Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-CV-1253
12-27-2019
LUIS NIEVES, Plaintiff v. STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al., Defendants
(MUNLEY, D.J.) ()
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
On June 20, 2018, Plaintiff initiated this pro se civil rights action by filing a Complaint. After conducting a preliminary review of Plaintiff's Original Complaint (Doc. 1), the Court issued an Order explaining that Plaintiff failed to state a claim and affording Plaintiff one opportunity to amend his Original Complaint. (Doc. 28).
On May 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 47). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint appears to start at page two of a pre-printed civil complaint form. The Amended Complaint is barely legible and does not identify what legal claims Plaintiff intends to pursue. Plaintiff appears to name the following twenty-one Defendants:
(1) EMT Ron Thorne
(2) Lackawanna County Common Pleas Judge Vito P. Geroulo;
(3) Lackawanna County Public Defender Michael O'Brien;
(4) Jermyn/Mayfield Police Chief, Joseph Palipski;
(5) Detective Ryan Munley
(6) Plaintiff's former landlord, Tony Caljine, III
(7) Police Detective Brian Kosch
(8) Lackawanna County Common Pleas Judge Margaret Bisignani Moyle;
(9) Lackawanna County Public Defender Jamie Dench;
(10) Court Appointed Counsel, Tim Corbett;
(11) Lackawanna County Assistant District Attorney, Suzanne Tierney;
(12) Fayette County District Attorney, Richard Bower;
(13) Superintendent of SCI Mahoney, Theresa DelBalso;
(14) Deputy Superintendent at SCI Fayette, Scott Nickelson;
(15) Warden of Lackawanna County Prison, Tim Bette;
(16) Chief Grievance Officer, Dorina Varner;
(17) Grievance Officer, Keri Moore;
(18) PREA Investigator, David Radziewicz;
(19) Hearing Examiner, Zachary Moslak;
(20) Holly O'Connor, Prison Law Society; and
(21) Emily Clashell, Prison Law Society.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint consists of a series of disjointed allegations that appear to involve the judicial proceedings in two State court criminal cases in Lackawanna County and his treatment in various state and county prisons.
As relief, Plaintiff requests:
To be granted my request of relief/merit in 6.7 million, changes in linked criminal cases in parole & probation dropped, all court fees of cost payed of my request of 6.7 million will be added to all other
requests in mental and physical pain damages, money damages, pain and suffering, false imprisonment requested proof investigation.(Doc. 47, p. 6). I construe this as a request for monetary damages. To the extent Plaintiff requests to have criminal convictions vacated, this type of relief is not available in a § 1983 action. I. LEGAL STANDARD
This Court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by litigants given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Specifically, the Court is obliged to review the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides, in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that -
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal--
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In performing this mandatory screening function, the Court applies the same standard that is used to evaluate motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed the evolving standards governing pleading practice in the federal courts, stating that "pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009). "[A] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief." Id. at 211. It also "has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Id.
To test the sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must conduct the following three-step inquiry:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 1950. Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Id.Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and '"however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se complaint must recite factual allegations that are enough to raise the Plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action. II. ANALYSIS
A. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
On August 4, 2015, Plaintiff alleges that he was "provoked at and given to first responders by police," and that the medical team in the back of the ambulance twisted his legs. (Doc. 47, p. 3). Plaintiff reports that he could not see who twisted his legs. Id. Although Plaintiff names one EMT, Ron Thorne, as a Defendant, he does not allege that Defendant Thorne was present on August 4, 2015, or that he twisted Plaintiff's legs.
