Opinion
No. 7:02-CV-227-R
October 16, 2002
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This is a petition for habeas corpus relief brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by an inmate confined in the Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Iowa Park, Texas. Petitioner seeks to challenge the validity of prison disciplinary action no. 20020300574 brought against him at the Alfred Unit on July 29, 2002. Petition ¶ 17. As a result of the disciplinary action, Petitioner lost 30 days of good time credits. Id. ¶ 18. In his sole ground for habeas relief, Obadele claims that he was denied due process of law because he was charged with failure to obey an order to stop talking that was given by an officer who had no authority to give such an order. Id. ¶ 20.A. Obadele argues that the order for him to stop talking was unlawful and violated his First Amendment right to free speech. Id.
The due process rights of prisoners are generally limited to freedom of restraint which "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995). Restrictions which alter the conditions of confinement do not implicate due process. See Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 958 (5th Cir. 2000) (commissary and cell restrictions); Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997) (same). A prisoner has a protected liberty interest in the loss of accrued good time only if he is eligible for release to mandatory supervision. Malchi, 211 F.3d at 957-58; see also Creel v. Keene, 928 F.2d 707, 712 (5th Cir.) (finding that Texas prisoners have no protected liberty interest in early release on parole), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1210, 111 S.Ct. 2809 (1991). Obadele claims that lie is a candidate for mandatory supervised release. Petition ¶ 16.
When a prisoner has a protected liberty interest in the loss of accrued good time credit, the revocation of such credit must comply with minimal procedural due process. Henson v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 213 F.3d 897, 898 (5th Cir. 2000); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975 (1974) (holding that prisoners are entitled to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated". These minimal requirements are: (1) written notice of the alleged disciplinary violation at least 24 hours prior to a hearing; (2) the ability to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when not unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (3) a written statement of the hearing officer as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for any disciplinary action taken. Wolff 418 U.S. at 564-66, 94 S.Ct. at 2979. Federal habeas review of the sufficiency of the evidence is extremely limited. Due process requires only "some evidence to support the endings made in the disciplinary hearing." Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2775 (1985); see Smith v. Rabalais, 659 F.2d 539, 545 (5th Cir. 1981) (requiring the court to determine whether "any evidence at all" supports disciplinary action taken by prison officials), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 992, 102 S.Ct. 1619 (1982).
In the case at bar, Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable ground for relief: Obadele complains that his failure to obey an order was not an offense for which he could be disciplined because the order was invalid. This fact, taken as true, does not state a cognizable ground for habeas relief: Petitioner does not allege improper notice or an inability to call witnesses or present evidence. He does not allege the lack of a written statement regarding evidence considered and reasons for punishment and lie does not allege insufficient evidence. All Obadele has presented is an excuse for his violation of the prison disciplinary rules.
When an inmate challenges a prison disciplinary conviction on the basis that he had a good, although unsuccessful defense, no ground for federal habeas relief is presented. "[This] court is not required to examine the entire record, make an independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weigh evidence." Hudson v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2001) (Pogue, J., specially concurring). Federal courts hold no appellate authority over prison disciplinary proceedings and may intervene only to correct errors of constitutional magnitude. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221, 102 S.Ct. 940, 948 (1982). Federal courts "do not sit as a `super' state supreme court in a habeas corpus proceeding to review errors under state law." Cronnon v. State of Alabama, 587 E.2d 246, 250 (5th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974, 99 S.Ct. 1542 (1979). Absent a claim that he has been deprived of some right secured to him by the United States Constitution, laws or treaties, Obadele is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. See Thomas v. Torres, 717 F.2d 248, 249 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1010, 104 S.Ct. 1008 (1984). Where it plainly appears from the face of a petition that the applicant is not entitled to relief, the case should be summarily dismissed. Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED and DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.
A copy of this order shall be transmitted to Petitioner.