Opinion
HHDFA144075806S HHDFA144076364S
03-29-2016
Asia Muhammad (ST/CT) v. Geoffrey Murphy, Jr.; Geoffrey Murphy, Jr. v. Asia Muhammad
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Michael A. Albis, J.
BACKGROUND
The present appeal arises from the above two matters originating in the Family Support Magistrate Court. The first is an action for support brought by the State of Connecticut in the name of the mother of the minor child against Geoffrey Murphy, Jr., who had executed an acknowledgment of paternity with the mother. Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-172(a), the acknowledgment had the force and effect of a judgment of the superior court. Shortly after the support action was initiated, Mr. Murphy filed a motion to open the judgment represented by the acknowledgment of paternity, which is the second matter.
The two actions were companionized prior to February 24, 2015, the date of the hearing before the family support magistrate on the motion to open judgment. Following the hearing, the family support magistrate issued a written decision on March 3, 2015, opening the judgment of paternity represented by the acknowledgment and dismissing the support petition filed in the first matter. The State of Connecticut has appealed both decisions.
In order to avoid the confusion that might otherwise arise from the fact that the parties occupy different positions in the two cases (e.g., plaintiff in one case and defendant in the other, or vice-versa), the court will refer to Geoffrey Murphy, Jr. as " Murphy" and to Asia Muhammad as " Muhammad." The State of Connecticut is sometimes referred to as the " State" and the minor child, Kareem Muhammad, is sometimes referred to as " Kareem" or the " child." The family support magistrate is sometimes referred to as the " magistrate."
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court's review of the decision of the magistrate is governed by General Statutes § 46b-231(n), wherein the applicable standard of review is set forth in the following subsection:
(7) The Superior Court may affirm the decision of the family support magistrate or remand the case for further proceedings. The Superior Court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the decision of the family support magistrate is: (A) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (B) in excess of the statutory authority of the family support magistrate; (C) made upon unlawful procedure; (D) affected by other error of law; (E) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (F) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
The court has considered the State's appeals in light of the applicable statute. It has reviewed the record, including the transcript of the February 24, 2015, proceedings in the family support magistrate court, and considered the oral arguments and written briefs of the parties.
DISCUSSION
Facts
The following facts were not in dispute before the magistrate:
1. Kareem was born on February 15, 2011.
2. Muhammad is the biological mother of Kareem.
3. Murphy and Muhammad executed an acknowledgment of paternity of Kareem, in accordance with the provisions and requirements of General Statutes § 46b-172(a), on April 26, 2011.
4. Neither Murphy nor Muhammad rescinded the acknowledgment of paternity within the time period allowed by General Statutes § 46b-172(b).
5. Murphy is not the biological father of Kareem.
6. Muhammad knew when the parties executed the acknowledgment of paternity that Murphy was not Kareem's biological father.
There was a factual dispute at the hearing as to whether Murphy was aware when he executed the acknowledgment that he was not Kareem's biological father. Based on evidence he found credible, the family support magistrate found that Murphy knew when he executed the acknowledgment that he was not the biological father of Kareem. This court finds ample support in the record for that factual finding by the magistrate. A finding of fact by the magistrate must be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous. A finding is not clearly erroneous if there is evidence in the record to support it: Jewett v. Jewett, 265 Conn. 669, 691, 830 A.2d 193 (2003).
The magistrate further found there was no demonstration of fraud, duress or mistake, insofar as both Muhammad and Murphy knowingly and willing executed the acknowledgment of paternity. However, the magistrate granted the motion to open based solely upon the best interests of Kareem, citing the child's right and interest in an accurate determination of paternity.
Issues
This appeal presents three issues. The first is whether a judgment represented by an acknowledgment of paternity may be opened after the statutory period for its rescission has expired, based only on the best interest of the child and without a finding of fraud, duress or mistake. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, the second question is whether the issue of the best interest of the child was properly raised in the present case. If so, then the final question is whether the magistrate properly determined in the present case that it was in the child's best interest to open the judgment. The court considers each question in turn.
