudicating actions in which the relief requested requires determining whether the state court's decision is wrong or voiding the state court's ruling." Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Specifically, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents a District Court from reviewing a claim in two circumstances. Id. First, a lower federal court is barred from reviewing claims that were "actually litigated" in state court. Id. Second, the court may not consider a claim that is "inextricably intertwined" with the prior state court action. Id. If the state court claims were either "actually litigated" or are "inextricably intertwined" with the current federal action, a District Court lacks jurisdiction over the federal claims, even if they were not previously raised in state court. Parkview Assocs. P'ship v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Adam McLain, Note, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Toward a Workable Role, 149 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1555, 1581 (2001) (" Rooker-Feldman, unlike res judicata, is a jurisdictional doctrine rather than an affirmative defense."). The Third Circuit has noted that "[o]rdinarily, it will be more difficult to demonstrate that a claim was `actually litigated' than to show that the federal claim is `inextricably intertwined' with the state court judgment. The former requires that the state court has considered and decided precisely the same claim that the plaintiff has presented in the federal court." ITT Corp. v. Intelnet Int'l Corp., 366 F.3d 205, 210-11 n. 8 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Desi's Pizza, Inc., 321 F.3d at 422).
2. Prior Decision on the Merits
As a threshold matter, for a state court's decision to be "inextricably intertwined" with the plaintiff's current federal claims, the state court decision must have been "on the merits." Id. at 212. An "`on the merits' adjudication" has traditionally been defined as one that "`passes directly on the substance of a particular claim.'" Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501-02 (2001) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19 cmt. a (1982)) (internal brackets omitted). Consequently, we must determine whether the state court decided on the substance of the O'Briens' claims. ITT Corp. 366 F.3d at 211-12.
In the state court litigation, Defendant sued the O'Briens in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County for unpaid tuition under a breach of contract theory. Valley Forge Specialized Educ. Servs., No. 99-9565, slip op. at 1-2. After the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs, Crossroads proceeded to execute on the judgments "against assets held by [the O'Briens] at First Union Bank." Valley Forge Specialized Educ. Servs., 828 A.2d 410, slip op. at 2 (table). In response, the O'Briens filed a motion to set aside the attachment of the bank accounts assets because Defendant's notice and levy and attachment allegedly were in violation of Pennsylvania law. (Am. Compl. Ex. A.) The Chester County Court of Common Pleas denied the motion after briefing and oral argument, holding that the O'Briens' claims were without merit because "they have failed to establish that the challenged attachment violated any law or rule of court." Valley Forge Specialized Educ. Servs. v. O'Brien, No. 99-9565 (Pa.Ct.Com.Pl. May 6, 2002) (order denying motion to vacate and set aside attachment). The O'Briens appealed this decision to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, asserting that the execution of the writs should have been stayed because notice was improper and the writs illegally attached the O'Briens' children's bank accounts. Valley Forge Specialized Educ. Servs., 828 A.2d 410, slip op. at 2 (table). The Superior Court denied the appeal, holding that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to stay the execution of the attachments under Pa. R. Civ. P. 3121 ( id. slip op. at 3-6), (2) the O'Briens "actually received notice that the funds were going to be attached" ( id. slip op. at 6), and (3) the O'Briens failed to satisfy their burden to demonstrate that the notice was improper or inadequate under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure ( id.).
Based on this record, we conclude that the trial court and the Superior Court resolved the state court claims on the merits. The trial court concluded after briefing and argument that the motion to vacate was without legal merit, holding that the execution of the writs of attachment did not "violate any law or rule of court. Valley Forge Specialized Educ. Servs., No. 99-9565 (order denying motion to vacate and set aside attachment). Likewise, the Superior Court rejected the O'Briens' argument that Defendant had not provided adequate notice, finding that the O'Briens had received actual notice prior to execution and that the notice did not violate Pennsylvania's rules of civil procedure.
