Opinion
No. 18618.
September 23, 1985.
Herschel Bullen, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
K. Allan Zabel, Lorin R. Blauer, Bruce A. Horstmanshoff, Salt Lake City, for respondent.
This is an appeal by a former U.S. Army captain challenging the denial of his claim for unemployment compensation benefits by the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah. The decision of the Board is affirmed.
Claimant Michael B. Newton spent seven years in military service. Repeated and extensive absences from his family, required by his military assignments, caused Newton serious family problems. He therefore made substantial efforts first to change his specialty within the military to one requiring fewer family separations and then to secure a satisfactory civilian job should he be forced to leave the military. Neither effort was successful. Newton left the service effective August 5, 1981. He then moved with his family from California, where he had been stationed, to Utah and applied for unemployment compensation benefits. His claim was denied.
The Board of Review affirmed the denial on the ground that it was required to deny benefits to Newton by 5 U.S.C. § 8521(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1981), as it read at the time Newton left military service. Section 8521(a)(1)(B)(ii) at that time provided in pertinent part that an individual was eligible for benefits if, inter alia, he or she "did not resign or voluntarily leave the service." Because Newton had voluntarily resigned from active military duty, he was precluded from receiving benefits. In its decision, the Board of Review stated that if the issue were governed by Utah law, a denial of benefits would be contrary to the equity and good conscience standard of the Utah Employment Security Act, U.C.A., 1953, § 35-4-5(a) (Supp. 1983). However, the Board found that federal law in effect at the time of Newton's severance intended to deny benefits "to all military personnel who [left] the Service under honorable conditions but were eligible to reenlist." Board of Review Decision, Case No. 81-A-3440 UCX (July 6, 1982). The Board therefore was required by law to affirm the denial of benefits.
Pub.L. No. 97-35, § 2405(a)(B)(ii), 95 Stat. 876 (1981).
The Utah Department of Employment Security, in determining the unemployment claims of ex-federal employees, acts as an agent of the United States under the provisions of a contract with the Secretary of Labor, which contract is authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 8502(a)(1) (1982). The contract provides that the federal government will reimburse the state for any benefits paid to ex-federal employees, but requires that in disbursing these funds, the Department of Employment Security must "abide by the [applicable] Federal Statutes and regulations and procedures adopted thereunder. . . ." UCFE-UCX Agreement between Department of Employment Security, Industrial Commission and the Secretary of Labor of the United States (June 27, 1973). The statutes referred to in this contract include the one at issue here.
In this Court, Newton first asserts that the provisions of Utah law relating to good cause and equity and good conscience should be construed as exceptions to the federal statute. The reasoning of the Board of Review is sound, however, and its decision will not be disturbed.
The Department of Employment Security acts only as an agent of the federal government in determining the eligibility of and paying unemployment compensation to former military personnel and is contractually bound to abide by federal law. See n. 2, supra. In this case, the federal law specifically denied unemployment benefits to an individual who voluntarily left the military. We can find no basis for construing the federal statute to permit the application of the good cause and equity and good conscience provisions of section 35-4-5(a) of the Utah Code. To adopt appellant's position would be to rewrite the federal statute, something we cannot do.
It is worth noting that Congress has since acted to alleviate the possible injustice complained of by Newton. Congress amended section 8521(a)(1)(B)(ii) shortly after Newton's claim was resolved and now permits an award of benefits "if . . . the individual . . . was released [or voluntarily terminated the term of service] . . . because of hardship." 5 U.S.C. § 8521(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1982). Unfortunately for Newton, Congress did nothing to alleviate any hardship the earlier language may have created for ex-service personnel.
Newton's second contention is that section 8521 as it existed at the time of his separation denies his federal constitutional right to equal protection of the law. Newton argues that classification of persons on the basis of how they separated from the service should be subjected to strict scrutiny; considered in this light, the statute results in an arbitrary discrimination between people who have left the military voluntarily and those who have left involuntarily. This claim is without merit. We cannot sensibly find that military personnel who voluntarily leave the service constitute a "suspect classification" for purposes of an equal protection analysis, as appellant urges. Therefore, we need only find that there is some rational basis for the congressional classification. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-27, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104-05, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); United States v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 2825, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973). Congress apparently judged that the challenged enactment would discourage military personnel from voluntarily leaving the service. That judgment is not an irrational one, and it is certainly related to the legitimate governmental objective of retaining trained personnel. Nothing more is required to sustain the challenged classification.
Affirmed.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., concur.