Opinion
CV-21-00115-TUC-SHR (BGM)
04-06-2023
Abdullah Mujahid aka Myron Scott Sievers, Petitioner, v. Ryan Thornell,[1] et al., Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald, United States Magistrate Judge.
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Abdullah Mujahid aka Myron Scott Sievers Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 13), Respondents' Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. 14), and Petitioner replied (Doc. 22). Respondents also filed a Notice of Supplemental Citation of Authority (Doc. 23). The Petition (Doc. 1) is ripe for adjudication. Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure (“LRCiv”), this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Macdonald for Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 3.) The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Judge dismiss the Petition (Doc. 1).
Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
Mujahid pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, theft, and second-degree burglary in 1989 for offenses he committed in 1988. (Doc. 13-1 at 4-9, Exh. A, Doc. 13-1 at 11-26, Exh. B, Doc. 13-2 at 155-56, Exh. L.) Mujahid was 17 at the time he committed the offenses. (Doc. 13-2 at 155-56, Exh. L.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was sentenced to life in prison, with the possibility of parole after 25 years, for the murder count, and two consecutive ten year prison sentences for the remaining two counts. (Doc. 13-1 at 28-39, Exh. C at 10-11; Doc. 13-2, Exh. L.) On March 16, 2021, Mujahid filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court, asserting: 1) that his cumulative prison sentences amount to a de facto sentence of life without the possibility of parole in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights as announced by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016); and 2) that, by dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing on his claims, the state court decision denying him relief was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence presented. (Doc. 7-1.)
Mujahid is not entitled to relief. Initially, his habeas petition is untimely because it was not filed within one year of Miller's holding. However, even if his petition were timely filed, he is still not entitled to relief because the Supreme Court has never held that a juvenile defendant's lengthy cumulative prison sentence based on multiple consecutive sentences violates the Eighth Amendment. Thus, the state court decisions denying Mujahid relief were not contrary to, nor did they involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. And, even accepting his factual allegations as true, Mujahid is still not entitled to relief because the state court decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
I. STATEMENT OF THE RECORD
Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Respondents (hereinafter “the State”) have reproduced and attached only the portions of the state-court record relevant to the affirmative defenses of statute of limitations and procedural default. These include: (1) all relevant and available pleadings, minute entries, and charging documents filed in Pima County Case No. CR025289; and (2) all relevant and available pleadings and court orders from Mujahid's post-conviction relief proceedings in the state courts.
Due to the age of the state court proceedings, an electronic copy of the superior court's docket is unavailable.
Rule 5(c) also requires the State to “indicate what transcripts (of pretrial, trial, sentencing, or post-conviction proceedings) are available, when they can be furnished, and what proceedings have been recorded but not transcribed.” The State is only required to attach those “parts of the transcript that the [State] considers relevant.” Id. The following transcripts are available, and filed with this answer: March 16, 1989, change of plea hearing; April 13, 1989, sentencing hearing. (Doc. 13-1 at 11-26, Exh. B, Doc. 13-1 at 2839, Exh. C.)
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 1989, Mujahid pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, theft, and second-degree burglary for offenses committed in 1988 when he was 17 years old. (Doc. 13-1 at 4-9, Exh. A, Doc. 13-1 at 11-26, Exh. B, Doc. 13-2 at 155-56, Exh. L.) At sentencing, defense counsel asked the trial court to determine “whether [it] should perhaps reject [the plea agreement] as being too harsh” based upon information contained in the presentence report and a doctor's report. (Doc. 13-1 at 31, Exh. C at 4.) The trial court found the plea agreement should be accepted, and, consistent with the plea agreement, sentenced Mujahid to life with parole eligibility after 25 years for the murder, 10 years for the theft and 10 years for the burglary. (Doc. 13-1 at 35, 36-38, Exh. C at 8, 10-11; Doc. 13-2 at 155-56, Exh. L.) All three sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. (Doc. 13-1 at 37-38, Exhs. C at 10-11; Doc. 13-2 at 155-56, Exh. L.) Mujahid was granted parole on the life sentence in 2014 and will be eligible for release after serving two-thirds of each of his remaining prison terms. (Doc. 13-2 at 155-56, Exh. L.) On September 12, 2016, Mujahid filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (Doc. 13-1 at 41-43, Exh. D.) On May 8, 2017, Mujahid filed his PCR petition, (Doc. 13-1 at 45-106, Exh. E), and following several extensions and a stay, filed an amended PCR petition on May 31, 2019. (Doc. 13-1 at 108135, Exh. F.) In his petition, Mujahid argued that his sentences cumulatively amounted to a de facto life sentence without the possibility of parole which violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Supreme Court's holdings in Miller and Montgomery. Id. He based his argument that his cumulative sentence amounted to life without the possibility of parole on life expectancy estimates. Id.