3. State Court Decision "Inextricably Intertwined" With the Present Litigation
We must now determine whether Plaintiffs' current action is "inextricably intertwined" with the state court litigation. A claim is inextricably intertwined when, in order to grant relief, the federal court would have to (1) "`determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered'" or (2) "`take action that would render the state court's judgment ineffectual.'" Desi's Pizza, Inc., 321 F.3d at 420 (quoting FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996)) (brackets omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs' sole federal claim is that Defendant's execution of the writ of attachment violated Plaintiffs' Due Process rights. (Am. Compl. ¶ 1.) To determine this issue, we first would have to determine whether Defendant had afforded Plaintiffs adequate procedural protections to protect against a mistaken deprivation of their property. See N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 605-06, 609 (1975) (holding the garnishment of a bank account unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause for failure to provide prior notice or a hearing); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n. 21 (1972) (noting that under the Due Process Clause, " some form of notice and hearing — formal or informal — is required before deprivation of a property interest"); Snidach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969) (holding that notice and a prior hearing were required under the Due Process Clause before garnishing an individual's wages); see also United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) ("The right to prior notice and a hearing is central to the Constitution's command of due process."). A ruling in Plaintiffs' favor would necessarily require this Court to declare the Chester County Court of Common Pleas and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania erred in holding that notice was procedurally proper. A decision for the Plaintiffs would also require us to "render the state court's judgment ineffectual" by vacating the attachments against Plaintiffs' bank accounts and order the restoration of all funds taken from them. Thus, we conclude that Plaintiffs' due process claim is "inextricably intertwined" with the O'Briens' state court claims.
4. Privity
In response to Defendant's Rooker-Feldman claim, Plaintiffs argues that because the O'Brien children were not parties to the state court action, they cannot be precluded from bringing a separate due process claim in federal court. (Doc. No. 5.) The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, binds not only the parties to the state court suit, but also their privities. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 364 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 2004); see also ITT Corp., 366 F.3d at 216 ("[C]laims and issues decided against an entity bind also its parties in privity for Rooker-Feldman purposes.").
Privity "refers to a cluster of relationships . . . under which the preclusive effects of a judgment extend beyond a party to the original action and apply to persons having specified relationships to that party." Restatement (Second) of Judgments, ch. 1 (1982). Pennsylvania courts have defined parties in privity as those that have "mutual or successive relationships to the same right of property," or have "such an identification of interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal right." Ammon v. McCloskey, 655 A.2d 549, 554 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1995); see also Bergdoll v. Commonwealth, No. 706 M.D. 2003, 2004 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 698, at *23 n. 4 (Pa.Commw. Ct. Sept. 16, 2004). The Third Circuit has described privity as "`a word used to say that the relationship between one who is a party on the record and another is close enough to include that other within the [scope of] res judicata.'" EEOC v. United States Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 493 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3d Cir. 1950)); see also First Options v. Kaplan, 913 F. Supp. 377, 384 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("The Third Circuit has long recognized that privity is a legal conclusion; the privity inquiry should be flexible enough to acknowledge the realities of parties' relationships.")
Because "Pennsylvania privity law is . . . consistent with our federal privity law," Hitchens v. County of Montgomery, No. 03-1858, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 8231, at *16 n. 6 (3d Cir. Apr. 26, 2004), we use both interchangeably in our analysis, and conclude that the result would be the same regardless of which law we applied. See First Options v. Kaplan, 913 F. Supp. 377, 384 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding that privity existed under both Pennsylvania and federal law).
