Opinion
Case No. CV 03-02549 SBA (JL).
January 12, 2006
Matthew H. Poppe (State Bar No. 177854), ORRICK, HERRINGTON SUTCLIFFE LLP, Menlo Park, CA, Robert M. Isackson (admitted pro hac vice), W. Benjamin Tabler (admitted pro hac vice), Amelia K. Smith (admitted pro hac vice), ORRICK, HERRINGTON SUTCLIFFE LLP, New York, NY, Attorneys for Plaintiff NIKKO MATERIALS USA, INC. d/b/a GOULD ELECTRONICS, INC.
ORDER DENYING RES' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, OR ALTERNATIVELY, FOR A NEW TRIAL
On July 12, 2005, defendant R.E. Service Co., Inc. ("RES") brought on for hearing its Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law, Or Alternatively, For A New Trial. The Court, having considered the pleadings and papers on file, and having heard the arguments of counsel, HEREBY ORDERS that the motion is DENIED as follows:
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, the Court must determine whether, as a matter of law, the evidence at trial reasonably supports the jury verdict. Dean v. Trans World Air Lines Inc., 924 F.2d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1991). A JMOL motion involves the same inquiry as a motion for summary judgment. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Therefore, the Court, in reviewing all of the evidence in the record, must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Nikko while making no credibility determinations or weighing any evidence. Id. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Id. The Court should "disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151. Specifically, the "court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses." Id.; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 300.
1. RES has failed to prove that there was no legally sufficient basis for the jury's finding of literal infringement of claims 12, 13, and 14 of the '596 patent. Thus, a judgment as a matter of law in RES' favor on the issue of infringement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 is unfounded and denied.
The determination of patent infringement is a two-step process. First, the patent claims are construed as a matter of law by the Court, and second, the claims as construed are compared to the accused products to determine whether there is literal infringement. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The second step, whether an accused product infringes a patent claim, is a question of fact for the jury. See Oakley, Inc. v. Int'l Tropic-Cal, Inc., 923 F.2d 167, 169 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Proving literal infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) requires proof by a preponderance of evidence that each and every limitation of a patent claim is present in the product accused of infringing. See Augustine Medical, Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., Inc., 181 F.3d 1291, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Lantech, Inc. v. Keip Mach. Co., 32 F.3d 542, 547 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
The record contains substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict that, by a preponderance of the evidence, every limitation of claim 13 in the '596 patent is present in the SC2 product and every limitation of claims 12-14 is present in the SC3 product. Indeed, RES only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to one claim limitation: "flexible adhesive . . . defining a substantially uncontaminated central zone. . . ." The trial testimony of Richard Steiner, Gregg Frazier, Mark Frater, and Brian Campbell, together with the stipulated facts, is sufficient to support the jury's finding that the accused products meet this limitation. See, e.g., Tabler Decl. Ex. A at 226:4-13, 347:13-24, 348:9-22, 349:4-9, 404:6-11, 404:21-23, 407:3-7, 408:22-24, 409:10-13, 413:20-24, 577:1-21, 581:15-582:16, 592:20-593:13, 593:22-594:25, 595:23-597:12, 598:1-24, 676:17-19; PTX 3, 70, 138. Thus, contrary to RES' urging, it was not unreasonable for the jury to find literal infringement and RES' motion for a judgment as a matter of law of noninfringement of claims 12, 13, and 14 of the '596 patent is denied.
2. RES has not proven that there was no legally sufficient basis for the jury's finding of willful infringement of claims 12, 13, and 14 of the '596 patent. Thus, a judgment as a matter of law in RES' favor on the issue of willfulness pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 is unfounded and denied.
To establish willfulness, Nikko had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, in view of the totality of the circumstances, RES acted in disregard of the '596 patent at the time it infringed or continued to infringe, and that RES lacked a reasonable basis for believing that it has a right to do what it did. Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 181 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see Tabler Decl. Ex. A at 1068:8-12 (jury instruction re willfulness). "The test is whether, under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would prudently conduct himself with any confidence that a court might hold the patent invalid or not infringed." Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also Vulcan Eng'g, Inc. v. Fata Aluminum, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Construing the evidence in Nikko's favor, a reasonable juror considering the totality of the circumstances could easily find that RES willfully infringed the '596 patent. To the extent that the jury was confronted with contradiction and competing views of the evidence at trial, it properly weighed the credibility of the testifying witnesses and drew inferences from the facts in reaching its willful infringement verdict. Nikko amply demonstrated substantial evidence, as the jury found, that Mr. Frater, acting on behalf of RES, engaged in unreasonable conduct, acted in complete disregard of Nikko's patent rights, and failed to satisfy his duty of care to avoid infringement. See, e.g., Tabler Decl. Ex. A at 289:3-24, 416:12-15, 416:24-418:4, 418:11-14; 418:24-419:2, 420:2-422:7, 424:7-20, 426:17-24, 427:8-433:5, 443:17-25, 453:20-454:11, 454:23-455:4, 457:23-24, 478:1-2, 485:12-16, 487:11-13, 542:13-547:9, 772:22-24, 813:5-816:5, 822:18-827:10, 844:23-845:3; PTX 3, 5, 36, 83, 84, 147, 154; PTX 4 at J000297, J000660; PTX 48 at 10; Opening Brief at 2:2-3. Thus, RES' motion for judgment as a matter of law that its infringement of claims 12, 13, and 14 of the '596 patent was not willful is denied.
3. RES has not proven that the jury reached a seriously erroneous result in view of the substantial evidence before the jury of willful infringement and thus a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 is not warranted.
Under Rule 59(a), RES, as the losing party, has a heavy burden to establish that it is entitled to a new trial. The "underlying basis for a new trial is always to prevent injustice[.]" Helgeson v. American Int'l Group, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1103 (S.D. Cal. 1999); see also Computer Access Tech. Corp. v. Catalyst Enters., Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (emphasizing that a court should only grant a new trial with "a firm conviction that the jury made an error which led to a miscarriage of justice"). This Court may therefore "grant a new trial only if the jury's verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence." Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 331 F.3d 735, 742 (9th Cir. 2003).
When a new trial motion is based on insufficiency of the evidence, "a stringent standard applies." Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Venegas v. Wagner, 831 F.2d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987)). This Court may weigh evidence and assess witness credibility, but "is not justified in granting a new trial merely because it might have come to a different result than that reached by the jury." Roy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 896 F.2d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Union Oil Co., 331 F.3d at 743 (stressing that a court should not substitute its evaluations for those of the jurors); Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a court should not grant a new trial simply because it would have reached a different verdict). Unless it is "quite clear that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result," this Court abuses its discretion in granting a new trial. Hemmings v. Tidyman's Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002); see McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil. Co., 871 F.2d 1412, 1420 (9th Cir. 1989).
RES has not proven that it was unreasonable for the jury to find, in view of the evidence presented by Nikko at trial, that the SC3 and SC2 products do not have a flexible adhesive that "defines" substantially uncontaminated central zones. Nowhere does RES contend that the Court committed any errors in its evidentiary rulings or jury instructions. The clear weight of the evidence, including the evidence cited above, strongly and undeniably supports the jury's verdict of willful infringement. The Court may only grant a new trial if it is "quite clear the jury reached a seriously erroneous result," and RES, at best arguing that the Court might come out the other way, has not met this stringent standard. See Hemmings, 285 F.3d at 1189. Thus, RES' Rule 59 motion should also be denied.
Accordingly, RES's motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.