On August 5, 2015, Plaintiff was charged with burglary, aggravated assault, criminal trespass, resisting arrest, terroristic threats, and disorderly conduct. Commonwealth v. Nieves, MJ-45103-CR-0000337-2015 (Magis Ct. Lackawanna County) (Nieves I). Judge Vito P. Geroulo—named as a Defendant in this case—presided over the criminal proceedings in the Common Pleas Court related to these charges. Commonwealth v. Nieves, CP-35-CR-0001970-2015 (C.C.P. Lackawanna County) (Nieves II); (Doc. 48, p. 7). The State court docket shows that Public Defender Michael O'Brien represented Plaintiff in the proceedings before the magistrate, then filed a petition for the appointment of conflict counsel on November 23, 2015. Nieves I, MJ-45103-CR-0000337-2015 (Magis Ct. Lackawanna County); Nieves II, CP-35-CR-0001970-2015 (C.C.P. Lackawanna County); (Doc. 47, p. 2). On April 14, 2016, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to one count of criminal trespass, the other charges were nolle prossed. Nieves II, CP-35-CR-0001970-2015 (C.C.P. Lackawanna County). Plaintiff alleges that there is "county corruption," and that Joseph Palipski (the Mayfield/Jermyn Chief of Police) and Detective Ryan Munley—both named as Defendants in the Amended Complaint—acted inappropriately. (Doc. 48, p. 5); (Doc. 49, p. 2). However, the specific nature of the alleged misconduct by Defendants Palipski, and Munley is not well-explained. Inexplicably, Plaintiff also appears to suggest that his former landlord, Tony Caljine, III is also involved in some sort of conspiracy with the police. The substance of Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants Palipski, Munley, and Caljine is completely unintelligible due to Plaintiff's poor handwriting. Aside from naming them as Defendants, Plaintiff does not mention Defendants Geroulo or O'Brien in his Amended Complaint.
On or around October 4, 2016, Plaintiff was charged with assault by prisoner. Commonwealth v. Nieves, MJ-45106-CR-0000627-2016 (Magis. Ct. Lackawanna County) (Nieves III). Brian Kosch—named as a Defendant in the Amended Complaint—is listed as the arresting officer. Id. Judge Margaret Bisignani Moyle—named as a Defendant in this case—presided over the criminal proceedings in the Common Pleas Court related to this charge. Commonwealth v. Nieves, CP-35-CR-0002442-2016 (C.C.P. Lackawanna County) (Nieves IV). Public Defender Jamie A. Dench—named as a Defendant in the Amended Complaint—represented Plaintiff before the magistrate, and for some of the proceedings in the Common Pleas Court. Nieves III, MJ-45106-CR-0000627-2016 (Magis. Ct. Lackawanna County); Nieves IV, CP-35-CR-0002442-2016 (C.C.P. Lackawanna County). Plaintiff identifies Tim Corbett, named as a Defendant in the Amended Complaint, as "court appointed counsel." (Doc. 47, p. 2). The Common Pleas Court docket shows that Timothy Corbett filed several documents during the criminal proceedings in Nieves IV. CP-35-CR-0002442-2016 (C.C.P. Lackawanna County). The Common Pleas Court docket identifies Suzanne Tierney—named as a Defendant in the Amended Complaint—as a Lackawanna County Assistant District Attorney. Id. On April 3, 2017, the original charge of assault by prisoner was replaced with a charge of simple assault, and Plaintiff pleaded guilty. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Kosch, Moyle, Dench, and Corbett coerced him into pleading guilty. (Doc. 47, pp. 1, 4). Aside from naming her as a Defendant, Plaintiff does not mention Defendant Tierney in his Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff also names Richard Bower, the Fayette County District Attorney. Plaintiff does not, however, allege any facts that provide insight into the nature of his claim against Defendant Bower.