The legal arguments raised in Mujahid's amended petition were largely substantively identical to those raised in his initial petition. See Doc. 13-1 at 45-106, Doc. 13-1 at 108-135, Exhs. E, F. The amended petition, however, contained additional exhibits. Compare Doc. 13-1 at 45-106, Exh. E, with Doc. 13-2 at 3-103, Exh. G.
The State responded, arguing Mujahid was not entitled to relief under Miller or Montgomery because Mujahid was never subjected to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. (Doc. 13-2 at 105-108, Exh. H.) The State observed that the Arizona court of appeals had rejected a similar argument in a separate case. Id.; see also State v. Helm, 431 P.3d 1213 (Ariz. App. 2018). The State also criticized Mujahid's argument regarding his de facto life sentence, noting there was no consistent approach as to what amounted to a de facto life sentence among the various authorities Mujahid cited. (Doc. 13-2 at 105-108, Exh. H.) Mujahid filed a reply. (Doc. 13-2 at 110-118, Exh. I.)
The PCR court denied Mujahid's petition. (Doc. 13-2 at 120-124, Exh. J.) The court began by observing that “it [was] unclear if Miller even applies,” because Mujahid was paroled on the murder charge but remained in prison on two remaining sentences that were not life sentences. Id. Relying on Helm, supra, the PCR court found that Mujahid's arguments were unsupported by Arizona law. Id. The PCR court further noted that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit lengthy aggregate sentences and “prohibits the imposition of life without parole sentences on a juvenile defendant only for nonhomicide offenses.” Id. (emphasis original). The PCR court thus found Mujahid failed to present “a colorable claim that would provide relief under Rule 32 [of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure] and [was therefore] not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.” Id.
Mujahid petitioned for review to the Arizona court of appeals. (Doc. 13-2 at 126153, Exh. K.) He again argued that the Eighth Amendment prohibited aggregate sentences which exceeded a juvenile offender's expected lifespan. Id. He acknowledged, however that Miller and Montgomery do not expressly apply to the cumulative length of consecutive sentences for juvenile offenders. (Doc. 13-2 at 135, Exh. K at 10) (stating “the reasoning in [the Miller and Montgomery] line of cases also implicates de facto JLWOP sentences”) (emphasis added). Rather, he argued that the court of appeals should, in effect, reverse its prior decisions and conclude Miller and Montgomery apply to cumulative sentences. Id.
The court of appeals granted review of Mujahid's petition. (Doc. 13-2 at 155-156, Exh. L.) The court of appeals noted that Mujahid asked the court to revisit “the argument that Montgomery and Miller, which prohibit life sentences for juvenile offenders without a meaningful opportunity for release, apply to non-life, consecutive sentences.” Id. The court of appeals “decline[d] to do so,” and denied relief. Id.
III. ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review
Because his petition was filed after April 24, 1996, Mujahid's habeas petition is governed by AEDPA. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001). Under AEDPA, a habeas petitioner is only entitled to relief if they can show that a claim “that was adjudicated on the merits” in a state court “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This is a “highly deferential standard.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
B. Timeliness under AEDPA
Under AEDPA, habeas petitioners have one year to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute of limitations runs “from the latest of' a number of events, including “the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). Because Mujahid is asserting his rights as recognized in Miller were violated, and because Miller was not decided until after he was sentenced, the statute of limitations contained in § 2244(d)(1)(C) applies.
