Opinion
Civil No. 05-1928 WQH (POR).
January 9, 2006
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. On December 16, 2005, the parties appeared for oral argument before the Honorable William Q. Hayes. After considering the arguments raised by the parties in their briefing and during oral argument, the Court now issues the following rulings.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sarah Muzquiz filed a Complaint in the Superior Court for the State of California seeking a declaration that she is the surviving spouse of the now deceased Raymundo Muzquiz (hereinafter "Sr. Muzquiz"). According to her Complaint, Plaintiff Sarah Muzquiz married Raymundo Muzquiz on June 28, 1935. Plaintiff further alleges that Sr. Muzquiz married Defendant Gloria Muzquiz on May 21, 1949, without first obtaining a legal divorce from Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that therefore, Defendant's marriage to Sr. Muzquiz is void, and that she was the lawful spouse of Sr. Muzquiz at the time of his death on September 6, 2002.
Defendant removed this matter to Federal Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff is a citizen of California. Defendant is a Mexican citizen and has not been admitted to the United States as a permanent resident. Plaintiff moves for remand to state court based on Defendant's "domicile" in San Diego, and defendant moves for a stay or dismissal based on the Brillhart abstention doctrine.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motion to Dismiss 12 (b) (1)
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . . It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). "On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the moving party may rely upon affidavits or other evidence properly before the court." Salmo v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 226 F.Supp.2d 1234, 1235 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (Battaglia, J.) (citing Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 2000)). The court may consider these extra-pleading materials and resolve factual disputes, if necessary. Id. The court must also assume all material facts alleged in the complaint are true. See Orsay v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 289 F.3d 1125, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002). "If the moving party produces evidence in support of its motion, the opposing party must then present its own affidavits or other evidence `to satisfy its burden of establishing that the court, in fact, possesses subject matter jurisdiction.'" Id. (quoting St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989)).
I. Motion to Remand
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). This includes cases that could have been commenced in federal court based on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Thus, a suit that involves citizens of different states, where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000.00, may be removed to federal court. However, "[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).DISCUSSION
Plaintiff moves for Remand to California state court, arguing that diversity jurisdiction does not exist. Defendant removed this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (hereinafter "1332(a)") "based on the fact that Gloria Muzquiz is a citizen of Mexico and the amount in controversy far exceeds $75,000 exclusive on interest and costs." Opposition to Motion to Remand at 2. Gloria Muzquiz (1) is a citizen of Mexico, (2) is not a citizen of the United States, and (3) has not been admitted to the United States as a permanent resident. See September 26, 2005 Declaration of Gloria Muzquiz.
Plaintiff argues, "[g]iven the presence of Gloria's real estate assets in San Diego County and her domicile at Chula Vista, California for at least the last (15) fifteen years, she cannot now argue that because of her Mexican nationality she is not amenable to suit in the county of her residence." Motion to Remand at 3.
Defendant argues that domicile is irrelevant because "§ 1332(a) provides for federal subject matter jurisdiction over cases between `citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state' regardless of allegations about the domicile of the aliens." Opposition to Motion to Remand at 2.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) provides:
§ 1332. Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy; costs
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between —
(1) Citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title [ 28 USCS § 1603(a)], as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.Plaintiff further argues:
For diversity purposes, a person is a "citizen" of the state in which he or she is domiciled and not one of formal citizenship. See eq., Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1080, at 1090 (9th Cir. 1983).Motion at 4.
The Court notes that the correct citation for Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd. is 704 F.2d 1088, at 1090 (9th Cir. 1983).
In Kantor, the Court stated: "[t]o show state citizenship for diversity purposes under federal common law a party must (1) be a citizen of the United States, and (2) be domiciled in the state. Kantor, 704 F.2d at 1090. Gloria Muzquiz is not a citizen of the united States. Thus, Kantor is inapposite. Furthermore, other courts have rejected Plaintiff's theory. See, e.g., Foy v. Schantz, Schatzman Aaronson, P.A., 108 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding the plain language of the statute therefore directs courts to refer to an alien litigant's official immigration status); Stirzaker v. Howard 2001 WL 1090198, 1 (M.D.Fla.,2001) (holding that Plaintiff, who were citizens of the United Kingdom but who had resided in Florida for more than eight years were not "citizens" of Florida for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction).
