Opinion
CV105033401S
11-02-2018
Rochelle Myrick, Administratrix of the Estate of Ensley E. Myrick and Tara Reed, Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph E. Reed and Anthony Perelli v. Jack A. Halprin, Inc. et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh):Wilson, Robin L., J.
CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT AND FOR ADDITUR (#319)
Wilson, J.
STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiffs, Rochelle Myrick, Administratrix of the Estate of Ensley E. Myrick, Tara Reed, Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph E. Reed, and surviving plaintiff, Anthony Perrelli, commenced this wrongful death and negligent action against the defendants, Jack A. Halprin, Inc. (Halprin) and Catwalk, LLC (Catwalk), based upon premises liability and negligent security. Evidence in this case was presented over a period of two weeks commencing on February 26, 2018, and concluding on March 9, 2018. On March 9, 2018, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, against the defendant, Jack A. Halprin, Inc., and found the defendant, Halprin 100% solely liable for the plaintiff’s injuries and deaths. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant Catwalk, LLC. The jury awarded economic damages in the amount of $18,830.59 to the estate of Ensley Myrick; $5,715 to the estate of Joseph Reed; and $1002 to Anthony Perelli. The economic damages awarded to Myrick and Reed represent exactly all of their claimed associated medical and funeral/burial expenses as a result of the accident, and the amount of economic damages awarded to Perelli represent all of his claimed medical expenses incurred as a result of the accident. Although there was evidence submitted that both Myrick and Reed at the time of their deaths were 27 and 25 years old respectively, with life expectancies of 52.4 and 54.3 years, and that both were gainfully employed at the time of death, the jury did not award damages for their lost wages or for the loss of future income/loss of earning capacity. Anthony Perelli did not make a claim for lost wages or loss of earning capacity. With respect to non-economic damages, the jury awarded Myrick and Reed each, $25,000 and awarded Anthony Perelli, $50,000.
Pursuant to Practice Book § 16-35 and General Statutes 52-228b, the plaintiffs, Rochelle Myrick and Tara Reed, Administrators of the decedents’ estates, have moved the court to set aside the jury’s verdict as to damages only, and that an additur be granted on the grounds that the jury’s verdict is inadequate. The motion was scheduled for oral argument on April 16, 2018. During oral argument, the plaintiffs withdrew their claim for an additur as to economic damages because they conceded that it was the province of the jury to accept or reject any or all of plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Ward S. Curran’s testimony as to the decedents’ lost income and earning capacity. The plaintiffs, however, seek an additur as to non-economic damages awarded by the jury. The plaintiffs seek compensation for the destruction of the decedents’ capacity to carry out and enjoy life’s activities in a way that would have been done had the decedents lived, and compensation for the destruction of life itself. The plaintiffs argue that the jury’s award of $25,000 of noneconomic damages to each of the decedents is so utterly shocking that it is inconsistent with all sense of fairness and justice.
Practice Book § 16-35 provides: "Motions in arrest of judgment, whether for extrinsic causes or causes apparent on the record, motions to set aside a verdict, motions for remittitur, motions for additur, motions for new trials, unless brought by petition served on the adverse party or parties, and motions pursuant to General Statutes § 52-225a for reduction of the verdict due to collateral source payments must be filed with the clerk within ten days after the day the verdict is accepted; provided that for good cause the judicial authority may extend this time. The clerk shall notify the trial judge of such filing. Such motions shall state the specific grounds upon which counsel relies."
General Statutes § 52-228b provides: "No verdict in any civil action involving a claim for money damages may be set aside except on written motion by a party to the action, stating the reasons relied upon in its support, filed and heard after notice to the adverse party according to the rules of the court. No such verdict may be set aside solely on the ground that the damages are excessive unless the prevailing party has been given an opportunity to have the amount of the judgment decreased by so much thereof as the court deems excessive. No such verdict may be set aside solely on the ground that the damages are inadequate until the parties have first been given an opportunity to accept an addition to the verdict of such amount as the court deems reasonable."
Due to an unexpected death in the court’s family, the court requested the parties to waive the 120-day statutory time required for issuance of the court’s decision and extend the time for issuance of the court’s decision for 90 days to November 16, 2018. All counsel of record agreed and submitted written waivers.
