Opinion
C/A No. 8:20-cv-03043-HMH-JDA
09-25-2020
Gavin Less Nowlin, Petitioner, v. Major Jeff Johnson, Petitioner.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Gavin Less Nowlin ("Petitioner"), proceeding pro se, brings this habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner is a detainee at the Florence County Detention Center ("Detention Center"). He files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons below, the undersigned concludes that the District Court should dismiss the Petition for the reasons below.
BACKGROUND
As noted, Petitioner filed this case under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking habeas relief related to his present incarceration at the Detention Center. He makes the following allegations in his Petition. [Doc. 1.] Petitioner has been charged with a number of crimes in the Florence County Court of General Sessions at case numbers 2019A2120400272, 2019A2120400273, 2019A2120400319, 2019A2120400320, and 2019A2120400321. [Id. at 2.] Petitioner alleges his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment has been violated. [Id.] Petitioner alleges that he filed a motion for speedy trial on July 19, 2019, on the charges that were filed against him in June 2019. [Id.] Petitioner contends that he has exceeded 180 days of incarceration on his pending charges and has raised the issue with authorities, but has not received an order. [Id.] Petitioner alleges that he has filed a motion for speedy trial in the state court. [Id.] For his relief, Petitioner asks for a speedy trial on his pending criminal charges. [Id. at 7.]
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the documents in the pending criminal actions in the Florence County Court of General Sessions at case numbers 2019A2120400272, 2019A2120400273, 2019A2120400319, 2019A2120400320, and 2019A2120400321. See Florence County Twelfth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Florence/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers) (last visited Sept. 23, 2020); see also Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'").
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se pleadings pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Because Petitioner is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Petition is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
Further, this Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine if "it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; see also Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (allowing district courts to apply the rules to other § 2241 petitions). Following the required initial review, it is recommended that the Petition submitted in this case be dismissed.
DISCUSSION
As noted, Petitioner seeks an immediate trial on his pending charges, claiming he has been denied his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. Nevertheless, this action should be dismissed because Petitioner's claims are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine. This is so because granting Petitioner's requested relief would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin his pending state court proceedings. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings "except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances." Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Petitioner is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings, and he asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations and to require an immediate trial on the pending state charges against him; thus, the first element is satisfied. See Boyd v. South Carolina, No. 1:11-cv-2981-TMC-SVH, 2012 WL 786341, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2012) (noting the first prong of the abstention test was satisfied where the petitioner alleged that "he is currently awaiting trial in an ongoing state criminal proceeding"), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 786356 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2012). The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: "[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as Petitioner can raise his constitutional claims in the state court.
A ruling in Petitioner's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court proceedings against him and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, 'whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'") (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Petitioner can raise his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. See Brazell v. Boyd, 991 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding the district court should abstain from considering a speedy trial claim pursuant to Younger). Thus, this Court should dismiss this case without prejudice on abstention grounds pursuant to Younger. See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 247 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that "when a district court abstains from a case based on Younger, it should typically dismiss the case with prejudice; not on the merits").
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that Petition filed in this action be DISMISSED without requiring the Respondent to file a return.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge September 25, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).