1. May a judgment represented by an acknowledgement of paternity be opened more than sixty (60) days after it has been executed, absent a finding of fraud, duress or mistake and based solely on the best interest of the child?
Acknowledgments of paternity in Connecticut are governed by General Statutes § 46b-172. Subsection (a)(1) of the statute prescribes the formal requirements for the execution of a written acknowledgment of paternity by the mother and " putative father" of a minor child. Upon its execution in accordance with the statute, the document:
In the present case there is no claim of any defect, error, omission, or irregularity in the content or execution of the acknowledgment of paternity.
. . . shall have the same force and effect as a judgment of the Superior Court. It shall be considered a legal finding of paternity without requiring or permitting judicial ratification, and shall be binding on the person executing the same whether such person is an adult or a minor, subject to subdivision (2) of this subsection.
General Statutes § 46b-172(a)(1). In addition to specifying the formalities of execution of the document, the statute provides that in order for the acknowledgment to have the force and effect of a court judgment, the signers must be notified of certain rights and of the ramifications of the document. Most pertinent to the present inquiry is the following requirement:
For purposes of this decision, any reference to the " judgment of paternity" in the present case shall mean the acknowledgment of paternity which, by statute, had the force and effect of a judgment.
The notices shall also explain the right to rescind the acknowledgment, as set forth in subdivision (2) of this subsection, including the address where such notice of rescission should be sent, and shall explain that the acknowledgment cannot be challenged after sixty days, except in court upon a showing of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact . [Emphasis added.]
In its next subdivision, the statute sets out two distinct ways in which the parties may later seek to avoid the finding of paternity represented by the acknowledgment, i.e. by rescinding the document within stated time limits or thereafter by proving specified grounds in court.
(2) The mother and the acknowledged father shall have the right to rescind such affirmation or acknowledgment in writing within the earlier of (A) sixty days, or (B) the date of an agreement to support such child approved in accordance with subsection (b) of this section or an order of support for such child entered in a proceeding under subsection (c) of this section. An acknowledgment executed in accordance with subdivision (1) of this subsection may be challenged in court or before a family support magistrate after the rescission period only on the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact which may include evidence that he is not the father, with the burden of proof upon the challenger . During the pendency of any such challenge, any responsibilities arising from such acknowledgment shall continue except for good cause shown. [Emphasis added.]
The cited statute lies at the heart of the present case. The magistrate clearly opened and vacated the judgment represented by the acknowledgment of paternity, upon petition of the father named in it, long after the expiration of the sixty-day rescission period from the document's execution. Furthermore, he expressly, found that neither fraud, duress, nor material mistake had been proven, insofar as both Muhammad and Murphy knew when they voluntarily executed the acknowledgment that Murphy was not Kareem's biological father.
Rather than relying on any of the grounds for challenging the acknowledgment recited in the statute, the magistrate ruled that the court had the independent authority to open the judgment of paternity on the basis of the best interest of the child. In so ruling, the court relied on Ragin v. Lee, 78 Conn.App. 848, 829 A.2d 93 (2003). The cited case involved an appeal from the family support magistrate's consideration of a motion filed by the attorney for the minor child, seeking to open a default judgment of paternity on the basis of improper service on the putative father and alleging that it was in the child's best interest to open the judgment. The state opposed the child's motion on the grounds that the child lacked standing to claim improper notice to the putative father. The Appellate Court held that the child did have standing in the paternity action, noting that the child's motion to open judgment alleged not only improper service on the putative father but also that it was in the child's best interest to open the judgment of paternity.
We hold that a child who is the subject of a paternity action has a fundamental interest in an accurate determination of paternity that is independent of the state's interest in establishing paternity for the benefit of obtaining payment for the child's care and any interest that the parents may have in the child. We note that in the present case, the motion to open filed by counsel for the minor child and the guardian ad litem for the minor child alleged that it was in the best interest of the child that there be a definitive determination of the child's paternity by genetic testing, and we remand the matter for consideration of that claim . [Emphasis added.]Ragin v. Lee, 78 Conn.App. 862.
