Opinion
2013-12-26
Michael NICHOLSON, etc., et al., respondents, v. INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF GARDEN CITY, et al., appellants.
Cullen and Dykman LLP, Garden City, N.Y. (Peter J. Mastaglio, Justin F. Capuano, and Sardar M. Agadullah of counsel), for appellants. Michael Nicholson, Garden City, N.Y., and Diana L. Nicholson, Garden City, N.Y., respondents pro se (one brief filed).
Cullen and Dykman LLP, Garden City, N.Y. (Peter J. Mastaglio, Justin F. Capuano, and Sardar M. Agadullah of counsel), for appellants. Michael Nicholson, Garden City, N.Y., and Diana L. Nicholson, Garden City, N.Y., respondents pro se (one brief filed).
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
In a hybrid action for a judgment declaring, among other things, that Local Law 4–2009 of the Village of Garden City is unconstitutional and proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Board of Trustees of Incorporated Village of Garden City dated August 13, 2009, resolving to enact Local Law 4–2009 of the Village of Garden City, the defendants/respondents appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Phelan, J.), entered March 27, 2012, as denied that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment, in effect, declaring that Local Law 4–2009 of the Village of Garden City is not unconstitutional, and granted that branch of the plaintiffs/petitioners' cross motion which was for summary judgment, in effect, declaring that Local Law 4–2009 of the Village of Garden City is unconstitutional.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the appellants' motion which was for summary judgment, in effect, declaring that Local Law 4–2009 of the Village of Garden City is not unconstitutional is granted, that branch of the plaintiffs/petitioners' cross motion which was for summary judgment, in effect, declaring that Local Law 4–2009 of the Village of Garden City is unconstitutional is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings, including the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that Local Law 4–2009 of the Village of Garden City is not unconstitutional.
Local Law 4–2009 of the Village of Garden City (hereinafter the local law) rezoned corner lots on four avenues in the Central Section of the Village of Garden City from R–20, a residential zoning classification requiring a minimum lot size of 20,000 square feet, to R–20C, a residential zoning classification prohibiting subdivision unless the resulting corner lot has a minimum lot size of 40,000 square feet. The local law applies to a 62,500–square–foot corner lot owed by the plaintiffs/petitioners (hereinafter the plaintiffs).
Initially, since the plaintiffs are mounting a facial attack on the constitutionality of the local law by virtue of the declaratory judgment causes of action set forth in the complaint/petition, rather than challenging the local law “as applied” to their property, the challenge is ripe for review ( see Yee v. Escondido, Cal., 503 U.S. 519, 533–534, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153; Levitt v. Incorporated Vil. of Sands Point, 6 N.Y.2d 269, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212, 160 N.E.2d 501; cf. Town of Islip v. Zalak, 165 A.D.2d 83, 95–96, 566 N.Y.S.2d 306).
We disagree with the Supreme Court's determination that the local law is unconstitutional. Legislative enactments are entitled to an “exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality” ( Lighthouse Shores v. Town of Islip, 41 N.Y.2d 7, 11, 390 N.Y.S.2d 827, 359 N.E.2d 337; see ATM One, LLC v. Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, 91 A.D.3d 585, 936 N.Y.S.2d 263; American Ind. Paper Mills Supply Co., Inc. v. County of Westchester, 65 A.D.3d 1173, 1175, 886 N.Y.S.2d 178). A local law is cloaked with the same strong presumption of constitutionality as a statute ( see Town of Huntington v. Park Shore Country Day Camp of Dix Hills, 47 N.Y.2d 61, 65, 416 N.Y.S.2d 774, 390 N.E.2d 282; Marcus Assoc. v. Town of Huntington, 45 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 410 N.Y.S.2d 546, 382 N.E.2d 1323; Matter of G & C Transp., Inc. v. McGrane, 97 A.D.3d 817, 818, 949 N.Y.S.2d 113). “With the police power as the predicate for the State's delegation of municipal zoning authority, a zoning ordinance will be struck down if it bears no substantial relation to the police power objective of promoting the public health, safety, morals or general welfare” (Trustees of Union Coll. in Town of Schenectady in State of N.Y. v. Members of Schenectady City Council, 91 N.Y.2d 161, 165, 667 N.Y.S.2d 978, 690 N.E.2d 862; see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303; Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 107, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 341 N.E.2d 236).
