Summary
holding that an assistant district attorney (ADA) who only prosecuted juvenile cases and was not involved in the policymaking details of the office was a policymaker because regardless of whether the ADAs actually exercised all their powers, the powers granted to ADAs were broad
Summary of this case from DiRuzza v. County of TehamaOpinion
No. 82-1075.
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) August 2, 1982.
Decided August 12, 1982.
Dona S. Kahn, Harris Kahn, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
Joseph W. McGuire, Joseph P. Green, Krusen, Evans Byrne, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees Michael Ranck and Ronald Buckwalter.
LeRoy S. zimmerman, Atty. Gen., Susan J. Forney, Allen C. Warshaw, Deputy Attys. Gen., Chief, Sp. Litigation, Harrisburg, Pa., for amicus curiae Atty. Gen. of Com. of Pa.
David W. Heckler, Ann A. Osborne, Pa. Dist. Attys. Ass'n, Doylestown, Pa., for amicus curiae Pa. Dist. Attys. Ass'n.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
OPINION OF THE COURT
In Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1981), we determined that as a matter of law the positions of city solicitor and assistant city solicitor were those for which party affiliation was an appropriate requirement for effective performance and therefore a mayor's dismissal of those attorneys for reasons of their political affiliation did not violate the First Amendment. In the present case, Mummau v. Ranck, 531 F. Supp. 402 (E.D.Pa. 1982), the district court used kindred reasoning and determined that the plaintiff's employment as an assistant district attorney brought him within the exemption of the rule of Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). The plaintiff has appealed. We affirm essentially for the reasons set forth in Ness v. Marshall, as applied to the facts here by the district court. Additionally, the district court considered and applied appropriate Pennsylvania statutory and case law relating to the obligations of Pennsylvania's district attorneys and their assistants. We specifically reject appellant's contention that his function was purely technical and ministerial and that therefore political affiliation would be an inappropriate criterion for employment. That an assistant district attorney "could conceivably operate in such a legal/technical manner," or that appellant in fact so limited himself to the role described is irrelevant. See Ness, 660 F.2d at 521; Mummau, 531 F. Supp. at 405.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.