Opinion
NO. 01-19-00046-CV
11-14-2019
HELEN HUONG LAN NGUYEN A/K/A MRS. VAN BINH, Appellant v. MAYA DANGELAS, AS NEXT FRIEND OF HER MINOR CHILD, K.D., Appellee
On Appeal from the 127th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2018-56878
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Maya Dangelas and her adoptive daughter, K.T., are both originally from Vietnam. They now live in Houston and share strong ties with the local Vietnamese refugee community. For a time, Maya was close friends with Helen Nguyen, who also lives in Houston. After Maya and Helen had a falling out, Maya was told that Helen was making alarming, disparaging comments about Maya's daughter to others in the Vietnamese refugee community. Maya, as next friend of K.T., sued Helen for defamation. Helen moved for dismissal of Maya's suit under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. The trial court denied Helen's dismissal motion, and Helen appealed.
For ease of reading and because some individuals discussed in this memorandum opinion share last names, we will refer to each person by their first name or a pseudonym, when appropriate.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 27.001-.011.
In three issues, Helen contends the trial court erred in denying her TCPA motion. We affirm.
Background
In 2007, while Maya was still living in Vietnam, Maya's brother and his girlfriend had a child. The girlfriend chose to place the child for adoption. Maya stepped in and agreed to adopt the child. Maya's adoption of K.T.—who hereafter will be referred to as Kelly—became final in 2010. Maya and Kelly left Vietnam and moved to Houston in 2012.
Beginning around 2016, Kelly began taking classes at the Van Binh Self-Defense Academy, which was owned by Maya's good friend, Helen, and Helen's husband.
In mid-2018, Maya and Helen had a falling out. A couple months later, two mutual friends, Huy Luong and Lan Luong, were at a restaurant with Helen when Helen began discussing Kelly. According to their declarations, which are part of the appellate record, Helen told Huy and Lan at the restaurant that Kelly is the "bastard child" of the former president of Vietnam, Truong Tan Sang. Huy and Lan state that Helen's accusation carries "significant weight" in the Vietnamese refugee community because Vietnamese refugees experienced the cruelty of the Viet Cong party when it took over their country and because many of the refugees lost family members in the takeover.
Huy and Lan state that it was "apparent" Helen "intended to disparage" Kelly by making such a claim. They explain: "Asserting that [Kelly] is the illegitimate child of a powerful member of the Viet Cong party is particularly harmful in our community. That invites hatred. The child will be subject to threats and violence."
According to Maya, Helen's alarming accusations were not limited to dinner conversation. Maya alleges that Helen conspired with others to cause certain Facebook posts to appear online, which also call Kelly the "bastard child" of Truong Tan Sang and call Maya the "Number One Prostitute" of Vietnam.
These posts are written in the Vietnamese language. The parties' pleadings and evidence provide unofficial translations of their content. No party has disputed the accuracy of the translations offered by either party.
Maya contends Helen's statements were false. The appellate record includes reports of DNA testing performed in 2010 and again in 2018, which establish that Maya's brother and Kelly are biologically related.
Maya's brother also lives in Houston.
Maya further contends that Helen's statements significantly damaged Kelly. Maya's affidavit describes the damage Helen's statement allegedly caused:
K.D. was harmed by Mrs. Nguyen's false statements. . . . Mrs. Nguyen's statements have caused a significant disruption to K.D.'s daily life that is interfering with her education and enjoyment of life. K.D. has not been able to go to the Vietnamese school to study Vietnamese. K.D. cannot go to the Vietnamese Temple to worship. K.D. cannot go to the Vietnamese community to learn about her heritage and cultural background. She cannot go to the Vietnamese market. She cannot go to the normal places she goes in her daily life. I have had to take K.D. out of the activities she enjoys so that she will not be exposed to threats.
Maya, as next friend of Kelly, sued Helen for defamation. She seeks damages on Kelly's behalf, injunctive relief, and a retraction of Helen's false statements about Kelly. Helen moved to dismiss the defamation suit under the summary dismissal procedures found in the Texas Citizens Participation Act. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 27.001-.011.
The TCPA contains a mechanism for limited discovery. Id. § 27.006(b). Maya invoked that provision and, over Helen's objection, the trial court allowed Maya to depose Helen. Portions of the deposition transcript are in the record.
