Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-2005-D
January 25, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs' and intervenors' motions to remand this removed case present the question whether state product liability claims arising from the fatal crash of a helicopter are preempted by the complete preemption or substantial federal question exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule, under federal aviation law, the federal common law of foreign relations, or under the doctrine of international comity. Concluding that they are not preempted, the court grants the motions to remand.
I
On March 21, 2000 a Bell helicopter Model 206L-4 crashed in Toluca de Lerdo, Mexico, killing all six persons aboard. Among the fatalities were plaintiffs and intervenors' decedents, Olga Navarro Legorreta and Ruben Abelardo Campiran Romero, and plaintiffs' decedent, Enrique Carlos Rosales Morales. Plaintiffs Maria del Socorro Legoretta Suarez, et al. ("plaintiffs") brought this suit in state district court against defendants Bell Helicopter Services Inc. ("Bell Helicopter"), Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. ("Bell Textron"), Rolls-Royce Corporation d/b/a Allison Engine Co. and Rolls-Royce Allison, Honeywell International Inc. ("Honeywell"), and Dallas Airmotive, Inc. Plaintiffs alleged state-law claims for strict liability and negligence in the design, manufacture, assembly, and distribution of the helicopter and breach of implied warranty. Intervenors Luis Eduardo Hernandez Navarro, et al. ("intervenors") filed a plea in intervention before the case was removed to this court.
Intervenors' claim appears to relate primarily to a dispute concerning the authority of their attorney of record to represent plaintiffs in this lawsuit. See Ints. Br. at 2.
With the consent of the other defendants, Bell Helicopter and Bell Textron removed the case based on this court's federal question jurisdiction, contending that plaintiffs' state-law claims are preempted by federal aviation law and federal common law. Intervenors and plaintiffs move to remand the case to state court, contending there is no federal question jurisdiction. In separate response briefs, defendant Honeywell and the remaining defendants oppose the motions.
In its separate response to the motions to remand, Honeywell argues that federal jurisdiction lies in this matter "[b]ecause of the inextricable questions relating to international treaties and discretionary acts taken by foreign sovereigns." D. Honeywell Br. at 4-5.
Defendants concede that the case is not removable based on diversity of citizenship. See Ds. Br. at 17 n. 6.
II A
Ordinarily, federal question jurisdiction is determined by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which holds that "[r]emoval is not possible unless the plaintiffs `well pleaded complaint' raises issues of federal law sufficient to support federal question jurisdiction." Rodriguez v. Pacificare of Tex., Inc., 980 F.2d 1014, 1017 (5th Cir. 1993). The well-pleaded complaint rule "makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 483 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Therefore, even if federal claims are available, the plaintiff may remain in state court by relying exclusively on state law. See id.
This principle, however, is not without exception. Under the so-called "artful pleading doctrine," courts have recognized "two types of situations [in which] the court may disregard the state law facade of a complaint, thereby bringing to the surface the federal claims lying beneath." Wynn v. Philip Morris Inc., 51 F. Supp.2d 1232, 1238 (N.D. Ala. 1999). The first, to which defendants refer as the substantial federal question exception, see D. Br. at 3, is "where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983). The second, the complete preemption doctrine, applies to areas "in which Congress has `so completely preempt[ed] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.'" Heimann v. National Elevator Indus. Pension Fund, 187 F.3d 493, 499 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 US. 58, 63-64 (1987)).
In their notice of removal, defendants asserted that plaintiffs' claims "are completely preempted by federal law." Not. Rem. at 6. This statement suggests that defendants are relying on the complete preemption exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. In their brief in response to the motions to remand, however, they appear to disclaim any reliance on complete preemption and argue instead that the substantial federal question exception makes the case removable. See Ds. Br. at 2-3. Regardless which theory defendants advance, neither complete preemption nor the substantial federal question exception applies to this case.
B
The complete preemption exception is narrow. See Richardson v. United Steelworkers of Am., 864 F.2d 1162, 1169 (5th Cir. 1989). It is warranted only where the statute at issue (1) contains a civil enforcement provision; (2) includes a specific grant of federal subject matter jurisdiction; and (3) reflects a clear manifestation of congressional intent to make preempted state-law claims removable to federal court. See Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 245-46 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Aaron v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 876 F.2d 1157, 1163-66 (5th Cir. 1989)). Specifically, defendants maintain that federal aviation regulations that dictate design, performance, and certification of aircraft preempt plaintiffs' state-law product liability claims. In addition to several regulations promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration, defendants point to the Federal Aviation Act ("FAA"), 49 U.S.C. § 40101-49105, which they describe as precluding any state regulation over aviation.Fifth Circuit case law, however, "refutes the idea that aviation is generally a field of complete preemption." Johnson v. Baylor Univ., 214 F.3d 630, 634 (5th Cir. 2000). Although Johnson considered the preemptive effect of the Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA"), 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1), rather than the FAA, the result is the same. Defendants cite numerous statements of legislative intent suggesting that federal power is plenary in the field of airline operations, but they cannot establish that this power extends to the construction of planes and helicopters. Absent congressional intent to make claims involving the design, manufacture, and assembly of helicopters removable to federal court, complete preemption does not apply.
Defendants maintain that Johnson is distinguishable because it was addressing complete preemption, not preemption based on a substantial federal question. See Ds. Br. at 3 n. 1. This may explain why defendants apparently do not rely on complete preemption to sustain a right of removal in this case.
