Opinion
NO. 14-19-00913-CV
03-02-2021
VIET NGUYEN AND TSUNG-JU "REX" CHUANG, INDIVIDUALLY AND TETRIX CONSTRUCTION GROUP, LLC D/B/A TROJAN GLOBAL CONSTRUCTION, Appellants v. SIMON NGUYEN, Appellee
On Appeal from the 125th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2016-18067
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants appeal a summary judgment enforcing a mediated settlement agreement. Appellants contend that the agreement is unenforceable because (1) it lacks assent from all parties, (2) it is ambiguous, and (3) it omits certain essential terms. Because we conclude that the settlement agreement is valid and enforceable, we affirm the trial court's judgment against appellants.
Background
Appellant Tetrix Construction Group, LLC d/b/a Trojan Global Construction ("Tetrix") is a construction company that focuses on hotel and other commercial construction. Appellants Viet Nguyen and Tsung-Ju Chuang ("Rex") are managers and members of Tetrix, each owning a one-third interest. At relevant times, appellee Simon Nguyen was also a manager, member, and one-third interest owner in Tetrix. We are told that another entity, Trojan Global Construction, Inc., predated Tetrix and was owned by Viet and Simon prior to the formation of Tetrix.
The settlement agreement at issue is the culmination of three proceedings between and among the present parties and related entities or persons. The first action is cause number 2016-18067; styled Viet Nguyen and Tsung-Ju "Rex" Chuang, Individually and Tetrix Construction Group, LLC d/b/a Trojan Global Construction v. Simon Nguyen; originally filed in the 113th Judicial District Court of Harris County and later transferred to the 125th District Court. When the plaintiffs filed that lawsuit, the claims at issue involved allegations that Simon breached his fiduciary duty by, among other things, commencing work on projects without Tetrix's authorization, appropriating business opportunities for himself, and making material misrepresentations to existing and potential customers regarding Tetrix's construction methods, qualifications, and ability to perform work. Based on these same allegations, plaintiffs also asserted claims for business disparagement and tortious interference.
The style of cause number 2016-18067 has varied over time. On some documents in our record, the style appears as: "Viet Nguyen and Tsung-Ju "Rex" Chuang, Individually and Derivatively on behalf of Tetrix Construction Group, LLC d/b/a Trojan Global Construction v. Simon Nguyen"; or as: "Viet Nguyen and Tsung-Ju "Rex" Chuang, Individually and as Equity Members of Tetrix Construction Group, LLC d/b/a Trojan Global Construction v. Simon Nguyen" (bold added).
The second proceeding is a lawsuit filed against Simon by Viet, individually and derivatively on behalf of Trojan Global Construction, Inc., known as cause number 2016-53079. The pleadings in that action are not included in our record so the nature of the allegations is unknown to us.
While these proceedings were pending, Simon purportedly obtained a personal loan from Tsung-Han "Ted" Chuang (Rex's brother), which resulted in a money judgment against Simon in a third proceeding, known as cause number 2017-00858; styled Tsung-Han "Ted" Chuang v. Simon Nguyen; in the 11th Judicial District Court of Harris County.
On June 14, 2019, a mediation was conducted jointly for the first two proceedings: cause numbers 2016-18067 and 2016-53079. The mediation resulted in a two-page written "Settlement Agreement" signed by Viet, Rex, Simon, and their respective attorneys (the "Agreement"). The document included a caption noting the cause number 2016-18067; identifying the plaintiffs as "Viet Nguyen and Tsung-Ju 'Rex' Chuang, Individually and Derivatively on Behalf of Tetrix Construction Group, LLC d/b/a Trojan Global Corporation;" and identifying Simon as the defendant. According to the Agreement's terms, it was intended to resolve all three proceedings. Among the Agreement's provisions were:
• The parties "agree[d] to settle all claims and controversies between them, asserted or assertable in this case."
• Simon was to receive $157,000 "by all Plaintiff [sic]," $25,000 of which was to be paid within thirty days of the agreement, and then $5,500 per month for twenty-four months.
