Opinion
Nos. CV 08-4024500S, CV 08-4024470-S
June 9, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DISMISS
The defendants have filed these Supplemental Motions to Dismiss (#105-Murphy) (#112-Save West Beach) claiming that the plaintiff lacks standing as taxpayers to bring either action. (The original Motion to Dismiss in West Beach was directed at specific counts, was based upon the original action filed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff thereafter filed an Amended Complaint and Amended Application for Temporary Injunction.) These Supplemental Motions to Dismiss now seeks to dismiss the entire complaints in both cases.
The issues before the court in both cases are the same, therefore, the court will address both in this Memorandum of Decision. The threshold issue in both is whether the plaintiffs have standing to bring the actions
In Murphy v. City of Stamford et al. (" Murphy"), the plaintiff is seeking declaratory and an injunctive relief relating to installation of artificial turf on fields in three locations in the City of Stamford by virtue of her status as a taxpayer and claiming that she will suffer an increase in taxes.
In Save West Beach et al v. The City of Stamford et al., (" Save West Beach") the plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief relating to installation of artificial turf on fields in three locations in the City of Stamford by virtue of the plaintiff being a voluntary association of property owners and taxpayers and the plaintiff Maureen Boylan being a taxpayer and owner of property which abuts one of the subject fields and as their status as a taxpayers and claiming that they will suffer an increase in taxes.
In addition the issues are whether or not the City acted in violation of its charter and whether or not there are environmental issues which were not addressed by the City.
All of these issues can only be addressed if the plaintiffs have standing
MOTION TO DISMISS
"Any defendant, wishing to contest the court's jurisdiction, may do so even after having entered a general appearance, but must do so by filing a motion to dismiss within thirty days of the filing of an appearance." Practice Book § 10-30. "A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blumenthal v. Barnes, 261 Conn. 434, 442, 804 A.2d 152 (2002). "The motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sadloski v. Manchester, 235 Conn. 637, 645-46 n. 13, 668 A.2d 1314 (1995). "[S]tanding . . . implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction, which may be raised at any point in judicial proceedings." Stamford Hospital v. Vega, 236 Conn. 646, 656, 674 A.2d 821 (1996). "The plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183, 199 n. 13, 680 A.2d 1243 (1996).
"Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless [one] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Shawn S., 262 Conn. 155, 164, 810 A.2d 799 (2002). "Standing is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Water Pollution Control Authority v. OTP Realty, LLC, 76 Conn.App. 711, 714, 822 A.2d 257 (2003). The "plaintiff has the burden of proving standing." Sadloski v. Manchester, supra, 235 Conn. 649. The case of West Farms Mall, LLC v. Town of West Hartford, 279 Conn. 1 (2006) 901 A.2d 649 is controlling, both on taxpayer standing and classical aggrievement.
TAXPAYER STANDING
"The plaintiff's status as a taxpayer does not automatically give [it] standing to challenge alleged improprieties in the conduct of the defendant town . . . The plaintiff must also allege and demonstrate that the allegedly improper municipal conduct cause[d it] to suffer some pecuniary or other great injury . . . It is not enough for the plaintiff to show that [its] tax dollars have contributed to the challenged project . . . [T]he plaintiff must prove that the project has directly or indirectly increased [its] taxes . . . or, in some other fashion, caused [it] irreparable injury in [its] capacity as a taxpayer." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In that case, wherein the plaintiff had challenged a tax abatement, we held that, "[b]ecause standing is a practical concept, common sense suggests that a taxpayer who challenges a part of a particular governmental program must demonstrate [its] injury in the entire fiscal context of that program, taking into account both the burdens and benefits of the program, and not just by demonstrating that the presumably burdensome part of the program itself divorced from the larger program of which it is a part, causes injury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id." West Farms Mall, LLC v. Town of West Hartford, supra, 279 Conn. 13-14
"The two-pronged standard of proof — taxpayer status and conduct that has caused or will cause increased taxes or other irreparable injury — is one that this court consistently has articulated since at least 1943. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Waterbury, 130 Conn. 237, 245, 33 A.2d 142 (1943); Bassett v. Desmond, supra, 140 Conn. 430; Austin v. Housing Authority, 143 Conn. 338, 349, 122 A.2d 399 (1956); Atwood v. Regional School District N. 15, 169 Conn. 613, 617, 363 A.2d 1038 (1975); Belford v. New Haven, 170 Conn. 46, 53, 364 A.2d 194 (1975), overruled in part by Manchester Environmental Coalition v. Stockton, 184 Conn. 51, 57 n. 7, 441 A.2d 68 (1981); Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., supra, 179 Conn. 549; Highgate Condominium Ass'n. v. Watertown Fire District, 210 Conn. 6, 15, 553 A.2d 1126 (1989); Unisys Corp. v. Dept. of Labor, 220 Conn. 689, 695, 600 A.2d 1019 (1991); Sadloski v. Manchester, supra, 228 Conn. 83. Indeed, it is evident from these cases that a more stringent standard is imposed to assert successfully taxpayer standing than is required to invoke standing on the basis of classical aggrievement." Id., 14. At the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss the plaintiff claimed their taxes would probably increase due to the cost of installing the new surface. However, they were not able to sustain their burden of proof as to the fact that the installation of the artificial turf caused or will cause increased taxes or other irreparable injury to them. They ignored the evidence presented that the ordinary cost of maintenance of the field in their present condition also would cost them money. They did not present any proof to the court that the cost of the installation of the new turf would exceed the cost of the regular maintenance of the present surface.
The plaintiffs are also making a claim of violation of Section C6-30-13 of the City of Stamford Charter in that the project to install the turf was not referred to the Planning Board of the City of Stamford.
The court in Alarm Applications v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire, 179 Conn. 541 (1980) 427 A.2d 822 addressed this issue and when along with West Farms Mall, LLC v. Town of West Hartford, guides this court on this issue. "We have long recognized the capacity of taxpayers of towns and cities to challenge the legality of the actions of their municipal officers by seeking injunctive relief against such action. See Belford v. New Haven, 170 Conn. 46, 52-53, 364 A.2d 194 (1975); Bassett v. Desmond, 140 Conn. 426, 430, 101 A.2d 294 (1953); Sauter v. Mahan, 95 Conn. 311, 314, 111 A. 186 (1920); Mooney v. Clark, 69 Conn. 241, 244, 37 A. 506 (1897); New London v. Brainard, 22 Conn. 553, 557 (1853). Such actions may also be brought where the alleged improper action is that of a quasi-municipal corporation. See Larkin v. Bontatibus, supra. Absent the existence of another special legal relationship,3 not here alleged, however, this court has not recognized the capacity of an individual or a private corporation that has not alleged taxpayers' status to maintain an action challenging the propriety of the conduct of a municipal corporation. We have said that a party's status as a taxpayer, without a demonstration by him of some tangible injury, does not by itself confer standing upon him where the defendant is a municipal corporation. Bell v. Planning Zoning Commission, 174 Conn. 493, 497-98, 391 A.2d 154 (1978); Belford v. New Haven, 170 Conn. 46, 51-53, 364 A.2d 194 (1975); Gannon v. Sanders, 157 Conn. 1, 6-9, 244 A.2d 397 (1968); Truesdale v. Greenwich, 116 Conn. 426, 430-32, 165 A. 201 (1933). Thus, our cases in this area have required two conditions for the maintenance of actions seeking to challenge municipal conduct: (1) the plaintiff must be a taxpayer of the defendant municipal entity; and (2) the plaintiff must allege and demonstrate that the allegedly improper municipal conduct causes him to suffer "some pecuniary or other great injury." Bassett v. Desmone, supra, 430; see Belford v. New Haven, supra, 53; Atwood v. Regional School District No. 15, 169 Conn. 613, 617, 363 A.2d 1038 (1975); Cannon v. Sanders, supra; see 18 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed.) 52.12, 52.24. The first condition ensures that there be some legal relationship or nexus between the plaintiff and the municipal entity that establishes the municipality's duty to expend or allocate tax monies in a manner consistent with law. See 74 Am.Jur.2d, Taxpayers' Actions 1; 64 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations 2122. The second condition ensures that our courts will be called upon to decide matters in which the litigants have a specific, legal interest, as distinguished from a mere general interest, in the subject matter of the controversy. See Bedford v. New Haven, supra, 52-53; Cannon v. Sanders, supra, 6; Waterbury Trust Co. v. Porter, 130 Conn. 494, 498, 35 A.2d 837 (1944); see also 74 Am.Jur.2d, op. cit. 4." Alarm Applications v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire, supra, 179 Conn. 548-49.
The plaintiffs in these two cases have failed to establish their standing as taxpayers and failed to demonstrate that the allegedly improper municipal conduct causes them to suffer some pecuniary or other great injury.
CLASSICAL AGGRIEVEMENT
"The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: [F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action] . . . Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Eder Bros., Inc. v. Wine Merchants of Connecticut, Inc., 275 Conn. 363, 369-70, 880 A.2d 138 (2005). West Farms Mall, LLC v. Town of West Hartford, supra, 279 Conn. 15.
In Save West Beach the plaintiffs are making a claim of an adverse environmental impact. However, there was no evidence presented to the court on this issue. Their claims are vague, tenuous and unproven. For all the reasons stated above the defendant's Supplemental Motions to Dismiss in both cases, are granted.