Opinion
No. 2:19-CV-0180-KJM-DMC-P
02-07-2019
WAHIDULLAH QUDRETULLAH NOOR, Plaintiff, v. L. PIGNIOLO, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 1). Also before the court is plaintiff's motion for a court order directing service of the complaint by the United States Marshal (Doc. 3).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a ". . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory.
I. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) L. Pigniolo, the Library Technical Assistant at California State Prison - Solano; and (2) D. Adams, supervisor of the prison's education department. Plaintiff claims defendants violated his First Amendment right to freedom of religion. According to plaintiff:
On numerous occasions L. PIGNIOLO, LTA for SCP-Solano had racially profiled plaintiff by calling him "a terrorist," "how are the poppy fields," "YOU WANT TO GO BACK TO AFGHANISTAN BECAUSE YOU WANT TO RUN THE POPPY FIELDS WITH THE TALIBAN," this humiliation went on in front of co-workers and other inmates while I was a clerk in the library. Dr. Adams interviewed me and still denied plaintiff's 602 appeal. Dr. Adams is in charge of the education department which includes the library. . . .Plaintiff alleges he suffered "[p]sychological and emotional abuse. . . ." because "these racist and insensitive statements" caused other inmates to make the same statements and threaten plaintiff with physical violence. Id. / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
Doc. 1, p. 3.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant Pigniolo
According to plaintiff, defendant Pigniolo violated plaintiff's First Amendment freedom of religion rights by making racially insensitive statements. To the extent plaintiff is asserting a claim based on denial of the free exercise of his religion, he does not state a viable claim against defendant Pigniolo. To the extent plaintiff is asserting a claim based on verbal harassment, he also does not state a viable claim.
1. Free Exercise of Religion
The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners retain their First Amendment rights, including the right to free exercise of religion. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Thus, for example, prisoners have a right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good health and which satisfies the dietary laws of their religion. See McElyea v. Babbit, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987). In addition, prison officials are required to provide prisoners facilities where they can worship and access to clergy or spiritual leaders. See Glittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 4 (3rd Cir. 1970). Officials are not, however, required to supply clergy at state expense. See id. Inmates also must be given a "reasonable opportunity" to pursue their faith comparable to that afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).
However, the court has also recognized that limitations on a prisoner's free exercise rights arise from both the fact of incarceration and valid penological objectives. See McElyea, 833 F.2d at 197. For instance, under the First Amendment, the penological interest in a simplified food service has been held sufficient to allow a prison to provide orthodox Jewish inmates with a pork-free diet instead of a completely kosher diet. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877-79 (9th Cir. 1993). Similarly, prison officials have a legitimate penological interest in getting inmates to their work and educational assignments. See Mayweathers v. Newland, 258 F.3d 930, 38 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing Muslim inmates' First Amendment challenge to prison work rule). / / /
While free exercise of religion claims originally arose under the First Amendment, Congress has enacted various statutes in an effort to provide prisoners with heightened religious protection. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). Prior to these congressional efforts, prison free exercise claims were analyzed under the "reasonableness test" set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987); see e.g. O'Lone, 382 U.S. at 349. The first effort to provide heightened protection was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993. However, the Supreme Court invalidated that act and restored the "reasonableness test." See City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the United States Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne invalidated RFRA and restored the "reasonableness test" as the applicable standard in free exercise challenges brought by prison inmates).
Congress then enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in 2000 ". . . in response to the constitutional flaws with RFRA identified in City of Boerne." Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2006). Under RLUIPA, prison officials are prohibited from imposing "substantial burdens" on religious exercise unless there exists a compelling governmental interest and the burden is the least restrictive means of satisfying that interest. See id. at 986. RLUIPA has been upheld by the Supreme Court, which held that RLUIPA's "institutionalized-persons provision was compatible with the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence and concluded that RLUIPA 'alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise.'" Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2117 (2005)). Congress achieved this goal by replacing the "reasonableness test" articulated in Turner with the "compelling government interest" test codified in RLUIPA at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). See id.
It is not clear whether a prisoner must specifically raise RLUIPA in order to have his claim analyzed under the statute's heightened standard. In Alvarez v. Hill, the Ninth Circuit held that, if a complaint contains "factual allegations establishing a 'plausible" entitlement to relief under RLUIPA, [plaintiff has] satisfied the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008); but see Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 715 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to express any opinion about whether plaintiff could prevail under RLUIPA because plaintiff brought his claim under the First Amendment only). Therefore, it is possible for a prisoner's complaint to raise both a First Amendment claim and RLUIPA claim based on the same factual allegations. In other words, even if the plaintiff does not specifically invoke the heightened protections of RLUIPA, he may nonetheless be entitled to them. Under Henderson, however, the plaintiff's claim may be limited to the less stringent Turner "reasonableness test" if the plaintiff specifically brings the claim under the First Amendment only.
