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Oates v. Dreamworks Animation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA SPARTANBURG DIVISION
Sep 23, 2020
No. 7:20-cv-02895-HMH-JDA (D.S.C. Sep. 23, 2020)

Opinion

No. 7:20-cv-02895-HMH-JDA

09-23-2020

Frances H. Oates, Plaintiff, v. Dreamworks Animation, Defendant.


REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Frances H. Oates ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, files this action against Dreamworks Animation ("Defendant"), purportedly for copyright infringement. Plaintiff files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on August 10, 2020. [Doc. 1-3.] Plaintiff sues a single Defendant in this action, Dreamworks Animation. [Id. at 1.]

The undersigned notes that Plaintiff has filed two nearly identical Complaints. The only discernable difference between the two Complaints appears to be that the second Complaint includes Plaintiff's signature and her request for relief, which the first Complaint appears to have omitted. [Compare Doc. 1 with Doc. 1-3.] As such, the Court will refer to the allegations contained in the Complaint filed at Doc. 1-3. The undersigned further notes that Plaintiff has filed numerous other documents in this case, many of which make repetitive assertions as those in the documents noted above. The Court has carefully reviewed each document submitted by Plaintiff in its review of this case.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has willfully infringed on her copyrighted book, entitled Luwee's Adventures, for profit without her permission. [Id. at 2.] Plaintiff contends that Defendant's copyright infringement is best demonstrated in the January 2019 DVD release of How to Train Your Dragon: 3-Movie Collection and How to Train Your Dragon: the Short Film Collection. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in copyright infringement by releasing numerous other movies and television series, video games, short films, print publications, and comics, as well as merchandise and theme park attractions. [Id.]

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant used her book as a blueprint, copying her pictures to be used in its How to Train Your Dragon franchise. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff contends that her "Intangible Rights" include her exclusive right to develop, market, create derivative works, reproduce, and display. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that, due to the infringements, Defendant is liable for financial damages, including royalties, and injunctive relief. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that she can "show without a doubt through the use of pictures from [her] book and pictures from their book that they continuously infringed [her] book." [Id.]

Plaintiff contends that her claims are within the statute of limitations under the separate accrual rule, which she claims provides a new three-year limitations period each time an infringement occurs. [Id.] According to Plaintiff, the latest release of How to Train Your Dragon in January 2019 should determine the start date of the applicable statute of limitations. [Id.]

Plaintiff seeks royalties from the How to Train Your Dragon franchise because her book, Luwee's Adventures, "was written, created, and animated by [Plaintiff]" for her children. [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff alleges that all the work that she did, which should have benefitted her and her children, "has instead benefited a large company that willfully, possibly maliciously, continuously for profit infringed [her] book for their profit depriving [Plaintiff] of the right to the American Dream." [Id.] For her relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages in the amount of $10 million. [Id. at 4.]

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Additionally, the Complaint is subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that a plaintiff has standing, that subject matter jurisdiction exists, and that a case is not frivolous. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) ("Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a 'frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision."); Mills v. Greenville Cty., 586 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487 (D.S.C. 2008); Cornelius v. Howell, No. 3:06-cv-3387-MBS-BM, 2007 WL 397449, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2007) (noting that the payment of the full filing fee does not excuse the court from determining sua sponte that there is a valid basis for jurisdiction), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2007 WL 4952430 (D.S.C. Jan. 30, 2007).

Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, her pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which a plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite the pleadings to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct a plaintiff's legal arguments for her, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove her case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011) (holding that a plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). "A claim has 'facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).

Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint for relief must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). "And, although the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) are very liberal, more detail often is required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant." Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff appears to argue that Defendant copied certain elements of her book, Luwee's Adventures, in violation of her copyright, and used those elements in its film, How to Train Your Dragon. Despite Plaintiff's allegations, however, this action is subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief that is plausible.

The Copyright Act grants copyright protection to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). To state a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must allege facts establishing two elements: (1) that she owned the copyright to the work that was allegedly copied; and (2) that the defendant copied protected elements of the work. See Green v. West, No. 2:19-cv-00366-RMG, 2020 WL 473638, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 17, 2020); Secret of the Islands, Inc. v. Hymans Seafood Co. Inc., No. 2-17-cv-00342, 2018 WL 1566706, at *7 (D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2018). Further, "[a] copyright registration is essential to assert a prima facie copyright infringement claim." Green, 2020 WL 473638, at *3.

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that she owns a copyright to her work, Luwee's Adventures, and she has attached to her Complaint a copy of her copyright registration. [Doc. 1-1 at 1.] Plaintiff's copyright was registered on July 8, 2019, at registration number TX0008768814. [Id.] However, although Plaintiff has alleged facts showing that she has a valid copyright for her work, she has not alleged facts plausibly showing Defendant copied protected elements of her work.