At the deposition, Helen was asked about Kelly's parentage. Helen testified she knows only that Kelly is Maya's daughter. Helen stated that she has no other knowledge about Kelly's biological parents. She denied ever having a conversation about Kelly being the daughter of the former president of Vietnam. Helen testified that she has no interest in the topic of Kelly's parentage—describing the issue as "not important" and "nothing at all," because it is Kelly's "private life." In other words, Helen denied ever discussing Kelly's parentage, directly contradicting Huy's and Lan's declarations.
Following Helen's deposition, the trial court denied Helen's TCPA dismissal motion, and Helen appeals. See id. § 51.014(a)(4) (permitting interlocutory appeal of denial of TCPA motion).
Texas Citizens Participation Act
The TCPA's purpose is to protect "citizens who petition or speak on matters of public concern from retaliatory lawsuits that seek to intimidate or silence them." In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 584 (Tex. 2015). It does so by creating a "set of procedural mechanisms through which a litigant may require, by motion, a threshold testing of the merits of legal proceedings or filings that are deemed to implicate the expressive interests protected by the statute, with the remedies of expedited dismissal, cost-shifting, and sanctions for any found wanting." Serafine v. Blunt, 466 S.W.3d 352, 369 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, no pet.) (Pemberton, J., concurring); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 27.003-.009.
This suit is determined under the pre-September 1, 2019 version of the statute.
A. TCPA's dismissal provision and relevant statutory definitions
Section 27.003 of the TCPA provides that a party may file a motion to dismiss a legal action that "is based on, relates to, or is in response to [that] party's exercise of" one of three rights: free speech, petition, or association. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(a). The Legislature defined "legal action" as "a lawsuit, cause of action, petition, complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim or any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal or equitable relief." Id. § 27.001(6). The Legislature also statutorily defined the three sets of rights protected by TCPA summary-dismissal procedures. Id. § 27.001(3) (defining "exercise of the right of free speech" as "a communication made in connection with a matter of public concern"); § 27.001(2) (defining "exercise of the right of association" as "a communication between individuals who join together to collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend common interests"); § 27.001(4) (defining "exercise of the right to petition").
B. TCPA's shifting burdens
When a movant seeks dismissal under the TCPA, the movant has the initial burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the nonmovant has asserted a "legal action" that is based on, relates to, or is in response to the movant's exercise of one of the three rights delineated in the statute. Id. § 27.005(b). If the movant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant.
The nonmovant has the burden to establish by clear and specific evidence a "prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question." Id. § 27.005(c). This generally "requires only the minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact is true." In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see, e.g., Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, Ltd., 416 S.W.3d 71, 80 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (explaining that Legislature's use of "prima facie case" in Chapter 27 indicates minimal factual burden).
Dismissal may be required, notwithstanding the nonmovant's evidence proffered to meet its burden, if the movant establishes "by a preponderance of the evidence each essential element of a valid defense to the nonmovant's claim." Id. § 27.005(d).
"Prima facie evidence is evidence that, until its effect is overcome by other evidence, will suffice as proof of a fact in issue. In other words, a prima facie case is one that will entitle a party to recover if no evidence to the contrary is offered by the opposite party." Rehak Creative Servs., Inc. v. Witt, 404 S.W.3d 716, 726 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (citation omitted) (disapproved of on other grounds, In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 587-88); cf. Kerlin v. Arias, 274 S.W.3d 666, 668 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (explaining that summary-judgment movant's presentation of prima facie evidence of deed's validity established right to summary judgment unless nonmovants presented evidence raising fact issue related to deed's validity).
A nonmovant should be able to meet the clear and specific standard in a defamation case if her "pleadings and evidence" establish "the facts of when, where, and what was said, the defamatory nature of the statements, and how they damaged the plaintiff." In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 591. It generally suffices if a plaintiff provides "enough detail to show the factual basis for its claim." Id. This standard is higher than the notice-pleading standard, see TEX. R. CIV. P. 45, 47, but it does not require direct evidence; circumstantial evidence can suffice. In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 591. At the same time, though, "[c]onclusory statements are not probative and . . . will not suffice to establish a prima facie case." Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc. v. John Moore Servs., Inc., 441 S.W.3d 345, 355 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied); see In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 592 (explaining that "bare, baseless opinions" are not "a sufficient substitute for the clear and specific evidence required to establish a prima facie case" under the TCPA).