C
Defendants' reliance on the substantial federal question exception is similarly unavailing. According to defendants, cases falling under this exception "implicate an important question of federal law[,]" D. Br. 3, even in the absence of complete preemption. The Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Waste Control Specialists, LLC v. Envirocare of Texas, Inc., 199 F.3d 781, 783 (5th Cir. 2000), however, leads the court to conclude that the substantial federal question exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is no longer recognized in this circuit. In Waste Control Specialists the panel considered a district court's denial of a motion to remand in an antitrust case. Although the plaintiff had stated only state-law claims under the Texas Antitrust Act, the district court held that the Texas state claims could not apply to the interstate actions at issue in the case. See id Because the district court concluded that the plaintiff had not alleged a valid state cause of action, it held that the plaintiff had effectively alleged a federal claim, and it applied the artful pleading doctrine even though it acknowledged that the federal Sherman Act did not completely preempt the Texas Antitrust Act. See id The Fifth Circuit reversed, unequivocally stating that "[w]ithout complete preemption, the artful pleading doctrine does not apply. If this was once a matter of debate, the Supreme Court has put the issue to rest." Id at 783; see also Greer v. Majr Fin. Corp., 105 F. Supp.2d 583, 592-93 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (recognizing that in absence of complete preemption, well-pleaded complaint rule applies).Although the Waste Control Specialists panel did not state explicitly that the substantial federal question doctrine can never support removal jurisdiction absent complete preemption, its reasoning leaves little room for doubt. As Professor Arthur Miller, whom defendants cite in their brief, has recognized, courts have treated the separate doctrines of substantial federal question and complete preemption "under the single heading of artful pleading." Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1781, 1784 (1998). In the absence of complete preemption, some courts, such as the district court in Waste Control Specialists, had applied the artful pleading doctrine because they found a substantial federal question in the plaintiff's pleadings. The Fifth Circuit, however, in rejecting the possibility that the artful pleading doctrine can apply without complete preemption, has clearly foreclosed any reliance on the substantial federal question branch of the artful pleading doctrine. In light of Waste Control Specialists, therefore, plaintiffs must demonstrate complete preemption to take advantage of the artful pleading doctrine. Having concluded that complete preemption is inapplicable in this case, the court cannot rely on the substantial federal question exception to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims.
Even if the substantial federal question exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule remains viable, defendants have not demonstrated that it applies to this case. At most, defendants have pointed to federal regulations governing the safe operation of aircraft, including the certification of some aircraft components, such as engines. Plaintiffs' claims, however, do not challenge these certification procedures, but are instead directed at the manufacture and design of the aircraft. Furthermore, the case-law that defendants cite does not support their contention that federal law completely occupies the field of aircraft manufacturing and design. Rather, the cited cases refer to the plenary federal power over specific areas, such as flight operations. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1983) (noise regulations on flight operations); Abdullah v. American Airlines, 181 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 1999) (safety of air operations); French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) (pilot qualifications). Therefore, plaintiffs' state-law product liability claims do not necessarily involve questions of federal law.
III
Defendants also argue that the case was properly removed because plaintiffs' claims implicate the federal common law of foreign relations and international comity. In addition to endorsing this theory, Honeywell also argues that the claims necessarily require the construction of international treaties.This argument, however, presupposes the continued vitality of the substantial federal question exception. Defendants have not cited any authority that supports the proposition that the presence of foreign relations issues establishes removal jurisdiction independent of the substantial federal question exception. Indeed, all the cases that defendants cite rely on the substantial federal question exception. For example, the sole Fifth Circuit case that defendants and Honeywell cite, Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997), applied the substantial federal question exception to justify removal. See id at 542-43 (holding that where an action "raises substantial questions of federal common law by implicating important foreign policy concerns" federal question jurisdiction exists); see also Republic of Phillipines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 352 (2d Cir. 1986) (invoking substantial federal question jurisdiction doctrine); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 62-63 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (same). As noted supra § II(C), the Fifth Circuit has determined that the substantial federal question exception cannot justify removal jurisdiction in the absence of complete preemption. Furthermore, defendants do not, and indeed cannot, argue that federal common law completely preempts plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, defendants cannot rely on the federal common law of foreign relations and international comity to support removal.
Even if the court's holding in § II(C) does not settle the issue, remand is nevertheless appropriate. Defendants note that there are many international aspects to this case. For example, the helicopter involved in the fatal crash was registered, certified, and flown extensively in Mexico and was owned by the Mexican government. The crash occurred in Mexico. Furthermore, the helicopter was manufactured in Canada and certified as airworthy by the Canadian Department of Transport. Defendants argue that these international ties require adjudication of this matter in federal court.
Although the area of international relations is exclusively an aspect of federal law, it has never been the case that any dispute between private litigants must be litigated in federal court simply because the dispute features international aspects. Rather, courts have looked to whether a given case "implicat[es] important foreign policy concerns." Torres, 113 F.3d at 543. For example, in Torres the Fifth Circuit held that a state-law tort action arising out of events at a Peruvian mine implicated Peru's vital sovereign interests and noted that Peru had officially protested the litigation. Id. By contrast, Mexico's vital sovereign interests are not at stake in this litigation. Although the Mexican government owned the helicopter and certified it as airworthy, plaintiffs do not challenge the certification process. See supra note 6. Furthermore, their claims involving the design, manufacture, and assembly of the aircraft do not implicate such issues as Mexico's sovereignty over its airspace and the regulation of Mexico's or Canada's aviation industry. Finally, adjudication of plaintiffs' claims does not necessarily involve the interpretation of international treaties regarding the sovereignty of airspace or the validity of aviation regulations.
Therefore, even if the court's holding that the substantial federal question exception is inapplicable in the absence of complete preemption does not dispose of defendants' arguments, remand is still appropriate because plaintiffs' claims do not implicate the federal common law of foreign relations and international comity.