Opinion
NNHCV156054538
04-03-2017
Deanne Negri v. Cory Murphy et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Jon M. Alander, J.
The plaintiff initiated the subject action for personal injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident against, inter alia, the defendant Cory Murphy, the driver of the motor vehicle who is alleged to have negligently caused the accident, and the defendant PV Holding Corporation, the owner and renter of the motor vehicle operated by Murphy. The plaintiff's amended complaint asserts claims against PV Holding Corporation in three counts of the complaint: count one asserts a claim that PV Holding Corporation is vicariously liable for the negligence of Murphy, count three asserts a claim that it is vicariously liable for the recklessness of Murphy and count four asserts a claim of negligent entrustment. The defendant PV Holding Corporation has moved for summary judgment as to all three counts claiming that the vicarious liability claims are barred by 49 U.S.C. § 30106 and the negligent entrustment claim fails because the undisputed facts establish that it was not negligent.
" Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . Scrapchansky v. Plainfield, 226 Conn. 446, 450, 627 A.2d 1329 (1993). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather, to determine whether any such issues exist. Cortes v. Cotton, 31 Conn.App. 569, 575, 626 A.2d 1306 (1993). [I]n deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . Johnson v. Meehan, 225 Conn. 528, 535, 626 A.2d 244 (1993). Once the moving party has presented evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue . . . Hammer v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 214 Conn. 573, 578, 573 A.2d 699 (1990)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Warner v. Lancia, 46 Conn.App. 150, 158, 698 A.2d 938 (1997).
" It is not enough for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. The existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counter affidavits and concrete evidence. If the affidavits and the other supporting documents are inadequate, then the court is justified in granting the summary judgment, assuming that the movant has met his burden of proof." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn.App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893 (2003). The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts. Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 105-06, 639 A.2d 507 (1994).
In counts one and three of the amended complaint, the plaintiff asserts that PV Holding Corporation is vicariously liable pursuant to General Statutes § 14-154a for the negligence and recklessness of Murphy in the operation of the motor vehicle. PV Holding Corporation asserts that, since it is undisputed that it rented the motor vehicle pursuant to its business of renting such vehicles, these vicarious liability claims are prohibited by 49 U.S.C. § 30106, also known as the Graves Amendment. I agree with the defendant.
Title 49 of the United States Code, § 30106, provides in relevant part: " (a) In General.--An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if--
" The Graves Amendment was enacted by Congress on August 10, 2005, as part of a comprehensive transportation bill entitled the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (act), Pub.L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005). The act deals generally with motor vehicle safety, primarily providing billions of dollars in funding allocations for transportation projects. The Amendment was included in the act as a tort reform measure intended to bar recovery against car rental and leasing companies on the basis of vicarious liability. The Amendment contains a preemption clause and two savings provisions. The preemption clause in subsection a) provides in relevant part: An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person . . . shall not be liable under the law of any State . . . by reason of being the owner of the vehicle . . . for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if (1) the owner . . . is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner . . . 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) (2006)." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Rodriguez v. Testa, 296 Conn. 1, 9-10, 993 A.2d 955 (2010).
The plaintiff has made no claim that the savings provisions are applicable to this case.
The parties do not dispute that the defendant PV Holding Corporation is engaged in the business of renting motor vehicles and that it rented the motor vehicle involved in the accident to the defendant Murphy who was the operator on the day of the accident. It is also clear that the Graves Amendment preempts the imposition of liability under General Statutes § 14-154a, which is the statute upon which the plaintiff rests her claims of vicarious liability in counts one and two. See Rodriguez v. Testa, supra 296 Conn. 21. The plaintiff seeks to save both counts by asserting in her objection to the motion for summary judgment that she is asserting a viable claim of agency under General Statutes § 52-183. But that is not what the complaint says. Both counts one and two expressly allege liability pursuant to § 14-154a. Neither count identifies § 52-183 as the source for its claims. See Practice Book § 10-3(a) (" When any claim made in a complaint . . . is grounded on a statute, the statute shall be specifically identified by its number").
The plaintiff in her amended complaint alleges that the defendant PV Holding Corporation was doing business as Avis Car Rental and rented the subject motor vehicle to Murphy.
General Statutes § 52-183 provides that: " In any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment. The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption."