• The "above styled and numbered case" was to be resolved by an agreed order of dismissal with prejudice "as to Cause 2016-18067 . . . and Cause No. 2016-53079, and Release of Judgment on 2017-00858."
• The parties agreed "to release, discharge and forever hold the other harmless from any and all claims . . . arising from or
related to the events and transactions which are the subject matter of this case, and all other matters asserted or unasserted in this cause; cause 2016-53079 and 2017-00858 and cause 2016-18067."
• The term "party" "as used in this release" included "all named parties to this case . . . and related entities of the parties."
Each signatory to the Agreement also represented and warranted that (1) he had authority to bind the parties for whom the signatory acts, and (2) "the claims, suits, rights and/or interests which are the subject matter hereto are owned by the party asserting same . . . ."
Approximately three weeks after the Agreement was signed, appellants' counsel filed a "Notice of Settlement" in cause number 2016-18067, which stated that: "[t]he parties have reached a complete settlement of this case at mediation. The parties anticipate that a settlement agreement will likely take approximately 30 days to be approved and executed by the parties. Once the settlement agreement has been executed, this lawsuit will be dismissed as to all parties and claims." The same attorney filed an identical Notice of Settlement in cause number 2016-53079 on behalf of the plaintiffs in that case—Viet, individually and derivatively on behalf of Trojan Global Construction, Inc.
Simon's attorney subsequently sent appellants a document titled "Settlement and Release Agreement," which was considerably longer than the Agreement and purportedly "represent[ed] the final agreement of the parties." Only Simon signed this document; appellants did not. Appellants also did not pay the initial $25,000 by the due date. They still refused to pay following a demand letter from Simon's attorney notifying appellants of their default.
Thereafter, Simon amended his pleadings in cause number 2016-18067 to assert a counterclaim for breach of contract. Simon also amended his answer to assert the defenses of settlement and release. Simon then moved for a traditional summary judgment on both his affirmative defense of release and his counterclaim for breach of the Agreement. Appellants responded, arguing that the Agreement was unenforceable because it (1) was not signed by Tetrix and (2) was impermissibly vague or omitted essential terms because it did not specify whether the $157,000 payment to Simon was to be divided equally among all plaintiffs.
The trial court granted Simon's motion. In its judgment, the court ordered that Simon recover on his breach of contract counterclaim; awarded Simon $157,000 from Viet, Rex, and Tetrix jointly and severally; and awarded pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, costs, and trial and conditional appellate attorney's fees. The trial court also ordered that Viet, Rex, and Tetrix take nothing from Simon and that "the judgment rendered in 2017-00858 is hereby released."
Viet, Rex, and Tetrix now appeal from the judgment in cause number 2016-18067.
Standard of Review
We review summary judgments de novo. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). Under well-established standards governing traditional motions for summary judgment, the movant carries the burden to show there is no genuine issue of material fact on a claim or defense, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). Once the movant establishes a right to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to produce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678-79 (Tex. 1979). Grounds not expressly presented to the trial court by written response cannot be considered as grounds for reversal on appeal. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d at 678.
Analysis
In a single issue, appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting Simon's motion for summary judgment. Appellants contend that the Agreement is unenforceable for essentially four reasons: (1) the Agreement does not specify if or how the $157,000 payment to Simon is to be apportioned among the several appellants; (2) no corporate representative signed the Agreement on behalf of Tetrix or Trojan Global Construction, Inc.; (3) the Agreement requires release of the judgment in cause number 2017-00858, but the judgment creditor in that case, Ted Chuang, did not sign the Agreement; and (4) the Agreement does not state the consideration that Trojan Global Construction, Inc. and Ted Chuang are to receive. For the reasons stated below, we reject each argument and conclude that the Agreement is valid and enforceable.
