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In Archer v. Noble, (3 Greenl. 418,) a constable had given a bond with sureties "for the faithful performance of his duties and trust, as to all processes by him served or executed."
Summary of this case from The People v. SchuylerOpinion
CLAIM NO. E800112
OPINION FILED SEPTEMBER 14, 1999
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by the HONORABLE KENNETH A. OLSEN, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Respondents represented by the HONORABLE CAROL LOCKARD WORLEY, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Affirmed.
OPINION AND ORDER
[2] The claimant appeals to the Full Workers' Compensation Commission an administrative law judge's opinion filed April 6, 1999. The administrative law judge found that the claimant did not meet his burden of proving that he sustained a compensable injury pursuant to Act 796 of 1993. After de novo review of the entire record, the Full Commission affirms the opinion of the administrative law judge.The claimant, age 60, has worked for the respondent-employer since 1976. Dr. A. Jack Somers treated the claimant intermittently for bilateral wrist and arm pain beginning in 1983. The claimant testified that he treated with Dr. Somers in 1995 for nonwork-related arm pain, which he said went away after a few months. One of the claimant's work duties entailed "probing," where he obtained a cotton-seed sample from a truck by manually twisting a hand tool. The respondent automated this procedure in about March, 1996, after which time the claimant was no longer required to manually twist the hand tool. Starting in approximately 1997, the claimant worked as a utility mill loader. The claimant testified that he loaded trucks, frequently pulling chains with his hands.
The claimant stated that he was struck on the left wrist by a spinning crank on March 1, 1997 and felt pain for about five months, but missed no work and did not seek medical treatment. Dr. Somers assessed degenerative joint disease in May, 1997, and he diagnosed possible inflammatory arthritis on June 2, 1997, after the claimant complained of left wrist pain and swelling. The parties stipulated that the employer-employee relationship existed in September, 1997, and that the claimant was averaging a 48-hour work week. The claimant testified that both hands began bothering him, but that he complained primarily of left wrist pain. The claimant presented to University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences emergency room around Labor Day, 1997, stating that his left hand began hurting while driving a forklift at work. About three to four days later, claimant testified, "my right hand tightened up on me at work because I was using it and trying to save my left hand, because it was giving me trouble." Right wrist swelling was reported on September 25, 1997. A November, 1997 EMG study revealed no evidence of a left carpal tunnel syndrome, but objective findings consistent with carpal tunnel syndrome on the right.
Dr. Somers assessed rheumatoid arthritis and Type II diabetes in February, 1998. Dr. Houk began treating the claimant in March, 1998 for "a new onset of rheumatoid synovitis." Dr. Michael Moore, an orthopedic hand surgeon, opined in August, 1998 that the claimant's described job activity would not be a primary cause of carpal tunnel syndrome; rather, Dr. Moore suspected that the claimant had a right carpal tunnel syndrome "related to the rheumatoid arthritis." Dr. Earl Peeples performed a right carpal tunnel release and excision of large lipoma, left thigh, on October 23, 1998. The claimant returned to work, but did not seek further medical treatment for his left hand. The claimant feared possible termination for missing any further work, but he testified that his hands remained symptomatic.
The employee filed a claim for workers' compensation, contending that he sustained a gradual injury which manifested itself as right carpal tunnel syndrome in September, 1997. The claimant contended entitlement to medical benefits and two weeks of temporary total disability compensation beginning October 23, 1998. The respondent controverted the claim in its entirety, contending that the claimant could not causally relate his carpal tunnel syndrome to his work duties. After a hearing before the Commission, an administrative law judge found that the claimant did not prove that his complaints of hand and wrist pain, and carpal tunnel syndrome on the right, are causally related to his work duties or activities. The administrative law judge determined that the claimant did not meet his burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a causal relationship between his carpal tunnel syndrome and his work duties. The administrative law judge thus denied and dismissed the claim; claimant appeals to the Full Commission.
The claimant contends that he sustained a compensable right carpal tunnel syndrome injury manifesting itself in September, 1997, which brings this case under the provisions of Act 796 of 1993. A claimant has the burden of proving the compensability of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Georgia-Pacific Co. v. Carter, 62 Ark. App. 162, 969 S.W.2d 677 (1998). Since the claimant asserts that he sustained a work-related gradual onset of carpal tunnel syndrome, the claimant is not required to establish that his work duties required rapid repetitive motion.Kildow v. Baldwin Piano Organ, 333 Ark. 335, 969 S.W.2d 1990 (1998). The claimant must prove, however, that he sustained a carpal tunnel syndrome injury arising out of and in the course of employment, that the injury is the major cause of his disability or need for medical treatment, and that the injury is established by objective medical findings. Id.
In the within matter, the administrative law judge determined that the claimant failed to meet his burden of proving that there is a causal relationship between his right carpal tunnel syndrome and his work duties. After de novo review, we affirm. According to the record, the claimant was treated intermittently for bilateral wrist and arm pain beginning in 1983. The claimant complained of a traumatic left wrist injury in 1997, and Dr. Somers subsequently assessed degenerative joint disease and possible inflammatory arthritis. The claimant complained of additional work-related left hand symptoms around September, 1997, in addition to right wrist swelling. Objective diagnostic testing performed in November, 1997 indicated findings consistent with carpal tunnel syndrome on the right, but no treating physician attributed the claimant's right carpal tunnel condition to his work duties. Rather, Dr. Somers and Dr. Houk diagnosed rheumatoid arthritis and synovitis, in addition to Type II diabetes.
In August, 1998, Dr. Moore opined that the claimant's work activity would not be a primary cause of the claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome. Instead, Dr. Moore suspected that the claimant's condition was related to rheumatoid arthritis. Nor did Dr. Peeples, the surgeon who performed the right carpal tunnel release, attribute the claimant's condition to his work. Except in the most obvious cases, the existence of a causal relationship must be established by expert medical evidence.Cotton v. Ball Prier, Full Workers' Compensation Commission, September 23, 1997 ( E512437). An employee alleging a compensable carpal tunnel condition must also establish this causal relationship. Chenowith v. Ozark Mountain Smokehouse, Full Workers' Compensation Commission, January 8, 1999 ( E800928). Since the claimant in the instant matter has failed to establish this causal relationship by a preponderance of the evidence, we must find that the claimant failed to prove that his right carpal tunnel condition arose out of and in the course of his employment with the respondent. In addition, we expressly find that the claimant did not meet his burden of proving that he sustained a carpal tunnel syndrome injury which was the major cause of his disability or need for treatment. Medlin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 64 Ark. App. 17, 977 S.W.2d 239 (1998).
Accordingly, based on our de novo review of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that the claimant failed to prove a compensable carpal tunnel syndrome injury pursuant to the provisions of Act 796 of 1993. We therefore affirm the opinion of the administrative law judge, and we dismiss this claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Commissioner Humphrey dissents.