Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-1971(RMU), Document No. 6.
September 10, 2004.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS I. INTRODUCTION
This case comes before the court on the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The defendant asserts that the plaintiff's amended complaint should be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Treating the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and making all reasonable inferences in his favor, the court concludes that the plaintiff's pre-complaint questionnaire ("questionnaire") constitutes a valid charge of discrimination. Additionally, the late-filed formal charge relates back and cures the verification defects in the questionnaire. Accordingly, the court denies the defendant's motion to dismiss.
II. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background
Mr. Gregg Nesemier ("the plaintiff"), a white male, has had a hearing impairment since the age of 18. First Am. Compl. ("Am. Compl.") ¶ 2. The plaintiff began working for Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company ("the defendant") in 1981 as a title examiner. Id. ¶ 15. The plaintiff was promoted to senior title examiner in 1990. Id. The plaintiff alleges that, because of his disability, he was not allowed to apply for the position of plant manager. Id. ¶ 25. From 1987 until his termination in August 1997, the plaintiff alleges several acts of discrimination, including unlawful termination, an unusually large assignment of labor intensive cases, threat of criminal sanctions, denial of the opportunity to apply for superior positions, harassment about attendance, disparate treatment and disparate pay. Id. ¶¶ 16-18, 25, 28, 30-31, 34.
The plaintiff, unrepresented by counsel, filed a completed questionnaire with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights ("DCOHR") on March 6, 1997, alleging discrimination on the basis of his disability and reprisal. Am. Compl. ¶ 11; Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot.") at 3; Def.'s Mot. Attach. 2; Pl.'s Opp'n at 1. DCOHR is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") deferral agency for the District of Columbia. Pl.'s Opp'n at 1-2. The questionnaire is unsigned and unverified. Def.'s Mot. Attach 2 . The plaintiff filed the questionnaire within the 300-day time period mandated by the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Am. Compl. ¶ 11.
After not receiving any communication from DCOHR for several months, the plaintiff wrote a letter to the DCOHR regarding the status of his claim. Pl.'s Opp'n at 2. On August 27, 1997, the plaintiff filed a formal complaint of discrimination, which the plaintiff signed and verified. Id. The plaintiff's filing of his formal charge, however, fell outside of the 300-day time limitation. Pl.'s Opp'n at 4; Def.'s Mot. at 7-8. In August 1997, only after the plaintiff filed his formal complaint, the DCOHR began its investigation of the claim. Pl.'s Opp'n at 2. DCOHR also cross-filed the plaintiff's complaint with the EEOC on September 24, 1997. Id. On August 1, 2001, the DCOHR dismissed the plaintiff's claim. Id. After the plaintiff requested reconsideration, DCOHR denied the claim again on May 30, 2003. Id. The EEOC then issued a right to sue letter on June 27, 2003, stating that it agreed with the findings of the DCOHR. Compl. ¶ 2.
B. Procedural History
The plaintiff filed his first complaint on September 23, 2003. The complaint alleged eight counts under the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA") of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101. Compl. ¶¶ 37-70. On January 30, 2004, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint alleged only two counts under the ADA: hostile work environment and unlawful termination. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35-42.
Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Specifically, the defendant states that the plaintiff did not file a valid charge of discrimination within the required 300-day period. Def.'s Mot. at 7-8. In other words, the defendant claims that the plaintiff's questionnaire is not a valid charge of discrimination and therefore his claim is time-barred. Id. at 6, 11.
III. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard for a Motion to Dismiss
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The complaint need only set forth a short and plain statement of the claim, giving the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. Williams, 348 F.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing FED R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) and Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Accordingly, "the accepted rule in every type of case" is that a court should not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim unless the defendant can show beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Kingman Park, 348 F.3d at 1040. In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must treat the complaint's factual allegations — including mixed questions of law and fact — as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor. Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Holy Land Found. for Relief Development v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Browning, 292 F.3d at 242. While many well-pleaded complaints are conclusory, the court need not accept as true inferences unsupported by facts set out in the complaint or legal conclusions cast as factual allegations. Warren, 353 F.3d at 39; Browning, 292 F.3d at 242. Here, the defendant argues that because the plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies, he cannot prove any facts that would entitle him to relief.