Simon moved for summary judgment on his defense of release and his counterclaim for breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment only on Simon's breach of contract counterclaim, so we address only that issue. To prevail on his breach of contract claim, Simon was required to prove: (1) a valid contract existed between the parties; (2) Simon tendered performance or was excused from doing so; (3) appellants breached the terms of the contract, and (4) Simon sustained damages as a result of appellants' breach. See MKM Eng'rs, Inc. v. Guzder, 476 S.W.3d 770, 777 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.); WTG Gas Processing, L.P. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 309 S.W.3d 635, 643 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). Simon addressed each element in his motion, and appellants disputed only the first one: the existence of a valid agreement.
A settlement agreement must comply with Rule 11 to be enforceable. Rule 11 agreements have long been recognized as "an effective tool for finalizing settlements by objective manifestation so that the agreements 'do not themselves become sources of controversy.'" Knapp Med. Ctr. v. De La Garza, 238 S.W.3d 767, 768 (Tex. 2007) (quoting Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tex. 1984)). Rule 11 requires settlement agreements to "be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record." Tex. R. Civ. P. 11. Compliance with Rule 11 is a threshold requirement for enforceability. Knapp Med. Ctr., 238 S.W.3d at 768. A Rule 11 settlement agreement also must contain all the essential terms of the settlement. Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 460 (Tex. 1995); MKM Eng'rs, Inc., 476 S.W.3d at 778. Essential terms are those terms that the parties "would reasonably regard as vitally important elements of their bargain," Potcinske v. McDonald Prop. Invs., Ltd., 245 S.W.3d 526, 531 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.), and include payment terms and release of claims. See Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 460-61. Courts construe Rule 11 settlement agreements just as they would any contract. See id. at 460; Trudy's Tex. Star, Inc. v. City of Austin, 307 S.W.3d 894, 914 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.).
A. Appellants' Arguments Based on Lack of Assent
1. Tetrix
There is no question that the Agreement was in writing and filed with the court. Appellants argue, however, that the Agreement is unenforceable because "no one signed on behalf of Tetrix." See Tex. R. Civ. P. 11.
Tetrix is a named party to the Agreement. As captioned, the Agreement names as plaintiffs in cause number 2016-18067: "Viet Nguyen and Tsung-Ju "Rex" Chuang, Individually and Derivatively on behalf of Tetrix Construction Group, LLC d/b/a Trojan Global Construction." Besides identifying Tetrix as a plaintiff in the caption, the Agreement includes Tetrix as a party in the release paragraph, which states that "[t]he parties agree to release, discharge, and forever hold the other harmless from any and all claims." The release paragraph defines "party" as including "all named parties to this case." The plural language in these provisions encompasses the plaintiffs collectively—Viet, Rex, and Tetrix. At the end of the Agreement, signature lines appear for "Plaintiffs," "Defendants," and their respective attorneys. In the spaces provided under "Plaintiffs," Viet and Rex each signed a single time, with no indication of whether they were signing individually, on Tetrix's behalf, or both. Simon signed in the space for "Defendants." Appellants' attorney and Simon's attorney each signed the Agreement.
While acknowledging that Viet and Rex signed the Agreement and that they are bound by it individually, appellants argue that their signatures do not "evidence their authority" to bind Tetrix. For several reasons, we disagree that Viet and Rex by their signatures bound only themselves and not Tetrix to the Agreement.
First, Tetrix is a limited liability company and acts through its authorized agents. See In re Vesta Ins. Grp., Inc., 192 S.W.3d 759, 762 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding, per curiam) ("[C]orporations must act through human agents."). The Texas Business Organizations Code provides that "each governing person of a limited liability company and each officer of a limited liability company vested with actual or apparent authority by the governing authority of the company is an agent of the company for purposes of carrying out the company's business." Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 101.254(a). "Governing person" means "a person serving as part of the governing authority of an entity." Id. § 1.002(37). "Governing authority" is defined as:
(1) the managers of the company, if the company's certificate of formation states that the company will have one or more managers; or
(2) the members of the company, if the company's certificate of formation states that the company will not have managers.Id. § 101.251
The Business Organizations Code also describes the circumstances when the act of a limited liability company's governing person or agent binds the company:
(b) An act committed by an agent of a limited liability company described by Subsection (a) for the purpose of apparently carrying out the ordinary course of business of the company, including the execution of an instrument, document, mortgage, or conveyance in the name of the company, binds the company unless:
Id. § 101.254(b).(1) the agent does not have actual authority to act for the company; and
(2) the person with whom the agent is dealing has knowledge of the agent's lack of actual authority.