In appealing the decision of the magistrate, the State's position is that General Statutes § 46b-172(a)(2) prescribes the only grounds upon which an acknowledgment of paternity may be opened after the expiration of the rescission period. In the State's view, Ragin stands only for the principle that the minor child has standing to seek to open an acknowledgment of paternity; but the child remains bound by the statute's express limitations as to the grounds for opening the judgment represented by the acknowledgment of paternity. In support of its position the State points out that Ragin involved not an acknowledgment of paternity, but a default judgment of paternity entered by the family support magistrate court, and that the motion to open the default judgment was filed by the child's attorney within the four-month time period allowed for motions to open default judgments. The " best interest of the child, " the State argues, confers standing upon the child but does not constitute an independent ground for opening a judgment of paternity.
General Statutes § 52-212; Practice Book § 17-43.
Murphy, on the other hand, having alleged but failed to prove any of the grounds to open the judgment set forth in General Statutes § 46b-172(a)(2), now apparently concurs with the magistrate that Ragin provides an additional independent ground. Having litigated the motion based on his allegations of fraud or mistake, he now seeks to uphold the opening of the judgment on the basis of the best interest of the child whose fatherhood he disputes. At oral argument and in his brief, he continues to argue in support of his fraud and mistake claims, but the court affords no weight to that argument in light of the clear factual findings of the magistrate which are supported by the record.
The trial courts of Connecticut have been divided in their view of whether, under Ragin, there is a so-called " fourth ground" for opening a judgment of paternity, namely the best interest of the child. In a case factually similar to the present one, the court opened a default judgment of paternity even though it found no fraud, duress or mutual mistake, citing Ragin and stating that " a judgment of paternity may be opened when it is determine [sic] to be in the best interest of the child to do so and after considering a child's independent right to know his or her biological father." Oppelt v. Oppelt, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. FA-09-4047137-S, (September 21, 2011, Olear, J.). Similarly relying on Ragin, the court in Campbell v. Barrow, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. FA-03-0634839, (December 28, 2004, Baird, F.S.M.), found that the best interest of the child provided a basis for opening the paternity judgment. See also Eubanks v. Moss, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. FA-88-0246900, (March 5, 2010, Lifshitz, F.S.M.).
In contrast, the court in State v. Negron, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. FA-96-0078493-S, (September 8, 2004, McCarthy, F.S.M.) and State ex rel. Russo v. Barr, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. FA-92-0039347-S, (October 26, 2004, McCarthy, F.S.M.) determined that in the absence of fraud, duress or mutual mistake, a judgment of paternity may not be opened solely on the ground that it is in the best interest of the child to do so. In each case the court stated, " It is unfortunate that a fourth ground for re-opening does not exist, to wit, 'in the best interest of the child(ren).' If this ground existed, this court may have reopened the judgment. However, in the opinion of the court, that option does not exist in the law as it exists today in Connecticut."
On the question of whether Ragin merely grants standing to a minor child to seek to open a judgment of paternity, or goes further to create a fourth independent ground for doing so, the holding of the case in light of the overall scheme of the law of paternity in Connecticut persuades this court to adopt the latter interpretation. The court concludes that the " best interest of the child" in a given case may constitute grounds to open a judgment represented by an acknowledgment of paternity, even after the expiration of the statutory rescission period and absent a finding of fraud, duress or mistake.
In reaching this conclusion, the court has considered carefully the State's analysis of Ragin . In particular, the court agrees with the State that the facts in Ragin differ in that there, the attorney for the minor child had filed a timely motion to open the judgment. But this difference supports the court's conclusion that the child's best interest must itself be grounds to open the judgment. To hold otherwise in the context of an acknowledgment of paternity would in many situations render valueless the standing conferred on the child by Ragin .