“The power to zone is derived from the Legislature and must be exercised in the case of towns and villages in accord with a ‘comprehensive plan’ ” (Asian Ams. for Equality v. Koch, 72 N.Y.2d 121, 131, 531 N.Y.S.2d 782, 527 N.E.2d 265; seeTown Law § 263; Village Law § 7–704). The function of land regulation is to implement a plan for the future development of the community ( see Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d at 109, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 341 N.E.2d 236). Thus, when a plaintiff fails to establish a “clear conflict” with a formal comprehensive plan, a zoning classification may not be annulled for incompatibility with the comprehensive plan (Infinity Consulting Group, Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 49 A.D.3d 813, 814, 854 N.Y.S.2d 524; see Taylor v. Incorporated Vil. of Head of Harbor, 104 A.D.2d 642, 644–645, 480 N.Y.S.2d 21; Blumberg v. City of Yonkers, 41 A.D.2d 300, 306–308, 341 N.Y.S.2d 977).
The record establishes that the local law is not inconsistent with the comprehensive plan of the Village. The local law is reasonably related to the legitimate stated purpose of preserving larger corner lots on the larger boulevard-style streets within the Central Section of the Village. Municipalities can “enact land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city” (Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631; see Trustees of Union Coll. in Town of Schenectady in State of N.Y. v. Members of Schenectady City Council, 91 N.Y.2d at 165, 667 N.Y.S.2d 978, 690 N.E.2d 862). Moreover, the local law was enacted after the issue of the subdivision of certain large corner lots in the Central Section of the Village was studied by an expert engaged by the Village, who advised it on the necessity of additional regulation, and offered alternative approaches to resolve the issue ( see Goodrich v. Town of Southampton, 39 N.Y.2d 1008, 1009, 387 N.Y.S.2d 242, 355 N.E.2d 297).
The plaintiffs' property was not arbitrarily singled out for different, less favorable treatment than neighboring properties in a manner that was inconsistent with a well-considered land-use plan, as would be required to sustain a finding of unconstitutional reverse spot zoning ( see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 132, 98 S.Ct. 2646; Matter of C/S 12th Ave. LLC v. City of New York, 32 A.D.3d 1, 9, 815 N.Y.S.2d 516; Peck Slip Assoc., LLC v. City Council of City of N.Y., 26 A.D.3d 209, 210, 809 N.Y.S.2d 56). A well-considered land-use plan can be shown by “evidence, from wherever derived,” that serves to “establish a total planning strategy for rational allocation of land use, reflecting consideration of the needs of the community as a whole” (Taylor v. Incorporated Vil. of Head of Harbor, 104 A.D.2d 642, 644, 480 N.Y.S.2d 21), ensuring that the public good will not be undetermined by “special interest, irrational ad hocery” ( id., quoting Matter of Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 188, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129, 306 N.E.2d 155; see Peck Slip Assoc., LLC v. City Council of City of N.Y., 26 A.D.3d at 210, 809 N.Y.S.2d 56). Here, the evidence demonstrates that the local law affects a total of 20 corner lots, and that the local law accords with the Village's rational comprehensive plan.
The plaintiffs' contention that the local law violates the uniformity requirement of Village Law § 7–702 is without merit.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have declared that the local law is not unconstitutional.
Since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings, including the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that the local law is not unconstitutional ( see Lanza v. Wagner, 11 N.Y.2d 317, 334, 229 N.Y.S.2d 380, 183 N.E.2d 670, appeal dismissed371 U.S. 74, 83 S.Ct. 177, 9 L.Ed.2d 163, cert. denied371 U.S. 901, 83 S.Ct. 205, 9 L.Ed.2d 164).