Opinion
CA No. 99A-07-003-NAB.
Submitted: January 11, 2000.
Decided: January 26, 2000.
Claimant's Appeal From a Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. Decision Affirmed.
Claimant's Motion for Damages. Denied.
Deanna M. Nardi, 6 Butternut Court, Wilmington, Delaware 19810, Pro Se Claimant.
Douglas A. Shachtman, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for Employer Lewis.
James J. Hanley, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, for UIAB.
ORDER
Having reviewed the parties' submissions, as well as the record below, the Court finds as follows:
1. Claimant Deanna Nardi was hired by insurance agent Jack Lewis (Employer) as a customer service staff assistant. Employer is a licensed agent of State Farm, an insurance company which requires that customer service representatives obtain an insurance license. On June 15, 1998, Claimant signed an agreement recognizing that the license was a priority and she had 90 days in which to obtain it. The licensing process involves an examination administered by the State of Delaware Department of Insurance and sponsorship by State Farm Insurance Company. After failing the exam twice, Claimant passed in December 1998.
2. Although the parties disagree about what happened next, the record makes several things clear. First, the examination results are sent only to the person who sat for the exam. Second, the State Farm agent (in this case, Mr. Lewis) initiates the sponsorship process upon receipt of the examinee's test results. Third, Claimant received her test results at the end of December 1998, but did not provide them to Employer until sometime in February. (Although Claimant seems to deny this fact in her Opening Brief before this Court, she clearly acknowledged it to the appeals referee. She stated both that she forgot to bring them in and that she misplaced them when she moved at the beginning of February 1999.) Fourth, when Claimant and Employer met to discuss the situation, Employer expressed concern about some aspects of her work, and Claimant expressed a certain amount of dissatisfaction with her job. Fifth, after deciding to discharge Claimant for having failed to obtain a license, Employer gave Claimant leeway to interview for other jobs and gave her one week with pay prior to discharge.
See Record of the Proceedings at 21-22. Subsequent references to this document appear as "Rec. at page no."
3. After Claimant applied to the Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment (Division) for unemployment insurance benefits, a Division claims deputy found that Claimant had been discharged for just cause in connection with her work and was therefore disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Claimant appealed, and a Division appeals referee reversed. Employer appealed to the Board. Several days before the Board's scheduled hearing, Claimant sent a letter to the Board stating that she would not attend the hearing and that she explicitly waived her right to participate in the proceedings. Following the hearing on May 26, 1999, the Board found that Claimant was discharged for just cause in connection with her work and denied her petition for benefits.
See 19 Del. C. § 3315(2).
4. Claimant again wrote to the Board, this time requesting a "rebuttal hearing." The Board denied her request, stating that the opportunity to rebut Employer was at the hearing, which she had chosen not to attend.
5. On October 18, 1999, Claimant filed with the Superior Court an appeal of the Board's decision. On October 27, 1999, the Department of Labor filed its answering brief. On October 29, 1999, Employer filed a motion to affirm. This Court denied the motion to affirm, and the parties proceeded with briefing. The issues are now ripe for decision.
The Department of Labor is a party to any judicial action involving a decision of the Board. 19 Del. C. § 3322(b).
Nardi v. Lewis and the UIAB, Del. Super., C.A. No. 99A-07-003, Barron, J. (ORDER) (Nov. 23, 1999).
6. Claimant challenges both the Board's decision denying her petition for benefits and the Board's denial of her request for a rehearing. Employer and the Department assert that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a rehearing and that there is substantial record evidence to support the Board's findings.
7. Claimant also seeks compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $10,000. The purpose of unemployment compensation law is to eliminate economic insecurity due to involuntary unemployment and does not provide for an aggrieved claimant to seek or recover monetary damages. The motion for damages must therefore be denied.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co. v. Dale, Del. Supr., 271 A.2d 35 (1970).
8. Scope of review. This Court's role in reviewing Board decisions on the merits is limited to determining whether the Board's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. When the issues on appeal pertain to discretionary acts of the Board, the scope of review is whether the Board abused its discretion. This Court will not disturb a discretionary act unless it is based on "clearly unreasonable or capricious grounds." Stated otherwise, abuse of discretion occurs when the Board "exceeds the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice."
See 19 Del. C. § 3323(a); Longobardi v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Super., 287 A.2d 690, 692 (1971), aff'd, Del. Supr., 293 A.2d 295 (1972).
Funk v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Supr., 591 A.2d 222, 225 (1991) (en banc).
K-Mart, Inc. v. Bowles, Del. Super., C.A. No. 94A-10-007, Cooch, J. (Mar. 23, 1995) (ORDER).
Id.
9. It is not unusual for a claimant who receives an unfavorable result after not attending a Board hearing to assert that she has an inviolable right to another hearing. However, the law is clear that the Board is free to grant or deny a request for a rehearing and that this Court will not disturb such a discretionary decision absent an abuse of discretion. In Patterson v. Peninsula Oil, this Court affirmed such a decision, observing that the General Assembly has authorized the Board to establish rules and regulations for resolving claims and conducting hearings.
Del. Super., C.A. No. 93A-02-002. Lee, J. (Feb. 8, 1994) (Letter Op.).
Id. See 19 Del. C. § 3321(a)
10. In its Rules and Regulations, the Board requires that each party to an action be present at the hearing. A party who does not appear waives her right to participate in the hearing process. Board Rule 6 provides in part as follows:
All parties are required to be present for a hearing at the scheduled time. Any party who is not present within 10 minutes after the scheduled time for [a] hearing shall be deemed to waive his right to participate in said hearing and the hearing shall commence without the presence of said party.
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board State of Delaware, Rules and Regulations at 6 (1979).
