Opinion
March 9, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court Nassau County (Adams, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The decision to grant a preliminary injunction is a matter ordinarily committed to the sound discretion of the court hearing the motion ( see, Doe v. Axelrod, 73 N.Y.2d 748, 750). To obtain a preliminary injunction a movant must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits; (2) danger of irreparable harm unless the injunction is granted; and (3) a balance of the equities in its favor ( see, Aetna Ins. Co. v. Capasso, 75 N.Y.2d 860, 862; Doe v. Axelrod, supra, at 750; Preston Corp. v. Fabrication Enters., 68 N.Y.2d 397, 406). Viewed in this framework, it cannot be said that the Supreme Court's decision granting the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction was an improvident exercise of discretion.
Nor was the court's denial of that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was to sever the action into two actions an improvident exercise of discretion ( see, Shanley v. Callanan Indus., 54 N.Y.2d 52; County of Chenango Indus. Dev. Agency v. Lockwood Greene Engrs., 111 A.D.2d 508).
We have reviewed the defendants' remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.
Mangano, P.J., Bracken, Miller and Krausman, JJ., concur.