Opinion
No. CV 06-4005205
March 1, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Plaintiff Alan Neri brought this action involving a disputed easement over a railroad line by Complaint dated March 22, 2006. Plaintiff filed a Revised Complaint dated February 13, 2007, alleged the following causes of action against defendant: inverse condemnation under the United States Constitution, inverse condemnation under the Connecticut Constitution, obstruction of a right of way, and trespass. The original plaintiff, Alan Neri, died during the pendency of this action. On October 29, 2008, plaintiff filed a Motion to Substitute Party Plaintiff seeking to substitute Helen Neri, Executrix of the Estate of Alan Neri for Alan Neri, which the court granted on November 10, 2008 (Rubinow, J.). The Revised Complaint also contained three counts against defendant Stephen Korta, Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Transportation, which plaintiff eventually withdrew.
On February 19, 2010, a default entered against defendant for its failure to comply with a court order. On May 18, 2010, defendant filed a Motion to Open Default, which was denied by the court by Order dated June 22, 2010 (Burgdorff J.). On August 30, 2010, defendant filed this Motion to Dismiss. On September 30, 2010, plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. On October 22, 2010, the defendant filed a reply brief and the court heard oral argument on October 25, 2010. At the hearing, the court granted plaintiff permission to file a reply brief, which she did on November 4, 2010.
The court notes that while the parties filed exhibits with their briefs, neither filed an affidavit referencing those exhibits, as required by Practice Book § 10-31. See Romano v. Westport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 05 4013008 (November 13, 2006, Rodriguez, J.). Nonetheless, as neither party objected to the form of the exhibits at the hearing, this noncompliance with the Practice Book is hereby waived. See Andrews v. Leddy, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 08 6001440 (March 3, 2010, Swienton, J.) ( 49 Conn. L. Rptr. 427). The court also notes that an evidentiary hearing is not required because neither party requested one; Walshon v. Ballon, Stroll, Bader Nadler, P.C., 121 Conn.App. 366, 371, 996 A.2d 1195 (2010); and that the court's decision turns on a question of law that does not require the resolution of a critical factual dispute.
I. FACTS
In 1974, Alan Neri and his brother purchased two parcels of land (hereinafter "the property") containing 31.7 acres and 2.9 acres, respectively, in Clinton, CT. Plaintiff is now the sole owner of the property. Defendant owns a railroad line, which has existed since 1851, that separates the two parcels. A grade crossing over the railroad known as Lawyer's Crossing or Shoemaker's Crossing existed when plaintiff purchased the property, and this crossing provided the only means of access to the 31.7 acre parcel, which would otherwise be landlocked. On September 3, 1980, the Connecticut Department of Transportation (hereinafter "CDOT") ordered the crossing due to safety concerns. Plaintiff appealed, and both the Superior Court and the Appellate Court affirmed the legality of CDOT's decision. Neri v. Powers, 3 Conn.App. 531, 490 A.2d 528, cert. denied, 196 Conn. 808, 494 A.2d 905 (1985). The Appellate Court noted that CDOT's action did not constitute a determination of property rights and that Mr. Neri could pursue any available remedies in establishing his crossing rights. In 1992, defendant installed a barricade that rendered the 31.7-acre parcel landlocked. Plaintiff claims she is entitled to compensation because she had a right appurtenant to her land to use the crossing and installing the barrier amounted to a physical taking of her property.
II. DISCUSSION OF LAW
Defendant argues that pursuant to 45 U.S.C. § 719(e)(2), the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has exclusive jurisdiction over all of the claims asserted in this case. Consequently, the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to determine the effect of the 1976 deeds or whether plaintiff owns an easement over the defendant's land. Defendant argues, furthermore, that the plaintiff's claims are not ripe for adjudication until after the District Court determines the effect of the 1976 deeds on the plaintiff's easement. Finally, the defendant asserts that the court must decide this motion before it rules on other pending motions.
