Opinion
No. CV 03-0472402 S
August 5, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This matter is before the court on an application to vacate arbitration award. The applicant is New Haven Firefighters Local 825 ("Union"). The respondent is the City of New Haven ("City").
The plaintiff is the collective bargaining unit for the City of New Haven Firefighters. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the City, the parties submit to arbitration before the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration ("Board") disputes over matters pertaining to the employer-employee relationship and matters concerning the interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement.
Sheryl Broadnax, a member of the Union, was terminated by the City for conduct specified by the City. The Union, on Ms. Broadnax's behalf grieved the matter and it was heard by the Board. The issue before the Board was, "Did the New Haven Board of Fire Commissioners have just cause to terminate Sheryl Broadnax on February 25, 2002? If not, what shall the remedy be?" After hearing, the Board made a written award. In the award, the Board determined that the City did not have just cause to terminate her but did have just cause to suspend her for six months; the award was made accordingly. The application before the court challenges that award, as made in notation of Connecticut General Statutes § 52-418 (a)(3) and (4).
The factual circumstances that gave rise to the dispute before the Board are relevant for a determination of the merits of the present application. From the Board's factual findings the following is discovered.
On January 18, 2002, Sheryl Broadnax went to the Deputy Chief's office at Central Fire Headquarters with John Brantley, a lieutenant in the Fire Department. Brantley sat at a desk and utilized the computer there to gain access to a "Master List" which contained personal information. Broadnax stood in the doorway of the office while Brantley utilized the computer to download personal information which was the NHFD master list.
While Broadnax was at the Deputy Chief's office area, a second alarm went off for a fire. Broadnax had the right of access to the area that she was in when Brantley downloaded this information. At that time, Captain Quinn was present and reported that event. An investigation ensued at the direction of the Fire Chief.
As a part of the investigation, the computer utilized by Broadnax was examined. On it was located a master list which was renamed "DUMAS" on the computer. The file downloaded by Brantley from the Deputy Chiefs computer was 1.4 mb. The file on Broadnax's computer was 6.0 mb. It was unable to be determined when the file on Broadnax's computer was created. While there are similarities between the two master lists, the one on the Broadnax computer is broader. Broadnax, as a part of the inquiry denied receiving any copies of the information downloaded by Brantley.
She was also quizzed as to why she did not respond to the second alarm fire. Broadnax responded she had no duty to respond because she was not assigned to fire suppression.
On February 25, 2002, after holding a hearing, the Board of Fire Commissioners voted to terminate Broadnax for violation of General Order #19 and Rules 16(A) and 16(H). At the hearing, Broadnax had faced five charges; all of them including these three she was found to have violated, cited the following charged conduct: "That on January 18, 2002 Lieutenant Sheryl P. Broadnax participated in accessing a database from the computer assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief, which was copied onto a floppy diskette. The file, entitled `Master List Personnel' contained personal information on Department personnel that included home addresses, home telephone numbers (some of which are unlisted), and Social Security Numbers."
The arbitrators found that the Board of Fire Commissioners "did not prove its case." It also specifically found that confidential information was "almost universally unprotected and that the computer files of the Deputy Chief and Broadnax while similar, were not identical, and, no transfer from one to the other was proven.
At the same time, the arbitrators also found that Broadnax's naming of the master file as DUMAS was "a deception" (without saying why or how). The arbitrators found it was wrong for Broadnax to observe Brantley's download of the computer file. The arbitrators found that Broadnax lacked proper regard for the protecting of confidential information in computer files. Finally, the Board found that Broadnax was not supposed to be in the vicinity of the Deputy Chief's office at the time that she was but, instead, should have been out responding to the fire alarm that came in. These findings were made by the Board over the Union's objection that evidence on these issues was inadmissable since it went to uncharged conduct.
"[T]he law in this state takes a strongly affirmative view of consensual arbitration . . . Arbitration is a favored method to prevent litigation, promote tranquility and expedite the equitable settlement of disputes . . . As a consequence of our approval of arbitral proceedings, our courts generally have deferred to the award that the arbitrator found to be appropriate . . . The scope of review for arbitration awards is exceedingly narrow . . . Additionally, every reasonable inference is to be made in favor of the arbitral award and of the arbitrator's decisions." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocky Hill Teachers' Assn. v. Board of Education, 72 Conn. App. 274, 278, 804 A.2d 999, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 907, 810 A.2d 272 (2002).
"These well established principles governing consensual arbitration are subject to certain exceptions. Even in the case of an unrestricted submission, we have, however, recognized three grounds for vacating an award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute . . ., (2) the award violates clear public policy . . . or (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of [General Statutes] § 52-418." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Local 1042, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Board of Education, 66 Conn. App. 457, 463, 784 A.2d 1018 (2001). Section 52-418 provides for the vacation of an arbitral award under the following circumstances: "(1) If the award has been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) if there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definitive award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." Wachter v. UDV North America, Inc., 75 Conn. App. 538, 543-44 (2003).
The submission to the arbitrators was an unrestricted one. The question before the arbitrators was, "Did the New Haven Board of Fire Commissioners have just cause to terminate Sheryl Broadnax on February 25, 2002? If not, what shall the remedy be?"
The award stated, "The NHBFC did not have just cause to terminate Sheryl Broadnax but did have just cause to suspend her for rule violations."
§ 52-418 (a)(3)
It is the Union's position that the arbitrators prejudiced the rights of Broadnax when they received evidence on issues of additional misconduct by Broadnax that were not the asserted reasons for her termination from employment by the City. These issues were whether Broadnax should have responded to the fire alarm instead of staying in the building, whether she committed misconduct when she renamed the personnel file on the computer assigned to her as DUMAS and "having a cavalier attitude" toward the confidential information in the computer file. These reasons, along with the fact that Broadnax watched Brantley download the file, were the reasons stated by the Board in support of its decision to vacate the termination and impose a six month suspension, not withstanding the finding that the City did not prove its case.
With the exception of her watching Brantley download the file, none of the other reasons were a part of the charges brought by the NHFD Chief which resulted in the NHFD terminating Broadnax. It is these charges brought by the NHFD that the Board found to be unproven by the City.
The collective bargaining agreement between the parties at Section 5.2 provides, "In all disciplinary proceedings before the Board of Fire Commissioners the employee or employees and the Union shall be furnished with a written statement of the charges at least ninety-six (96) hours in advance of the scheduled hearing . . . Together with a brief description of the circumstances which led to the charges." It is this contract between the parties that governs the rights and responsibilities of the parties on all issues including discipline. By receiving evidence and making findings of uncharged misconduct by Broadnax, the arbitration panel has deprived Broadnax of the right to a written statement of the charges against her. The arbitrators have exceeded their powers. ( 52-418 (a).)
Part of the award of the arbitrators was within the submission; that is, when it determined whether the termination for the charged conduct was appropriate, the panel acted within its authority. It is impossible from the arbitration decision to determine what Broadnax's role in watching Brantley download played in the decision of the six-month suspension. Arguably that prohibited conduct was within the original charges brought against Broadnax. When the panel went on to consider the uncharged conduct, it acted without authority. "As our Supreme Court stated in Cheney Bros., if part of an award is within the submission and part of it is not, the court may vacate any portion of the award that does not disturb the merits of the arbitration. Local 63, Textile Workers Union v. Cheney Bros., supra, 141 Conn. 613." Housing Authority v. Local 1303-260, Council 4, 56 Conn. App. 786, 793, 746 A.2d 217 (2000).
Accordingly, the court vacates only that portion of the award that imposed a six-month suspension and confirms the balance of the award.
It is so ordered.
Lynda B. Munro Judge of the Superior Court