Appellants' petition asserted and it is undisputed that Viet and Rex are two of Tetrix's three members, with Simon being the third member. Throughout this entire proceeding, Viet and Rex, as Tetrix members, have asserted the rights of Tetrix derivatively, thus exercising decision-making authority on Tetrix's behalf. No party has contested Viet's and Rex's authority to assert derivative claims, and Simon relied on Viet's and Rex's "dual capacities" in support of his summary judgment argument that Tetrix assented to the Agreement.
Consistent with their actions in bringing derivative claims in the first place, both Viet and Rex represented and warranted in the Agreement that they "ha[d] the authority to bind the parties for who[m] that signatory acts," and that the claims, rights, and interests that are the "subject matter hereto" were owned by the parties asserting them. As a limited liability company whose interests are being asserted derivatively by its member agents Viet and Rex, Tetrix undisputedly is a named party to the proceeding. E.g., Providential Inv. Corp. v. Dibrell, 320 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. App.—Houston 1959, no writ) (in derivative suit, the "real party at interest is the corporation," which is "a necessary party to the suit"). The parties asserting the rights and interests that are the subject matter of the settlement, therefore, include Tetrix. The Agreement does not differentiate between Viet and Rex individually, and Viet and Rex as representative members of Tetrix. Nor is there any indication in the Agreement that Viet and Rex intended to sign only on their own behalf, but not on Tetrix's, such as a blank signature line for Tetrix. Indeed, no persons other than Viet and Rex could have signed on Tetrix's behalf to settle the company's claims asserted derivatively against Simon. See In re Vesta Ins. Grp., Inc., 192 S.W.3d at 762; Hufco-Beaumont, LLC v. Johnson, No. 14-10-01011-CV, 2011 WL 2462195, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 21, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
As Tetrix members with decision-making power, Viet and Rex are "governing persons" and agents of Tetrix. See Badmand Holdings, LLC v. Jimin Xie, No. 05-15-01379-CV, 2016 WL 6835722, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 4, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (signatory to contract was member of LLC and one of its two decision-makers and therefore was a governing person of LLC, which made him an agent of LLC; signatory's acts bound LLC). Thus, the signatures of Viet and Rex bound Tetrix to the Agreement unless two things existed: (1) Viet and Rex did not have actual authority; and (2) Simon knew Viet and Rex did not have actual authority. See Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 101.254(b). Neither prong is satisfied on this record. We therefore conclude that Viet and Rex had authority to sign the Agreement and that their signatures bound Tetrix.
Our conclusion is notably consistent with general agency law. As Viet, Rex, and Simon are or were the only members of Tetrix, Tetrix is a known principal. Generally, and unless otherwise agreed, a disclosed principal is a party to a contract made by its agent within the scope of the agent's authority. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 147 (1958); see also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 6.01 (2006).
