Opinion
No. 24524.
June 18, 2002.
Appeal From Circuit Court of Greene County, Hon. J. Miles Sweeney.
David W. Ransin, for Appellant.
Bruce E. Hunt and Deborah A. Malkmus, for Respondent.
Opinion
A jury returned a verdict of $308,855.35 in favor of Jerry Norman and Kimberly Norman (Plaintiffs) on their wrongful death claim against Andy J. Wright, M.D. (Defendant) arising from the death of their infant son. The trial court subsequently reduced the verdict by $100,000 to reflect the amount Plaintiffs had received in a pre-trial settlement with former defendants St. John's Health Systems (Hospital) and Joseph C. Johnson, Jr., M.D. (Dr. Johnson). Plaintiffs appeal the judgment claiming the trial court erroneously reduced the jury award pursuant to section 537.060.
Statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise indicate.
The facts of the underlying claim against Defendant are not in dispute. It is sufficient to note that this case stems from the death of Plaintiffs' infant son, Kenneth, after he suffered brain damage during his birth. Plaintiffs originally filed suit against Defendant, Dr. Johnson, Hospital, and a third doctor. Prior to trial, Plaintiffs settled their claims with Dr. Johnson and Hospital for the joint sum of $100,000, with no allocation or apportionment of fault. The trial court approved the settlement and dismissed Dr. Johnson and Hospital from the case with prejudice. The claims against the third doctor were also dismissed prior to trial.
The trial commenced on July 23, 2001, with only the claim against Defendant remaining. The jury returned its verdict in favor of Plaintiffs. Approximately one week after the verdict, Defendant filed a motion asking the trial court to reduce the jury award by $100,000, representing the amount tendered by Dr. Johnson and Hospital in the pretrial settlement in accordance with section 537.060. Plaintiffs opposed the request as untimely based upon Defendant's failure to include an affirmative request for offset in his pleadings. The trial court sustained Defendant's motion "as a matter of law," reduced the verdict by the amount of the pretrial settlement, and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in the amount of $221,818.56, including all costs assessed against Defendant.
The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the law when reducing the jury award pursuant to section 537.060. Because this issue is purely a matter of law and does not involve factual issues, our review is essentially de novo. Baris v. Layton , 43 S.W.3d 390, 397 (Mo.App. 2001). Accordingly, we give no deference to the trial court's judgment in such matters. Id .
In their sole point on appeal, Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in reducing the jury verdict to reflect the $100,000 settlement received from Dr. Johnson and Hospital. Plaintiffs concede that Defendant "would have had a right to some sort of credit or offset against the jury verdict in this case as a consequence" of the settlement sum "if he had properly requested such in his pleadings under . . . section 537.060." Plaintiffs assert, however, that Defendant waived any such benefit by failing to properly set forth section 537.060 as an affirmative defense in his pleadings.
Under this point, Plaintiffs also claim Defendant was not entitled to any credit pursuant to section 538.230, the statute addressing the effect of settlement by one of several defendants in a medical malpractice case. Plaintiffs provide a lengthy discussion of that statute and spend several pages of their brief arguing why they believe Defendant was not entitled to benefit from the provisions of section 538.230. This entire discussion and argument is superfluous because Defendant sought no credit based upon section 538.230 and the statute had no bearing on the trial court's judgment. Furthermore, section 538.230 only applies in those cases where fault is apportioned. Glidewell v. S.C. Management, Inc ., 923 S.W.2d 940, 947 (Mo.App. 1996). No fault was apportioned in this case because neither side made such a request.
Section 537.060 addresses contribution between tort-feasors and the effect of the release of one or more on the liability of any remaining claims. This statute provides in pertinent part:
When an agreement by release, covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or wrongful death, such agreement shall not discharge any of the other tort-feasors for the damage unless the terms of the agreement so provide; however such agreement shall reduce the claim by the stipulated amount of the agreement, or in the amount of consideration paid, whichever is greater.