The defendant, Halprin has objected to the plaintiffs’ motion to set aside on grounds that the plaintiffs presented little evidence to the jury to adequately paint a picture of the two decedents and their loss of life’s enjoyment. The defendant contends that the evidence presented by both plaintiffs focused on evidence of personal loss to the family and significant others of the decedents, but little evidence about the decedents themselves.
DISCUSSION
" ‘The right of trial by jury is of ancient origin, characterized by Blackstone as the glory of the English law and the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy ...’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485, 55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935). [Our Supreme Court] repeatedly ha[s] stated that the award of damages, in particular, ‘is a matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of facts.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mahon v. B.V. Unitron Mfg., Inc., 284 Conn. 645, 661, 935 A.2d 1004 (2007)." Saleh v. Ribeiro Trucking, LLC, 303 Conn. 276, 280, 32 A.3d 318 (2011); and our Appellate Court in Cusano v. Lajoie, 178 Conn.App. 605, 609, 176 A.3d 1228 citing Smith v. Lefebre, has recently emphasized this stating: " ‘It is axiomatic that [t]he amount of damages awarded is a matter peculiarly within the province of the jury ... Moreover, there is no obligation for the jury to find that every injury causes pain, or the amount of pain alleged ... Put another way, [i]t is the jury’s right to accept some, none or all of the evidence presented ... It is the [jury’s] exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses ... The [jury] can ... decide what- all, none, or some- of a witness’ testimony to accept or reject.’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Lefebre, 92 Conn.App. 417, 421-22, 885 A.2d 1232 (2005)." Id.
Preliminarily, it is important for this court to point out that the parties did not submit interrogatories to the jury, "and, as a result, the jury returned a general verdict. [Our Appellate Court] previously ha[s] stated that [w]here there is a general verdict and no breakdown of the components of the verdict, it would be error to set it aside.’ Marchetti v. Ramirez, 40 Conn.App. 740, 746, 673 A.2d 567 (1996), aff’d, 240 Conn. 49, 688 A.2d 1325 (1997). In such a situation, ‘neither the trial court nor this court ha[s] any reasonable basis on which to break down the verdict’; id. ; and it is ‘impossible ... to determine what factors the jury considered in making its award.’ Id. Accordingly, not ‘know[ing] how or why the jury arrived at its determination of damages ... [w]e cannot speculate as to how the jury reached its figure.’ Caruso v. Quickie Cab Co., 48 Conn.App. 459, 462, 709 A.2d 1154 (1998)." Deesso v. Litzie, 172 Conn.App. 787, 797, 163 A.3d 55 (2017).
General Statutes § 52-216a provides in relevant part: "If the court concludes that the verdict is inadequate as a matter of law, it shall order an additur, and upon failure of the party so ordered to add the amount ordered by the court, it shall set aside the verdict and order a new trial."
"It is the court’s duty to set aside the verdict when it finds that the verdict does manifest injustice, and is ... palpably against the evidence ... The only practical test to apply to a verdict is whether the award of damages falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation in the particular case, or whether the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury was influenced by partiality, mistake or corruption." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Lefebre, 92 Conn.App. 417, 422, 885 A.2d 1232 (2005).
"When analyzing a post-trial motion that challenges a verdict, a trial court must view the evidence offered at trial in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. See Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Corp., 249 Conn. 523, 534, 733 A.2d 197 (1999). Consequently, in this case, the court must consider the evidence and damages award in the light most favorable to the defendant. Id. A damages award "should not be set aside ... where it is apparent that there was some evidence on which the jury might reasonably have reached its conclusion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v. Bergen, 63 Conn.App. 810, 814, 779 A.2d 195, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 908, 782 A.2d 1254 (2001). A damages award and judgment "should be disturbed only by considerations of the most persuasive character, as where the [damages award] shocks the sense of justice or the mind is convinced that it is in fact entirely disproportionate to the injury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunte v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 68 Conn.App. 534, 541, 792 A.2d 132 (2002). "The evidence offered at trial must be given the most favorable construction to which it is reasonably entitled to support the [damages award and judgment] ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Indeed, a trier of fact is "not compelled to accept the plaintiff’s claims as to the severity of her injuries, no matter how persuasive that evidence might have seemed ..." Parasco v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 48 Conn.App. 671, 676, 712 A.2d 433 (1998). Importantly, a trier of fact is not required to award noneconomic damages simply because economic damages are awarded. Wichers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174, 176, 745 A.2d 789 (2000).
