Opinion
No. 01-04-00667-CV
Opinion issued August 11, 2005.
On Appeal from the 278th District Court, Walker County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 0221785-C.
Panel consists of Justices NUCHIA, HANKS, and HIGLEY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This interlocutory appeal arises from the trial court's order granting in part and denying in part Sam Houston State University's plea to the jurisdiction filed in response to Linda Myers's employment discrimination suit. In one point of error, Myers asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing her gender and pregnancy discrimination claims for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
Background
Myers was a member of the teaching faculty in the College of Criminal Justice at Sam Houston State University ("SHSU"). In October 1999, in her seventh year of teaching at SHSU, Myers was approached by Dr. Richard Ward, the Dean and Director of the College of Criminal Justice, who asked if she would be interested in serving as an assistant dean over the college's undergraduate and graduate programs. On September 1, 2000, Myers became the College of Criminal Justices's Assistant Dean of Academic Programs.
SHSU is a governmental unit as that term is defined by section 101.001. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001(3) (Vernon 2005).
Shortly after assuming her new title, Myers informed Ward that she was pregnant and expecting a baby in January 2001. Myers alleged that, as soon as he found out about her pregnancy, Ward told her that, if he had known about her pregnancy earlier, he would not have promoted her to assistant dean. Myers alleged that Ward's behavior towards her changed and that others within the SHSU administration mistreated her, called her "Mama" during formal meetings, and the males regularly made statements like, "I wish I could get pregnant and take time off."
In March 2001, while on maternity leave, Myers was informed by Ward that the requirements for the Assistant Dean position were going to change. The position that Myers originally understood to be devoted one-half to administrative duties and one-half to faculty responsibilities of teaching, research, and service was going to change to a 40-hour-a-week assignment with little flexibility. Myers met with Ward a few weeks later, and Myers alleged that Ward suggested that she consider being reassigned to Director of Research to give her more flexibility and time to be with her family. Myers told him that she was not interested in the "demotion," but Ward still wrote a letter to Dr. David Payne, Vice President of Academic Affairs, seeking approval of Myers's reassignment to Director of Research. On September 10, 2001, the President of SHSU, Dr. James Gaertner, approved Myers's reassignment.
On February 13, 2002, Myers filed a charge of discrimination against SHSU with the Texas Commission on Human Rights (TCHR), alleging that she had been demoted because of her gender and her pregnancy.
Myers also sued Ward, William Wesley Johnson (the Associate Dean of Administration in the College of Criminal Justice), and Randy Garner (the Associate Dean of Faculty in the College of Criminal Justice). Motions for summary judgment were granted for these individuals, and they are not parties to this appeal.
The TCHR issued a right-to-sue letter, and Myers filed suit.
SHSU challenged the trial court's jurisdiction over Myers's claims, arguing that it had immunity from the tort and breach of contract claims and that she had not timely filed her discrimination charges with the TCHR. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order dismissing Myers's tort and breach of contract claims, and it further dismissed "the claims of Laura Myers alleging pregnancy/gender discrimination for actions taken prior to August 15, 2001" — the 180th day before the filing of Myers's charge of discrimination with the TCHR. Myers appeals only the trial court's order as it relates to the dismissal of her discrimination claims which occurred before August 15, 2001.
In its appellate brief, SHSU acknowledges that "such other matters which remain pending in the trial court and not raised in this appeal include: hostile work environment, . . . retaliation, . . . [and] discrete acts of gender and pregnancy discrimination occurring after August 15, 2001."
Plea to the Jurisdiction
In one point of error, Myers asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing her gender and pregnancy discrimination claims for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically, Myers contends that she did not receive unequivocal notice of the discriminatory employment decision until September 10, 2001 — when her "demotion" was approved by President Gaertner.
SHSU is a governmental unit generally immune from tort liability, except when the legislature has specifically waived that immunity. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 111.01-.02 (Vernon 2002 Supp. 2004); TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001(3)(D); Freedman v. Univ. of Houston, 110 S.W.3d 504, 506 n. 5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). A governmental unit may contest a trial court's authority to determine the subject matter of the cause of action by filing a plea to the jurisdiction. See Reyes v. City of Houston, 4 S.W.3d 459, 461 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). In the absence of a waiver of governmental immunity, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a suit against a governmental unit. Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003). When a trial court learns that it lacks jurisdiction to hear a cause, the court must dismiss the cause and refrain from rendering a judgment on the merits. Freedman, 110 S.W.3d at 507.
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction, we consider the facts alleged by the plaintiff and, to the extent relevant to the jurisdictional issues, any evidence submitted by the parties. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d at 542. We review a trial court's disposition of a plea to the jurisdiction under a de novo standard of review. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998); Reese v. City of Hunter's Creek Vill., 95 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).
The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA") maintains a comprehensive administrative review system for obtaining relief from unlawful employment practices. Schroeder v. Tex. Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Tex. 1991). Before suing in state court, an employee must exhaust her administrative remedies under the Act by first filing a complaint with the TCHR within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. Id. at 485-86; see also Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.202(a) (Vernon 1996). This affords the TCHR the opportunity to investigate the allegation, informally eliminate any discrimination, and minimize costly litigation. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.203, 21.204(a), 21.207(a) (Vernon 1996). The requirement is of such import that failing to comply deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 485-88. In other words, unless and until an employee timely submits her complaint to the TCHR, the courts of Texas are barred from adjudicating that complaint. Id. The supreme court has held that the "limitation period for [filing a] civil action [under the Act] is also mandatory and jurisdictional." Id. at 487 n. 10.