11. Board Rule 10 provides that "[o]n its own motion, or on application duly made to it, the Board may, within 10 days following their decision, direct a rehearing on one or more issues involved in the appeal." The Court notes that Board Rule 10 uses the permissive "may" rather than the mandatory "shall" in describing the Board's authority to grant a rehearing. Although Rule 10 does not require the Board to state a reason or reasons for denying a motion for a rehearing, this Court has remanded such decisions for clarification. In the case at bar, the Board clearly stated that the "claimant's opportunity to rebut the employer was May 26, and because the claimant waived this right, the Board denies her request for a rebuttal hearing."
See, e.g., Connors v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., Del. Super., C.A. No. 95A-05-007. Lee, J. (October 18, 1995) (remanding the cause where the Board had summarily denied request for a rehearing on the Board's dismissal of the claim for failure to prosecute).
12. Claimant offers several reasons for her failure to appear. First, she states that she could not attend because of the restrictions of her new job. Second, she asserts that the Board's secretary told her that attendance was unnecessary. Finally, she contends that she had a right to a rehearing because her pre-hearing letter to the Board specifically reserved such a right.
13. Although Claimant now asserts that attending the hearing at the scheduled time would have jeopardized her new job, she put it differently in her letter to the Board: "I am in a new job and I am not eligible for time off with pay." Later in the letter she adds, "I will consider attending an appeal hearing provided it occurs at 4:00 p.m. or later, or if I am compensated for the time I miss and mileage, should my current employer agree to give me time off." Clearly, the issue for Claimant was monetary, both in terms of hours missed from work and mileage on her car — a most inventive claim. In her Opening Brief before this Court, Claimant never mentions losing money from work (much less compensation for mileage on her car) but emphasizes instead that attending the hearing "would [have] jeopardize[d] her new job" and that "not attending the Appeal Hearing to maintain her new job" is sufficient reason to justify a rehearing. On this record, two conclusions are unavoidable. First, Claimant chose not to attend the scheduled hearing because she did not want to lose money by taking time off from her new job. Second, Claimant has been less than forthright regarding the consequences of attending the hearing. The Court concludes that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a rehearing based on Claimant's unwillingness to take time off without pay to attend the original hearing.
Rec. at 41.
Id. at 42.
Opening Brief at 1.
The Court notes further inconsistencies in Claimant's assertions. At the hearing before the appeals referee, Claimant acknowledged that after receiving her test scores in December 1998, she forgot to bring them to work and, at the end of January 1999, she misplaced them. Rec. at 22. In her Opening Brief before this Court, she states that she received her test scores on 12/28/98 and presented them to Employer on 12/29/98. She further states that Employer directed her to fax the scores to State Farm and provides a fax transmittal sheet and transmission verification dated 12/29/98. Opening Brief at 3, 4. However, the transmittal itself is not identified or included. Claimant's credibility is not untarnished.
14. Claimant also contends that she should be allowed a rehearing because the Board's secretary told her it was unnecessary for her to attend the hearing. The Department disputes this contention, asserting instead that Board employees know better than to make such a misleading statement to a claimant. In other cases, this Court has affirmed the Board's refusal to grant a rehearing based on a claimant's assertion about misinformation allegedly provided by an employee of the Department of Labor.
Mullins v. Dover Downs, Inc., Del. Super., C.A. No. 97A-10-001, Terry, J. (March 11, 1998) (ORDER). See also Patterson v. Peninsula Oil UIAB, supra.
15. On these facts, the Court has previously found that a reasonably prudent person would attend a hearing where new evidence could be presented, thus possibly affecting the outcome of the hearing. Nothing in the case at bar distinguishes it from the prior cases, and the Court therefore finds no abuse of discretion on the Board's part. Furthermore, the Board's decision was not "capricious" and did not ignore established rules of procedure, but, in fact, followed procedure that was entirely typical under similar circumstances.
Id. at 3.
K-Mart, Inc. v. Bowles, supra.
16. Finally, Claimant contends that her pre-hearing letter to the Board reserved her right to be heard by the Board if she disagreed with its decision. In her letter, Claimant stated that, if the Board found that she was not entitled to benefits, "I, will expect to be able to review the new information provided by [Employer] that may have convinced the Board of the recent appeal to reverse the decision. I will exercise my right to appeal the reversal." In the Opening Brief, Claimant asserts that the Board has "consistently ignored" this portion of her letter. If this is true, it is because Claimant cannot create rights for herself that are not enacted into law by the General Assembly or incorporated into the Rules and Regulations of the Board itself. Simply put, Claimant did not have the right to another hearing just because she wanted one. The Court concludes that the Board did not abuse its discretion even though Claimant articulated a desire for a rehearing.
Rec. at 41.
17. In sum, Claimant chose not to appear at the Board's hearing and explicitly waived her right to participate. In her letter to the Board, Claimant sought to preserve her right to be heard by the Board in the event of an unfavorable result. However, even if Claimant had not sent a written waiver, the Board had the right to proceed without her, based on the clear language of Board Rule 6. The Court is satisfied that the Board did not abuse its discretion when it denied, Claimant's request for a rehearing.
18. In light of the Court's finding that the Board's denial of the request for a rehearing must be affirmed, Claimant's challenges to the merits of the Board's decision denying her benefits need not be reached.
Wright v. Quorum Litigation Service, Del. Super., C.A. No. 96A-08-006, Cooch, J. (ORDER) (April 4, 1997).
For all these reasons, the Board's decisions denying Claimant unemployment benefits and denying the request for a rehearing must be and hereby are Affirmed. Claimant's motion for damages must be and hereby is Denied.
It Is So ORDERED.