The court’s "task is to determine whether the total damages awarded falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation in the particular case ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunte v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 68 Conn.App. at 541, 792 A.2d 132. Only if the court finds the original award to be "so clearly against the weight of the evidence in the case as to indicate that the jury did not correctly apply the law to the facts and evidence in the case, or was governed by ignorance, prejudice, corruption or partiality, may a trial court set aside the original judgment and grant a new trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schroeder v. Triangulum Associates, 259 Conn. 325, 330, 798 A.2d 459 (2002).
A fact finder’s decision to award zero noneconomic damages or a lower amount in noneconomic damages than the plaintiffs believe they are entitled to "is best tested in light of the circumstances of the particular case before [the court]." Wichers v. Hatch, supra, 252 Conn. at 188, 745 A.2d 789. "Accordingly, the trial court should examine the evidence to decide whether the jury reasonably could have found that the plaintiff had failed in her proof of the issue." Id., at 188-89, 745 A.2d 789. "That decision should be made, not on the assumption that the jury made a mistake, but, rather, on the supposition that the jury did exactly what it intended to do." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 189, 745 A.2d 789.
Our Supreme Court’s Wichers decision, supra, 252 Conn. 174, and its progeny require that the court engage in a case specific analysis when determining whether to invoke the extraordinary relief of additur. As the Appellate Court recognized in Turner v. Pascarelli, 88 Conn.App. 720, 871 A.2d 1044 (2005), Wichers is "an instruction to a trial court specifically to identify the facts of record that justify the extraordinary relief of additur ..." Id., 723-24. Consequently, Wichers "obligate[s] [a trial] court to make an express ‘case-specific’ statement of its reasoning." Id., at 727, 871 A.2d 1044. More specifically, a trial court must identify the part of the record that supports its determination that the award of damages in the original judgment was "unreasonable under the circumstances of th[e] case." Id.
If a judgment does not constitute a "manifest injustice" it should not be set aside. Silva v. Walgreen Co., 120 Conn.App. 544, 550, 992 A.2d 1190 (2010). "A verdict should not be set aside ... where it is apparent that there was some evidence on which the fact finder might reasonably have reached its conclusion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 558. Indeed, "[t]he existence of conflicting evidence curtails the authority of the court to overturn the verdict because the jury is entrusted with deciding which evidence is more credible and what effect it is to be given." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 556. When "there [is] evidence in the record tending to support the [damages award] reached by the jury, [an award] does not shock the sense of justice ..." Childs v. Bainer, 235 Conn. 107, 116-17, 663 A.2d 398 (1995). More importantly, as this court previously discussed, our Supreme Court has held that "[t]he amount of a damage award is a matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact ..." Mather v. Griffin Hospital, 207 Conn. 125, 138, 540 A.2d 666 (1988). If, based on the evidence, the jury’s decision was reasonable, "[the reviewing court] will not find error in the trial court’s acceptance of the verdict ..." Malmberg v. Lopez, 208 Conn. 675, 679, 546 A.2d 264 (1988).
"In actions for injuries resulting in death, a plaintiff is entitled to ‘just damages’ together with the cost of reasonably necessary, medical, hospital and nursing services, and including funeral expenses. General Statutes § 52-555. ‘Just damages’ include (1) the value of the decedent’s lost earning capacity less deductions for [his] necessary living expenses and taking into consideration that a present cash payment will be made, (2) compensation for the destruction of [his] capacity to carry on and enjoy life’s activities in a way [he] would have done had [he] lived [; ] ... (3) compensation for conscious pain and suffering, (Emphasis added.) Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 657, 368 A.2d 172 (1976)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Procaccini v. Lawrence and Memorial Hospital, Inc., 175 Conn.App. 692, 735, 168 A.3d 538 (2017); and (4) "damages for the death itself." Morrin v. Koplin, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. UWYX10-CV6012598 (August 26, 2014, Dooley, J.).
In Morrin v. Koplin, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. UWYX10-CV6012598, a wrongful death action, the defendants sought a new trial for instructional error. The defendants claimed that the court erred in allowing the jurors to consider, as separate items of damages, damages for the death itself as well as damages for the loss of the enjoyment of life’s activities. The court noted that the instruction given to the jury was the standard instruction set forth on the judicial website which is derived from the Supreme Court’s language in Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc. 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957). Although there is a conflict amongst two Supreme Court decisions as to whether the two items of damages are separate and distinct, which the court noted in Morrin, the court concluded that "until such time as our appellate courts either clarify Floyd, or otherwise define for the jury what it should consider when determining damages for "death itself" ... damages for the death itself as well as damages for the loss of the enjoyment of life’s activities are separate items for which the jury can award damages." Morrin v. Koplin, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. UWYX10-CV6012598. Notwithstanding the conflict in the case law on whether these two items of damages are separate and distinct, and the lack of clarity on what are damages for the death itself, the court in reaching its conclusion that the two are separate items of damages, provided a very useful and thorough analysis of wrongful death damages which is instructive here.
The defendants in Morrin argued that Floyd, supra, does not allow for a separate award for the death itself as well as for the loss of the enjoyment of life’s activities, and thus the court erroneously instructed the jury to consider the two items as separate items of damages. The court in Morrin, although concluding that the two are separate items for which the jury can award damages, noted that "the defendants’ reading of Floyd [was] not unreasonable [because] Floyd cites and relies upon Chase v. Fitzgerald, supra, 132 Conn. 461, a decision which does not suggest an award of damages for "death itself" separate and distinct from the loss of life’s enjoyment. Indeed, Chase arguably equates the two." Morrin, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. UWYX10-CV6012598.
The court noted: " ‘The right of recovery for the death is as for one of the consequences of the wrong inflicted upon the decedent.’ ... The cause of action ... is a continuance of that which the decedent could have asserted had he lived." Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc., 144 Conn. 668.
" ‘Damages for wrongful death, as such, are allowed as compensation for the destruction of the decedent’s capacity to carry on life’s activities, including his capacity to earn money, as he would have if he had not been killed ... In the case of one who is gainfully employed, especially one who earns a relatively large income, as did the present decedent, the destruction of earning capacity may well be the principal element of recovery resulting from the death ... But we have consistently pointed out that damages for wrongful death are not restricted to those arising from the mere destruction of earning capacity. Some damages are recoverable for death itself even though instantaneous, without regard to earnings or earning capacity ... In the case of Chase v. Fitzgerald, supra, involving the death of a married woman who had neither an earned income nor any reasonable prospect of acquiring one, the defendants in effect claimed that the jury’s assessment of damages for her death was restricted to the element of the destruction of earning capacity. This claim was held erroneous and led to a re-examination of our rule and an attempt to restate it so as to facilitate its application in the case of housewives and others who might not have substantial earning capacity. At the same time, we amplified and clarified our settled rule allowing recovery of damages for death itself apart from its effect on earning capacity ... [i]n many respects damages are assessed in the same way as in a nonfatal case involving a total and permanent destruction of capacity to carry on life’s activities. Whether this destruction was caused by death or by permanent total disability is in general of little importance if the destruction is complete and permanent, as, of course, it must be in a fatal case (Internal citations omitted. Emphasis added.) Id. at 670-71. The question: what does the Court mean when it says damages for "death itself?"
"In Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461, 45 A.2d 789 (1946), the case relied upon by the Court in Floyd, the Supreme Court discussed at length the then existing jurisprudence regarding damages for wrongful death. Ultimately, it eschewed previous decisions which measured damages based upon an economic analysis of what a decedent would probably have accumulated and left as part of his estate had he lived. The Court, in light of the inequities of such an approach, determined that it was not a proper way to determine "just damages" as required under the wrongful death statute. Id., at 466-67, 45 A.2d 789. The Court continued: ‘[The wrongful death cause of action] is, as we have said, a continuation of that which the deceased would have had if he had lived. He could have recovered for pain and suffering and for any expense which resulted from the injury. He could also have recovered for any injury; the loss from that cause, aside from certain subjective elements, would consist essentially of the impairment or destruction of his ability to carry on his wonted activities, ... and, as incidental to that, he could have recovered for the destruction or any limitation upon his earning capacity. (Internal citations omitted. Emphasis added.) Id., at 468, 45 A.2d 789 ... [T]he court concluded: ‘The rule for measuring damages resulting from death may then be briefly summarized as follows: It is that sum which would have compensated the deceased so far as money could do for the destruction of his capacity to carry on life’s activities as he would have done had he not been killed, including the destruction of his earning capacity, for such time as he would probably have lived, but with due allowance for the effect which the ordinary vicissitudes of life might have had upon his continued enjoyment of those capacities and, as far as destruction of earning capacity is concerned, for the fact that a present payment will be made in lieu of sums which, had he lived, would have been received at periodic times in the future. Id. at 469-70, 45 A.2d 789.
"Here, the defendants argue that damages for the ‘death itself’ encompass the damages stemming from the lost ability to enjoy life’s activities. This question has not been addressed by our appellate courts and this court’s research has revealed sparse discussion among the trial courts. However, as noted by Judge Flynn, ‘Damage in a death action for the death itself has not been defined by our appeals courts and the distinction is not easily appreciated between the damages a jury might award for the death itself as opposed to the effects of that death otherwise provided for by statute.’ Brown v. Dooling, 1998 WL 43197, (Conn.Super. 1998)." Morrin v. Koplin, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. UWYX10-CV6012598. Thus, as the law presently holds, damages for the death itself and for the lost ability to enjoy life’s activities are separate items of damages in a wrongful death action. Moreover, based upon the language in Floyd, "allowing recovery for damages for death itself, apart from its effect on earning capacity ... are assessed in the same way as in a nonfatal case involving total and permanent destruction of capacity to carry on life’s activities. Whether this destruction was caused by death or permanent total disability is in general of little importance if the destruction is complete and permanent, as, of course, it must be in a fatal case." Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc., supra, 144 Conn. 671.
"Regarding compensation for the destruction of a decedent’s capacity to carry on and enjoy life’s activities, our Supreme Court has stated the following: ‘[T]he parties in a death action are entitled to attempt to present an over-all picture of the decedent’s activities to enable the jury to make an informed valuation of the total destruction of his capacity to carry on life’s activities ... So, for example, evidence bearing on how pleasurable the decedent’s future might have been is admissible ... as is evidence as to the decedent’s hobbies and recreations.’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Waldron v. Raccio, 166 Conn. 608, 616-17, 353 A.2d 770 (1974); id., at 617, 353 A.2d 770 (evidence of ‘decedent’s attachment to his family’ relevant to claim for destruction of capacity to carry on and enjoy life’s activities); see also Katsetos v. Nolan, supra, 170 Conn. at 658, 368 A.2d 172 (evidence that decedent ‘was happily married,’ ‘had four children,’ ‘was a very happy person and in good health,’ ‘was a dedicated mother and homemaker,’ ‘[was] active in many outside activities,’ ‘was a state-licensed hairdresser,’ and had worked in pizza restaurant and office relevant to her capacity to enjoy life’s activities); cf. Bruneau v. Quick, 187 Conn. 617, 635-36, 447 A.2d 742 (1982) (in personal injury action for surgeon’s malpractice, evidence that plaintiff no longer could undertake ice skating, sailing, ballroom and jazz dancing, and gardening as she had before botched surgery was relevant to her ‘ability to carry on and enjoy certain activities’).
"A claim for the destruction of a decedent’s capacity to carry on and enjoy life’s activities requires proof of the decedent’s life expectancy. See Sims v. Smith, 115 Conn. 279, 286, 161 A. 239 (1932) (’damages based upon the loss to the estate of a decedent by his death necessarily involves a consideration of the probable duration of his life’); cf. Acampora v. Ledewitz, 159 Conn. 377, 384-85, 269 A.2d 288 (1970) (in personal injury action, trial court erred in allowing jury to consider damages for permanent pain and suffering because ‘no evidence was introduced as to [plaintiff’s] life expectancy’)." Procaccini v. Lawrence Memorial Hospital, Inc., supra, 175 Conn.App. 735-36.