Defendant's motion challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction. "A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, 282 Conn. 130, 134, 918 A.2d 880 (2007). Practice Book § 10-31(a) provides in relevant part: "The motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter . . . This motion shall always be filed with a supporting memorandum of law, where appropriate, with supporting affidavits as to facts not apparent on the record." "[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n. 12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). "[I]n determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connor v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 260 Conn. 435, 443, 797 A.2d 1081 (2002).
Furthermore, "subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . and a judgment rendered without subject matter jurisdiction is void . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) LaSalle Bank, NA. v. Bialobrzeski, 123 Conn.App. 781, 789, 3 A.3d 176 (2010). "Once the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, it must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented . . . Whenever a court finds that it has no jurisdiction, it must dismiss the case, without regard to previous rulings." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 125 Conn.App. 201, 204, 9 A.3d 379 (2010). "[A] challenge to a courts subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and by any party . . ." Oxford House at Yale v. Gilligan, 125 Conn.App. 464, 473, 10 A.3d 52 (2010). Accordingly, a party may raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction by a motion to dismiss even after a default judgment has entered. Romano v. Westport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 05 4013088 (November 13, 2006, Rodriguez, J.); Stra v. Widholm, judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. HDSP-128699 (August 31, 2004, Dos Santos, J.); Seigel Realty, Inc. v. Ellis, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV 98 0061155 (November 5, 1998, Curran, J.) ( 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 254).
In response, plaintiff counters that because Judge Burgdorff entered the default judgment against defendant, plaintiff's easement over the defendant's property has been conclusively established. Furthermore, plaintiff contends that, even without the default, her easement is already established. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that the chain of title recognizes the existence and location of the easement, that her crossing rights are protected by Chapter 148 of the Public Acts of 1889, that the Connecticut Marketable Record Title Act preserves her easement rights, and that defendant's application to CDOT to close the grade crossings is an admission by defendant that the easement exists. Plaintiff argues, moreover, that the federal statutes defendant relies on do not apply to existing crossing easements.
"Congress passed the Rail Act in response to the bankruptcy of eight major railroads, which threatened the viability of the United States rail transportation system . . . The Rail Act reorganized the railroads into a single, viable system operated by a private, for-profit corporation, which would not have been possible under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act." New York v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., United States District Court, Docket No. 06 CV 793 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), aff'd, United States Court of Appeals, Docket No. 09 1200 CV (2nd Cir. April 21, 2010). The Rail Act provides that "[a]ll rail properties conveyed to the Corporation . . . shall be conveyed free and clear of any liens or encumbrances, but subject to such leases and agreements as shall have previously burdened such properties . . . Such conveyances shall not be restrained or enjoined by any court." 45 U.S.C. § 743 (b)(2). The Act established a "Special Court" with "the power to order the conveyance of rail properties of railroads leased, operated, or controlled by a railroad in reorganization in the region." 45 U.S.C. § 719(b). Conveyances made pursuant to the Rail Act do not extinguish existing easements. New York v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., supra, United States District Court, Docket No. 06 CV 793. The Special Court had, moreover, exclusive and original jurisdiction to "interpret, alter, amend, modify, or implement any of the orders entered by such court pursuant to Section 743(b) of this title in order to effect the purposes of this chapter or the goals of the final systems plan . . . Any orders pursuant to this paragraph which interpret, alter, amend, modify, or implement orders entered by the special court shall be final and shall not be restrained or enjoined by any court." 45 U.S.C. § 719(e)(2).
In 1997, Congress transferred the Special Court's exclusive jurisdiction over these issues to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 97 F.Sup.2d 454, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). As a result, the court uses the terms "Special Court" and "District Court" interchangeably in this decision.
