Opinion
CV 122-100
08-03-2022
TITA H. NWANNA, Plaintiff, v. CHAUNCEY TOWING, Defendant.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BRIAN K EPPS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in the above-captioned case. Because she is proceeding IFP, Plaintiff's complaint must be screened to protect potential defendants. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
I. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT
A. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff names Chauncey Towing as the sole Defendant. (Doc. no. 1, pp. 1-2.) Plaintiff is a Georgia resident and lists a Georgia address for Defendant. (Id.) Taking all of Plaintiff's factual allegations as true, as the Court must for purposes of the present screening, the facts are as follows.
Defendant illegally removed cars and trucks, along with property therein, from Plaintiff s private property. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff seeks the return of the vehicles and property, along with $100,000 in damages for her pain and suffering. Plaintiff provides no other information about the circumstances of the removal of her vehicles.
B. DISCUSSION
1. Legal Standard for Screening
The complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc., 366 Fed.Appx. 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)).
To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the allegations in the complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint is insufficient if it “offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,'” or if it “tenders ‘naked assertions' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In short, the complaint must provide a “‘plain statement' possessing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
Finally, the court affords a liberal construction to a pro se litigant's pleadings, holding them to a more lenient standard than those drafted by an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, this liberal construction does not mean that the court has a duty to re-write the complaint. See Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020); Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
2. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction
“[B]ecause a federal court is powerless to act beyond its statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction, a court must zealously insure that jurisdiction exists over a case, and should itself raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction at any point in the litigation where a doubt about jurisdiction arises.” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001). Federal courts must always dismiss cases upon determining that they lack subject matter jurisdiction, regardless of the stage of the proceedings. Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1331 n.6 (11th Cir. 2001). To invoke the jurisdiction of the Court, a plaintiff must properly “allege the jurisdictional facts, according to the nature of the case.” McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182 (1936).
“A federal district court must have at least one of three types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction under a specific statutory grant; (2) federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity jurisdiction exists where the suit is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that their cause lies within this limited grant of jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
Plaintiff left the complaint form blank under the section titled “Basis for Jurisdiction.” (Doc. no. 1, pp. 3-4.) Upon examination, the complaint is devoid of any federal claim or cause of action and appears instead to be an attempt to bring a state law claim for the tort of conversion for which there is no federal jurisdiction.
“Conversion consists of unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over personal property belonging to another, in hostility to [her] rights; an act of dominion over the personal property of another inconsistent with [her] rights; or an unauthorized appropriation.” Corbin v. Regions Bank, 574 S.E.2d 616, 621 (Ga.Ct.App. 2002) (citations omitted).
Nor has Plaintiff plead the facts necessary for diversity jurisdiction, which, as explained above, requires diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. While a federal court could have diversity jurisdiction over a state law claim, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts sufficient to establish such jurisdiction. Based on the information in the complaint, Plaintiff, a Georgia resident, is not completely diverse from Defendant, as Plaintiff provides a Georgia address for Defendant. See Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity between named plaintiffs and defendants. For purposes of determining diversity, a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.” (citations omitted)). Thus, the complaint should be dismissed.
Plaintiff also does not appear to carry her pleading burden regarding the amount in controversy, as she provides no information about the value of the vehicles or property taken. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinnon Motors, LLC, 329 F.3d 805, 807 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining where jurisdiction is based on claim for indeterminate damages, party seeking to invoke jurisdiction must show claim meets jurisdictional minimum by preponderance of the evidence).
II. CONCLUSION
As Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirements for invoking the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS this case be DISMISSED and this civil action be CLOSED.
SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED.