Summary
In O'Brien, the Fourth Department affirmed the dismissal of an RPTL article 7 proceeding which was returnable after the 90-day period specified in RPTL 704 (1). This was a second application for review, the first timely petition having been dismissed without any appeal. These facts distinguish O'Brien from the instant cases, in which the only notices of petition specified return dates within the statutory time period.
Summary of this case from Caldor v. Bd. of AssessorsOpinion
May 14, 1976
Appeal from the Jefferson Supreme Court.
Present — Cardamone, J.P., Simons, Mahoney, Dillon and Witmer, JJ.
Order unanimously affirmed, without costs. Memorandum: Special Term's order dismissing appellant's petition in a proceeding under article 7 of the Real Property Tax Law for judicial review of respondent's assessment of appellant's real property was in all respects proper. Although appellant's proceeding was timely commenced within the requisite period provided under subdivision 2 of section 702 Real Prop. Tax of the Real Property Tax Law, and, initially, timely returnable as required under subdivision 1 of section 704 of said law, appellant's failure to pursue by appeal Special Term's May 15, 1972 disposition in declining to entertain the instant proceeding for reasons then stated, has resulted in the loss of viability of appellant's proceeding. Appellant's instant application, being made in excess of the maximum 90-day period prescribed by subdivision 1 of section 704 Real Prop. Tax of the Real Property Tax Law, statutorily mandates dismissal of the proceeding. Considering the nature of the proceeding and the procedural requirements specified in sections 702 Real Prop. Tax and 704 Real Prop. Tax of the Real Property Tax Law, strict conformity and compliance therewith is required (People ex rel. Soeurbee, Inc. v Purdy, 179 App. Div. 748, 751, affd 222 N.Y. 657; Matter of Petley v Hall, 48 Misc.2d 807, 811).