The trial court considers the pleadings and any supporting and opposing affidavits to evaluate whether each party has met its burden. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(a); In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 587. The trial court also "may allow specified and limited discovery relevant to the motion" to dismiss. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(b); see In re SSCP Mgmt., Inc., 573 S.W.3d 464, 472 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, no pet.) (acknowledging that "some merits-based discovery" may be necessary for nonmovant to respond to TCPA dismissal motion). Thus, in addition to the pleadings and affidavits, "a trial court may, but is not required to, hear live testimony and receive the submission of documentary evidence" in determining whether to grant or deny a dismissal motion. Batra v. Covenant Health Sys., 562 S.W.3d 696, 707 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. denied). A trial court considers the pleadings and evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Porter-Garcia v. Travis Law Firm, P.C., 564 S.W.3d 75, 84 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
Standard of Review
We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a TCPA motion to dismiss. Better Bus. Bureau, 441 S.W.3d at 353. To the extent resolution of this appeal turns on construction of the TCPA, we review that de novo as well. Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tex. 2015). When construing the TCPA, as with any other statute, our objective is to give effect to the legislative intent, looking first to the statute's plain language. Id. If that language is unambiguous, "we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning." Id. Additionally, we construe the TCPA "liberally to effectuate its purpose and intent fully." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.011(b); see State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2018).
Whether the Parties Met Their TCPA Burdens
Helen identifies two rights she contends Maya's suit is based on, related to, or in response to. She asserts the defamation claim is based on, related to, or in response to her right of free speech. And she asserts the conspiracy claim is based on, relates to, or is in response to her right of free speech and right of association.
Even assuming Helen could meet her burden to establish that the legal action against her is sufficiently connected to her rights of free speech and association, Helen's appeal necessarily fails because Maya adequately met her burden to establish a prima facie case of the essential elements of her claim. Accordingly, we focus our review on step two of the analysis, which considers Maya's prima facie proof. Before doing so, though, we must address an argument raised by Helen regarding the unit of measurement for Maya's prima facie case.
A. Whether Maya's suit presents three "legal actions," each requiring prima facie proof to prevent dismissal
Helen argues that Maya has three legal actions: her defamation claim, her conspiracy allegation, and her request for injunctive relief.
As we have already held in a related suit, when a party seeks injunctive relief as a remedy for tortious conduct, the pursuit of an injunction is not its own TCPA "legal action" subject to discrete dismissal. Bui v. Dangelas, No. 01-18-01146-CV, 2019 WL 5151410, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 15, 2019, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); see Van Der Linden v. Khan, 535 S.W.3d 179, 201-03 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. denied) (rejecting idea that each form of recovery is separate legal action, and stating, "Because when a legal action is dismissed pursuant to the TCPA, all remedies available under that legal theory disappear with the dismissal of the action itself, a chapter 27 challenge to a request for injunctive relief should be directed at the underlying legal action, not at the requested remedy."); Ruder v. Jordan, No. 05-14-01265-CV, 2015 WL 4397636, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 20, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (declining to review separately trial court's denial of TCPA dismissal of injunctive relief because "injunctive relief . . . is ancillary to the defamation claims" already reviewed). A plaintiff defending against a TCPA dismissal motion is not required to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to an injunctive remedy. Bui, 2019 WL 5151410, at *6.
Maya has a defamation suit against two others in the Vietnamese refugee community for Facebook posts they authored claiming that Maya is a "Viet Cong bitch" with access to hundreds of millions of Viet Cong money that they allege she is using to bribe locals and support Viet Cong objectives. Those defendants' TCPA motions were denied. This Court affirmed the trial court's order.
Likewise, when a party seeks to hold another liable for participating in a conspiracy, the allegation of a conspiracy is not a separate legal action for which a prima facie showing is required; it is, instead, a theory of collective liability that continues to seek to hold the tortfeasor liable for the underlying tort. See Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. Jones, 538 S.W.3d 781, 813-14 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. granted) (argument heard on Sept. 19, 2019 on appeal to Texas Supreme Court, wherein appellant challenges whether plaintiff satisfied prerequisites to suit for defamation). As such, Maya had no burden to make a prima facie showing of conspiracy. See id. (because conspiracy claim is a derivative tort, trial court does not err by refusing to analyze conspiracy claim separate from defamation claim in connection with TCPA dismissal motion).
Maya's burden, therefore, was to establish by clear and specific evidence a "prima facie case for each essential element" of her defamation claim only. Bui, 2019 WL 5151410, at *6-7.
We overrule Helen's first and third issues.