Critically, Defendant's work was created and copyrighted before Plaintiff created and copyrighted her work. According to the online records of the United States Copyright Office, Defendant filed a preregistration for copyright on September 17, 2008, for its motion picture, How to Train Your Dragon, at preregistration number PRE000001626. See https://cocatalog.loc.gov (search by Registration Number "PRE000001626") (last visited Sept. 7, 2020); see also Bates v. Vandroff, No. 4:17-cv-00361-RBH, 2017 WL 2734264, at *2 n.6 (D.S.C. June 26, 2017) (noting courts may take judicial notice of true and correct copies of the Copyright Office's online record of registration). Defendant then registered a copyright for the completed motion picture, How to Train Your Dragon, on March 26, 2010, at registration number PA0001754422, with a 2010 creation date and March 26, 2010, publication date. See http://cocatalog.loc.gov (search by Registration Number "PA0001754422") (last visited Sept. 7, 2020). The fact that Defendant produced its motion picture, How to Train Your Dragon, and registered a copyright for that work before Plaintiff registered a copyright for her work, Luwee's Adventure, shows as a matter of law that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie claim for copyright infringement. Because Plaintiff's copyright was registered after Defendant's work was created and copyrighted, she cannot plausibly show that Defendant copied protected elements of her work.

Further, the Complaint provides insufficient factual allegations to allege that Defendant made an unauthorized copy of protected material. See Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 513 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that to show copyright infringement, a plaintiff "must establish that the defendant engaged in unauthorized copying of the work protected by the copyright"). Plaintiff's sole allegation of copyright infringement appears to be an assertion that Defendant's entire How to Train Your Dragon franchise used her work, Luwee's Adventures, as a blueprint. [Doc. 1-3 at 2-3.] This conclusory allegation, however, fails to demonstrate copyright infringement by the named Defendant, and Plaintiff's claims under the Copyright Act are therefore subject to summary dismissal on this basis as well. See, e.g., Todd v. Graham, No. 3:15-cv-283-MBS-PJG, 2015 WL 11109873, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2015), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2015 WL 11109874 (D.S.C. Mar. 20, 2015); Moore v. Lightstorm Entm't, 992 F. Supp. 2d 543, 550 (D. Md. 2014) (noting that speculation and conjecture are insufficient to establish the elements of copyright infringement).

"A plaintiff can raise a presumption of copying if it shows that the Defendant (1) had access to [her] copyrighted work; and (2) the copyrighted work and the copied work look substantially similar." Southgate v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-648-AJT-IDD, 2017 WL 6759867, at *2 (E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2017), aff'd, 714 F. App'x 301 (4th Cir. 2018). Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that Defendant had access to her work. See Home Design Servs., Inc. v. J.F. Schoch Bldg. Corp., No. 2:11-cv-574, 2012 WL 442008, at *3 (E.D. Va. Feb. 10, 2012) ("Plaintiff's Complaint must also plead that Defendants had access to the copyrighted works."). "Access [is] an indispensable part of a copyright infringement claim." Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens, Inc., 241 F.3d 350, 356 (4th Cir. 2001). "A plaintiff can make the requisite showing of access either by direct evidence that the defendant had the opportunity to view or study the protected works or by showing that the plaintiff's and defendant's works are so strikingly similar that there is no reasonable probability that they were independently created." Home Design Servs., 2012 WL 442008, at *3. "Determining 'substantial similarity' involves an analysis of extrinsic and intrinsic similarity." Devil's Advocate, LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 666 F. App'x 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting "a district court may properly dismiss a copyright claim in the absence of substantial similarity"). "To satisfy the objective 'extrinsic' similarity prong, the plaintiff must show that the works share 'substantially similar' ideas . . . [and] a court looks at the works in their entirety, searching broadly for similarities in elements of the work, including plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, and sequence." Levi v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., No. 3:16-cv-129, 2018 WL 1542239, at *4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 29, 2018) (citations omitted). "To satisfy the subjective 'intrinsic' portion of the test, the plaintiff must show that the works are substantially similar in 'the expression of [the] ideas' identified in the first, objective prong." Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

Although Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant had access to her copyrighted book, she appears to assert that her book and Defendant's motion picture are substantially similar. Specifically, Plaintiff has provided a number of pictures from her book and a number of pictures from Defendant's motion picture. [Doc. 1-1 at 2-9.] However, Plaintiff has not identified any similarities in her Complaint, and the Court is unable to glean any similarity from its review of the provided photographs. Further, there is no indication whatsoever that the key elements of the works are similar, including plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, and sequence. In sum, Plaintiff does not plead facts plausibly demonstrating that How to Train Your Dragon is substantially similar to Luwee's Adventures.

For these reasons, this action is subject to summary dismissal, as Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to state a claim for copyright infringement.

RECOMMENDATION

In light of the forgoing, the undersigned recommends that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process.

The undersigned notes that any attempt to cure the deficiencies in the Complaint would be futile for the reasons stated herein. In light of the allegations in the Complaint, the undersigned finds that no set of facts can support Plaintiff's asserted claim for relief. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the District Court dismiss this action without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her Complaint.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin

United States Magistrate Judge September 23, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina

Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk

United States District Court

300 East Washington Street, Room 239

Greenville, South Carolina 29601

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).


Summaries of

Oates v. Dreamworks Animation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA SPARTANBURG DIVISION
Sep 23, 2020
No. 7:20-cv-02895-HMH-JDA (D.S.C. Sep. 23, 2020)
Case details for

Oates v. Dreamworks Animation

Case Details

Full title:Frances H. Oates, Plaintiff, v. Dreamworks Animation, Defendant.

Court:UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA SPARTANBURG DIVISION

Date published: Sep 23, 2020

Citations

No. 7:20-cv-02895-HMH-JDA (D.S.C. Sep. 23, 2020)