The plaintiff also argues the Graves Amendment does not apply to the claims asserted in counts one and two due to the prerequisite that there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner. See 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(2). The plaintiff contends that she alleges that PV Holding Corporation knew or should have known that Murphy was likely to use the rental car in an unreasonably risky manner and knew or should have known that he was not competent to operate the vehicle. Again, counts one and two contain no such allegations. Rather, they simply allege vicarious liability pursuant to § 14-154a.
In count four of her amended complaint, the plaintiff asserts a claim of negligent entrustment. Specifically, she alleges that PV Holding Corporation was negligent in various ways, including failing to properly verify that Murphy was licensed to drive the vehicle, failing to verify the validity of Murphy's driver's license and his identity, failing to properly verify that Murphy had insurance, failing to properly staff and supervise the rental car location and failing to exercise reasonable discretion in deciding whether to rent a motor vehicle to Murphy. PV Holding Corporation claims that the undisputed facts established by the record in this case show that it did not negligently entrust its vehicle with Murphy.
The tort of negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle was recognized in Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515, 520, 165 A. 678 (1933). In Greeley, the court concluded that a person may recover for his injuries when it is proved that " the owner of an automobile knows or ought reasonably to know that one to whom he entrusts it is so incompetent to operate it upon the highways that the former ought reasonably to anticipate the likelihood of injury to others by reason of that incompetence." Id. The elements of negligent entrustment of an automobile are (1) there is actual or constructive knowledge that the person to whom the automobile is lent is incompetent to operate the motor vehicle and (2) the injury resulted from that incompetence. Griffin v. Larson, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV-020079364 (August 18, 2004, Lager, J.).
In her amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that during the evening of December 18, 2013, the defendant Cory Murphy crashed the motor vehicle he was operating into the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle causing injury to her. The plaintiff has submitted evidence that Murphy had been drinking alcohol prior to the collision. The undisputed evidence is that PV Holding Corporation had rented the motor vehicle to Murphy two days before the accident.
PV Holding Corporation has submitted evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment that Murphy had a valid driver's license, he provided the number of his driver's license to the representative of the rental car company, he had not previously been arrested for driving under the influence or for a motor vehicle violation, and he did not suffer from any medical condition at the time which made it dangerous for him to operate a vehicle. PV Holding Corporation contends that this evidence establishes that Murphy was not incompetent to drive a car and that it did not know or have reason to know that Murphy was incompetent to do so.
The plaintiff submitted evidence that PV Holding Corporation did not review Murphy's license, confirm his identity or perform a background check prior to renting the vehicle to him. She also points to Murphy's drinking of alcohol on the evening of the accident as evidence of his incompetence to operate a motor vehicle.
I agree with the PV Holding Corporation that, based on the record before me, it had no reason to believe that Murphy was incompetent to operate a motor vehicle. He had a valid driver's license and gave the number of that license to the rental company at the time of the rental. The existence of a valid driver's license is evidence that Murphy had the competency to operate a motor vehicle. See Shea v. Brown, 146 Conn. 631, 633, 153 A.2d 419 (1959) (the operator's obtaining a driver's license in the first place established that he was competent to operate a motor vehicle). As Shea v. Brown, supra, the plaintiff has provided no evidence that Murphy lacked the skill, technique or capability necessary for the operation of an automobile. The fact that Murphy was drinking alcohol two days after the rental of the car is simply not evidence of his incompetence at the time of the rental.
The plaintiff asserts that PV Holding Corporation was negligent because it failed to inspect Murphy's driver's license. See General Statutes § 14-153 which provides, in relevant part, that " [a]ny person, firm or corporation which rents a motor vehicle without a driver . . . shall inspect or cause to be inspected the motor vehicle operator's license of the person initially operating such motor vehicle, [and] shall compare the signature on such license with that of the alleged licensee written in his presence . . ." Such negligence does not assist the plaintiff in her claim of negligent entrustment. In light of the evidence presented, there exists no valid claim that the failure to inspect Murphy's license and compare signatures caused the plaintiff's injuries as it is undisputed that Murphy rented the vehicle and he had a valid driver's license.
Further, while the plaintiff complains that PV Holding Corporation failed to perform a background check on Murphy before renting a vehicle to him, she has failed to show that PV Holding Corporation had any duty to do so or that such a check would have revealed any information that Murphy was incompetent to drive a car.
In light of the above, the defendant PV Holding Corporation has shown that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the defendant PV Holding Corporation's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted as to counts one, three and four of the plaintiff's amended complaint.
" (1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and " (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)."