B. The Court Denies the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Because The Plaintiff Exhausted His Administrative Remedies
Before a plaintiff may file suit under the ADA, he must first timely file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Generally, Title VII administrative charge requirements should not be construed to place a heavy technical burden on individuals untrained in the law. Park v. Howard University, 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995). But, the requirement of some specificity in a charge is not a mere technicality; therefore, a court cannot allow such liberal interpretation of a charge as to allow someone to bypass the Title VII administrative process. Id. A court can exercise jurisdiction over only those claims contained in a plaintiff's administrative complaint or claims "like or reasonably related to" those in the administrative complaint and with respect to which the plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies. Id. (internal citations omitted). Here, the plaintiff is a layperson and was unrepresented by counsel at the time of filing the questionnaire and formal charge. Pl.'s Opp'n at 1-2. Therefore, the court construes the plaintiff's questionnaire with some liberality. Because the plaintiff's questionnaire is a valid charge of discrimination and the initial failure to verify was subsequently cured, the court denies the defendant's motion to dismiss.
The remedial provisions of Title VII are applicable to the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12117. Thus, courts addressing the issue of burdens and orders of proof in ADA cases look to Title VII caselaw for guidance. Henry v. Guest Services, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 641, 645 (D.D.C. 1995).
1. The Plaintiff's Questionnaire Is a Valid Charge of Discrimination
Under 29 C.F.R. 1601.12(b), a charge is sufficient when it is a "written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of." 29 C.F.R. 1601.12(b). Usually a statement identifying the parties, the type of discrimination complained of, and the discriminatory acts complained of is sufficient to constitute a valid charge. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that an intake questionnaire that contained information required by 29 C.F.R. 1601.12 constituted a valid charge); Philbin v. General Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321, 324-25 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Casavantes v. California State Univ., 732 F.2d 1441, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1984) (same).
Although this circuit has not conclusively adopted a test to determine what would constitute a valid charge, the Third, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh circuits have taken a single approach to determine what would constitute a valid charge pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), termed the "manifest-intent" approach. Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1319-20 (collecting cases). The manifest-intent approach requires that in order to constitute a charge under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, notice to the EEOC must be of the kind that would convince a reasonable person that the complainant has manifested an intent to activate the Act's machinery. Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1319; Whitmore v. O'Connor Mgmt., Inc., 156 F.3d 796, 799 (8th Cir. 1998); Philbin, 929 F.2d at 324-25; Bihler v. Singer Co., 710 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1986). In conjunction with the information called for under 29 C.F.R. 1601.12, the manifest intent test approach indicates that the plaintiff wishes to activate the two principal functions of a charge, namely, to (1) provide the EEOC with sufficient information to notify the defendant employer that it is accused of discrimination; and (2) give the EEOC the opportunity to investigate the charge. Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1319-20; Park, 71 F.3d at 907 (stating that a charge serves the important purposes of giving the charged party notice of the claim and narrowing the issues for prompt adjudication and decision). This circuit, however, has noted that to treat intake questionnaires "willy-nilly" as charges would be to dispense with the requirement of notification of the prospective defendant, since that is a requirement only of the charge and not of the questionnaire. Park, 71 F.3d at 909.
Here, the plaintiff's questionnaire includes the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of both parties. Pl.'s Opp'n at 5; Pl.'s Attach. 2 at 1. It also indicates that the plaintiff believes that he was discriminated and retaliated against on the basis of his disability. Pl.'s Opp'n at 5; Pl.'s Attach. 2 at 2. More specifically, he refers to his hearing impairment. Pl.'s Attach. 2 at 4. Also, the questionnaire indicates that the plaintiff believes that the discrimination was evident through his termination, denial of promotion, and differential treatment. Pl.'s Opp'n at 5; Pl.'s Attach. 2 at 2. These assertions are at least minimally sufficient to fulfill the requirements of a charge under 29 C.F.R. 1601.12(b).