According to appellants, Simon did not prove that Viet and Rex are part of Tetrix's "governing authority" under section 101.251, because nothing in the record indicates whether Tetrix was managed by members or managed by managers. Texas limited liability companies are either member-managed or manager-managed. See Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 101.251. The company's certificate of formation must indicate whether the company will be managed by members or by managers. See id. § 3.010(1) (requiring the certificate of formation to specify whether the LLC will or will not have managers). To be sure, we do not have Tetrix's certificate of formation in our record. However, the summary judgment motion, response, and all evidence in the record establish that no persons other than Viet and Rex possess and have exercised the requisite decision-making authority for Tetrix. Appellants raised no genuine issue of material fact on that issue.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the record does not conclusively show that Viet and Rex are "governing persons" or agents of Tetrix, Tetrix is nonetheless bound to the Agreement if it ratified it. See Reliant Energy Servs., Inc. v. Cotton Valley Compression L.L.C., 336 S.W.3d 764, 783 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); see also Dhingra v. Mendelow, No. 14-00-00770-CV, 2001 WL 1136149, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 27, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (a party recognizes validity of a contract by affirmatively acknowledging it). As Simon reminded the court in his summary judgment motion, appellants filed two "Notice[s] of Settlement" in the trial court, one in each of the first two actions. Both notices stated affirmatively that the "parties have reached a complete settlement of this case at mediation." (Emphasis added). The "parties" to each proceeding as referenced in both notices of settlement included Tetrix (cause number 2016-18067) and Trojan Global Construction, Inc. (cause number 2016-53079). The notices were signed by Tetrix's counsel—the same counsel who signed the Agreement. Both notices stated that the "lawsuit will be dismissed as to all parties and claims," and neither notice indicated that any parties or entities were excluded from the settlement. In his summary judgment motion, Simon asserted that Viet, Rex, and Tetrix joined in filing the Notice of Settlement. By filing the notices of settlement three weeks after the Agreement was signed, Viet, Rex, and Tetrix effectively adopted or ratified the Agreement. See Bob Montgomery Chevrolet, Inc. v. Dent Zone Cos., 409 S.W.3d 181, 195 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) ("Ratification of a contract occurs when a party recognizes the validity of a contract by acting under it, performing under it, or affirmatively acknowledging it."); Dhingra, 2001 WL 1136149, at *3 (same).
We note that Simon's summary judgment motion did not explicitly use the term "ratification," but he plainly discussed and attached the notice of settlement in support of his argument that Tetrix cannot now be heard to disavow the Agreement. This is the essence of a ratification argument, and appellants did not dispute that Tetrix filed the notice of settlement, in which Tetrix represented to the court that it had settled its claims.
We conclude that, on these specific facts, the Agreement unambiguously reflects Viet's and Rex's assent to the Agreement's terms, in both their individual and representative capacities. Accord Crowder v. Ann L. Crowder Estate Tr., No. 01-06-00606-CV, 2007 WL 2874818, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 4, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (settlement agreement did not differentiate between Crowder individually and as trustee; single signature over signature block that included both capacities connected Crowder to released claims both individually and as trustee); cf. Plotkin v. Joekel, 304 S.W.3d 455, 474 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (contract was ambiguous as to whether signatory signed in individual or representative capacity or both, when contract terms used both singular and plural possessives). Alternatively, Tetrix indicated its assent by filing the Notice of Settlement. Thus, Tetrix assented to, and is bound by, the Agreement.
2. Trojan Global Construction, Inc., and Ted Chuang
Appellants also complain that the Agreement cannot be enforceable because neither Trojan Global Construction, Inc., nor Ted Chuang signed it. The Agreement purports to bind Trojan and Ted by requiring the dismissal of Trojan's lawsuit (cause number 2016-53079) and the release of a final judgment in which Ted allegedly had an interest (cause number 2017-00858). We need not address these questions because Trojan Global Construction, Inc. and Ted Chuang are not parties to this appeal. Texas courts have long held that an appealing party may not complain of errors that do not injuriously affect it or that merely affect the rights of others. See Tex. Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund v. Mandlbauer, 988 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. 1999); Buckholts Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Tex. 1982); Jackson v. Fontaine's Clinics, Inc., 499 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex. 1973); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Grays, 114 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. 1938). Whether the trial court's judgment may have been erroneous as to Trojan Global Construction, Inc. or Ted Chuang, questions we need not decide, any such error does not injuriously affect the named appellants here.