In sum, this statute permits a non-settling defendant's liability to be reduced by the settlement amounts of other tort-feasors on a dollar-for-dollar basis. Teeter v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Comm'n , 891 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Mo. banc 1995). This rule is designed to uphold the principle of fairness by ensuring that a defendant who decides to go to trial is not forced to bear an unfair burden. Id . Section 537.060 is also in keeping with the general proposition that a party is entitled to only one satisfaction for the same wrong and prevents a plaintiff from recovering more than the amount of damages incurred. See Slankard v. Thomas , 912 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Mo.App. 1995); Victor v. Manhatten Life Ins. Co ., 772 S.W.2d 826, 832 (Mo.App. 1989).
Plaintiffs cite only one case, Titan Constr. Co. v. Mark Twain Kansas City Bank , 887 S.W.2d 454, 458 (Mo.App. 1994) in support of the proposition that a defendant must plead section 537.060 as an affirmative defense in order to be entitled to a settlement credit under the statute. Titan is distinguishable from the instant case because it involved a claim for credit in a contract matter and section 537.060 only applies to tort claims. Obviously, Titan contains no discussion of section 537.060.
In Julien v. St. Louis University , 10 S.W.3d 150 (Mo.App. 1999), a jury returned a verdict for plaintiff on his assault and battery claim and false arrest claim. Judgment was entered on April 28, 1998. On May 11, 1998, defendant filed a motion for set off and credit based on the amount plaintiff had earlier received from other settling defendants. On July 28, 1998, the trial court granted defendant's motion. Id . at 151. On appeal, plaintiff argued the July 28, 1998, order was void because the trial court lost jurisdiction thirty days after the entry of the judgment on April 28, 1998. Plaintiff reasoned that defendant's motion was not an authorized after-trial motion which would extend the trial court's jurisdiction as allowed by Rule 75.01. Id .
The appellate court determined that defendant's motion under section 537.060 was a "statutory post-judgment motion for satisfaction of judgment." Id . at 152. The court ruled that such a motion "may be filed, considered and ruled at any time after the entry of a judgment. Id .
Although Julien does not address the necessity of pleading a section 537.060 set off as an affirmative defense, the case does demonstrate that a motion under the statute can be filed and considered after entry of the judgment. Certainly, Defendant in the instant case followed the procedure approved in Julien .
On appeal, the trial court's judgment is presumed to be correct. Delf v. Cartwright , 651 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Mo.App. 1983). An appellant has the burden to demonstrate the trial court's judgment is erroneous. Id . at 624. Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of showing that Defendant waived any benefit under section 537.060 by failing to plead the effect of the statute as an affirmative defense.
In the instant case, the jury determined that Plaintiffs suffered damages in the amount of approximately $308,000. To deny the application of section 537.060 to reduce the jury award by the amount Plaintiffs received in settlement would result in Plaintiffs receiving a windfall of $100,000 above the damages they suffered. Such a result would be at odds with the goal of section 537.060 and the general proposition that a plaintiff may have only one satisfaction for the same wrong.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs' argument that they had no notice of the potential reduction of any jury verdict by the settlement amount based upon the operation of section 537.060 appears to be disingenuous. By the terms of the "Limited Release" signed by Plaintiffs on July 26, 2000, Plaintiffs released all claims against Dr. Johnson and Hospital in exchange for $100,000, but expressly retained their claims against Defendant "pursuant to Section 537.060." In addition, the "Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice" pertaining to Dr. Johnson and Hospital filed with the trial court on August 1, 2000, states that "all other actions and claims not expressly dismissed remain pending pursuant to Section 537.060 RSMo." The language in both of these documents indicates that Plaintiffs anticipated the potential application of section 537.060 to any jury verdict against Defendant.
Based upon the principles underlying section 537.060 and the fact that Plaintiffs had actual notice of the applicability of the statute, we find no error in reducing the jury award by $100,000. Point denied.
The judgment is affirmed.