Opinion
Civil Action NO. 01-714, Section "N"
June 11, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are defendants Mercedes Benz Credit Corporation, Inc.'s and Daniel A. Smith's Motion to Dismiss and defendant Holtz House of Vehicles, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, the defendants' motions are GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On June 3, 1996, plaintiffs James H. Murungi and Asenath Murungi bought a used 1989 Mercedes from Holtz House of Vehicles, Inc. ("HHOV") in Rochester, New York. At the time of the purchase, the Murungis were New York residents. The Murungis financed their purchase through Mercedes Benz Credit Corporation ("MBCC"), and HHOV was paid in full by MBCC on or about the date of the sale.
In September 1999, the Murungis moved to Louisiana. Shortly thereafter they defaulted on their loan payments to MBCC, and MBCC filed an action to enforce the financing contract in Louisiana state court. While the state court action was pending, MBCC filed a writ of sequestration against the Murungis' vehicle. On January 29, 2001, the 22nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Tammany entered a judgment in favor of MBCC in the amount of $10,964.78 plus interest and attorney's fees.
On October 30, 2000, the Murungis filed suit in this Court against MBCC alleging that it violated the Fair Debt Collection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, by having the writ of sequestration issued. See Murungi v. Mercedes Benz Credit Corp., Inc., Civil Action No. 00-3200. On March 7, 2001, the Court entered a final judgment in favor of MBCC after granting its motion to dismiss as unopposed. The Murungis have appealed that judgment.
On March 19, 2001, the Murungis filed the instant pro se lawsuit. The instant suit names MBCC, American Lenders Service Co. of New Orleans, Daniel A. Smith, Damon Daussat, and Holtz House of Vehicles, Inc. as defendants. MBCC, Daniel A. Smith, and Holtz House of Vehicles, Inc. now move the Court to dismiss the claims against them.
LAW AND ANALYSIS 1. MBCC
MBCC argues that the Murungis' claims in the instant suit are identical to those previously dismissed and that allowing the instant case to proceed would offend the doctrine of judicial comity. The Court does not find this doctrine to be applicable to the instant case. However, the Court does find that the instant suit is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The test for res judicata is well established in the Fifth Circuit. "The parties must be identical in both suits, the prior judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, there must have been a final judgment on the merits and the same cause of action must be involved in both cases." Nilsen v. City of Miss Point. Miss., 701 F.2d 556, 559 (5th Cir. 1983).
The Murungis' allegations against MBCC in the instant case are the same as those in Civil Action No. 00-3200. This Court granted MBCC's motion to dismiss the allegations in Civil Action 00-3200 as unopposed and explicitly granted the Murungis ten days to file a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal. The Murungis chose not to do so and have instead filed an appeal of the final judgment. Because the Murungis had a full opportunity to litigate their Fair Debt Collection Act claims against MBCC in the previous action and because an appeal of the previous action is pending, the Court finds that the claims asserted in the instant case are barred by res judicata. Accordingly, MBCC's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
2. Daniel A. Smith
The Murungis have also asserted claims against Daniel A. Smith, MBCC's counsel in the instant matter, in the previous federal action, and in the state court proceedings. The Murungis claim that Smith harassed them, violated their constitutional rights, intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon them, intentionally disgraced them, and defamed them by petitioning the state court to issue a writ of sequestration against their vehicle. In Penalber v. Blount, 550 So.2d 577, 581 (La. 1989), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, although attorneys do not owe legal duties to their client's adversaries, "[i]ntentionally tortious actions, ostensibly performed for a client's benefit, will not shroud an attorney with immunity." Id. at 582.
In the instant case, the Court finds the Murungis' allegations that Smith committed intentional torts are wholly unsubstantiated. Under Louisiana law, intent to commit a tort "is an intent to bring about a result which will invade the interests of another in a way that the law forbids." Id. at 582 (citing Caudle v. Betts, 512 So.2d 389, 391 (La. 1987)). The Murungis are seeking more than $3,000,000.00 in damages because:
Maliciously and willfully, Mr. Smith has defamed the Plaintiffs by making accusations that the Plaintiffs have "Power" to engage in unlawful "waste" of the said vehicle, as a pretextual [sic] to act as a debt collection agent for MBCC. Such accusations are false and intended to disgrace the Plaintiffs in clear violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1962 (e)(7). Plaintiffs have no criminal background and have never engaged in any unlawful activities.
Pet. at ¶ 22. While the Murungis may have been offended by the language in Smith's petition for a writ of sequestration, they have failed to allege that the writ was obtained with the intent to "invade their interests . . . in a way that the law forbids." Penalber, 550 F.2d at 582. In other words, nothing in their petition suggests that the writ was improperly or illegally issued; and the fact that the Murungis may have been embarrassed by a legal course of action is insufficient to state a claim against Smith in his capacity as MBCC's attorney. Accordingly, the Court does not find that the Murungis have stated a claim against Smith; and Smith's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
3. Holtz House of Vehicles
Finally, Holtz House of Vehicles, Inc. (HHOV) moves the Court to dismiss the claims against it on the grounds that it does not have minimum contacts with the State of Louisiana to subject it to this Court's jurisdiction. HHOV is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Rochester, New York; and its dealership activities are restricted to western New York. It has never been qualified to do business in Louisiana; and with the exception of a one-day Honda-dealers' convention in New Orleans, no HHOV personnel have ever engaged in business in Louisiana.
In the Fifth Circuit, "[w]hen a nonresident defendant presents a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the district court's jurisdiction over the nonresident." Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1992 (5th Cir. 1985). The Court does not find that the Murungis have carried this burden. They bought their vehicle from HHOV in New York when they were New York residents, and they brought the car to Louisiana when they moved here in 1999. It is well-settled that a consumer's unilateral act of bringing the defendant's product into the forum state is not a sufficient constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The Murungis' only other attempt to establish minimum contacts is an allegation that they sent a letter to HHOV on December 4, 2000 requesting copies of all repair jobs and other records related to their vehicle. This contact was also initiated by the Murungis and is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over HHOV, HHOV's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) defendant Mercedes Benz Credit Corp., Inc.'s motion to dismiss is GRANTED,
(2) defendant Daniel A. Smith's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and
(3) defendant Holtz House of Vehicles, Inc.'s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.