In addition to his allegations relating to judicial proceedings, Plaintiff also makes allegations about his treatment in Lackawanna County Prison, as well as in SCI Fayette, SCI Mahoney, and SCI Coal Township. Plaintiff names the Superintendent of SCI Mahoney (Theresa DelBalso), the Deputy Superintendent at SCI Fayette (Scott Nickelson), and the Warden of Lackawanna County Prison (Tim Bette) as Defendants in his Amended Complaint. Aside from naming these individuals as Defendants, Plaintiff does not make any allegations about them in his Amended Complaint. Plaintiff also names several individuals associated with the prison grievance or disciplinary processes: Dorina Varner (Chief Grievance Officer); Keri Moore (a Grievance Officer); David Radziewicz (involved in PREA investigations); and Zachary Moslak (a Hearing Examiner). The documents attached to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint include two appeals of inmate grievances filed with the Secretary's Officer of Inmate Grievances that Defendant Moore signed on behalf of Defendant Varner. (Doc. 47-3, pp. 2, 16). Aside from naming them as Defendants, Plaintiff does not make any specific allegations against Defendants DelBalso, Nickelson, Bette, Varner, Moore, Radziewicz, or Moslack.
Last, Plaintiff names two individuals he alleges are associated with the Prison Society: Holly Connor and Emily Clashell. Aside from naming these individuals as Defendants, Plaintiff does not make any specific allegations against them.
B. PLAINTIFF'S § 1983 CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED
Plaintiff's claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). "It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but merely 'provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)).
1. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claims against Defendants Thorne, O'Connor, and Clashell Should be Dismissed because these Defendants are not State Actors
To establish a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005). "Only persons acting under the color of state law [ ] can be held liable for constitutional violations under § 1983." Hynoski v. Columbia County Redevelopment Authority, 941 F.Supp.2d 547, 560 (M.D. Pa. 2013).
Furthermore, for a private actor to "come within the purview of § 1983 liability, plaintiff must show that [the stated] defendants acted under color of state law by pointing to some action, undertaken by them, that is 'fairly attributable' to the state." Id. at 562 (citations omitted). To accomplish this, a plaintiff "must show (1) that the defendants' acts were 'the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible' and (2) that the defendants may fairly be said to be state actors." Id. For example, "[a] private party who willfully participates in a joint conspiracy with state officials to deprive a person of a constitutional right acts 'under color of state law' for purposes of § 1983." Id.
Plaintiff identifies Defendants O'Connor and Clashell as being associated with the prison society—a non-profit organization. Plaintiff identifies Defendant Thorne as an EMT but does not allege enough facts to demonstrate that Defendant Thorne is a state actor. Therefore, I find that these Defendants are not state actors for the purposes of § 1983 liability. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts that suggest Defendants O'Connor, Clashell, or Thorne willfully participated in a joint conspiracy with state officials.
Accordingly, I recommend that all § 1983 claims against Defendants O'Connor, Clashell, and Thorne be dismissed because these Defendants are not state actors.
2. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claims Against Defendants O'Brien, Dench, and Corbett Should be Dismissed because Court Appointed Counsel does not Act under Color of State Law when Representing Clients in a Legal Capacity
A Section 1983 claim against an attorney necessarily fails because counsel is not a state actor. Counsel, whether court appointed or privately retained, does not act under color of law when representing clients in a legal capacity. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (holding that public defender not acting under color of state law); Steward v. Meeker, 459 F.2d 669, 669 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that privately-retained counsel not acting under color of state law when representing client); Thomas v. Howard, 455 F.2d 228, 229 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that court-appointed pool attorney not acting under color of state law). Therefore, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the Wayne County Public Defender's Office should be dismissed with prejudice.
3. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claims against Defendants Geroulo, O'Brien, Tierney, DelBalso, Nickelson, Bette, Varner, Moore, Radziewicz, and Moslak Should be Dismissed Due to a Lack of Personal Involvement
Liability in a § 1983 action is personal in nature, and to be liable, a defendant must have been personally involved in the wrongful conduct. In other words, defendants are "liable only for their own unconstitutional conduct." Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015). Respondeat superior cannot form the basis of liability. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005). "Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). As this Court has explained:
This personal involvement can be shown where a defendant personally directs the wrongs, or has actual knowledge of the wrongs and acquiesces in them. Id.; A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Detention Center, 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir.2004) (noting that "a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations"). Actual knowledge "can be inferred from circumstances other than actual sight." Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir.1995). Acquiescence is found "[w]here a supervisor with authority over a subordinate knows that the subordinate is violating someone's rights but fails to act to stop the subordinate from doing so, the factfinder may usually infer that the supervisor 'acquiesced' in (i.e., tacitly assented to or accepted) the subordinate's conduct." Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1294 (3d Cir.1997).Festa v. Jordan, 803, F. Supp. 2d 319, 325 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (Caputo, J.) (internal footnote omitted).
