Opinion
Civil Action No. 6:18-2089-DCC-KFM
09-19-2018
Jonathan Allen Nix, Plaintiff, v. Marvin Nix, Kristy Leopard, Charles Way and Dolly Curver, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d)(D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
On August 27, 2018, the undersigned filed an order informing the plaintiff that his complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to defendants Dolly Curver and Dr. Charles Way, and in part as to defendants Marvin Nix and Kirsty Leopard. Specifically, the order advised the plaintiff that all claims would be dismissed except his claims for deliberate indifference (doc. 13). The plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint curing the identified deficiencies, so as to allow for review for possible service of process (Id.). The plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends this action be dismissed with prejudice as to defendants Curver and Way, and that all claims against defendants Nix and Leopard be dismissed, except for the plaintiff's claims for medical deliberate indifference.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Pickens County Detention Center ("PCDC") in Pickens, South Carolina. He alleges that defendants Nix, Leopard, Way, and Curver, who he asserts are all employees of the PCDC, violated his constitutional rights (doc. 1). By Order dated August 1, 2018 (doc. 7), the undersigned directed the plaintiff to bring his case into proper form by (1) completing and returning a summons for each named defendant; (2) completing and returning service forms for each defendant; (3) completing and returning the "Statement of Claims" section of the complaint; and (4) answering and returning the Court's Special Interrogatories (doc. 7 at 2). The plaintiff substantially complied with the court's proper form order on August 16, 2018 (docs. 1-3, 10, and 11).
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that he was "jumped" by other PCDC prisoners around May 1, 2018 and on July 7, 2018. He claims defendant Nix denied his request for medical attention for injuries to his shoulder and arm in the May assault, and that defendant Leopard initially denied his request for medical attention for his jaw that was injured in the July assault. He further claims that his canteen was taken in each incident. He complains that defendant Nix failed to punish those responsible in May, and instead moved the plaintiff to a different pod in the PCDC. He further alleges that following the July incident, defendant Leopard moved him out of the cell block into a "visitation room" that lacked a toilet and shower, and that he slept on the floor for four days. The plaintiff claims that when he later saw defendant Curver, she ordered an x-ray that he never received, and that she and her supervisor defendant Way should therefore be held responsible. He also complains that the defendants failed to find and return his canteen (docs. 1, 1-3).
As relief, he appears to seek damages and the dismissal of the charges: "I'm being held on for not doing anything to the individuals who jumped me and refusing (sic) medical treatment" (doc 1 at 7).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Under this standard, it appears the plaintiff is making claims against the defendants for their indifference to his serious medical needs after both incidents and the conditions of his confinement in the visitation room after the second incident. He also attempts to bring claims for the defendants' failure to charge or punish the other inmates, and their failure to recover his canteen that was taken. Only the medical indifference claims against defendants Nix and Leopard are sufficient to survive initial screening.
DISCUSSION
The complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1501 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se complaint and the plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the complaint, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory).
Medical Indifference and Conditions of Confinement Claims
Claims of pretrial detainees against detention center officials for such constitutional violations as presented here are evaluated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement for those convicted of crimes. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). In any event, "[the] due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner." Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). "The due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to the convicted prisoner; while the convicted prisoner is entitled to protection only against punishment that is 'cruel and unusual,' the pretrial detainee, who has yet to be adjudicated guilty of any crime, may not be subjected to any form of 'punishment.'" Martin, 849 F.2d at 870.
The government is "obligat[ed] to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,102 (1976). This obligation arises from an inmate's complete dependency upon prison medical staff to provide essential medical services. Id. The duty to attend to prisoners' medical needs, however, does not presuppose "that every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 105. Instead, it is only when prison officials have exhibited "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's "serious medical needs" that the Eighth Amendment is offended. Id. at 104. As such, "an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care" will not comprise an Eighth Amendment breach. Id. at 105-106.
In order to state a claim, "[a] plaintiff must satisfy two elements . . . : he must show a serious medical need and he must prove the defendant's purposeful indifference thereto." Sires v. Berman, 834 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1987). With regard to the objective component, a medical need is "serious" if "it is diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990).