Under both the First Amendment and RLUIPA, the prisoner bears the initial burden of establishing that the defendants substantially burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith. See Freeman v. Arpaio,125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing claim under First Amendment); see also Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994-95 (analyzing claim under RLUIPA). While RLUIPA does not define what constitutes a "substantial burden," pre-RLUIPA cases are instructive. See id. at 995 (discussing cases defining "substantial burden" in the First Amendment context). To show a substantial burden on the practice of religion, the prisoner must demonstrate that prison officials' conduct ". . . burdens the adherent's practice of his or her religion by pressuring him or her to commit an act forbidden by the religion or by preventing him or her from engaging in conduct or having a religious experience which the faith mandates." Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1987). The burden must be more than a mere inconvenience. See id. at 851. In the context of claims based on religious diets, a plaintiff must prove that prison officials refused to provide a diet which satisfies his religious dietary laws or that the available prison menu prevented him from adhering to the religious dietary laws mandated by his faith. See Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995).
Under the First Amendment "reasonableness test," where the inmate shows a substantial burden the prison regulation or restriction at issue is nonetheless valid if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). In applying this test, the court must weight four factors: (1) whether there is a rational connection between the regulation or restriction and the government interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there are available alternative means of exercising the right; (3) whether accommodation of the asserted religious right will have a detrimental impact on prison guards, other inmates, or the allocation of limited prison resources; and (4) whether there exist ready alternatives to the regulation or restriction. See id.; see also Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).
Under RLUIPA, the government is required to ". . . meet the much stricter burden of showing that the burden it imposes on religious exercise is 'in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.'" Green v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 992, 986, 989 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) and 2(b)); see also Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994-95. Prison security is an example of a compelling governmental interest. See Green, 513 F.3d at 989 (citing Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2113 n.13). In establishing that the regulation or restriction is the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling governmental interest, prison officials must show that they actually considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive means before adopting the challenged practice. See Green, 513 F.3d at 989 (citing Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 999).
Here, plaintiff does not state any claim under the First Amendment or RLUIPA because plaintiff has not asserted facts which would indicate defendants burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith. In fact, plaintiff has not alleged what his faith is, what conduct his faith mandates, or how any defendant prevented him from engaging in such conduct.
2. Verbal Harassment
The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment ". . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with "food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety." Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official's act or omission must be so serious such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities; and (2) subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must have a "sufficiently culpable mind." See id. Allegations of verbal harassment do not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment unless it is alleged that the harassment was "calculated to . . . cause [the prisoner] psychological damage." Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996), amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). In addition, the prisoner must show that the verbal comments were unusually gross, even for a prison setting, and that he was in fact psychologically damaged as a result of the comments. See Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1092.
Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim based on verbal harassment because he has not alleged defendant's conduct was calculated to cause plaintiff psychological harm. While plaintiff alleges this was the result of defendant's conduct, he has not alleged it was the motivating force behind such conduct. For this reason, plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to establish the subjective component of his claim.
B. Defendant Adams
Plaintiff appears to allege defendant Adams is liable either as defendant Pigniolo's supervisor or by virtue of defendant Adams' denial of plaintiff's inmate grievance. Under either theory, plaintiff does not state a viable claim.
1. Supervisory Liability
Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate's unconstitutional conduct because government officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). "[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the constitution." Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676.
In this case, plaintiff appears to allege defendant Adams is liable by virtue of his role as defendant Pigniolo's supervisor. Plaintiff has not, however, alleged any conduct on defendant Adams' part (except denial of his inmate grievance, discussed below). Nor has plaintiff alleged defendant Adams implemented a policy which is itself the moving force behind a constitutional violation.
2. Denial of Plaintiff's Inmate Grievance
Prisoners have no stand-alone due process rights related to the administrative grievance process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no liberty interest entitling inmates to a specific grievance process). Because there is no right to any particular grievance process, it is impossible for due process to have been violated by ignoring or failing to properly process grievances. Numerous district courts in this circuit have reached the same conclusion. See Smith v. Calderon, 1999 WL 1051947 (N.D. Cal 1999) (finding that failure to properly process grievances did not violate any constitutional right); Cage v. Cambra, 1996 WL 506863 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (concluding that prison officials' failure to properly process and address grievances does not support constitutional claim); James v. U.S. Marshal's Service, 1995 WL 29580 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (dismissing complaint without leave to amend because failure to process a grievance did not implicate a protected liberty interest); Murray v. Marshall, 1994 WL 245967 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding that prisoner's claim that grievance process failed to function properly failed to state a claim under § 1983). Prisoners do, however, retain a First Amendment right to petition the government through the prison grievance process. See Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). Therefore, interference with the grievance process may, in certain circumstances, implicate the First Amendment.
Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim against defendant Adams based on his handling of plaintiff's inmate grievance because plaintiff has not alleged any related interference with the grievance process.
III. CONCLUSION
Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. / / / / / / / / /
If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between each defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply with Rule 8 may, in the court's discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend;
2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order; and
3. Plaintiff's motion for an order directing service of the complaint by the United States Marshal (Doc. 3) is denied. Dated: February 7, 2019
/s/_________
DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE