Opinion
A113144
4-19-2007
MATTHEW MURPHY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF ALAMEDA et al., Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Plaintiff Matthew Murphy (Murphy) appeals from an order of the Alameda County Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of defendants City of Alameda (City), City Council of the City of Alameda (City Council), and Planning Board of the City of Alameda. He asserts the trial court erred in concluding that a city ordinance authorizing the construction of work/live studios does not violate a city charter provision that prohibits the construction of multiple dwelling units. We conclude there was no error, and therefore, we shall affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 1973, Alameda voters approved a ballot initiative entitled "Measure A," which became part of the city charter. It provided: "There shall be no multiple dwelling units built in the City of Alameda. [¶] . . . Exception being the Alameda Housing Authority replacement of existing low cost housing units and the proposed Senior Citizens low cost housing complex . . . ." A few months later, the City Council enacted Ordinance 1693, which provided definitions of terms not defined in Measure A, and set forth how the measure would be implemented. Ordinance 1693 defined "dwelling" as "a building or portion thereof designed exclusively for residential occupancy" and "dwelling unit" as a "group of rooms, including one kitchen, a bath and sleeping quarters, designed for and not occupied by more than one family." It defined "multiple dwelling units" as a "residential building, whether a single structure or consisting of attached or semiattached structures, designed, intended or used to house, or for occupancy by, three or more families, or living groups, living independently of each other, located in districts or zones authorized therefor. . . ."
In December 1998, the City Council adopted Ordinance 2784, authorizing the construction of work/live studios, which were defined as "a commercial or industrial unit with incidental residential accommodations occupying one or more rooms or floors in a building primarily designed and used for industrial or commercial occupancy . . . ." Ordinance 2784 limited the construction of work/live studios to existing buildings in commercial and industrial zoning districts, and provided that no portion of any work/live studio was to be considered a "dwelling" as defined by Ordinance 1693.
Murphy challenged Ordinance 2784 on the ground that it violated Measure A. He filed a lawsuit against the City, seeking a declaration that Ordinance 2784 was "facially inoperative and void," as well as an injunction preventing the City from implementing the ordinance. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding Ordinance 2784 did not violate Measure A. Murphy filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A motion for summary judgment "shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The appellate court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.)
A. Ordinance 2784 does not violate the "plain meaning" of Measure A.
Citing dictionary definitions of the words "dwelling," "dwelling house" and "residence," Murphy asserts that Ordinance 2784 violates the "plain meaning" of Measure A because it allows the construction of multiple work/live studios, which are, by definition, "dwellings," where people reside. His claim is without merit.
A charter constitutes a citys local constitution, and city ordinances stand in the same relationship to a charter as do statutes to the state constitution. (Porter v. City of Riverside (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 832, 836, 837 (Porter).) Thus, the same presumptions favoring the constitutionality of statutes apply to ordinances. (Id. at p. 837.) "`In considering the scope or nature of appellate review in a case [concerning the validity of an ordinance] we must keep in mind the fact that the courts are examining the act of a coordinate branch of the government—the legislative—in a field in which it has paramount authority, and not reviewing the decision of a lower tribunal or of a factfinding body. " (Ratkovich v. City of San Bruno (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 870, 879 (Ratkovich).) "Courts have nothing to do with the wisdom of laws or regulations, and the legislative power must be upheld unless manifestly abused so as to infringe on constitutional guaranties." (Ibid.)
Further, unless expressly limited by its charter, a city council has plenary authority to interpret and implement charter provisions and may exercise all powers not in conflict with the California Constitution. (Miller v. City of Sacramento (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 863, 867-868 (Miller); Simons v. City of Los Angeles (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 455, 467-468.) The City Councils action "will be upheld by the courts unless beyond its powers, `or in its judgment or discretion is being fraudulently or corruptly exercised. " (Porter, supra, 261 Cal.App.2d at p. 836.) Thus, a party making a facial challenge to an ordinance, requesting that it be voided, must demonstrate that its provisions " `inevitably pose a present total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions. " (Personal Watercraft Coalition v. Marin County Bd. of Supervisors (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 129, 137-138 (Personal Watercraft Coalition).) "If reasonable minds might differ as to the reasonableness of the ordinance [citations] or if the reasonableness of the ordinance is fairly debatable [citations], the ordinance must be upheld." (Ratkovich, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d at p. 878.)
Alamedas charter provides that its legislative powers are vested in the City Council, and because there is no provision in the charter limiting the authority of the City Council, the City Council had full power to enact ordinances interpreting and implementing Measure A. (See Miller, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at pp. 867-868.) This was especially appropriate here, where the measure consisted of just one sentence and one phrase for a total of 47 words, prohibiting the construction of multiple dwelling units in the City. Measure A was not clear as to meaning or applicability and was silent on the matter most critical to the determination of this case—the definition of "multiple dwelling units."
The City Council acknowledged this problem and enacted Ordinance 1693 in which it stated: "The provisions hereof are designed to better achieve the objectives and will of the electorate, expressed at the March 13, 1973, General Municipal Election [at which Measure A was passed], . . . by clarifying existing uncertainties and ambiguities as to the meaning of the phrase, `multiple dwelling units . . . ." The limitations period to challenge Ordinance 1693 has long passed, as Murphy concedes, and he does not dispute that this ordinance is valid.
The City Council also had plenary power to enact Ordinance 2784, and it acted within its powers when it determined that the definition of "dwelling" did not extend to work/live studios. The City Councils conclusion that Measure A prohibited the construction of multiple dwelling units only in certain districts or zones was also valid in light of the fact that it had previously defined the term "multiple dwelling units" as a "residential building . . . located in districts or zones authorized therefor. . . ." Because the prohibition against multiple dwelling units applied only to certain districts or zones, the City Council acted reasonably in limiting the construction of work/live studios to commercial and industrial areas of the City.
Where a charter provision is ambiguous or susceptible of two or more meanings, the city council, not the court, has the authority to decide issues of interpretation and applicability. (Porter, supra, 261 Cal.App.2d at p. 836.) We therefore will not substitute the definitions and interpretations the City Council made in resolving the ambiguities of Measure A with Murphys dictionary definitions that do not take into consideration the specific needs and circumstances of the City. In light of the great deference we are to give to the City Councils actions, and the strong presumption of constitutionality applied to ordinances, we conclude that Murphy has not met his burden of establishing that Ordinance 2784 is in "total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions." (See Personal Watercraft Coalition, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 138.) We therefore affirm the trial courts order.
B. Extrinsic evidence does not support Murphys position that Ordinance 2784 violates Measure A.
Murphy asserts that "[e]ven if the Court were to believe that it needed to go behind the plain meaning of the language of Measure A," extrinsic evidence supports his claim that Ordinance 2784 violates Measure A. We disagree.
1. Ordinance 1693
Murphy asserts that Ordinance 1693 constitutes extrinsic evidence supporting his claim that Ordinance 2784 violates Measure A because (1) the definitions of "dwelling" and "dwelling unit" set forth in Ordinance 1693 support his position that work/live studios are "dwellings"; (2) Ordinance 1693 states that Measure As prohibition against multiple dwelling units applies to the entire city, and not just to residential areas; and that (3) even if the prohibition applies only to residential areas, the construction of multiple work/live studios in otherwise commercial or industrial buildings converts these places into "residential" buildings, where multiple dwelling units are not allowed.
We reject Murphys argument that the definitions of "dwelling" and "dwelling unit" set forth in Ordinance 1693 support his position that Ordinance 2784 violates Measure A. The definition of a "dwelling" as "a building or portion thereof designed exclusively for residential occupancy" is not reasonably interpreted to include an individual unit within a building that is designed for residential occupancy and other uses. Further, the fact that a work/live studio contains all of the accoutrements of a "dwelling unit," such as a kitchen and a bath, does not necessarily bring work/live studios within the definition of a "dwelling unit." In any event, the City Council, in defining the term "multiple dwelling units" as residential buildings "located in districts or zones authorized therefor," made clear that the prohibition against multiple dwelling units applied only to certain districts or zones. Thus, the construction of work/live studios outside of those districts or zones is, by definition, not prohibited.
Next, as Murphy points out, Ordinance 1693 states "[t]here shall be no multiple dwelling units built in the City of Alameda." It also states the City will not issue any building permits for the construction of multiple dwelling units "within the City." However, these are restatements of what Measure A states, and do not necessarily reflect the City Councils intent to interpret the measure in a way that would make the prohibition against multiple dwelling units applicable to the entire city, or to the work/live studios that are at issue here. To the contrary, as noted above, the City Council made it clear when defining the term "multiple dwelling units" in Ordinance 1693 that the prohibition applied only to certain districts or zones.
We also reject Murphys assertion that the construction of work/live studios, which are "dwellings," in otherwise commercial or industrial areas converts these places into residential areas to which the prohibition against multiple dwelling units applies. Because the City Council has defined "multiple dwelling units" as residential buildings "located in districts or zones authorized therefor," the fact that buildings outside of those districts contain work/live studios does not convert the buildings into residential buildings, and the districts or zones in which they are located into residential districts or zones.
2. Voter Testimony
Murphy relies on extrinsic evidence in the form of voter testimony in asserting that the construction of multiple work/live studios violates Measure A. He claims the voters intended and understood the phrase "dwelling unit" to encompass any space in which people resided, and expected the prohibition would apply to the entire city. This argument is without merit.
Because different voters make their decisions for various subjective reasons, often not shared or even known by others, courts generally do not rely on the subjective intent of voters, or even the drafters, of an initiative proposal. (See Carman v. Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318, 331, fn. 10 [drafters after-the-fact explanation of intent does not explain how voters understood the provision].) Expressions of individual motivation made "after-the-fact . . . may deserve some consideration [citation]; but by no means does it govern our determination how the voters understood the ambiguous provisions." (Ibid.)
Here, the recollections of several individual residents as to what their intent was when they supported Measure A in 1973 do not prove the meaning of undefined terms of Measure A, nor do they reflect the intent of the electorate generally. Their testimony also cannot replace the City Councils interpretations as to the meaning of Measure A. Thus, we reject Murphys claim that voter testimony supports his position that Ordinance 2784 violates Measure A.
3. Other City Ordinances
Murphy relies on rent control ordinances from other cities that classify work/live studios as "residential" in asserting that work/live studios are "dwellings" and that the construction of work/live studios thus violates Measure A. We conclude the trial court properly excluded these documents from evidence on the basis they were irrelevant, as there is nothing in the record indicating the City Council used or relied on these ordinances when enacting Ordinance 2784, and neither Measure A nor the ordinances makes any reference to any of the other city ordinances. We therefore need not address the issue of whether these city ordinances support Murphys position.
C. Health and Safety Code section 17958.11 does not support Murphys position, and in fact, specifically authorizes the City to convert commercial and industrial buildings into work/live studios.
Murphy asserts that Health and Safety Code section 17958.11, enacted after Measure A was passed, supports his position that Ordinance 2784 violates Measure A because the statute refers to work/live studios as a "residential occupancy." To the contrary, the statute supports the Citys position, as it specifically authorizes the conversion of commercial and industrial buildings into work/live studios. It provides: "Any city or county may adopt alternative building regulations for the conversion of commercial or industrial buildings, or portions thereof, to joint living and work quarters." (Health & Saf. Code, § 17958.11, subd. (a).)
Noting that many manufacturing and commercial buildings in urban areas had lost their tenants to more modern premises, the Legislature in enacting Health and Safety Code section 17958.11 declared: "[T]he untenanted portions of such buildings constitute a potential resource capable, when appropriately altered, of accommodating joint living and work quarters which would be physically and economically suitable particularly for use by artists, artisans, and similarly-situated individuals." (Health & Saf. Code, § 17958.11, subd. (b).) Although it referred to these joint living and work quarters as residential spaces, it also made clear that the residential use of these units was "accessory to the primary use of such a space as a place of work," and that these units were to be constructed only in commercial or industrial districts. (Health & Saf. Code, § 17958.11, subd. (c).) Thus, the statute not only authorizes the City to enact an ordinance such as Ordinance 2784, but it also provides support for the Citys position that its City Council acted reasonably in distinguishing between residential units constructed as "dwellings" in residential zones, and work/live studios designed primarily for commercial or industrial uses in nonresidential zones. The statute does not support Murphys position that Ordinance 2784 violates Measure A.
DISPOSITION
The trial courts order is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.
We concur:
MARCHIANO, P. J.
SWAGER, J. --------------- Notes: We also conclude that the dictionary definitions of the words "dwelling," "dwelling house" and "residence" submitted by Murphy do not show there is a conflict between Ordinance 2784 and Measure A.