The Court finds that because Sarah Muzquiz is a citizen of California, and Gloria Muzquiz is a "subject or citizen of a foreign nation," the parties are diverse under § 1332 (a) (2). Furthermore, the Court finds that because Sarah Muzquiz seeks a declaration that she was the lawful spouse of Sr. Muzquiz at the time of his death for the purpose of determining entitlement to a portion of his estate, and because it is undisputed that the value of that estate exceeds $75,000, the Court finds that the amount in controversy requirement is met. Accordingly, the Court finds that removal was proper and will deny Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. II. Motion to Dismiss or Stay
Plaintiff acknowledged during oral argument that the value of the estate exceeds $75,000. See Oral Argument Transcript at 8.
Sr. Muzquiz was born in Kerville, Texas, but was a Mexican citizen as a result of his parents' Mexican citizenship. On November 29, 1957, Sr. Muzquiz renounced his U.S. citizenship and became a Mexican National. On September 6, 2002, Sr. Muzquiz died testate and his will was probated on October 28, 2002, in the Fifth Civil Court, Tijuana, Baja California, Republic of Mexico. Defendant Gloria Muzquiz was made executrix of Sr. Muzquiz's will. Sr. Muzquiz's estate will be distributed through the Mexican probate proceeding.
Defendant Gloria Muzquiz is a citizen of Mexico. On or about May 21, 1949, Defendant Gloria Muzquiz and Sr. Muzquiz were married in Las Vegas, Nevada. Defendant Gloria Muzquiz contends that Plaintiff Sarah Muzquiz divorced Sr. Muzquiz before his marriage to Defendant Gloria Muzquiz in Las Vegas, pursuant to a dissolution of marriage judgment granted by the Civil Court of the District of Bravos, State of Chihuahua, Mexico dated April 23, 1949. Defendant Gloria Muzquiz further alleges that the Nevada marriage certificate was recorded in the State of Baja California, Mexico, on December 10, 1960.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's marriage to Sr. Muzquiz is void, and that she was the lawful spouse of Sr. Muzquiz at the time of his death.
On December 1, 2004, Defendant initiated a "juicio de jactancia" (hereinafter jactancia) against the Plaintiff in Mexico pursuant to Article 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the State of Baja California. Plaintiff challenged the jactancia action on jurisdictional grounds, but also responded substantively to Defendant's Complaint. Plaintiff's jurisdictional challenge was referred to the Superior Court of Justice in the State of Baja California, Mexico. On August 19, 2005, that court rejected Plaintiff's jurisdictional challenge and found that the "objection to improper venue or foreign jurisdiction, filed by [Sarah Muzquiz], is groundless." See Exhibit 6 at 83. The Superior Court of Justice in the State of Baja California, Mexico then returned the case to the jactancia court. Ten days later, Plaintiff commenced this action in California. Defendant now moves to dismiss this action in light of the pending jactancia action in Mexico.
In Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., the United States Supreme Court held:
Although the District Court had jurisdiction of the suit under the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, it was under no compulsion to exercise that jurisdiction. The petitioner's motion to dismiss the bill was addressed to the discretion of the court. The motion rested upon the claim that, since another proceeding was pending in a state court in which all the matters in controversy between the parties could be fully adjudicated, a declaratory judgment in the federal court was unwarranted. The correctness of this claim was certainly relevant in determining whether the District Court should assume jurisdiction and proceed to determine the rights of the parties. Ordinarily it would be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between the same parties. Gratuitous interference with the orderly and comprehensive disposition of a state court litigation should be avoided.Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court further explained its Brillhart findings in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. stating:
Brillhart makes clear that district courts possess discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, even when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites. Although Brillhart did not set out an exclusive list of factors governing the district court's exercise of this discretion, it did provide some useful guidance in that regard. The Court indicated, for example, that in deciding whether to enter a stay, a district court should examine "the scope of the pending state court proceeding and the nature of defenses open there." Ibid. This inquiry, in turn, entails consideration of "whether the claims of all parties in interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated in that proceeding, whether necessary parties have been joined, whether such parties are amenable to process in that proceeding, etc." Ibid. Other cases, the Court noted, might shed light on additional factors governing a district court's decision to stay or to dismiss a declaratory judgment action at the outset. See ibid. But Brillhart indicated that, at least where another suit involving the same parties and presenting opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues is pending in state court, a district court might be indulging in "gratuitous interference," ibid., if it permitted the federal declaratory action to proceed.Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 283 (1995).