Here the plaintiff alleges that he suffered injuries after both assaults, and viewing his allegations liberally as this court must do, the court is unable to dismiss the purported injuries as non-serious. Accordingly, the claims of medical indifference as to defendants Nix and Leopard should be served. By his own account, the plaintiff's May injuries were not known to defendants Curver or Way, and he presents no allegation that defendant Way knew of his swollen jaw in July. Defendant Curver did see his jaw injury and ordered an x-ray, but the plaintiff fails to make a claim that she was responsible for it not being administered. As such, the medical indifference claims against defendants Curver and Way should be dismissed as insufficient under Rule 8.
To state a claim that conditions of confinement violate constitutional requirements, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a basic human need and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation. Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). The first prong of the Strickler analysis requires an objective showing that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, such that significant physical or emotional injury resulted from it, while the second prong is a subjective test requiring evidence that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
The plaintiff fails to state a conditions of confinement claim against defendants Nix or Leopard. First, their respective decisions to transfer him to a different area of the PCDC is well within their discretion as detention center employees tasked with making such custodial determinations. As for the visitation room, this housing was clearly temporary, lasting only four days, and as such is insufficient to amount to a constitutional violation. Here, neither Strickler prong has been met, as the plaintiff has shown no deprivation such that he sustained a significant physical or emotional injury resulting from it. Therefore, the court finds the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to the plaintiff's conditions of confinement claim against defendants Nix and Leopard.
Deprivation of Property Claims
The plaintiff alleges that defendants Nix and Leopard did not attempt to retrieve his canteen that was taken during the May 2018 and July 2018 incidents. Deprivations of personal property, including negligent deprivations of personal property, do not support an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328-36 & n. 3 (1986). In Daniels v. Williams, the Supreme Court overruled its earlier holding in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), that negligent deprivations of property implicate due process interests. Secondly, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not impose liability for violations of duties of care arising under state law. In other words, "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation." DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200-03 (1989).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that a federal district court should deny Section 1983 relief if state law provides a plaintiff with a viable remedy for the loss of personal property, even if the deprivation was caused by an employee of the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision of a state. Yates v. Jamison, 782 F.2d 1182, 1183-84 (4th Cir.1986). The plaintiff has available state law remedies to recover any lost property. See S.C.Code Ann. 15-69-10 et seq.; and S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-10 et seq. (Westlaw 2015). Hence, the loss of the plaintiff's personal property is not a basis for a federal civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Treece v. Winston-Wood, C.A. No. 3:10-2354-DCN-JRM, 2012 WL 887476 (D.S.C. Feb. 2012).
Thus, to the extent the plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim for deprivation of property, his claim should be dismissed.
Inability to Press Charges
The plaintiff alleges defendants Nix and Leopard did not allow him to press charges against the individuals who jumped him (doc. 1-3 at 3). It is well settled that "[n]o citizen has an enforceable right to institute a criminal prosecution." Lopez V. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486, 494 (4th Cir.1990) (citing Linda R. V. Richard V., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (holding that, "in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another")). As such any claim against these defendants for failing to allow the plaintiff to press charges should be dismissed.
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued on August 27, 2018, the undersigned gave the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment as to all claims except his claims of deliberate indifference against defendants Nix and Leopard. The plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided. Accordingly, in addition to the reasons discussed herein, this action should be dismissed with prejudice and without issuance of process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order as to the defendants Curver and Way. Further, as to the defendants Nix and Leopard, all claims, except the plaintiff's claim for deliberate medical indifference, should be dismissed with prejudice. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, No. 17-7621, 2018 WL 2472069, at *1 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (stating that district court should, "in its discretion, either afford [the plaintiff] another opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order") (citing Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 630 (4th Cir. 2015)).
In summary, it is recommended that the defendants Nix and Leopard be served as to the plaintiff's claims for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and that all other claims as to these defendants be dismissed. It is further recommended that the defendants Curver and Way be dismissed from this case.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge September 19, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina
The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a),(d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).