According to Simon's summary judgment motion, appellant told Simon that Ted no longer owned the judgment in cause number 2017-00858 because he assigned it to them. Appellants did not dispute the point in their summary judgment response. In fact, appellants represented that, "[u]pon information and belief, Ted Chuang . . . transferred his judgment to Rex Chuang," and that they understood that "Simon Nguyen wanted a release of the judgment against him that Rex Chuang now holds."
B. Appellants' Arguments Based on the Lack of Essential Terms
Appellants next argue that the Agreement is ambiguous and lacks essential terms because it fails to specify how the $157,000 payment to Simon is to be apportioned among appellants, and because the Agreement does not state the consideration that Trojan Global Construction, Inc. and Ted Chuang are to receive.
Essential terms of a Rule 11 settlement agreement include payment terms and release of claims. See Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 460-61. The Agreement sets forth consideration and a full release of all claims. It states that Simon shall receive $157,000 as consideration for the settlement. There was a blank space where the parties could clarify that the "sum will be paid by the following parties in the amount stated," but that space was filled in with the payment schedule, not an apportionment of payment responsibility. Instead, the Agreement contemplates that the consideration to Simon is payable jointly and severally by all appellants because it provides simply that Simon shall receive $157,000 "by all Plaintiff [sic]."
When two co-signers promise the same performance to the same promisee, joint and several liability usually arises unless a contrary intention is apparent in the language of the instrument. E.g., Stavron v. SureTec Ins. Co., No. 02-19-00125-CV, 2019 WL 6768125, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 12, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); Pitman v. Lightfoot, 937 S.W.2d 496, 528 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) ("[O]bligations of multiple parties to a contract are usually 'joint and several.'"). Appellants' argument therefore does not persuade us that an allocation of payment responsibility was essential to the contract or that the Agreement is invalid on this basis.
Although their argument is primarily framed as an omitted essential term—i.e., that payment allocation is missing from the Agreement, thus rendering the contract invalid—appellants also argue that this omission renders the contract ambiguous. Specifically, appellants assert that the unsigned Settlement and Release Agreement "undeniably demonstrates the ambiguity of the [] payment term," because the later-prepared document provided that Tetrix was solely responsible for all payment, whereas such a provision is missing from the signed Agreement. We may not consider extrinsic evidence for the purpose of creating an ambiguity. See Sacks v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam). Here, the Agreement plainly states that Simon shall receive $157,000 from all plaintiffs, which unambiguously indicates joint and several liability.
Appellants also argue that the Agreement lacks essential terms as to Trojan and Ted because it "contains no recitation of the consideration Trojan or Ted will receive for releasing their claims and judgment (respectively) against Simon, effectively leaving two essential terms open for future negotiation." Again, we need not decide whether the Agreement is indefinite as to them, because they are not parties to this appeal.
Finally, appellants contend one other aspect of consideration is missing, namely that the Agreement is silent as to whether Simon must resign from Tetrix and relinquish his ownership interest, events that all parties understood would occur as part of the settlement. This omission, appellants insist, "would result in Simon being required to pay himself." We reject this argument because the Agreement on its face contains sufficient terms to establish its validity. It includes payment terms and mutual releases among all parties. Parties may agree on terms sufficient to create a contract, even while leaving other provisions for later negotiation and agreement. See Scott v. Ingle Bros. Pac, Inc., 489 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1972); cf. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 2.201(a) (providing that writing is not insufficient because it omits term, but only written terms can be enforced). Appellants' desired inclusion of additional terms they say were omitted does not raise a fact issue concerning the enforceability of the Agreement as written. See Robinson v. Cason, No. 01-11-00916-CV, 2013 WL 3354651, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 2, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Conclusion
Simon conclusively established a settlement agreement among all the parties as well as his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on his breach of contract claim. All other claims having been rendered moot by the settlement, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in Simon's favor.
See Mantas v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 656, 658-59 (Tex. 1996).
We overrule appellants' sole issue on appeal, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.
/s/ Kevin Jewell
Justice Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Poissant, and Wilson.