Opinion
23-cv-02211-DMR
01-05-2024
MATTHEW NATHANSON, Plaintiff, v. TRUEBECK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND
RE: DKT. NO. 20
Donna M. Ryu Chief Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Matthew Nathanson filed this discrimination action in San Mateo County Superior Court against his employer, Truebeck Construction, Inc. (“Truebeck”) and Does 1-50. Truebeck removed the case, asserting that this court has federal question jurisdiction because Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) preempts Nathanson's claims. Nathanson now moves to remand the case to state court. [Docket No. 20.] This matter is suitable for determination without oral argument. Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the following reasons, the motion to remand is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff's Allegations
In his complaint, Nathanson alleges that he was employed by Truebeck as a Jobsite Safety Manager from May 11, 2020 to December 22, 2022, when he alleges he was constructively or wrongfully terminated. [Docket No. 1-2 (Madonna A. Herman Decl., May 5, 2023) ¶ 1, Ex. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 10.]
Nathanson suffered an injury to his knee on January 21, 2021, while working for Truebeck. Compl. ¶ 14. After taking some doctor-recommended time off to receive treatment, Nathanson went back to work in February 2021. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Because his knee was still causing him pain, Nathanson took additional time off in May 2021. Id. ¶ 16-17. He underwent knee surgery and was on work disability during his recovery. Id. ¶ 17. In December 2021, Nathanson was able to return to work to perform “light dut[ies].” Id. ¶ 18. Throughout 2022, however, Truebeck told Nathanson that the company did not have any light duty positions, “refused to allow [Nathanson] to return to work,” and “consistently ignored [Nathanson]'s requests to return to work.” Id. ¶¶ 1920. In April 2022, Nathanson's doctor informed him that he was at his “maximum level of recovery” and could return to work. Id. ¶ 21. Nathanson alleges that Truebeck nevertheless refused to allow him to return. Id. According to Nathanson, he was constructively or wrongfully terminated on December 22, 2022, and the “pre-textual nature” of his termination is clear based on his “prior explicit request(s) for reasonable accommodation, Defendant's failure to provide them, and Plaintiff's forced leave from the company without pay.” Id. ¶ 22.
B. Procedural History
Nathanson filed a complaint against Defendants in San Mateo County Superior Court on April 3, 2023, alleging four claims under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California Government Code section 12900 et seq.: 1) disability discrimination; 2) failure to engage in an interactive process; 3) failure to provide reasonable accommodations; and 4) retaliation. Nathanson also brought claims for constructive/wrongful termination in violation of public policy and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Truebeck removed the action on May 5, 2023, asserting that this court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Nathanson's claims require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement and are thus completely preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA, 20 U.S.C. § 185. [Docket No. 1 (Notice of Removal) ¶¶ 5, 8.] Truebeck asserts that Nathanson's employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement at all relevant times. Notice of Removal ¶ 5; see also Herman Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 3 (2018-2023 Carpenters Master Agreement for Northern California (the “CBA”)).
In his motion, Plaintiff refers to an additional claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”). See Mot. at 8. The complaint does not allege a claim for NIED.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The federal district courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A civil action brought in state court over which the federal district courts have original jurisdiction may be removed to the federal district court for the district embracing the place where the action is pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
“[T]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that in the absence of diversity jurisdiction, federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). That rule applies equally to evaluating the existence of federal questions in cases brought initially in federal court and in removed cases. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 n.2 (2002). Under the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” the plaintiff is the master of his or her claim, and “may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. The removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal was proper. Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996).
III. DISCUSSION
Nathanson moves to remand the case to state court. He contends that his claims do not require interpretation of the CBA and therefore are not preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA.
The parties dispute whether Nathanson's motion to remand was timely filed. The motion was filed on October 31, 2023. Truebeck contends the motion was untimely because it was filed after a court-imposed deadline. [See Docket No. 11 (granting stipulation continuing deadline to file motion to remand from June 5, 2023 to July 5, 2023).] Nathanson responds that the motion was nevertheless timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) because he seeks to remand this action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Under section 1447(c), a motion to remand based on any defect other than subject-matter jurisdiction must be made within thirty days after the filing of the notice of removal. This is because subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental and cannot be waived. Billingsly v. C.I.R., 868 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). Because Nathanson's motion advances a challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction, Truebeck's timeliness argument is not well taken. See Weaver v. Kruse, No. 5:22-CV-07103 EJD, 2023 WL 2212983, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2023) (rejecting defendant's claim that plaintiff failed to timely move for remand).
