Opinion
01-CV-7630 (JD)
June 26, 2003
ALAN ROTHBERG, Law Offices of Alan Rothberg, P.C., New York, New York, for Plaintiff MICHAEL A. CARDOZO, City of New York Law Department, New York, New York, Mary O'Flynn for Defendants City of New York JEROME KARP, MTTCHELL FRIEDMAN, Law Offices of Jerome Karp, P.C., Brooklyn, New York, for Defendant Perrier
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BACKGROUND
Dr. Gregory Perrier, one of the defendants in this case, is a physician with offices at, among other places, 4256 Flatlands Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. Plaintiff Jacques Nazaire, a lawyer, occupied space in that building. On occasion, Perrier referred patients to Nazaire for legal services. In the fall of 2000, a disagreement arose between Perrier and Nazaire, the genesis of which is a matter of dispute in this case.
On October 13, 2000, Perrier went to the 69th precinct in Brooklyn and filed a complaint against Nazaire. According to the police complaint report, Perrier told an officer that Nazaire had telephoned his medical office and left a message that Perrier should "watch [his] back" and that Nazaire was going to "send [his] friends to pay [Perrier] a visit." Def.'s Notice of Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. B. Perrier told the officer that these statements alarmed him, and the complaint report shows that the officer believed that, based on these statements, Nazaire may have committed the offense of aggravated harassment in the second degree.Id.: see N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30.
A few days later, on October 17, 2000, Detective Derek Wright followed up Perrier's initial complaint by calling Perrier and interviewing him over the telephone. See Def.'s Notice of Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. C. The report drafted by Wright indicated that Wright was conducting an investigation into whether Perrier had committed the crime of aggravated harassment in the second degree by making threatening phone calls to Perrier. Perrier told Wright that he and Nazaire got into a disagreement over whether Nazaire owed Perrier money for the office space that Nazaire was using and whether Perrier had interfered with Nazaire's representation of some of Nazaire's clients.Id. Perrier told Wright that the disagreement had escalated and that Nazaire had called him on various occasions at his office, on his cellular phuric, and even his home, and that Nazaire had made threatening statements, including that Perrier had "better watch [his] back" and that Nazaire was "going to send [his] friends to pay [Perrier] a visit." Perrier also told Detective Wright that he had recently gone to one of his other medical offices and that his secretary there told him that four "thugs" had come to the office looking for him that they had said that they were "going to break [Perrier's] legs." Id. Perrier told Wright that he wanted Nazaire arrested and a protection order against him. Id.
Based on this information, Detectives Wright and Harrison (as well as another officer) arrested Nazaire the following day for aggravated harassment in the second degree. N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30.See Def.'s Notice of Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. D. Nazaire was held in custody for more than 24 hours before he was arraigned and released. Dr. Perrier reaffirmed his original complaint against Nazaire, and based on this information, the Kings County District Attorney's Office brought criminal charges against Nazaire. The case was subsequently dismissed.
Following that dismissal, Nazaire filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants include Perrier, the detectives who arrested Nazaire, an assistant district attorney and a paralegal who participated in the legal proceedings against him, the police commissioner, and the City of New York. Nazaire claims that the detectives lacked probable cause to arrest him, that the district attorney and paralegal lacked probable cause to prosecute him, that all of the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and that the city and the police commissioner were generally negligent in allowing these violations by hiring the detectives and by failing to train and supervise them. The complaint also alleged other state law claims.
All the defendants except for Perrier have moved for summary judgment. The motion is based for the most part on the assertion that the detectives had probable cause to arrest Nazaire for aggravated harassment based on Perrier's complaints. Following oral argument on the motion, Nazaire withdrew his claims against the assistant district attorney and the paralegal. Those claims are therefore dismissed with prejudice. As I explain below, his claims against the other city defendants are also dismissed because I grant their motion for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The substantive law governing the case identifies the facts that are material, and "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment" Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is warranted only if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. In reviewing the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, "the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . [T]he non-moving party must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."' Id. at 586-87 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
B. The Claims Against the City Defendants
1. False Arrest
"To establish a claim under § 1983 for false arrest a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged." Carson v. Lewis, 35 F. Supp.2d 250, 257 (E.D.N.Y.1999) (citing Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995)). The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a § 1983 claim for false arrest. See Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir.1996); Singer, 63 F.3d 110 at 118.