However, the statute of limitations began to run from when the Supreme Court announced the right, not from when they announced it applied retroactively. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357-58 (2005). Although Dodd addressed the statute of limitations found in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), see 545 U.S. at 354, the relevant statutory language is identical to § 2244(d)(1)(C). Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C), with 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Because the statutory language is identical, Dodd's holding applies equally to the AEDPA statute of limitations.
Miller announced the substantive rule that Mujahid claims entitles him to relief; Montgomery merely held it applied retroactively. See Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 206 (“Miller announced a substantive rule that is retroactive in cases on collateral review.”). Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run from the date that Miller was decided. See Dodd, 545 U.S. at 357-58.
Miller was decided in 2012. Mujahid therefore had until 2013 to file his habeas petition. He did not file his habeas petition until 2021. (Doc. 7-1.) His habeas petition is thus untimely by nearly eight years.
While the time period “during which a properly filed application for State post- conviction or other collateral review ... is pending” will ordinarily be tolled, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), that does not apply when the AEDPA statute of limitations has already expired by the time the collateral review proceedings are initiated. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Mujahid filed his notice of PCR in 2016-three years after the statute of limitations ran. (Doc. 131 at 45-106, Exh. E.) His PCR proceedings thus would not have tolled the statute of limitations because the statute of limitations had already run by the time he initiated his PCR proceedings.
Moreover, Mujahid is not entitled to equitable tolling. “To be entitled to equitable tolling, [the habeas petitioner] must show (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently; and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). The “extraordinary circumstances” must result from an external force rather than the petitioner's lack of diligence, Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999), and the petition must establish a causal connection between the extraordinary circumstances and his failure to file a timely petition. Bryant v. Ariz. Att'y Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2007).
Mujahid has not established that equitable tolling should apply. In fact, he does not address whether his petition is timely at all in his habeas petition. (Doc. 7-1.) Presumably, Mujahid's delay in initiating his PCR proceedings was attributable to Montgomery expressly holding that Miller applied retroactively. However, Dodd was decided in 2005, 7 years before Miller and 11 years before Montgomery was decided. “[A] pro se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, to the extent that Mujahid's delay is attributable to his failure to recognize that the statute of limitations began to run from the date Miller was decided, that would not entitle him to equitable tolling.
The habeas petition is not timely.
C. The state courts' denial of Mujahid's PCR petition was not contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law
Mujahid is not entitled to relief unless he can establish that the state court proceedings “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” § 2254(d)(1). The “‘clearly established' phrase ‘refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.'” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). “A state court decision is ‘contrary to ... clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases' or ‘if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the] precedent.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 73 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06).
“The ‘unreasonable application' clause [of § 2254(d)(1)] requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous[;] [t]he state court's application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75 (internal citation omitted). A state court decision is not unreasonable unless “there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [Supreme] Court precedents.” Richter v. Harrington, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.
Mujahid is not entitled to relief because the Supreme Court has never held that a juvenile defendant's lengthy cumulative prison term, based upon consecutive sentences- that are not themselves life without the possibility of parole-violates the juvenile defendant's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
The Supreme Court has recognized “that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing,” because “juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 471. It is for this reason the Supreme Court has held that juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to death, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), that juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life without parole for non-homicide offenses, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010), and “that mandatory life-without parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 470.
None of Mujahid's sentences individually violate Graham, Miller, or Montgomery. Indeed, Mujahid's 25-to-life sentence for the murder count is precisely what Miller and Montgomery require for juvenile offenders absent evidence of “irreparable corruption.” See Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 209-10; Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80. Recognizing this, Mujahid instead argues that the logic underpinning Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery prohibit lengthy cumulative prison terms that function as a “de facto” sentence of life without parole. (Doc. 7-1 at 12.)
The Supreme Court, however, has never held that a juvenile defendant's cumulative prison term based on consecutive sentences violates the Eighth Amendment. Rather, the Supreme Court has said that states are “not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender,” but instead need only give them “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. Moreover, the Eighth Amendment “does not require the State to release [a juvenile] offender during his natural life.” Id.