Section 301(a) provides federal jurisdiction over “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Section 301 “completely preempts any state causes of action based on alleged violations of contracts between employers and labor organizations.” Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1993). Usually, federal preemption is a defense that defendants cannot raise in order to remove state law cases. Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019). However, section 301 “has such ‘extraordinary pre-emptive power' that it ‘converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.'” Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)). Labor claims may be subject to preemption under section 301 “even in some instances in which the plaintiffs have not alleged a breach of contract in their complaint, if the plaintiffs' claim is either grounded in the provisions of the labor contract or requires interpretation of it.” Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, a state law claim is preempted “if the resolution of [that] claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Detabali v. St. Luke's Hosp., 482 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988)). “The plaintiff's claim is the touchstone for this analysis; the need to interpret the [collective bargaining agreement] must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff's claim. If the claim is plainly based on state law, § 301 preemption is not mandated simply because the defendant refers to the [collective bargaining agreement] in mounting a defense.” Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2001).
The Ninth Circuit uses a two-part analysis to determine whether a claim is preempted by section 301. First, the court inquires “whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an employee by virtue of state law, not by a CBA.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059. If the right “exists solely as a result of the CBA, then the claim is preempted, and [the] analysis ends there.” Id. If the right exists independently of the CBA, the court must then consider whether “it is nevertheless substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394). “If such dependence exists, then the claim is preempted by section 301.” Id. at 1059-60. But if the claim can be resolved by “looking to” instead of “interpreting” the CBA, the claim is not preempted and can proceed under state law. Id. at 1060.
Here, Truebeck does not dispute that the rights asserted by Nathanson are conferred upon employees by virtue of state law. Therefore, the court focuses on the second part of the preemption analysis, namely, whether Nathanson's claims are “substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Burnside, 491 F.3d 1059.
Truebeck does not differentiate between Nathanson's FEHA claims and his claims for constructive/wrongful termination in violation of public policy and IIED. In general, Truebeck argues that Nathanson's employment, treatment, and discharge are governed by the CBA and thus require interpretation of its provisions. Opp'n at 3. Truebeck relies primarily on the following provisions:
DISCHARGED EMPLOYEE: Employees receiving notice of termination for any reason shall be allowed a reasonable time (not less than fifteen (15) minutes) before the end of the regular work day to assemble their tools in addition to the normal pick-up time prevailing on the job.
After forty (40) hours of employment, the individual employer may discharge any employee for just cause only. Just cause is subject to Section 51, the grievance and arbitration provision of this Agreement. The individual employer during the first forty (40) hours of employment may reject or discharge any employee for any reason.
Discharge for cause shall be in writing to the employee.CBA at 18 (Section 30, Show Up Time, Termination Pay and Discharge).
An industrial injury shall not be cause for discharge and an applicant for employment shall not be rejected because of prior industrial injury, provided that any such prior industrial injury has not caused the applicant to be incapable of satisfactorily performing the duties and functions required by the job to which he/she is assigned or would be assigned.Id. at 19 (Section 34, Injury).
On all cases relating to discharge or discipline, employees must file their grievances with the Local Union or the NCCRC within three (3) working days after the imposition of the discharge or discipline.
Thereafter, the Local Union or the NCCRC must file its grievance with the Board of Adjustment within four (4) working days after the employee files his/her grievance. The Board shall meet within seven (7) working days following submission of the grievance. The Board of Adjustment or Arbitrator shall be free to sustain the discharge or to find discipline other than discharge to be appropriate and may order reinstatement with full or partial back pay as he or it deems appropriate provided there shall be no discrimination on the part of the individual employer against any employee for activities on behalf of or representation of the Union not interfering with the proper performance of his/her duties.Id. at 46-47 (Paragraph 16, Section 51, Grievance Procedure). Truebeck does not explain how these sections apply to Nathanson's claims, or why this action will require interpretation of any of the cited provisions. See Opp'n at 3 (quoting CBA provisions without further analysis); see also id. at 5 (arguing in a conclusory way that “[t]he CBA expressly governs Plaintiff's employment, treatment, and discharge, and claims regarding the same require consideration and analysis of the terms of the CBA”).