"In general, probable cause to arrest exists when the officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime." Weyant 101 F.3d at 852. The validity of an arrest does not depend upon a finding that the arrested person is guilty.See Fierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). Rather, a determination of the existence of probable cause "turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time." Maryland v. Macon. 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985) (citation omitted). "[A]n officer's subjective motivations are never in issue." Carson, 35 F. Supp.2d at 257. The existence of probable cause may be determined as a matter of law provided there is no factual dispute regarding the pertinent events and the knowledge of the officers. See, e.g., Singer, 63 F.3d at 118-119 (affirming dismissal of claim on the ground that the facts as to the store owner's complaint of theft established probable cause).
The police arrested Perrier for aggravated harassment in the second degree, an offense that prohibits making annoying or threatening statements by telephone. N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30. I conclude as a matter of law that the information recorded in Perrier's initial complaint and the ensuing interview by Detective Wright established probable cause to arrest Nazaire for that offense. The police reports detailing those complaints show that Perrier told the police about numerous threatening phone calls made by Nazaire, and Perrier mentioned other threatening communications by Nazaire that were not included in either of the police reports. See Def.'s Notice of Mot. for Summ. J. at Ex. F.
"When an officer is advised of a crime by a person who claims to be the victim, and that person signs a complaint accusing another, the officer generally has probable cause to arrest." Mistretta v. Prokesch, 5 F. Supp.2d 128, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Singer, 63 F.3d at 119). Crime victims themselves are ordinarily the most reliable sources of information, although this general rule can be rebutted if the circumstances raise doubts about the victim's veracity.Mistretta, 5 F. Supp.2d at 133. One such circumstance is a "prior relationship between the victim and the accused that gives rise to a motive for a false accusation." Id. "When such a relationship exists, and is known to the arresting officer before the arrest is made, the complaint alone may not constitute probable cause; the officer may need to investigate further." Id.
In this case, Detective Wright followed up Terrier's initial complaint by contacting Perrier again and reconfirming his initial accusations. This second interaction elicited further information regarding the alleged threatening behavior by Nazaire. Nazaire has not pointed to any information that should have alerted the police to any possible malfeasance on the part of Perrier sufficient to create a "demonstrable ring of untruth" to strip the circumstances of probable cause to arrest Nazaire and require further investigation into Perrier's veracity by the arresting officers. Id. at 135.
Nazaire's opposition to the motion betrays a misunderstanding of the issues it raised. Even assuming that "Perrier is a liar as proven by his deposition testimony," PL's Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 16, the police had neither the luxury nor the obligation to await that deposition before deciding whether to arrest Nazaire. Similarly, Nazaire's claim that the police "refused to wait for proof of his claim of innocence,id. at ¶ 19, misses the point. The police are not obligated or equipped to adjudicate charges of criminal conduct. Rather, their function is to determine only whether there is probable cause to believe a particular person committed a particular crime. Here, there was ample basis for the conclusion.
It follows from the foregoing that even if the detectives somehow lacked probable cause to arrest Nazaire, I would still conclude that they were entitled to qualified immunity based on Dr. Perrier's complaints.See id at 136-37; Thomas v. Culbere, 741 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
2. Malicious Prosecution
The absence of probable cause is also an element a claim of malicious prosecution. See Rounseville v. Zahl, 13 F.3d 625, 628 (2d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, my conclusion above requires the dismissal of this claim as well. Even if the arresting officers lacked probable cause, the defendants are again entitled to qualified immunity on this claim based on Dr. Perrier's complaints. See Thomas, 741 F. Supp. at 77.
3. Conspiracy to Deprive Constitutional Rights
To show a conspiracy to violate a constitutional right, the plaintiff must be able to show an actual violation of a constitutional right.See Singer v. Fulton Co. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995). Since Nazaire cannot show this, he cannot prove a conspiracy.
4. Custom or Practice to Deprive Constitutional Rights
In order to bring a claim against a municipality (or in this case the police commissioner also), the plaintiff must be able to show: (1) an official policy or custom, (2) that causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right. See Zahar v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995). Since Nazaire cannot prove the denial of a constitutional right, this claim also fails. Furthermore, his bare and conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a § 1983 claim against a municipality under Monell v. Dep't of Soc, Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991);Campbell v. Giulianl, No. 99-CV-2603 (JG), 2000 WL 194815, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2000).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the city defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety. Nazaire's remaining claims against Dr. Perrier appear to be based solely on § 1983, although the complaint obliquely references state law claims. Counsel are therefore directed to appear on July 11, 2003, at 10:00 a.m., for a conference to discuss whether there are any remaining state law claims and, if so, whether I should retain jurisdiction over them.
So Ordered.