Not every challenge relating the Rail Act fell within the jurisdiction of the Special Court: "It is not every challenge relating to the [Rail Act] that Congress brought within [the Special Court's] exclusive province but only those where the critical nature of the determination demands the consistent interpretation possible only when review is concentrated in a single court. Congress carefully considered the ambit of the Special Court's exclusive jurisdiction. Congressional concern focused on providing for exclusive jurisdiction where the Special Court's central functions under the Rail Act were concerned while narrowing the exclusive jurisdiction to oust problems which could be effectively dealt with by other courts." Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Illinois, 423 F.Sup. 941, 948 (Reg'l Rail Reorg. Ct. 1977). Thus, the Special Court has "exclusive jurisdiction where resolution of the dispute involves the court's central functions . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Surface Transportation Board, 571 F.3d 13, 18 n. 11 (C.A.D.C. 2009).
The Special Court consistently held that the interpretation of conveyance documents "so as to give effect to the intention formulated by [the United States Railway Association] and approved by Congress is within `the central functions' of [the Special Court] . . ." Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Pittsburgh Lake Erie Railroad Co., 459 F.Sup. 1013, 1017-18 (Reg'l Rail Reorg. Ct. 1978); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Surface Transportation Board, supra, 571 F.3d 18 n. 11; see also Penn Central Corp. v. U.S., 862 F.Sup. 437, 467 (Reg'l Rail Reorg. Ct. 1994) (Special Court is final arbiter of correct interpretation of conveyance documents, Rail Act and Final System Plan).
Nevertheless, the Special Court also recognized that it did not have jurisdiction to hear every case interpreting conveyance documents. Penn Central Corp. v. U.S., 814 F.Sup. 1116, 1119-20 (Reg'1 Rail Reorg. Ct. 1993); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Penn Central Corp., 533 F.Sup. 1351, 1353-54 (Reg'l Rail Reorg. Ct. 1982); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Pittsburgh Lake Erie Railroad Co., supra, 459 F.Sup. 1017. Rather, the Special Court "can and should exercise jurisdiction under [§ 719(e)(2)] over disputes that require it to interpret conveyance documents in light of an earlier conveyance order." Penn Central Corp. v. U.S., supra, 814 F.Sup. 1120. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Penn Central Corp., supra, 533 F.Sup. 1354 (Special Court has exclusive jurisdiction to interpret conveyance document that involved implementation of conveyance order); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Pittsburgh Lake Erie Railroad Co., supra, 459 F.Sup. 1017 (interpretation of conveyance document within special court's exclusive jurisdiction because it raised substantial questions with respect to interpretation of Final System Plan and conveyance orders).
In short, where the resolution of a dispute involves its central functions, the Special Court, now the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, has original and exclusive jurisdiction to interpret orders entered by it pursuant to § 743(b). A dispute over the interpretation of conveyance documents is within the central functions of the Court if it requires the Court to interpret those documents in light of an earlier conveyance order.
Defendant points out that pursuant to the Rail Act, in 1976, the Special Court ordered Penn Central Transportation Co. to convey the Shore Line Railroad to Conrail, which then conveyed that property to the defendant. Defendant argues that the Superior Court "does not have jurisdiction to determine the effect of the 1976 deeds or whether [plaintiff] owns an easement over [defendant's] land" because such a determination involves the interpretation of the conveyance documents, the conveyance order or both. According to the defendant, such an interpretation is within the central functions of the District Court, and, as a result, "falls squarely within [its] jurisdiction."
Defendant contends, moreover, that plaintiff's arguments "go to the merits of its claim that it owns an easement, not whether [the Superior Court] has subject matter jurisdiction in this case." Specifically, plaintiff's claims that the Special Court acknowledged the easement, that the easement was not part of the rail property, that the easement was not part of the conveyance order, and that the 1976 deeds had no legal effect on the easement all necessitate an examination of the conveyance order and documents, which now falls within the jurisdiction of the District Court. Indeed, defendant, relying on American Premier Underwriters, Inc. v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 47 Conn.App. 384, 704 A.2d 243 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 901, 710 A.2d 174 (1998), argues that the threshold and determinative issue of the effect of the 1976 deeds must be decided by the District Court before the plaintiff's claims are ripe for adjudication.
Furthermore, defendant asserts that the entry of a default against it does not preclude it from challenging this court's subject matter jurisdiction because this issue can be raised at any time and at any stage of the proceedings. Finally, defendant denies that CDOT's closing of the crossing constitutes an admission by defendant that plaintiff owned an easement over defendant's property.
