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finding persuasive the Fourth Circuit's reasoning that the word "may" in section 9 makes the one year provision permissive and not mandatory
Summary of this case from ARTHUR v. FIA CARD SERVS.Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:95-CV-3072-R.
May 15, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER US. DISTRICT CLERKS OFFICE
On March 31, 2000, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award. Subsequently, this Court issued a Final Judgment on April 3, 2000. Plaintiffs Nations Personnel of Texas, Inc. and Nations Personnel of Texas, Inc., Employee Benefit Plan filed their Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment on April 13, 2000. On April 21, 2000, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that Plaintiffs' motion is time barred. Now before this Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and Defendants' motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The background facts are fully referenced in this Court's prior decisions. (See. e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order (filed March 31, 2000).) Therefore, they will not be repeated here.
DISCUSSION
I. THIS COURT'S MARCH 31, 2000 OPINION WAS CORRECT
A. LAW OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs have confused this Court's quotation, which stated "under the law of this case, Plaintiffs' state law claims are preempted by ERISA." (See March 31, 2000 Memorandum Opinion at 3.) In using that language, this Court was not invoking the traditional common law doctrine of "law of the case," but was declining to rule on a prior decision made by this same Court absent new evidence or contrary binding case law. Indeed, the entire Opinion searched for new evidence and/or contrary binding case law. Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, even subject matter jurisdiction cannot be raised every day, before the same judge, based upon the same evidence and case law. In fact, Plaintiffs' cannot cite to any case for such a proposition.
This Court had adopted the Magistrate Judge's Opinions.
B. UNUM DOES NOT CREATE NEW LAW RELEVANT TO THIS CASE
Plaintiffs cite to various non-binding articles and press releases in an effort to argue that this Court's prior decision concerningUNUM Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999), is incorrect. In the March 31, 2000 Memorandum Opinion and Order, this Court held that, relevant to the issues it was cited to in the case at bar, UNUM did not create any new law that would change this Court's prior decisions. (See March 31, 2000 Memorandum Opinion at 4-5.) That holding stands. First, Plaintiffs' quote from the Secretary of Labor is contrary to their own argument. (See Motion to Alter or Amend at 6.) The last sentence of the second paragraph quoted states, "The Court left the door open for us to present this argument again." (Id.) This implicitly suggest that the Court did not accept the government's argument. In fact, the UNUM Court noted, "We need not address the Solicitor General's current argument. . . . UNUM, 526 U.S. at 376 n. 7. Second, law review articles are not precedent for this Court. Indeed, this Court prefers to believe Justice Ginsburg, the author of the UNUM opinion? Finally, the Court relies upon the reasons set forth in the March 31, 2000 Memorandum Opinion and Order in declining to revisit this Court's prior decisions.
The Court did accept portions of the government's arguments pertaining to issues unrelated to Plaintiffs' arguments in this present case.
As quoted in this Court's March 31, 2000 opinion, in UNUM, Justice Ginsburg stated, "Our precedent provides a framework for resolving whether a state law `regulates insurance' within the meaning of the savings clause." See UNUM, 526 U.S. at 367. (See also March 31, 2000 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 4.)
II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS IS DENIED
It would not serve justice for this Court to bar the Plaintiffs from receiving the Arbitration Award. The award of the Arbitrators was issued on August 18, 1998. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award on November 16, 1998. From that time, until March 31, 2000, that motion was in this Court. After receiving the denial of their Motion to Vacate, Plaintiffs immediately filed the current motion to confirm the award of the arbitrators. While Defendants refer the Court to the one year period during which the parties may have petitioned to have the award confirmed, Plaintiffs refer the Court to a Fourth Circuit case holding the one year period permissive. See Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 151-54 (4th Cir. 1993). For the following reasons, this Court holds that Plaintiffs are not barred from confirming their award.
First, this Court declines to allow the one year limitation to run during the period of time that Plaintiffs' motion was pending before this Court. Plaintiffs did not move to confirm the award because they disagreed with the award and were awaiting a decision from this Court. If the period of time that the motion was pending in this Court is tolled, Plaintiffs do not run afoul of the one year limitation period.
Second, the Court finds the reasoning of Sverdrup persuasive. See Sverdrup, 989 F.2d at 151-54. Thus, this Court holds that it has discretion to confirm the award. Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Dismiss is denied.
III. PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR INTEREST IS DENIED
The Court declines to award interest to the Plaintiffs. If Plaintiffs had not vigorously sought to circumvent this Court's prior decisions, the award would have been in their accounts earning a market rate of return for over a year. Instead, Plaintiffs decided to relitigate the same issues over and over, under different titles. The Court declines to reward this action.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. That motion is granted as to Plaintiffs' request to vacate the Final Judgment and confirm the arbitrators award; it is denied as to all other requests. Likewise, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. Further, the Final Judgment issued by this Court on April 3, 2000 is VACATED.
Finally, any further request to this Court, not related to the actual collection of the arbitration award, will be frowned upon by this Court. Therefore, the parties are ORDERED to seek leave from this Court prior to filing any other motions. The non-moving party SHALL NOT respond to any motion, unless requested by this Court.
It is so ORDERED.