Because Plaintiff has not alleged any specific conduct by Defendants Geroulo, O'Brien, Tierney, DelBalso, Nickelson, Bette, Varner, Moore, Radziewicz or Moslak that violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, or any theory suggesting that these Defendants are liable for the allegedly unconstitutional acts of others, his claims against these Defendants should be dismissed due to a lack of personal involvement.
4. Plaintiff's Claims Against Defendants Moyle and Geroulo Should be Dismissed Because these Defendants are Entitled to Judicial Immunity
Plaintiff alleges that he pleaded guilty to a charge of simple assault in April 2017 after being coerced by "counselor Jamie [sic] Dench, Brian Kosch, Judge Moyle." (Doc. 47, p. 4). The State court docket in Plaintiff's criminal case shows that Judge Moyle presided over Plaintiff's guilty plea. Nieves II, CP-35-CR-0002242-2016 (C.C.P Lackawanna County).
Plaintiff also alleges that he pleaded guilty to one count of criminal trespass before Judge Geroulo. Nieves II, CP-35-CR-0001970-2015 (C.C.P. Lackawanna County). Plaintiff does not allege any wrongdoing by Judge Geroulo.
"Although § 1983 purports to subject '[e]very person' acting under color of state law to liability for depriving any other person in the United States of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,' the Supreme Court has recognized that § 1983 was not meant to 'abolish wholesale all common-law immunities.'" Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)); See also Russell v. Richardson, 905 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2018).
There are two kinds of immunity under § 1983: qualified immunity and absolute immunity. Yarris, 465 F.3d at 135. Although most public officials are entitled only to qualified immunity, public officials who perform "special functions" are entitled to absolute immunity. Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978)). "[A]bsolute immunity attaches to those who perform functions integral to the judicial process." Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2006). "This immunity was and still is considered necessary 'to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.'" McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1084 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 512).
A functional approach is used to determine whether absolute or qualified immunity applies. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988). The inquiry focuses on the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. Id. See also Russell, F.3d 905 at 247. "The Supreme Court long has recognized that judges are immune from suit under section 1983 for monetary damages arising from their judicial acts." Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court has described the reasons for recognizing judicial immunity as follows:
[T]he nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have . . . . [T]his is the principal characteristic that adjudication has in common with
legislation and with criminal prosecution, which are the two other areas in which absolute immunity has most generously been provided. If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits. The resulting timidity would be hard to detect or control, and it would manifestly detract from independent and impartial adjudication.Forrester, 484 U.S.at 226-27 (citations omitted).
The Court must engage in a two-part inquiry to determine whether judicial immunity is applicable. Gallas, 211 F.3d at 768. First, because immunity applies only to actions taken in a judge's judicial capacity, the court must determine whether the challenged actions of the judge were taken in his or her judicial capacity. Id. The relevant factors "relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.'" Id. at 768-69 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)). "Our task is to 'draw the line between truly judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply happen to have been done by judges,' such as administrative acts." Id. at 769 (quoting Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227).
"Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Id. at 768 (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991)). In this regard, "we must distinguish between acts in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction,' which do not enjoy the protection of absolute immunity, and acts that are merely in 'excess of jurisdiction,' which do enjoy that protection." Id. at 769 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 n.6). Judicial immunity shields a judge from liability for judicial acts even if those acts were taken in error, if they were done maliciously, if they were in excess of the judge's authority, if the judge committed grave procedural errors, or if the judge's actions were unfair or controversial. Id. A judge will be subject to liability only when he or she has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Id. "In sum, our analysis must focus on the general nature of the challenged action, without inquiry into such 'specifics' as the judge's motive or the correctness of his or her decision." Id. See also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13.