Mujahid tacitly acknowledges the Supreme Court has never held that a juvenile defendant's lengthy consecutive prison terms may violate the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 7-1 at 12 (“The reasoning of the Roper/Graham/Miller/Montgomery line of cases extends to de facto JLWOP sentences.”) (emphasis added).) Because the state courts would have had to extend the Supreme Court's reasoning to find that Mujahid's Eighth Amendment rights were violated, their decisions were not contrary to clearly established federal law. See White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 426 (2014) (“‘[I]f a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand,' then by definition the rationale was not ‘clearly established at the time of the state-court decision.'”) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666 (2004)); Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f habeas relief depends upon the resolution of an open question in [Supreme Court] jurisprudence, § 2254(d)(1) precludes relief.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If no Supreme Court precedent creates clearly established federal law relating to the legal issue the habeas petitioner raised in state court, the state court's decision cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.”).
Mujahid argues that Miller's “reasoning did not turn on the procedure through which a juvenile LWOP sentence is imposed-that is, through a mandatory or a de facto scheme-but upon the nature of the sentence itself,” and that Miller crafted an “inclusive remedy.” (Doc. 7-1 at 12.) This is belied by Miller's explicit holding “that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.'” 567 U.S. at 465 (emphasis added). And it is unsupported by Montgomery, which determined that Miller announced a substantive rule that applied retroactively because it held such sentences were unconstitutional. 577 U.S. at 208. And, despite using seemingly broad language, Montgomery's narrow holding was simply that Miller applied retroactively. Id. at 206.
Moreover, neither Graham nor Miller addressed multiple sentences, despite having the opportunity to do so. Graham did not address the defendant's 15-year sentence for attempted armed robbery; instead, it only considered his life sentence without parole. 560 U.S. at 57. Similarly, Miller only addressed some of the defendants' sentences, specifically those which were required to be life without the possibility of parole. 567 U.S. at 465-69. The fact the Court did not address consecutive sentences “demonstrates that [it] did not even consider the constitutionality of such sentences, let alone clearly establish that they can violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.” Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 2012). Nothing from Graham or Miller, thus, suggests that a lengthy cumulative prison term based on consecutive sentences would violate a juvenile defendant's Eighth Amendment rights.
Like Graham and Miller, Montgomery only addressed a single sentence of life without the possibility of parole as well. 577 U.S. at 194.
Because the Supreme Court has never held that consecutive sentences resulting in a lengthy cumulative prison term violate a juvenile defendant's Eighth Amendment rights, the state court decisions were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Petitioner is thus not entitled to relief.
Mujahid nonetheless argues this Court is required to grant him relief based on a Ninth Circuit decision, Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2013). Moore, however, is readily distinguishable and therefore inapplicable. In Moore, the defendant was sentenced to “254 years” in prison “for nonhomicide crimes he committed when he was sixteen years old.” 725 F.3d at 1186 (emphasis added). The court concluded that the California state court's decision was contrary to Graham because the defendant's 254 year sentence meant he would “not be eligible for parole within his lifetime,” and “result[ed] in the same consequence as [the defendant's] sentence” in Graham. Id. at 1191-92.
Unlike Moore, Mujahid was sentenced for a homicide offense in addition to two non-homicide offenses. Additionally, unlike the defendant in Moore, Mujahid has a realistic opportunity for release. He has already been paroled on the murder sentence, and need only serve 66% of the remaining two sentences. (Doc. 13-2 at 155-56, Exh. L.) Although Mujahid claims he is unlikely to survive long enough to be paroled, that argument is utter speculation. Mujahid's case is thus unlike Moore where the defendant would never be able to be released for his non-homicide convictions.
Additionally, Moore is inconsistent with multiple other jurisdictions concluding that Miller and Montgomery are inapplicable when a juvenile is sentenced to a lengthy prison term due to consecutive sentences for multiple offenses. See, e.g., Ali v. Roy, 950 F.3d 572, 576 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Miller and Montgomery only explicitly applied to juveniles facing life-without-parole sentences; reason does not mandate their application to Ali's multiple lesser sentences.”); Atkins v. Crowell, 945 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 2019) (“The portion of Miller tailored to life-without-parole sentences shows that there is at least a ‘reasonable argument' that it applies only to those types of sentences. That reasonable argument forecloses any claim that the state court acted unreasonably under § 2254(d)(1).”) (internal citation omitted); United States v. Sparks, 941 F.3d 748, 7554 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Miller has no relevance to sentences less than LWOP. This means that sentences of life with the possibility of parole or early release do not implicate Miller. Nor do sentences to a term of years.”) (internal citations omitted, emphasis original); Evans-Garcia v. United States, 744 F.3d 235, 240-41 (1st Cir. 2014) (Miller limited to mandatory life-without-parole sentences); Bunch, 685 F.3d at 551-52 (Graham and Miller inapplicable to 89-year aggregate fixed term); State v. Slocumb, 827 S.E.2d 148, 157-62 (S.C. 2019) (holding “[n]either Graham nor the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, currently prohibits the imposition of aggregate sentences for multiple offenses amounting to a de facto life sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender,” and collecting cases).