The Court "possess discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.S. 2201(a) even when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites." See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (U.S. 1995); See also Id. at 286 (holding "[d]istinct features of the Declaratory Judgment Act, we believe, justify a standard vesting district courts with greater discretion in declaratory judgment actions . . ."). In Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, the Ninth Circuit held that the "district court's discretion to hear declaratory actions over which it has jurisdiction is guided by the Supreme Court's announcements in Brillhart" and listed the non-exclusive Brillhart factors as: [1)] the district court should avoid needless determination of state law issues; [2)] it should discourage litigants from filing declaratory actions as a means of forum shopping; and [3)] it should avoid duplicative litigation. See Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 394 F.3d 665, 672 (9th Cir. 2005).
The Ninth Circuit also expressed that the Court can consider "whether the declaratory action will settle all aspects of the controversy; whether the declaratory action will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue; whether the declaratory action is being sought merely for the purposes of procedural fencing or to obtain a `res judicata' advantage; or whether the use of a declaratory action will result in entanglement between the federal and state court systems. In addition, the district court might also consider the convenience of the parties, and the availability and relative convenience of other remedies." Id.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has found that when parallel proceedings involving similar issues are pending at the time that a second action is filed, there is a presumption that the entire suit should be heard in the original forum. See Government Emples. Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998).
The Court finds that the jactancia action will resolve the issue presented here in that it will determine whether Plaintiff has a right to file any claims against the estate, a finding necessarily predicated on her legal relationship with the decedent. While Plaintiff argues that the jactancia action will not result in a judicial declaration that Plaintiff is the surviving spouse of Sr. Muzquiz, Plaintiff has made no showing for need for a judicial declaration of decedent's surviving spouse aside from a potential claim to a portion of decedent's estate. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks a declaration in pursuit of such a claim, that issue will be resolved by the jactancia and the Mexican probate proceeding, both of which are currently ongoing.
Furthermore, adjudication by this Court could result in duplicative litigation. Proceedings are ongoing in Mexico's jactancia and in the Mexican probate court. Resolution of the issue before this Court will not result in resolution of each of the related issues. Regardless of this Court's determination, the probate and jactancia proceedings will continue in Mexico. Moreover, adjudication by this Court could result in inconsistent rulings by this Court and the Mexican court. The proceedings in Mexico involve similar issues and parties, and were pending when Plaintiff filed suit in California. The Defendant commenced a juicio de jactancia on December 1, 2004. Plaintiff Sarah Muzquiz filed an action in California State Court ten days after the jactancia court found that it had jurisdiction over her. This indicates possible forum shopping by Plaintiff. The Court finds that the entire suit should be heard in the original forum, Mexico.
The Court has the discretion to either stay or dismiss the action. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 290. The Court finds that dismissal is the preferable course here. See Supermicro Computer Inc. v. Digitechnic, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1152 (D. Cal. 2001) (finding that dismissal is the preferable course when ultimate prevail of either party in France would alleviate the need for action in the forum.) Accordingly, the Court finds that dismiss without prejudice is appropriate.
CONCLUSION ORDER
The Court finds that removal was proper. Accordingly, the court will deny the Motion to Remand. Furthermore, after consideration of each of the Brillhart factors, the Court finds that it should abstain from adjudicating this issue. Additionally, the Court finds that dismissal is warranted as opposed to entering a stay. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and deny Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, as moot.
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff's motion to Remand is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.