The plaintiff's amended complaint indicates that he viewed his March 1997 questionnaire as an "administrative complaint." Compl. ¶ 11. The questionnaire did not state on its face that it was not a charge of discrimination. Pl.'s Opp'n at 7; Pl.'s Attach. 2 at 2. In fact, the questionnaire itself states "I WISH TO COMPLAIN AGAINST:" Id. (emphasis in the original). The court concludes that these facts would convince a reasonable person that the plaintiff, a layperson, manifested an intent to activate the Act's machinery at the time of filling out the questionnaire. Although the DCOHR did not assign the plaintiff a charge number at this time, did not cross-file with the EEOC and did not notify the defendant as statutorily mandated, the plaintiff should not be penalized for the apparent mistakes of the DCOHR. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (e)(1); Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 300 F.3d 400, 404 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that "[o]nce a valid charge has been filed, a simple failure by the EEOC to fulfill its statutory duties regarding the charge does not preclude a plaintiff's Title VII claim"); Sifferman v. Bd. of Regents, Southeast Mo. State Univ., 250 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (stating that the EEOC's failure to consider the intake questionnaire a charge did not affect its validity).
Finally, the questionnaire also satisfies the two main objectives of a charge. As explained above, the information provided in the questionnaire is at least minimally sufficient to provide the DCOHR and EEOC with relevant information so that they may notify the defendant of the pending charge of discrimination. Even though DCOHR did not actually notify the employer that it had been charged with discrimination, the plaintiff should not be penalized for DCOHR's mistake. Edelman, 300 F.3d at 404. Also, the information was at least minimally sufficient to allow the agency the opportunity to begin an investigation. Furthermore, the fact that DCOHR did not begin an investigation until August 1997, and did not cross-file with the EEOC to allow them to investigate the claim also should not be used against the plaintiff. Id. Accordingly, the court concludes that the plaintiff's questionnaire is a valid charge of discriminaton.
2. The Plaintiff's Formal Complaint Relates-Back to the Questionnaire
To bring a claim for violation of the ADA, a plaintiff must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). In addition, 29 C.F.R. 1601.12(b) states that "[a] charge may be amended to cure technical defects or omissions, including failure to verify . . ." 29 C.F.R. 1601.12(b). Normally, an EEOC charge must be verified at the time it is made in order to be vaild. Park, 71 F.3d at 908-09. The Supreme Court, however, has held that a timely unsworn charge may still be considered valid if the plaintiff later files a verified charge after the statutory time for filing a verified charge has expired. Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106, 112-116 (2002). The principle of allowing a subsequent filing to cure a defect in a previous filing is termed "relation back." Id. at 115-116. Allowing relation back ensures that a layperson will not risk losing his rights inadvertently. Id. But, relation back also protects the employer's interest by not requiring a response until the plaintiff verifies the charge. Id.
Here, the plaintiff filed an unsigned and unverified pre-complaint questionnaire within the statutorily mandated 300-day time period. Am. Compl. ¶ 11; Pl.'s Attach. 2 at 1. As discussed previously, this is a valid charge. On August 27, 1997, 386 days after his termination, and therefore outside the 300-day time period, the plaintiff filed a formal complaint. Pl.'s Opp'n at 2; Pl.'s Attach. 4 at 6. The plaintiff signed and notarized this formal complaint. Pl.'s Attach. 4 at 6. Thus, the plaintiff's verified, formal complaint relates back and provides verification for the plaintiff's earlier, timely filed questionnaire. Edelman, 535 U.S. at 118; 29 C.F.R. 1601.12(b). Because the questionnaire is a valid charge that is deemed verified and timely filed, the plaintiff has not failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and is not barred from bringing suit in this court.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the court denies the defendant's motion to dismiss. An order directing the parties in a manner consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued this 10th day of September 2004.