Moore is also inconsistent with Graham. See 560 U.S. at 75 (stating the Eighth Amendment “does not require the State to release [a juvenile] offender during his natural.
Moreover, a more recent Ninth Circuit decision rejected a habeas petitioner's claim that “his sentences of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life violate[d] the Eighth Amendment because he was a juvenile at the time of his crimes.” Demirdjian v. Gipson, 832 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2016). The defendant in Demirdjian made the same argument Mujahid now makes, namely that “his sentence [was] the ‘functional equivalent' of the mandatory life-without-parole sentences overturned in Miller.” Id. The Ninth Circuit held the defendant failed to show that the California court's decision to affirm his sentences was contrary to Miller because the Supreme Court previously “reasoned a sentence of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life was ‘materially [ ] distinguishable' from a life-without-parole-term because the petitioner actually ‘retain[ed] the possibility of parole,' albeit when he was 87 years old.” Id. at 1076-77 (quoting Andrade, 538 U.S. at 74, 79) (internal citation omitted).
Demirdjian is directly on point, and therefore controlling. The only difference is that the Ninth Circuit concluded a state court decision affirming two consecutive 25-to-life sentences was not contrary to Miller. Mujahid had already been paroled on the murder charge during his PCR proceedings, and is thus only facing the two 10 year sentences. (Doc. 13-1 at 108-135, Exh. F, Doc. 13-2 at 155-56, Exh. L.) Pursuant to Demirdjian, the PCR court's conclusion was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Miller.
Finally, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly emphasized . . . [that] circuit precedent does not constitute clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.” Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. 21, 24 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moore, thus, does not constitute clearly established federal law. As such, this Court is not bound by it in determining whether the state courts here reached a decision that was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
Because Mujahid fails to establish that the state court decisions were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, he is not entitled to relief. This Court denies Petitioner's habeas petition.
D. The state courts' denial of Mujahid's PCR petition was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
Mujahid is not entitled to relief unless he can establish that the state court proceedings “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Federal courts may only reverse a state court's factual determination “if the state court decision was objectively unreasonable,” not “simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court.” Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007).
As argued above, the Supreme Court has never held that a juvenile offender's lengthy cumulative prison term on the basis of consecutive sentences violates his Eighth Amendment rights. Even accepting all of his factual allegations as true, Mujahid was not entitled to any relief under Graham, Miller, or Montgomery . The court's denial of his PCR petition without a hearing thus was not an unreasonable determination in light of the evidence presented because there was no relief available to Mujahid. He is thus not entitled to relief on this basis either. This Court denies Petitioner's habeas petition.
Under Arizona law, “[t]he relevant inquiry for determining whether [a] petition is entitled to an evidentiary hearing [in PCR proceedings] is whether he has alleged facts which, if true, would probably have changed the verdict or sentence. If the alleged facts would not have probably changed the verdict or sentence, then the claim is subject to summary dismissal.” State v. Amaral, 368 P.3d 925, 928, ¶ 10 (Ariz. 2016) (emphasis in original). Arizona PCR courts thus “need not hold an evidentiary hearing” where there are no material facts in dispute and the only issue is the legal consequence of the undisputed material facts.” Id. at 928, ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied and dismissed with prejudice. Further, no certificate of appealability shall issue because the dismissal of the petition is justified by a plain procedural bar, reasonable jurists would not find the ruling debatable, and Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
V. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge enter an order DISMISSING Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted from the District Judge. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number:
CV-21-00115-TUC-SHR
Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review.