Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. LF 002061. Michael J. Convey, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal.Const., art. VI, § 21.)
A.B., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Alan Ross for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J.
A.B. appeals from the judgment entered on N.F.’s petition to establish parental relationship. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
N.F. initiated this proceeding on March 21, 2003, by filing a petition to establish parental relationship. The record on appeal does not contain N.F.’s petition, but it apparently related to custody, visitation, child support, and similar matters concerning M.B., a minor child. N.F. and A.B. stipulated that they are M.B.’s parents.
The parties stipulated to have the case heard by a commissioner sitting as a temporary judge. The trial of the matter, excluding the bifurcated issues of attorney fees and court costs, lasted 25 days and spanned nearly two years, from July 16, 2007, to March 23, 2009. On appeal, A.B. elected to proceed without a reporter’s transcript, so we have no record of any of the oral proceedings, apart from two short excerpts totaling eight pages, which A.B. included in the appellant’s appendix on the basis that they allegedly were used as exhibits in the trial court.
On June 11, 2009, the trial court issued its tentative decision concerning all issues other than attorney fees and court costs. The parties filed objections to the tentative decision, but the parties’ objections are not included in the record on appeal.
On August 12, 2009, the court held a hearing on the parties’ objections to the tentative decision. At the same hearing, the court also allowed the parties to present evidence on the bifurcated issues of attorney fees and court costs. At a further hearing on August 27, 2009, the court heard final arguments on the bifurcated issues and took the matter under submission.
On November 9, 2009, the court issued its tentative decision on attorney fees and court costs. The court entered judgment on February 24, 2010. A.B. appealed.
DISCUSSION
We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo, and we review its findings of fact under the substantial evidence standard. (Crocker National Bank v. City and County of San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881, 888.) We presume that the decision of the trial court is correct, and we review only the decision itself, not the trial court’s reasoning. (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 631; J.B. Aguerre, Inc. v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 6, 15-16.) In order to prevail, an appellant must demonstrate both that the trial court’s decision was erroneous under the applicable standard of review and that the error was prejudicial. (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 610; In re Marriage of McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337.) The appellant ordinarily must carry those burdens in the opening brief, because arguments not raised until the reply brief are forfeited unless good cause is shown for failure to have raised them earlier. (Campos v. Anderson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784, 794, fn. 3.) It is also the appellant’s burden to provide us with a record that is adequate to establish prejudicial error. (Rancho Santa Fe Assn. v. Dolan-King (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 28, 46.) Because A.B. has not provided us with a reporter’s transcript of the trial, we must conclusively presume that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain the trial court’s factual findings. (Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.)
The foregoing procedural rules are fatal to the arguments A.B. presents on appeal. First, A.B. challenges the child support, child care add-on, and attorney fees awards because they are based on the trial court’s determination of N.F.’s income, a determination that A.B. contends is “unsubstantiated” and “inaccurate.” A.B.’s decision to proceed without a reporter’s transcript of the 25-day trial, however, precludes us from disturbing the trial court’s factual findings concerning N.F.’s income. (Nielsen v. Gibson, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 324.)
Second, A.B. argues that the trial court abused its discretion by modifying child support retroactive only to July 16, 2007; according to A.B., the evidence supports a reduction that is retroactive to an earlier date. Again, the absence of a reporter’s transcript compels us to presume that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision to make the modification retroactive to July 16, 2007, but no further. (Nielsen v. Gibson, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 324.)
Third, A.B. argues that the award of attorney fees was an abuse of discretion because, for example, the trial court’s determination of his ability to pay was incorrect, so the award “failed to guarantee a level playing field.” We are compelled to reject this argument and A.B.’s other, related arguments against the attorney fees award because we must presume that the evidence at trial is sufficient to support factual findings that would justify the award. (Nielsen v. Gibson, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 324.)
Fourth, A.B. argues that the trial court committed reversible error by setting his visitation schedule with M.B. in a manner that does not allow M.B. to spend sufficient time with her half-sibling K.B., who is A.B.’s daughter from a different relationship. Again, the absence of a reporter’s transcript compels us to reject A.B.’s argument, which is expressly based in part on his own trial testimony. (Nielsen v. Gibson, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 324.) We also note that even the limited record before us appears to demonstrate that at least one of the factual premises of A.B.’s argument is incorrect. A.B. claims that because of the lack of coordination between M.B.’s and K.B.’s visitation schedules, “the sisters never have sleepovers” (the “two sisters... never can spend the night together”). A.B.’s argument is based on his assertion that his visits with K.B. are Sunday through Wednesday and his weekend visits with M.B. end Sunday evening. Contrary to A.B.’s assertion, the judgment provides that M.B.’s weekend visits with A.B. begin on Friday afternoon and end on Monday morning (subject to certain exceptions), thus allowing M.B. and K.B. to spend Sunday night together.
Fifth, A.B. asserts that the trial court “has not articulated any evidence supportive of its decision that [A.B.] be given only 27 [percent] of the timeshare.” Assuming for the sake of argument that A.B.’s assertion is true, it is irrelevant. The trial court’s alleged failure to describe the evidence supporting its decision does not constitute a showing of reversible error, because the record might contain substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision even if the trial court did not expressly identify it. Moreover, because we have not been provided with a reporter’s transcript, we must presume that the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to support the trial court’s determination. (Nielsen v. Gibson, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 324.)
Sixth, A.B. argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding sanctions against him pursuant to Family Code section 271 and the discovery provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The judgment does not, however, award sanctions, and the record on appeal does not contain an order awarding sanctions. (The record does contain an unsigned proposed order awarding sanctions, but an unsigned proposed order is not an order of the court.) A.B. has therefore failed to provide us with a record demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion by sanctioning him, because he has not provided us with a record demonstrating that the trial court sanctioned him at all. (Rancho Santa Fe Assn. v. Dolan-King, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 46.)
Seventh, A.B. argues that the amount of the child care add-on is not supported by the evidence. Again, because A.B. did not provide us with a reporter’s transcript of the 25-day trial, we must presume that the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to support the trial court’s award. (Nielsen v. Gibson, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 324.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs of appeal.
We concur: CHANEY, J. JOHNSON, J.