Opinion
No. CV 05-2014-PHX-JAT.
May 11, 2006
ORDER
Pending before the Court is the Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial (doc. 75).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiff filed an action in Texas County Court seeking to have an alleged fraudulent transfer by Defendant Richard Ross set aside. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Subsequently, the Texas District Court transferred the case to this Court, together with the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
The Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment argued that the transfer in question was a fraudulent transfer as defined by the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. On August 16, 2005, the Defendants filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the transfer was not a fraudulent transfer, and that the Plaintiff could not prevail on any of its claims because the default judgment upon which the claims were predicated is void and unenforceable in Arizona.
On March 9, 2006, the Court Ordered supplemental briefing on several issues related to choice of law and the constitutionality of the relief sought by the Plaintiff. The Court heard oral argument on the parties' motions on March 13, 2006, and again ordered supplemental briefing. On March 24, 2006, the Court denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Granted the Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The Order was amended and superceded by an Order issued on March 27, 2006.
The amended order merely corrects a typographical error with respect to the name of one of the parties.
On April 6, 2006, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The Court has discretion to reconsider and vacate an order granting summary judgment. See Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Nutri-Cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, when a "motion for a new trial" has been filed following a grant of summary judgment, the motion is considered to be a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e).
In order to obtain the relief sought, the Plaintiff must provide (1) a valid reason why the Court should reconsider its prior decision, and (2) facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the Court to reverse all or part of its prior decision. See, e.g., Garber v. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ., 259 F.Supp.2d 979, 981 (D. Ariz. 2003). Additionally, any motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) must "be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment."
The recognized grounds for setting aside a court's decision after summary judgment under Rule 59(e) are: (1) newly discovered, previously unavailable, evidence; (2) the court committed a clear error of law and the initial decision was manifestly unjust; or (3) there has been an intervening change in controlling law. Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. AC and S, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993); United States ex rel Conveyor Rental Sales Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 1991 WL 495733, *1 (D. Ariz. 1991). Motions seeking reconsideration of a grant or denial of summary judgment may not, however, be used to re-litigate old matters or to raise arguments that could have been raised prior to entry of judgment. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Agency v. World Univ., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1992); accord Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985).
The Plaintiff filed its Motion for a New Trial on April 6, 2006. Judgment was entered in this case on March 27, 2006. Accordingly, the Motion for a New Trial is timely. The Plaintiff argues that the Court misinterpreted and misapplied the controlling law. Specifically, the Plaintiff disagrees with the Court's conclusions regarding the due process rights of Defendant Richard Ross.
The Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial is nothing more than a re-argument of the law previously presented to the Court in the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to the Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Rule 59 motions can not be used to ask the Court "to rethink what the court has already thought through," merely because a plaintiff disagrees with the Court's decision. Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983); See Refrigeration Sales Co. 605 F.Supp. at 8. Such disagreements should be dealt with in the normal appellate process. Database Am., Inc. v. Bellsouth Adver. Pub'g Corp., 825 F.Supp. 1216, 1220 (D.N.J. 1993); Refrigeration Sales Co., Inc. v. Mitchell-Jackson Inc., 605 F.Supp. 6, 7 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
Additionally, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's re-argument of the law as it applies to the facts of this case and finds no error with respect to its prior decision. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient grounds to cause the Court to alter or amend its March 27, 2006, Order denying the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and granting judgment in favor of the Defendants.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED denying the Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial (doc. 75).