Myers alleges that SHSU discriminated against her because of her gender and pregnancy by demoting her from Assistant Dean to Director of Research. Myers contends that she did not receive unequivocal notice of this decision until September 10, 2001, when her demotion was approved by President Gaertner. Myers further contends that, because she filed her complaint with the TCHR on February 13, 2002 — less than 180 days from President Gaertner's approval, the trial court had jurisdiction over her gender and pregnancy claims.
To illustrate that her claims were timely filed, Myers relies on Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S. Ct. 498 (1980) and Villareal v. Williams, 971 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.). In Ricks, the United States Supreme Court held that Ricks's claim that, based on national origin, he was denied tenure at a state college was untimely filed. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 256, 101 S. Ct. at 503. The trustees of the college voted to deny Ricks's tenure based on the recommendations of the college's tenure committee and faculty senate. Id. at 250, 101 S. Ct. at 500. On June 26, 1974, the trustees informed Ricks that, pursuant to the college's policy, he would be offered a one-year "terminal" contract that would expire June 30, 1975. Id. "[T]he only alleged discrimination occurred — and the filing limitations periods therefore commenced — at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated to Ricks. That is so even though one of the effects of the denial of tenure — the eventual loss of a teaching position — did not occur until later." Id. at 258, 101 S. Ct. at 504. The Supreme Court determined that, "[w]here, as here, the only challenged employment practice occurs before the termination date, the limitations periods necessarily commence to run before that date." Id. at 259, 101 S. Ct. at 505. Finally, the Court held that Ricks became aware of the college's decision no later than June 26, 1974, when the trustees informed him of their decision. Id. at 262, 101 S. Ct. at 506. The Court specifically stated that it need not decide from when the limitations began to run because the last possible date, June 26, was too remote from the filing of the suit; therefore, any earlier date would have been too remote as well. Id. at 262 n. 17, 101 S. Ct. at 506 n. 17. The Court explained that "the proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts [result in termination]." Id. at 258, 101 S. Ct. at 504.
In Villarreal, on June 13, 1995, due to budgetary shortfalls, the Falfurrias City Council voted to reduce the police force by three officers. Villarreal, 971 S.W.2d at 623. On July 11, the city council reconvened with the three policemen chosen by the police chief. Id. The officers were aware that they had been "designated to be discharged," however, they believed that they were being retaliated against in response to recent whistleblowing activities. Id. On July 17, the mayor sent written notification to each officer confirming his termination effective August 1. Id. On October 10, during a city council meeting, the mayor announced that, due to the budgetary surplus caused by the officers' termination, the city could afford to purchase new police cars. Id. On October 30, the officers sued the mayor and the city for retaliatory discharge. Id. The trial court granted the mayor's and the city's summary judgment motion on the basis that the retaliatory discharge claims were time barred. Id. at 623-24. The San Antonio Court of Appeals agreed and held that the officers' causes of action for retaliatory discharge accrued on July 17, when they received unequivocal written notification of termination. Id. at 626. In its review, the court of appeals noted that a claim for an allegedly discriminatory employment decision accrues when the employee receives unequivocal notice of the discriminatory decision, not when the effects of such decision are realized. Id. at 625 (citing Johnson Johnson Med., Inc. v. Sanchez, 924 S.W.2d 925, 928-29 (Tex. 1996) (applying Workers' Compensation Act); Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490, 492-93 (Tex. 1996) (applying TCHRA)).
Here, Myers contends that, "applying the reasoning of these cases here, there is no question that [her] claim for gender and pregnancy discrimination accrued on September 10, 2001, as President Gaertner did not approve [her] demotion to Director of Research until then." She further contends that "President Gaertner's approval was necessary to make Myers'[s] reclassification as Director of Research final and unequivocal; without the president's approval, Myers'[s] demotion could not have taken place."
SHSU, however, contends that the "reassignment" occurred in March 2001 when Ward met with Myers — approximately 10 months prior to the filing of the charge of discrimination. Furthermore, SHSU submits that Myers's pregnancy discrimination claims were untimely filed because her pregnancy ended on January 21, 2001, when Myers's child was born, but the charge of discrimination was not filed until February 13, 2002-13 months after the child's birth.
Both Myers and SHSU ask the Court to interpret and evaluate the merits of their claims. The trial court's plea to the jurisdiction ruling, however, does not address the merits. It simply applies the statutory deadlines. It is undisputed that the TCHRA requires that a complaint be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.202(a) (Vernon 1996). It is undisputed that, on February 13, 2002, Myers filed a charge of discrimination against SHSU with the TCHR. It is undisputed that August 15, 2001 fell 180 days before February 13, 2002. Accordingly, the trial court's order granting SHSU's plea to the jurisdiction does so in conformance with the TCHRA. It simply states that the trial court does not have jurisdiction over alleged acts of discrimination that occurred more than 180 days before Myers filed a claim with the TCHR. In its order, the trial court makes no findings regarding the timing of the various discriminatory acts alleged by Myers, nor does it reference whether any specific acts occurred before or during that time period or whether any specific claims are to be included or excluded. It is not this Court's prerogative to do so in the review of a plea to the jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we overrule Myers's sole point of error.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's order.