The allegations regarding Judges Moyle and Geroulo in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint relate to actions taken by these judges in their capacity as a judge overseeing criminal cases in the Court of Common Pleas, and their actions were not taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Accordingly, Judges Moyne and Geroulo are entitled to judicial immunity from Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them.
5. Plaintiff's Claims Against Defendants Tierney and Bower Should be Dismissed because they are Entitled to Prosecutorial Immunity
While the nature of his claims against Defendants Tierney and Bower are difficult to discern, it appears that Plaintiff is suing these Defendants for the act of prosecuting him. This he may not do. It is well-settled that a criminal defendant may not sue prosecutors for their act of filing charges against him since such conduct is cloaked in immunity from civil liability. The immunity conferred upon prosecutors for the quasi-judicial act of filing and bringing criminal charges is broad and sweeping:
[T]he Supreme Court [has] held that state prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for actions performed in a quasi-judicial role. This immunity extends to acts that are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process," such as "initiating a prosecution and ... presenting the State's case." Court has noted numerous public policy considerations underlying its extension of absolute immunity to prosecutors: [S]uits against prosecutors for initiating and conducting prosecutions "could be expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the State's advocate"; lawsuits would divert prosecutors' attention and energy away from their important duty of enforcing the criminal law; prosecutors would have more difficulty than other officials in meeting the standards for qualified immunity; and potential liability "would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system." ... [T]here are other checks on prosecutorial misconduct, including the criminal law and professional discipline.Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Here, I find that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint largely seeks to hold Defendants Tierney and Bower personally liable for the act of prosecuting him. Since these officials are immune from personal, individual liability for their actions in bringing criminal cases, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Tierney and Bower arising out of the decision to charge him should also be dismissed.
6. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claims against Defendants Palipski, Munley, Caljine, and Kosch should be dismissed Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain" the following:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
A document filed pro se is "to be liberally construed." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
"Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). "It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but merely 'provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)). Thus, to establish a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must, at a minimum, allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the alleged violation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. Plaintiff has failed to do this.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Palipski and Munley violated his rights because they are corrupt. Plaintiff does not identify what corrupt actions were undertaken by these Defendants, how Plaintiff was injured by those actions, or what constitutional rights those actions violated. As such, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable constitutional claim against Defendants Palipski and Munley.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Caljine violated his rights because Defendant Caljine is involved in a conspiracy with police. Plaintiff does not identify the other members of the conspiracy, explain what conduct undertaken by the members of this conspiracy violated his rights, or what constitutional rights those actions violated. As such, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable constitutional claim against Defendant Caljine.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Kosch violated his rights because Defendant Kosch induced Plaintiff to plead guilty to the charge of simple assault. Plaintiff does not identify the facts underlying his conclusion that Defendant Kosch forced him to plead guilty (i.e., Plaintiff does not describe what Defendant Kosch said or did in order to force Plaintiff to plead guilty).
Accordingly, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Palipski, Munley, Caljine, and Kosch be dismissed.
C. GRANTING FURTHER LEAVE TO AMEND WOULD BE FUTILE
Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). In this case, Plaintiff has already been granted one opportunity to amend his complaint and was given extension of time to do so. (Docs. 28, 39). Plaintiff was also advised that his amended complaint must be legibly written. (Doc. 39). Despite being granted this opportunity to amend, those portions of the Amended Complaint that are legible fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Other portions of the Amended Complaint are not legible. Because the portions of the Amended Complaint that the Court can decipher fail to state a claim, I find that granting further leave to amend would be futile. III. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:
(1) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 47) be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) without further leave to amend.Date: December 27, 2019
BY THE COURT
s/William I . Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.Date: December 27, 2019
BY THE COURT
s/William I . Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge