Summary
discussing the railroad business and when records are considered made in the "regular course of business" under the Uniform Business as Evidence Act
Summary of this case from In re I.B.B.Opinion
March 24, 1958.
May 26, 1958.
Evidence — Business records — Employe's accident report to employer — Uniform Business Records As Evidence Act.
1. A written statement of an employe to his employer concerning an accident allegedly caused by the employer's negligence is not a business record made "in the regular course" of the employer's business within the meaning of the Uniform Business Records As Evidence Act of 1939, P.L. 42. [642]
Appeals — Review — Verdicts — Excessiveness — Pain and disability without cause or symptoms — Comparison of other verdicts.
2. In this case in which the injured plaintiff's symptoms were largely subjective, it was Held, in the circumstances, that a verdict of $9.000 was not excessive. [642]
3. A person may suffer extreme pain and in fact be disabled by symptoms for which the physicians cannot find reason or cause. [643]
4. In determining whether a verdict for damages for personal injuries is excessive every factor of the resultant injuries must be evaluated; and a comparison of verdicts in other cases which were sustained or set aside is of little or no help in determining whether the verdict in question is excessive. [643]
Argued March 24, 1958. Before JONES, C. J., BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO, ARNOLD, JONES and COHEN, JJ.
Appeal, No. 46, March T., 1958, from judgment of Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Jan. T., 1952, No. 1258, in case of Theresa Neuman et vir v. Pittsburgh Railways Company. Judgments affirmed.
Trespass for personal injuries. Before O'BRIEN, J.
Verdicts entered for plaintiffs in total amount of $12,000; defendant's motions for judgment n.o.v. and new trial refused and judgments entered on the verdicts. Defendant appealed.
Leo Daniels, with him James A. Geltz, and Prichard, Lawler Geltz, for appellant.
A. H. Rosenberg, with him Rosenberg and Rosenberg, for appellees.
This is an action of trespass to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the wife-plaintiff when she was alighting from a streetcar in the city of Pittsburgh. Her testimony was to the effect that the car was suddenly started forward while she was about to step from the platform, and she was thrown to the ground. Her injuries were confined to the back and ankle.
At trial the defendant offered to prove from an alleged business record that, according to the conductor, the car was in a stationary position and the plaintiff, holding her child by the hand, stumbled on the step of the car; and that she subsequently stated that she did not know how she fell. The court's exclusion of this testimony is one of the principal assignments of error.
See Act of 1939, P. L. 42, 28 P. S. § 91a et seq.
The matter is decided in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 87 L.Ed. 645, in which the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals ( 129 F.2d 976).
The Palmer case is much like the instant case. There was involved a grade crossing accident alleged to be due to the negligence of the railroad company. The engineer had made a written statement at the freight office of the railroad (allegedly in the regular course of business), exculpating or tending to exculpate the railroad. The United States Supreme Court held that the statement was not made in the regular course of business within the meaning of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act. Holding that the report was not made in the regular course of business, the Court declared that the business of the railroad was transportation, and the preparation of cases for trial does not make such statements a part of defendant's business. "It is not a record made for the systematic conduct of the business as a business . . . or as a matter of routine to record events or occurrences, to reflect transactions with others, or to provide internal controls. The conduct of a business commonly entails the payment of tort claims incurred by the negligence of its employees. But the fact that a company makes a business out of recording its employees' versions of their accidents does not put those statements in the class of records made 'in the regular course' of the business within the meaning of the Act": Palmer v. Hoffman, supra, p. 113. In the instant case the court below properly excluded the defendant's offer.
The next question presented by this appeal is that the judgment was excessive. The judgment is for $9,000 for the wife-plaintiff and $3,000 for the husband of the plaintiff. We cannot say it is excessive even though the plaintiff's symptoms were largely subjective. A person may suffer extreme pain and in fact be disabled by symptoms for which the physicians cannot find reason or cause. Nevertheless they exist. The plaintiff's injuries required hospitalization on a number of different occasions and her doctors were most positive that she suffered the pain of which she complained. She suffered from a disc lesion and required large amounts of medication in the form of codeine and serpasil. She suffered from pains in the back and had lost 25 to 30 pounds in weight. She will likely require further hospitalization and surgical care. We cannot say that the verdict was too large.
The citation of cases showing various amounts in which judgments were sustained or reversed is of little or no help in determining whether or not the present judgment is excessive, for one has to evaluate every factor of the resultant injuries.
The judgment is affirmed.