We conclude that Plaintiffs are in privity with the state court litigants. "One relationship long held to fall within the concept of privity is that between a nonparty and party who acts as the nonparty's representative." United States Steel Corp., 921 F.2d at 493 (citing Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n. 2 (1989)); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 41(d) (1982) ("A legal representative is found where a party is. . . . [t]he executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, or similar fiduciary manager of an interest of which the person is a beneficiary."). The legal relationship necessary for a finding of privity can be either "an express or an implied relationship," Pony Express Records, Inc. v. Springsteen, 163 F. Supp. 2d. 465, 474 (D.N.J. 2001), and may include a "virtual representative of the non-party." Collins, 34 F.3d at 176. Mr. O'Brien has acted as his children's representatives in both the state court action and in this case, defending their property interests in their bank accounts. In the state court action, Mr. O'Brien acted as the legal representative of his children's interests, filing motions on their behalf to vacate the attachments on their bank accounts. (Am. Compl. Ex. A.) Mr. O'Brien then pursued this issue on appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, where he again argued that the attachment on his children's bank accounts should be set aside. Valley Forge Specialized Educ. Servs., 828 A.2d 410, slip op. at 2-3 (table). In this action, Mr. O'Brien is explicitly acting as trustee on behalf of his children to recover the funds taken from their accounts. (Doc. Nos. 1, 3, 5.) Therefore, we conclude that Plaintiffs are in privity with the state court defendants.
B. Res Judicata
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant did not discuss any grounds other than Rooker-Feldman that might warrant dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Defendant's Motion did note, however, that Plaintiffs' claims had been previously litigated in Pennsylvania state courts, and that "those cases have been concluded unfavorably for Plaintiffs." (Doc. No. 4 at 2-3.) Because "[t]he benefits of precluding relitigation of issues finally decided run not only to the litigants, but also to the judicial system," Studio Art Theater of Evansville, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 76 F.3d 128, 130 (7th Cir. 1996), we ordered supplemental briefing on whether the issues of collateral estoppel or res judicata would bar any or all of Plaintiffs' claims in this case. (Doc. No. 6.) Both Plaintiffs and Defendants submitted supplemental briefs (Docs. No. 7, 8), and we conclude that Plaintiffs' claims are also barred under the doctrine of res judicata.
Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, "`is a doctrine by which a former adjudication bars a later action on all or part of the claim which was the subject of the first action.'" R/S Fin. Corp. v. Kovalchick, 716 A.2d 1228, 1230 (Pa. 1998) (quoting Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d 309, 313 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1995)). However, "`[r]es judicata applies not only to claims actually litigated, but also to claims which could have been litigated during the first proceeding if they were part of the same cause of action.'" Id. (quoting Balent, 669 A.2d at 313) (emphasis added); see also 18 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 131.10 (3d ed. 2000) ("A claim, for purposes of claim preclusion, includes not only those matters actually addressed by the prior judgment, but those matters which could have been raised in that action. . . . Thus, matters that arise from the same facts, occurrence, or transactions that were the basis of a prior action may be within the scope of claim preclusion by that action."). If res judicata applies, "`[a]ny final, valid judgment on the merits . . . precludes any future suit between the parties or their privies on the same cause of action.'" R/S Fin. Corp., 716 A.2d at 1230 (quoting Balent, 669 A.2d at 313).
"The preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a subsequent federal lawsuit generally is determined by the full faith and credit statute, which provides that state judicial proceedings `shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they are taken.'" Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000)). Because the prior litigation occurred in the Pennsylvania state courts, we will apply Pennsylvania law to determine whether res judicata precludes Plaintiffs' suit in this Court. See, e.g., Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dep't, 91 F.3d 451, 461 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying Pennsylvania's res judicata standard); Allegheny Int'l v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 40 F.3d 1416, 1429 (3d Cir. 1994) (same).
"Under Pennsylvania law, the doctrine of res judicata holds that `a final valid judgment upon the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction bars any future suit between the parties or their privies, on the same cause of action.'" Allegheny Int'l, 40 F.3d at 1429 (quoting Keystone Bldg. Corp. v. Lincoln Sav. Loan Ass'n, 360 A.2d 191, 194 (Pa. 1976)). Res judicata applies when there is (1) identity of issues, (2) identity of causes of action, (3) identity of persons and parties to the action, and (4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or being sued in the two cases. In re Iulo, 766 A.2d 355, 337 (Pa. 2001) (citing Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 345 A.2d 664, 668 (Pa. 1975)); see also Allegheny Int'l, 40 F.3d at 1429 (same). "Although consistent in demanding satisfaction of these four criteria, the [Pennsylvania] courts have avoided mere technical adherence to mechanical principles." Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 116 (3d Cir. 1988). Notably, a claim that res judicata applies "will `not be defeated by minor differences of form, parties or allegations' where the `controlling issues have been resolved in a prior proceeding in which the present parties had an opportunity to appear and assert their rights.'" Jett v. Beech Interplex, Inc., No. 02-9131, 2004 WL 1588230, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2004) (quoting Helmig v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 131 A.2d 622, 627 (Pa. 1957)).
