Opinion
No. 09-57051.
Submitted April 5, 2010.
Filed April 15, 2010.
Frederick R. Ball, Richard P. Darke, Esquire, Nicholas James Lynn, I, Esquire, Christopher Petelle, Esquire, Duane Morris LLP, Chicago, IL, Yvette Darilynn Roland, Esquire, Audra L. Thompson, Esquire, Duane Morris, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Ismael Castro, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Esquire, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:09-cv-07097-CAS-MAN.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Appellants are not entitled to a preliminary injunction because the balance of equities and considerations of public interest weigh in the appellees' favor. The injunction that the appellants seek would require California to recalibrate its established reimbursement formula to counteract the effect of the reduction in AWPs. This, in turn, would compel California to bear the administrative burdens associated with amending its state Medicaid plan. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.12-.20. The state should not be required to take on such burdens before the district court has finally resolved the merits of the appellants' claims. Thus, regardless of the appellants' likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, they are not entitled to the preliminary injunction that they seek. Cf. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., — U.S. 129 S.Ct. 365, 376, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) (holding that a preliminary injunction that interfered with the Navy's ability to conduct effective, realistic training exercises was an abuse of discretion regardless of the plaintiffs' showing of irreparable injury and likelihood of success on the merits).
Whether the appellants are entitled to a permanent injunction that would require California to conduct a study to determine whether its reimbursement formula continues to accord with the factors set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) is a different question. See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th Cir. 1997). We do not address this issue, leaving it to the district court to decide in the first instance.
AFFIRMED.