In response, plaintiff counters that the federal statutes defendant relies on do not apply to private easements. Plaintiff argues that the "purpose of the Rail Act was to consolidate rail lines and to eliminate the debt and financial obligations of the prior railroads and relieve the successor railroads, including [defendant] . . . from the debt and liabilities of the insolvent railroads . . . not to eliminate existing easement rights of third parties unrelated to debt and financial liabilities of the railroads." On the contrary, plaintiff points out that § 743(b) specifies that any land conveyed is "subject to such leases and agreements as shall have previously burdened such properties." According to plaintiff, the District Court has no authority to take away the property rights of third parties because such a taking would violate the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Furthermore, plaintiff argues that the District Court does not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine every claim related to the Rail Act, but only claims that involve that Court's central functions. According to plaintiff, the "effect of a private railroad crossing over railroad tracks has no relationship to the liabilities of the railroad, railroad reorganization or the central functions of the Special Court." Plaintiff also points out that, although there must be thousands of on-grade crossings over railroads affected by the Rail Act, defendant cannot cite any case where either the Special Court or the District Court considered or ruled upon a private easement over a railroad. Additionally, plaintiff asserts that the default entered against the defendant conclusively establishes its liability. Plaintiff further argues on various grounds that the easement is established or defendant has admitted the easement exits.
The court first notes that for the purpose of this motion, it need not determine whether plaintiff has an easement across defendant's land. Instead, the issue is whether this court has the authority to make such a determination: if it does, then defendant's motion is denied and defendant's liability is conclusively proven as a result of the default; if does not, then the defendant's motion is granted, the issue must be resolved by the District Court, and the default judgment is of no effect.
"A default admits the material facts that constitute a cause of action . . . and entry of default, when appropriately made, conclusively determines the liability of a defendant . . . Accordingly, the entry of default against the defendant commands the rendering of judgment in favor of the plaintiff . . . Following the entry of a default, all that remains is for the plaintiff to prove the amount of damages to which it is entitled . . . At a minimum, the plaintiff in such instances is entitled to nominal damages. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Abbott Terrace Health Center, Inc. v. Parawich, 120 Conn.App. 78, 85-86, 990 A.2d 1267 (2010).
The determination of which court has subject matter jurisdiction hinges on whether the interpretation of the 1976 deeds falls within the District Court's central functions under the Rail Act. The defendant emphasizes that the District Court's predecessor, the Special Court, repeatedly held that the interpretation of conveyance documents lay within its central functions. Nevertheless, the Special Court also stated it did not have jurisdiction over every case involving the interpretation of conveyance documents, and narrowly construed that holding to instances where the interpretation of the conveyance documents raised substantial questions with respect to the interpretation of the conveyance orders or the Final System Plan. Indeed, the broad reading of this holding advocated by defendant would give the District Court "exclusive jurisdiction to determine every controversy that may arise over the interpretation of the thousands of instruments executed pursuant to [its] conveyance orders" Consolidated Rail Corp. v. U.S., 883 F.Sup. 1565, 1573 (Reg'l Rail Reorg. Ct. 1995), which would run counter to Congress's intent to narrow the Court's exclusive jurisdiction to problems that cannot be dealt with effectively by other courts.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the crossing existed at the time the Special Court ordered Conrail to convey the railroad to the defendant. Furthermore, defendant admitted in its answer that plaintiff used the crossing to access the 31.7-acre parcel. To determine whether plaintiff had an easement would not require the court to examine the conveyance documents in light of the conveyance orders because the easement, if it existed, came into being prior to enactment of the Rail Act. Instead, the court would need to examine the conveyance documents in light of previous deeds and other evidence that existed prior to the enactment of the Rail Act to determine whether the plaintiff has an easement over the defendant's land. Accordingly, the applicable precedent leads this court to conclude that interpretation of the conveyance documents in this case does not involve the District Court's central functions under the Rail Act and, as a result, this court has jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied.