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dismissing copyright infringement claims where "essence of the claim . . . is that [plaintiff] is claiming sole ownership"
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No. 01 Civ. 2807 (TPG).
March 15, 2005
OPINION
Plaintiff Betty Newsome brings this copyright action alleging claims about her song entitled "It's a Man's World," which challenge defendants' rights in two other songs, as will be described. The defendants are James Brown (the world-renowned singer and performer), Bert Jones, Dynatone Publishing Company, Leonard S. Mietus Management Co., Clamike Music, Inc., and Warner/Chappell Music, Inc.
Defendants Brown, Dynatone, and Warner/Chappell jointly move for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
The complaint contains four counts. Count I alleges that defendants have infringed Newsome's copyright in "It's a Man's World." However, Count I does not describe what the infringement consisted of. Count II is about the song "It's a Man's Man's Man's World." It essentially alleges that certain of the defendants made improper copyright registrations to the latter song, at first indicating that defendant Brown was the sole composer and later stating that both defendant Brown and Newsome jointly composed this song. Count II essentially challenges any claim of right to this song on the part of any of the defendants. Count III deals with a song entitled "It's a Man's Man's Man's World (But It Wouldn't Be Nothing Without a Woman or a Girl)." Count IV seeks an accounting.
Although the notice of motion states that summary judgment is sought as to all claims against the moving defendants, the arguments presented by these defendants do not deal at all with Count III. Thus, the court must construe the motion as addressed only to Counts I, II and IV. No issues regarding Count III and the song described therein will be discussed in this opinion.
The Court grants the motion as to Count II and that count is dismissed. As to Counts I and IV, the court dismisses these counts to the extent that they relate to Count II, but leaves them standing (subject to being amended) insofar as they relate to Count III.
Facts
The facts set forth herein are derived from the complaint, declarations and depositions, and documents. Creation and Registration of "It's a Man's World" and "It's a Man's Man's Man's World"
As the complaint states, Newsome wrote the words and music to the song "It's a Man's World," which was registered with the Copyright Office on October 23, 1964 under the number Ep 193698 in the name of Clamike Music Publishing Company. Newsome was listed as the author.
Newsome hummed the melody of "It's a Man's World" to defendant Brown while in a limousine leaving New York City. On that occasion Newsome and Brown made some efforts to come up with a new song, and ultimately Brown developed "It's a Man's Man's Man's World." Brown performed and recorded the song in 1966, which became an international hit.
Brown assigned his rights in "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" to defendant Dynatone on April 14, 1966 for the initial copyright term of 28 years and the renewal term of 28 years. Dynatone registered the song for copyright on the same day, crediting Brown as the sole author.
The 1966 Action and 1967 Settlement
After discovering that Brown had recorded and released the song "It's a Man's Man's Man's World," Newsome inquired of Clamike why she was not given credit on the recording. Clamike then commenced an action in this court in June 1966 against Brown, Dynatone, and King Records, Inc. alleging that "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" was an infringement of "It's a Man's World." Clamike Records, Inc. v. James Brown et al. The only defendant to appear in that action was Brown, who denied all allegations and interposed a counterclaim alleging that Clamike was infringing the copyright to "It's a Man's Man's Man's World."
A settlement agreement was reached in 1967. The agreement credited Newsome and Brown as co-authors of "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" and provided that Clamike and Dynatone were co-owners of the copyright. Dynatone had a 2/3 interest, and Clamike had a 1/3 interest. They were to receive royalties from the song in these proportions, and disburse them to Brown and Newsome respectively. In the settlement agreement there were signature lines for Clamike, Dynatone, and Brown, and also for the attorney for the plaintiff and the attorney for the defendants. The agreement was signed on behalf of Clamike by Clarence Jackson, but there was no signature on behalf of Dynatone. Brown signed. An attorney for the plaintiff signed. No attorney for the defendants signed.
Despite the lack of complete signatures, it appears that the terms of the settlement agreement were carried out. Dynatone collected the royalties from performances of "It's a Man's Man's Man's World." Dynatone retained a 2/3 share, which was disbursed to Brown, and paid a 1/3 share to Clamike, which was disbursed to Newsome.
Newsome now takes the position that this settlement agreement was not binding on her. Yet, Newsome has admitted in her deposition in the present action that she received accounting statements and royalties as a result of the agreement. Newsome has admitted that she has received over $250,000 in royalties from that song and that this was her primary source of income. She has also admitted in her deposition that she became aware of the terms of the agreement sometime within three years of its execution, and she has been aware that she and Brown were credited as co-authors of "It's a Man's Man's Man's World."
The Renewal of Copyrights
At some point Warner/Chappell succeeded to the duties of Dynatone in collecting royalties and dispersing them as Dynatone had done.
Defendant Mietus was connected with Clamike beginning in June of 1968. From 1968 to December 31, 1992, on behalf of Clamike, Mietus collected the royalty share from Dynatone, and later Warner/Chappell, and paid the royalties to Newsome.
The copyright for "It's a Man's World" was renewed as of January 8, 2001. Although the renewal application referred to Clamike as the original copyright claimant, Newsome is referred to as the renewal claimant. Based on the copyright laws enacted in 1976, the initial term of the copyright expires after 28 years, and then can be renewed. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(2)(B)(ii). The renewal rights belong to the proprietor or the author as of the time of expiration of the original copyright. The copyright for "It's a Man's World" expired January 1, 1993. As the registered author of the words of the song "It's a Man's World," Newsome claims that she became the owner of the renewal rights of the copyright on this day, rather than on the renewal registration date of January 8, 2001.
Warner/Chappell renewed the copyright for "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" on January 24, 1994, continuing to credit Brown as the lone author.
On January 24, 1994 Warner/Chappell also renewed the copyright for "Without A Woman or a Girl," again listing Brown and Jones as authors.
On December 1, 1994, Janet Raines, an employee of Warner/Chappell, wrote to Bob Crews, of the renewal section of the Copyright Office. The letter noted that the original registration of "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" was solely in the name of Brown. The letter stated that this needed to be corrected, because in fact Newsome had a 1/3 interest in the song, as a result of the settlement of litigation. The letter enclosed a Supplementary Registration form in accordance with the letter, and this registration became effective December 13, 1994.
Mietus also took steps in December 1994 to have Newsome included as author of "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" in the copyright registration. He wrote the Copyright Office on December 6, 1994, sending a renewal registration form for that song, which listed both Brown and Newsome as authors. Mietus used a company name, Mietus Copyright Management, in the letter and the copyright application. The Copyright Office accepted this registration and it became effective on the same date as the Raines registration — December 13, 1994. The evidence before the court provides no explanation as to why, in December 1994, Raines and Mietus took steps to have Newsome included in the copyright registration of "It's a Man's Man's Man's World." Newsome claims that she gave no authority to either Raines or Mietus to take the steps which they took.
The Standard Songwriters Contract
Some discussions or negotiations must have occurred among the various parties between 1994 and 1996, because there was a new agreement entered into in 1996. However, no information has been provided to the court about any such discussions or negotiations. But the record does show that there was an agreement dated January 9, 1996 between Clamike Music Publishing Company and Newsome. It states that it is "effective as of April 14, 1966." It expressly warrants that the song "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" is Newsome's, "co-written with James Brown." In the agreement Newsome assigns all her rights to the song to Clamike. In return, 50% of the royalties for performances of the song are to be paid to Newsome. This contract was signed by Clarence Jackson on behalf of Clamike. The contract had a signature line for Newsome as writer, and another signature line for a writer, with no name indicated. Newsome signed on both of the writer lines.
The January 1996 contract purports to give Newsome 50% of the royalties on "It's a Man's Man's Man's World." However, it is merely an agreement between Clamike and Newsome. The evidence does not contain any agreement in which Brown consented to having his 2/3 share reduced to 50% or having Newsome's 1/3 share increased to 50%.
The 1998 Agreement
Apparently there were some negotiations after the January 9, 1996 Standard Songwriters Contract. The evidence does not provide information about what occurred in these negotiations. However, they led to a letter agreement, dated June 11, 1998 between Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corporation (a subsidiary of Warner/Chappell) and Clamike Music Publishing Company. This agreement related to "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" and "Without a Woman or a Girl," referred to collectively as the "Subject Composition" or "SC." The January 9, 1996 Standard Songwriters Contract was attached to the letter agreement as Exhibit A. The letter agreement provided that, as of July 1, 1998, Clamike would transfer all its interest in the copyright in the SC to Warner-Tamerlane. In addition, Clamike assigned to Warner-Tamerlane the Standard Songwriters Contract. For the rights granted and assigned to Warner-Tamerlane, it would pay to Clamike $950,000.
Paragraph 2.2 of the letter agreement provided for the payment of royalties to Newsome with respect to the SC. The meaning of paragraph 2.2 is not completely clear, but it would appear that she was to receive 50% of the royalties earned on these songs. In any event, she was to receive substantial royalties and in fact did so.
The Corporate Identity of Clamike
It is necessary at this point to discuss the corporate identity of Clamike. The entity, which is a defendant in this action, is Clamike Music, Inc. However, the October 1964 copyright of "It's a Man's World" and the January 1996 Standard Songwriter's Contract were in the name of Clamike Music Publishing Company. The 1966 action named Clamike Records, Inc. as the plaintiff, and the 1967 settlement agreement was in the name of Clamike Records, Inc.
Apparently Clamike Music Publishing Company was not incorporated until it became a New Jersey corporation on December 6, 1996. As to Clamike Records, Inc., the New York Secretary of State certified on August 1, 2001 that it had never been incorporated in New York, contrary to what had been represented in the 1966 lawsuit.
As just stated, the defendant in the present action is Clamike Music, Inc. This is clearly a mistake. The Clamike entity referred to in the copyright documents is Clamike Music Publishing Co. The only reference in the body of the complaint attempting to give the full name of Clamike is in paragraph 8, which gives the name "Clamike Publishing Co." Under the circumstances, the court will consider that the Clamike defendant in the present action is Clamike Music Publishing Company.
The Present Action
The present action was commenced on April 3, 2001. It is not clear what event precipitated the bringing of the action.
Standard for Summary Judgment
A court may grant summary judgment only if it is satisfied that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P 56(c). A court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Discussion
I. Statute of Limitations
Civil actions under the Copyright Act of 1976 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations as provided by17 U.S.C. § 507(b), which states that "no civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued." A copyright claim accrues when the plaintiff "knows or has reason to know of the injury upon which the claim is premised." Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1996). This three-year statute of limitations generally applies to claims of copyright infringement on a "rolling" basis, since "each act of infringement is a distinct harm giving rise to an independent claim for relief." Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir. 1992); 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 12.05[A]. In other words, if a series of infringing acts constitutes a "continuing wrong," there can be liability for the acts which occur within the three-year statutory period. Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983).
However, in Barksdale v. Robinson, 211 F.R.D. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), the Court held that "when the gravamen of a plaintiff's copyright claim is ownership, and not infringement, the infringement claims are barred if the ownership claim is time-barred." Id. at 246. The Second Circuit has held that "plaintiffs claiming to be co-authors are time-barred three years after accrual of their claim from seeking a declaration of copyright co-ownership rights and any remedies that would flow from such a declaration." Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1996). Such ownership claim accrues when the plaintiff "knows or has reason to know of the injury upon which the claim is premised." Id. "The statute of limitations cannot be defeated by portraying an action as one for infringement when copyright ownership rights are the true matter at issue." Minder Music Ltd. v. Mellow Smoke Music Co., No. 98 Civ. 4496, 1999 WL 820575, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1999).
In their motion for summary judgment, the moving defendants (hereafter "defendants") assert that the gravamen of Newsome's claim regarding "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" is that she is the owner of that song, and that therefore the ruling in the Barksdale case and the other cases cited above applies in dealing with the statute of limitations issue.
The validity of this argument depends on a analysis of the relevant portions of the complaint.
Count I is cast as a claim that defendants have infringed her rights in her song "It's a Man's World." However, as noted earlier, Count I alleges nothing specific about the means of infringement, but only asserts generally that defendants "infringed or are presently infringing" the song "It's a Man's World" by reproducing, adapting, distributing or performing the work.
Count II of the complaint asserts that the lyrics and music to "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" "were created by Plaintiff" but copyrighted by defendant Dynatone, listing defendant Brown as author. Later in Count II, it is alleged the song "contains material created by Plaintiff." Plaintiff claims that the copyright to this song was renewed without her consent by defendant Mietus Management Co. on December 13, 1994, listing Newsome and Brown as co-authors. The complaint states that without Newsome's knowledge, Warner/Chappell's employee Janet Raines filed a supplementary registration to the copyright to this song naming Brown and Newsome as co-authors. In this second count of the complaint, Newsome claims that Brown "had and has no interest" in the copyright to "It's a Man's Man's Man's World." Plaintiff also asserts that Warner/Chappell is infringing "It's a Man's World." In this count plaintiff asserts that the defendants directly or indirectly received monies from "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" as the result of their actions.
Although the language of the complaint is not as clear as might be desired, the essence of the claim is that defendants have acted improperly in filing an original copyright for "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" listing Brown as the sole author, and then made later copyright filings purporting to list Brown as co-author along with Newsome. Newsome is challenging all of these registrations. She is denying that she is a mere co-author. Count II asserts that the lyrics and music to the song were created by her, although at another point in the pleading, this allegation appears to be diluted somewhat by the allegation that the composition of the song "contains material created by Plaintiff" as to ownership. Count II does not literally state that Newsome is the co-owner of "It's a Man's Man's Man's World." However, there is surely an attack on the ownership or co-ownership rights of Brown. The necessary implication is that Newsome is claiming sole ownership.
The court rules that the statute of limitations issue as to Count II is governed by Barksdale and the other decisions of similar import cited earlier. Newsome's ownership claim accrued when she knew or had reason to know of the injury upon which the claim was premised. Merchant v. Levy, supra, at 56.
It is conclusively established that this occurred nearly 40 years ago. Brown recorded "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" in 1966, and it became an international hit. At Newsome's instance, Clamike commenced a lawsuit in June 1966 against Brown and others. In the 1967 agreement settling that action, both Newsome and Brown were formally credited as being co-authors of the song. Although Newsome now attacks that agreement as not binding on her, she sure knew of the agreement at the time, and has admitted receiving $250,000 in royalties pursuant to the agreement and has admitted receiving accounting statements accompanying those royalties. She has specifically admitted that, sometime within three years of the date of the agreement, she was aware that she and Brown were credited in the agreement as co-authors of the song in question.
It is also relevant to note the January 9, 1996 agreement entered into between Clamike and Newsome. Newsome signed this agreement. It expressly recognizes Newsome and Brown as co-authors of "It's a Man's Man's Man's World." It purported to revise upward the royalties to be received by Newsome, as described earlier in this opinion.
Since this action was commenced April 3, 2001, any copyright claim which accrued prior to April 3, 1998 is barred. The ownership claim Newsome is asserting regarding "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" accrued in 1966 or within a very few years thereafter. Newsome not only knew that Brown was asserting a claim of ownership or co-ownership, but indeed she acquiesced in this. But, for statute of limitations purposes, the crucial fact is her knowledge. At the very latest, Newsome's claim accrued in 1996. At this time she again agreed to Brown's claim of co-ownership. But again for statute of limitations purposes is Newsome's knowledge. Although the 1996 events occurred almost 30 years after the transactions of 1996 and 1967, 1996 is still more than three years before the time Newsome commenced her lawsuit.
For these reasons, the court holds that defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing Count II as barred by the statute of limitations. This ruling also affects both Count I and Count IV. It is obviously intended that Count II should be, at least in part, a specification of the wrongdoing generally claimed in Count I. Also, Count IV, requesting an accounting, is obviously related in part to the wrongdoing claimed in Count II. Therefore, the court rules that Count I and Count IV are dismissed to the extent that they depend upon Count II. In further proceedings Counts I and IV will need to be amended.
II. Laches Doctrine Claim
Defendants assert laches as an alternative argument on their motion. It should be recalled that Newsome concedes that her infringement claim is barred by the statute of limitations as to all alleged wrongdoing except what was committed within three years before commencement of the action on April 3, 2001. The Court has just held that Newsome's claim as to "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" is entirely barred by the statute of limitations. But defendants contend that, even if Newsome were right about the three years not being time-barred, her claim about "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" is still entirely barred by laches.
There exists some authority in the Second Circuit to support the rule that when a plaintiff brings a federal statutory claim seeking legal relief, laches cannot bar that claim, at least where the statute contains an express limitations period within which the action is timely. Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1997).
However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Southern District have held that there are circumstances where laches will apply to copyright claims. Nihon Keizai Shombun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 1999) (implicitly recognizing availability of laches defense to copyright infringement claim by affirming rejection of laches because of defendant's wilful infringement); Stone v. Williams, 873 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 1989) (laches defense was upheld where the natural daughter of Hank Williams, Sr. had delayed six years in asserting a claim for co-ownership of renewal copyrights in Williams' songs); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 262 F. Supp.2d 204, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("defendant's innocence and justifiable reliance on a plaintiff's failure to prevent previous copyright infringement can lead to laches, barring the assertion of copyright claims"); Armstrong v. Virgin Records, Inc., 91 F. Supp.2d 628, 643-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (recognizing availability of laches defense to copyright infringement claim and finding fact issue as to whether laches bars claims); Lennon v. Seaman, 63 F. Supp.2d 428, 438-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); A. Brod, Inc. v. SKI Co., 998 F. Supp. 314, 328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (recognizing availability of laches defense to copyright infringement claim and finding fact issue as to whether laches bars claims); Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (Hand, J.) ("It must be obvious to everyone familiar with equitable principles that it is inequitable for the owner of a copyright, with full notice of an intended infringement, to stand inactive while the proposed infringer spends large sums of money in its exploitation, and to intervene only when his speculation has proved a success.").
The dismissal of an action based on a laches defense "promotes the principles of repose integral to a properly functioning copyright market and is also consistent with the Supreme Court's recognition that Congress' paramount goal in revising the 1976 Copyright Act was enhancing predictability and certainty of copyright ownership." Minder Music Ltd. v. Mellow Smoke Music Co. No 98 Civ. 4496, 1999 WL 820575, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1999).
To prevail on laches grounds, a party must demonstrate the following elements. First, there must be a delay in filing suit.Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 952 (9th Cir. 2001). Second, this delay must be unreasonable or inexcusable. American Greetings Corp. v. Kleinfab Corp., 400 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Third, the delay must cause prejudice to the defendant. Hoste v. Radio Corp. of Am., 654 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1981). The two forms of prejudice cognizable in this element are evidentiary and expectations based. See Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 955 (9th Cir. 2001)
Evidentiary prejudice includes things such as lost, stale, or degraded evidence, or witnesses whose memories have faded or who have died. A defendant may also demonstrate prejudice by showing that it took actions or suffered consequences that it would not have, had the plaintiff brought suit promptly.Id. "Where there is no excuse for delay . . . defendants need show little prejudice; a weak excuse for delay may, on the other hand, suffice to defeat a laches defense if no prejudice has been shown." Byron v. Chevrolet Motor Div. Of Gen. Motors Corp., 93 Civ. 1116, 1995 WL 465130, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1995). Where the delay is longer than the statute of limitations, a presumption of unreasonable delay arises that plaintiff must overcome by "prov[ing] the absence of prejudice to the defendant from the passage of time." Id. At *6.