B. Whether Maya met her burden with regard to the defamation claim
"Defamation is generally defined as the invasion of a person's interest in her reputation and good name." Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. 2013). The tort includes libel and slander. Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 60 (Tex. 2013). Defamatory statements are those that tend to (1) "injure a living person's reputation and thereby expose the person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or financial injury" as well as those statement that (2) "impeach any person's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.001; see Mem'l Hermann Health Sys. v. Khalil, No. 01-16-00512-CV, 2017 WL 3389645, at *6-7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 8, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Double Diamond, Inc. v. Van Tyne, 109 S.W.3d 848, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). The elements of a defamation claim include (1) the publication of a false statement of fact to a third party that was defamatory concerning the plaintiff, (2) the requisite degree of fault, and (3) in some cases, damages. In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 593.
A statement is considered "published" when it is communicated to a third person who is capable of understanding its defamatory meaning and in such a way that the person did understand its defamatory meaning. Thomas-Smith v. Mackin, 238 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
The requisite degree of fault is determined based on the status of the individual allegedly defamed (or, in some cases, the context of the statement made). See Neely, 418 S.W.3d at 61; Maewal v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 886, 893 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, writ denied); Combined Law Enf't Ass'ns of Tex. v. Sheffield, No. 03-13-00105-CV, 2014 WL 411672, at *6-8 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 31, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). A public figure suing for defamation is required to prove actual malice in the making of the defamatory statement; a private individual is required to prove only negligence. Neely, 418 S.W.3d at 61.
Regarding context, the heightened standard of malice is required if, for example, the challenged communication is made by a peer review committee. See Batra v. Covenant Health Sys., 562 S.W.3d 696, 710 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. denied).
In making a prima facie showing, damages must be shown when the form of defamation is defamation per quod, but general damages are presumed to exist for defamation per se. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 593, 596.
We consider whether Maya established a prima facie case as to each of these defamation elements.
1. A false, defamatory statement of fact about the plaintiff that was published to a third party
Whether a statement is defamatory is initially a question of law for the court. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989); Campbell v. Clark, 471 S.W.3d 615, 624 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). As stated, a defamatory statement "tends to injure a living person's reputation and thereby expose the person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule" or "to impeach any person's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.001; see Campbell, 471 S.W.3d at 624-25. "To qualify as defamation, a statement should be derogatory, degrading, somewhat shocking, and contain elements of disgrace. By contrast, a communication that is merely unflattering, abusive, annoying, irksome, or embarrassing," in light of the circumstances, "or that only hurts a person's feelings, is not actionable." MVS Int'l Corp. v. Int'l Advert. Sols., LLC, 545 S.W.3d 180, 202 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.); see Campbell, 471 S.W.3d at 624. The statement must assert an objectively verifiable fact but need not do so directly. Campbell, 417 S.W.3d at 625; Avila v. Larrea, 394 S.W.3d 646, 655, 658 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied).
We construe an allegedly defamatory publication as a whole in light of the surrounding circumstances and based upon how a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive it. In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 594; Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 114 (Tex. 2000); see City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 811 (Tex. 2005) ("[P]ublications alleged to be defamatory must be viewed as a whole—including accompanying statements, headlines, pictures, and the general tenor and reputation of the source itself."). A "person of ordinary intelligence" is one who "exercises care and prudence, but not omniscience, when evaluating allegedly defamatory communications." New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 157 (Tex. 2004). This is an objective standard. Campbell, 471 S.W.3d at 625.
Maya has presented evidence that Helen made a factual assertion about Kelly to third parties. Huy's and Lan's declarations state that Helen openly accused Kelly of being the "bastard child" of the former leader of Vietnam in a conversation the three had at a local restaurant. Both state that Helen's accusation was "intended to disparage" Kelly and that, in their Vietnamese refugee community, it is a "particularly harmful" accusation that "invites hatred" against Kelly within the community and subjects her "to threats and violence."
Maya has presented evidence that Helen's alleged statement was false. The record includes DNA-testing reports, indicating that Maya's brother and Kelly are biologically related. Maya also has presented the affidavit of her brother, who avers that he is Kelly's biological father.
Maya additionally has presented evidence of how Kelly has suffered emotionally from the false accusation. Maya avers that Kelly has suffered fear, anxiety, indignation, grief, and humiliation. Moreover, the threats and humiliation have caused Kelly to abandon many of her daily routines and to avoid the Vietnamese community centers she once enjoyed.
Maya's evidence establishes a prima facie showing that Helen's statement about Kelly to Huy and Lan was false and defamatory.