Contrary to Truebeck's assertions, the Ninth Circuit has “consistently held that state law discrimination claims under the FEHA do not require courts to interpret the terms of a CBA and are therefore not preempted by § 301.” Schrader v. Noll Mfg. Co., 91 Fed. App'x. 553, 555 (9th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases); see also Ramirez, 998 F.2d at 748 (“[i]n every case in which we have considered an action brought under [California's anti-discrimination statute], we have held that it is not preempted by section 301,” collecting cases). “This is true even where the CBA closely regulates the conduct that the plaintiff claims to be discriminatory.” Schrader, 91 Fed. App'x. at 555.
While it is possible that the parties will refer to the CBA during the course of the litigation, it will not be necessary to interpret its terms to adjudicate Nathanson's claims because “they turn on the defendants' motives, rather than their contractual rights.” Schrader, 91 Fed. App'x. At 555. Truebeck does not identify a claim that encompasses a dispute about the meaning of a CBA provision, and Nathanson's claims do not on their face require interpretation of the CBA. See Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 921 (9th Cir. 2018) (“‘Interpretation' is construed narrowly; ‘it means something more than ‘consider,' ‘refer to,' or ‘apply'” (quoting Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000))). The fact that Truebeck may refer to the terms of the CBA to defend itself does not change the result, because “[a] defense based on the CBA is alone insufficient to require preemption.” Ward v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc., 473 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2007). Instead, “the need to interpret the CBA must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff's claim.” Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691.
Truebeck also fails to satisfy its burden of establishing that removal of the remaining claims was proper. See Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485. Nathanson's claim for constructive/wrongful termination in violation of public policy is “based upon [his] FEHA claims.” See Mot. at 6. Absent any meaningful argument to the contrary, the complaint suggests that Nathanson's claim for constructive/wrongful termination in violation of public policy is independent of the CBA and is thus not preempted by the LMRA. See, e.g., Williams v. Lockheed Martin Space Operations Co., No. C-05-05210 RMW, 2006 WL 1329889, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2006) (“Assuming [the plaintiff]'s wrongful termination claim is based on FEHA, there is a sufficiently clear California standard for considering it without looking to the CBA”).
Nathanson's IIED claim also arises from the same circumstances as his FEHA claims. See Complaint ¶ 57 (“When the Defendants committed the acts described above [i.e., the facts underlying Nathanson's FEHA claims], it did so deliberately and intentionally to cause Plaintiff to suffer humiliation, mental anguish, and emotional distress”); see also Mot. at 8 (asserting that Plaintiff's IIED claim “arise[s] only from facts supporting his FEHA claims for discrimination, retaliation and wrongful termination”).
In general, “[w]hen the CBA governs the behavior, and the underlying claims are preempted, the IIED claims relying upon them are also preempted . . . In contrast, when the underlying claims are not preempted, neither are the claims for IIED.” Lee v. Eden Med. Ctr., 690 F.Supp.2d 1011, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 239-40 (9th Cir. 1990); Tellez v. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 536, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Truebeck does not specifically address Nathanson's IIED claim and thus fails to carry its burden of demonstrating that removal is proper. In addition, because Nathanson's IIED claim appears to rest primarily on his allegations of disability discrimination, the court finds that the claim is not preempted by section 301. See Lee, 690 F.Supp.2d at 1021 (“to the extent that Plaintiff's IIED claim rests on discrimination, it is not preempted [by the LMRA]”); see also Martinez v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., No. C-12-1824 EMC, 2012 WL 2598165, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2012) (finding that claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on discrimination was not preempted because the focus of the plaintiff's claim was on discriminatory treatment rather than the substantive provisions of the CBA).
In sum, the court concludes that section 301 does not preempt Nathanson's claims and removal is improper.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Nathanson's motion to remand this matter to the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Mateo is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.