The plaintiffs here, seek an additur because, as they claim, the award of damages for the destruction of the decedents’ lives was so shocking and disproportionate to the injury suffered, especially in light of their particular ages and background, that it must have resulted from improper influences or considerations. "A court should be especially hesitant to set aside a jury’s award of damages. This is particularly true in a wrongful death case where ‘[i]t serves no useful purpose to compare a verdict in one ... case with those in others. No one life is like any other, and the damages for the destruction of one furnish no fixed standard for others.’ " Zarrelli v. Barnum Festival Soc., Inc., 6 Conn.App. 322, 326-27, 505 A.2d 25 (1986). "Establishing damages for wrongful death is a task peculiarly within the expertise of a jury" insofar as it "defies any precise mathematical computation." (Internal citations omitted. Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "The ultimate test which must be applied to the verdict by the trial court is whether the jury’s award falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages or whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury were influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wichers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174, 187, 745 A.2d 789 (2000). The court’s decision "should be made, not on the assumption that the jury made a mistake, but, rather, on the supposition that the jury did exactly what it intended to do." Id. at 189, 745 A.2d 789. In sum, "[i]f there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for the jury’s verdict, unless there is a mistake in law or some other valid basis for upsetting the result other than difference of opinion regarding the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, the trial court should let the jury work their will." Id.
Toward this end, and as aptly noted by Judge Flynn: "Even in this jaded society, where human life is not always respected, the objective observer must acknowledge that a human life is not only a precious but a priceless thing. The question before the court was not to determine whether human life in the abstract is a valuable thing but what damages were proved by the plaintiff[s] to have resulted to the decedents by virtue of the [negligence] [of the defendant]. The plaintiffs] w[ere] obligated to prove damages. [Based on the evidence presented] [t]he jury could reasonably have found that the [plaintiffs] did not so do." Brown v. Dooling, Superior Court of Connecticut, Docket No. CV-900032598-S (January 23, 1998, Flynn, J.).
The plaintiffs did introduce the life expectancy of the decedents. Both decedents were very young at the time of their deaths. Ensley Myrick was 27 years old at the time of his death with a life expectancy of 52.4 years, and Joseph Reed was 25 years old, with a life expectancy of 54.3 years. The court carefully reviewed the evidence submitted on the issue of damages, particularly the testimony of Tara Reed, Joseph Reed’s sister, Rochelle Myrick, the mother of Ensley Myrick and Melissa Cappola, Joseph Reed’s fiancéat the time of his death. The main focus of the evidence and testimony presented was the personal loss to the family and significant others of the decedents. "Damages [in a wrongful death action] are never based on sentimental values or upon the loss caused to the family [,loved ones] or relatives of the decedent." (Citations omitted.) Lengel v. New Haven Gas Light Company, 142 Conn. 70, 78, 111 A.2d 547 (1955).
Here, there was very little credible evidence about the decedents themselves. Myrick testified as to her decedent son’s relationship with she and the decedent’s father. There was testimony that at the time of the decedents’ death he was engaged to be married. There was also testimony that the decedent had three children and that he loved them very much, however there was no testimony as to what activities the decedent engaged in with his children on a daily basis. Did he coach little league? Did he participate in their school activities? What was the decedent’s daily routine with his children? There was also testimony from Myrick that the decedent played sports growing up. However, there was no evidence that the decedent continued to engage in sports activities at the time of his death. There was very little credible evidence or testimony on the decedent’s future aspirations, goals, expectations, hobbies, and outside activities for the jury to get "an over-all picture of the decedent’s activities to enable the jury to make an informed valuation of the total destruction of his capacity to carry on life’s activities ..." Procaccini v. Lawrence Memorial Hospital, Inc., supra, 175 Conn.App. 735-36.
Both Reed, the decedent Reed’s sister, and Coppola, the decedent’s fiancéat the time of his death, testified on the issue of damages. Like the testimony of that of Myrick, the majority of both Reed’s and Coppola’s testimony focused on the effect the loss of the decedent Reed had on themselves and their family members. Reed testified as to the effect the loss of the decedent had on their father and sisters. Coppola testified as to the effect the loss had on her two children, both of whom were close to the decedent. The testimony of Reed and Coppola did not focus on who Reed was, what were his daily activities, what were his goals and aspirations and outside activities. There was some testimony presented suggesting that Reed was going to start a cellphone tower maintenance business, however no specifics were given. There was also testimony about Reed’s interest in real estate and taking classes, but nothing specific as to his goals in that area. The jury could have reasonably concluded, based upon the evidence presented, that the amount of damages awarded was a fair amount, given the lack of credible evidence to justify a large noneconomic award. Thus, in reviewing the evidence and testimony presented on the issue of damages, the court cannot say that the jury’s award of damages was without support in the record or was so low as to shock the court’s conscience. The motion to set aside the verdict and for an additur as to damages is therefore denied.