2. Requisite degree of fault
Helen concedes that Kelly is not a public figure, meaning that Maya's prima-facie burden is only to show that Helen acted with negligence. See WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998) (explaining that a private plaintiff must prove only that the defendant "was at least negligent," whereas a public official or public figure must establish actual malice, which is a higher degree of fault than negligence), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1051 (1999).
In a defamation action, a person acts negligently if she knew or should have known a defamatory statement was false, Neely, 418 S.W.3d at 72, or failed to investigate the truth or falsity of the statement. Newspaper Holdings, 416 S.W.3d at 85.
The record contains evidence that Kelly's biological father is Maya's brother. In her deposition, Helen was asked if she investigated who Kelly's father was. She indicated that she had no need to look into it because she "already asked" Maya about it when the two were friends, thereby making further investigation "not necessary."
There is no evidence that Kelly is the daughter of the former leader of Vietnam, as Helen allegedly stated. Instead, there is affirmative evidence that she is the biological daughter of her adoptive mother's brother. If Helen asked Maya about Kelly's parentage back when the two were friends, there is no basis from which to infer that Helen was told the biological parents were anyone other than who they truly are. There is no evidence Helen was told that Truong Tan Sang is Kelly's biological father. To the extent she knew who Kelly's biological father is, she knew it to be Maya's brother. To the extent she did not know, there is no evidence she undertook any investigation to determine the truth before allegedly publishing false statements linking this Vietnamese-American child to a Vietnamese communist leader.
From this, we conclude Maya satisfied the prima facie showing of negligence.
3. Damages
Evidence of special damages is not required in a prima facie showing when the defamatory statements qualify as defamation per se, as opposed to defamation per quod. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 596. "Defamation per se refers to statements that are so obviously harmful that general damages, such as mental anguish and loss of reputation, are presumed." Id. Defamation per se includes several categories of falsehoods, such as those accusing someone "of a crime, of having a foul or loathsome disease, or of engaging in serious sexual misconduct." Id. Whether a statement qualifies as defamation per se is generally a question of law. Id. If Helen's statement qualifies as defamation per se, Maya has no burden to make a prima facie showing of damages to survive a TCPA dismissal motion. Van Der Linden, 535 S.W.3d at 198, 202.
We need not decide, at this juncture, whether Helen's statements qualify as defamation per se to relieve Maya of the burden of establishing prima facie proof of damages because, even assuming she has the burden to establish such damages, she has met her burden.
In a defamation case that implicates the TCPA, pleadings and evidence that establish "the facts of when, where, and what was said, the defamatory nature of the statements, and how they damaged the plaintiff" should be adequate to avoid dismissal. In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 591 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court of Texas has identified three types of damages that may be at issue in defamation proceedings: "(1) nominal damages; (2) actual or compensatory damages; and (3) exemplary damages." Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 65. "Actual or compensatory damages" are intended to compensate a plaintiff for the injury she incurred, and they include both general damages—i.e., non-economic damages such as for loss of reputation or mental anguish—and special damages. Id.; see MacFarland v. Le-Vel Brands LLC, No. 05-16-00672-CV, 2017 WL 1089684, at *13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 23, 2017, no pet.).
A prima facie showing of damages in a defamation per quod suit can be met with evidence of general, non-economic reputational damages. See MacFarland, 2017 WL 1089684, at *13 (in TCPA review, concluding that party failed to meet its burden to establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for general damages respecting allegedly defamatory statements).
The record contains Maya's affidavit, which describes the harm Helen's accusations have caused Kelly. She avers that Kelly, a young child, is suffered a "significant disruption" in her daily life, which is "interfering with her education and enjoyment of life." Kelly is forced to avoid her former activities so that she "will not be exposed to threats." She is no longer able to go to the Vietnamese school for education, the Vietnamese Temple to worship, or the Vietnamese market and community centers for cultural and social benefits. She cannot engage in other activities she used to enjoy. She has been told "terrible things" because of Helen's accusation, and threats and disparaging comments would continue if she were to appear at these Vietnamese centers. There is evidence that the reaction within the Vietnamese refugee community to Helen's alleged statement has led those within the community to lash out at Kelly in a way that has caused Kelly to "experienced grief, . . . public humiliation, despair, shame, . . . fear, anxiety, and indignation." This evidence meets the prima facie standard for evidence of actual or compensatory damages.
We overrule Helen's second issue. Having concluded that Maya met the prima facie standard for her defamation claim, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying Helen's TCPA motion to dismiss.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's order and remand for additional proceedings.
Sarah Beth Landau
Justice Panel consists of Justices Lloyd, Goodman, and Landau.