Newsome delayed nearly 40 years in brining this claim. She has testified to being aware of various agreements and shared royalties since the late 1960's. She did not file this suit until 2001.
Newsome presents no reason or excuse for delaying in bringing this suit.
Defendants were prejudiced in the two ways recognized in the laches context set forth above — "evidentiary and expectations based."
First, evidence relevant to the defense of this case has been lost. Newsome has conceded that there was a paper on which certain lyrics were written when she and Brown were in the limousine in 1966, as described earlier. Newsome has testified that this paper was destroyed in a fire in the 1970s.
Newsome has been unable to testify to relevant matters because her memory has faded. When asked to describe the content of a document she claimed to have seen that set forth the settlement terms of the 1966, Newsome testified, "I don't remember what the paper said. That's 30 years ago." Likewise, she testified, after being asked what she did after discovering that Brown had released a recording of the song, "I don't remember. It's been 40 years." Newsome also honestly admitted during her deposition, "You are asking me questions from years ago and I'm not — no spring chicken."
Defendants conducted an extensive business over a period of almost forty years involving "It's a Man's Man's Man's World," in reliance on an unchallenged arrangement recognizing Newsome and Brown as co-authors, and recognizing the propriety of dividing the royalties. In 1998, more than 30 years after Newsome's claims arose, Warner/Chappell paid Clamike $950,000 to purchase Clamike's ownership interest "It's a Man's Man's Man's World." This was surely in reliance on the fact of Clamike's ownership.
The Court holds that Newsome's entire claim regarding "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" is barred by laches.
III. Settlement Agreement Claim
The defendants also assert that the 1967 settlement agreement bars Newsome's copyright infringement claims.
The settlement agreement was signed by Clamike Records, Inc. and James Brown. The settlement agreement states that Newsome and Brown are co-authors of "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" and that Clamike and Dynatone will share the ownership of the song, obviously representing, respectively, Newsome and Brown.
Newsome argues that the settlement agreement did not and does not bind her, because neither she nor her agent signed the agreement. It is true that Newsome did not sign the 1967 settlement agreement nor was she personally a party to that agreement. However, Clamike was, without question, acting as Newsome's agent in bringing the lawsuit and in entering into the 1967 settlement agreement. In this litigation, Clamike has at times been referred to as Newsome's "publisher." Newsome called Clamike her publisher in deposition testimony, although elsewhere in her submissions on this motion, she denied that this was the case. The fact is that whether "publisher" was the proper label for Clamike is of no great importance. Clamike was clearly Newsome's agent in both bringing the 1966 lawsuit and in entering into the 1967 settlement agreement.
Newsome also argues that Clamike Records, Inc. was not in fact a corporation, and that this circumstance invalidates the 1967 settlement agreement. As described earlier in this opinion, it is true that Clamike Records, Inc. was not in fact a corporation, and apparently no such entity has ever been incorporated. However, the evidence demonstrates that Clamike existed, at least as an unincorporated entity, and it did so for Newsome's benefit and with her knowledge. It was the business name assumed by Newsome's friend, Clarence Jackson.
Moreover, any argument about the invalidity of the 1967 settlement agreement is entirely negated by the conclusive evidence of ratification by Newsome in accepting her share of royalties under this agreement over a period of 35 years.
IV. Warranty in the Songwriter Contract Claim
Finally, defendants claim that Newsome's copyright action is further barred by the 1996 Songwriter's Contract. In that contract, she transferred all of her rights to "It's a Man's Man's Man's World" to Clamike Music Publishing Company. In doing so, Newsome specifically warranted that she and Brown were co-authors of the song.
The Court holds that this is yet another reason why Newsome has no valid cause of action regarding "It's a Man's Man's Man's World."
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons the court grants the motion as to Count II. The court also dismisses Counts I and IV, to the extent that they relate to Count II, but leaves them standing (subject to being amended) insofar as they relate to Count III.
SO ORDERED.