1. Identity of Issues
The first factor to consider is the identity of issues raised in the cases. Gregory, 843 F.2d at 116 (citing Duquesne Slag Prods. Co. v. Lench, 415 A.2d 53, 56 (1980)). When the "same occurrence underlies both suits," this requirement is met. Id. Here, the operative facts and the subject matter of the action — the validity of the execution of the writs of attachment — are identical to the prior state court proceedings.
2. Identity of Causes of Action
The second element is the likeness of the causes of actions in the state and federal proceedings. This factor does not require the claims in the cases to be identical; rather, "`identity of causes of action exist when, in both the prior and the subsequent proceedings the subject matter and the ultimate issues are the same. . . .'" Jett, 2004 WL 1588230, at *3 (quoting Patel v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 488 A.2d 1177, 1179 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 1985)); see also Gregory, 843 F.2d at 117 ("`A single cause of action may comprise claims under a number of different statutory and common law grounds.'" (quoting Davis v. U.S. Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1980))). Factors that the Third Circuit has held are relevant to this determination are: "`(1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for relief are the same . . .; (2) whether the theory of recovery is the same; (3) whether the witnesses and documents necessary at trial are the same . . .; and (4) whether the material facts alleged are the same.'" O'Leary v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1062 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984)). Here, factors (1), (3) and (4) are identical to the state court litigation. The only difference is that Plaintiffs appear to have simply tacked a procedural Due Process label on to their plethora of state law procedural challenges to the execution of the writs of attachment. Because this issue is closely related to — in fact, we found it to be "inextricably intertwined" with — Plaintiffs' state court litigation regarding notice, it should have been litigated in the state court action. See Patel, 488 A.2d at 1179 ("`Res judicata applies not only to matters which were actually litigated, but also to those matters which should have been litigated.'" (quoting Armco Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 431 A.2d 363, 365 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 1981))). Consequently, we find that this factor is also satisfied.
3. Identity of the Parties
The third factor is whether there is "identity of the parties" between the two suits. Under Pennsylvania law, identity exists when parties involved in the prior action are in privity with parties in the current litigation. See Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 464 A.2d 1313, 1317 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1983) ("`The doctrine of res judicata applies to and is binding, not only on actual parties to the litigation, but also to those who are in privity with them. A final valid judgment upon the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction bars any future suit between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action.'" (quoting Stevenson v. Silverman, 208 A.2d 786, 788 (Pa. 1965)); see also Jett, 2004 WL 1588230, at *4; Yates v. City of Philadelphia, No. 89-7884, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13075, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1991). As described above, because plaintiffs in the state court action (the O'Briens) acted as the de facto legal representatives of Plaintiffs in this case, privity exists between the parties.
4. Identity of Capacity of the Parties
The final factor is whether the parties in the two actions are suing, or being sued, in the same capacity. The only difference in capacities here is that Mr. O'Brien, who was a defendant in the state court action, is acting as the legal representative and trustee on behalf of his minor children. Because privity exists between these parties, as described above, the capacity of the parties is similar enough to satisfy this requirement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide Plaintiffs' claims under Rooker-Feldman, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint will be dismissed. In addition, based on the doctrine of res judicata, Plaintiffs are prohibited from continuing with the current lawsuit. Under the circumstances, we will grant Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss on all claims.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of October, 2004, upon consideration of the Motion of Defendant Valley Forge Specialized Educational Services d/b/a The Crossroads School Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. No. 4), and all papers filed in support thereof and opposition thereto, it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is DISMISSED.IT IS SO ORDERED.