The purpose of General Statutes § 46b-172 is clear. The statute is designed to facilitate and encourage prompt and efficient legal determinations of paternity by extrajudicial means. Because of the solemnity of the parental relationship and the seriousness of the rights and obligations of paternity, the statute requires numerous procedural safeguards and notices. The mother and putative father who execute an acknowledgment of paternity are fully apprised of the rights and opportunities they are waiving as to such matters as genetic testing and a judicial determination. The statute goes further still, providing each party with a period of up to sixty (60) days in which to rescind the document. In return for the expedited resolution of the paternity issue, the parties are expressly warned that if they execute the document and choose not to rescind it, their opportunities to undo the legal determination of paternity at a later time will be severely limited.
Of course, in the context of an acknowledgment of paternity, the child has the benefit of no such advisements, warnings or procedural safeguards. Unlike the situation in Ragin, the child also has no court-appointed attorney or guardian ad litem to protect his rights and interests during the procedure which results in a judgment--or more accurately, in the execution of the document that has the force of a judgment. In most cases it is a practical impossibility for the child to challenge an acknowledgment of paternity before the deadline when the statute severely limits the grounds for opening the judgment it represents. In the present case, the child's window for doing so closed on or about June 25, 2011, when Kareem was barely four months old.
In Ragin, the child was represented by an attorney in a pending paternity proceeding who was able to file on his behalf a timely motion to open the default judgment before the deadline imposed by the applicable statute and Practice Book rule, and before the minor would have been limited to narrow common-law grounds for opening a judgment. General Statutes § 52-212 permits a default judgment to be set aside within four months upon a showing of " reasonable cause" and other stated grounds. After the passage of four months, case law holds that a default judgment may still be opened upon grounds of fraud, duress or mutual mistake. The child's motion in Ragin was filed about two months after judgment, which relieved the child from having to prove the latter, more stringent grounds for opening it. The motion was based in part on a claim of improper service of process on the adjudicated father.
See e.g., Dougherty v. Dougherty, 109 Conn.App. 33, 950 A.2d 592 (2008).
In the present case, the opposite is true. The comparable deadline passed long before the commencement of any legal proceeding in which a court might have appointed an attorney for the child. The interpretation urged by the State would provide less finality to a judgment rendered by a court after a proceeding in which the child is represented by counsel than it would to a judgment created by an extrajudicial agreement solely between the mother and putative father--one that not only does not require judicial ratification but, under the statute, does not even permit judicial ratification.
The narrower view of Ragin --that it merely confers standing on the child with respect to an acknowledgment of paternity--would give the child an inferior kind of standing indeed. At the outset, the child has no role whatsoever, despite his standing, in the process that results in the judgment of paternity. Once the agreement having the force of judgment is in effect, no process to ratify it judicially is permitted by statute. Even if he were able to do so as a practical matter, the child is not granted the same statutory right to rescind the acknowledgment that is granted to the mother and the putative father. Finally, if and when the child somehow obtains the legal representation he needs to move to open the judgment, the rescission period will almost certainly have expired, severely limiting his grounds for the motion.
The limitation of the acknowledged parents' right to open the judgment after the rescission period is part of an overall statutory scheme providing them with multiple notices and procedural safeguards before that limitation takes effect. Such notices and safeguards are wholly unavailable to the child. The court does not believe that Ragin was intended to give such a limited kind of standing to the child--the party most affected--in paternity matters arising from an acknowledgment of paternity.
It is also important to note the action actually taken by the Appellate Court in Ragin . The court not only decided that the child had standing to pursue a motion to open based on the child's interest in the matter, but further ordered that:
. . . the matter is remanded to the family support magistrate for further proceedings with direction also to consider the child's motion to open the default judgment of paternity on the basis of the child's independent right to an accurate determination of paternity in that proceeding . [Emphasis added.]Ragin v. Lee, 78 Conn.App. 864. Clearly, the Appellate Court went beyond a determination that the child had standing to raise the issue of the sufficiency of service on the putative father, an issue whose adjudication would not likely involve the best interest of the child. The court also expressly directed the family support magistrate to consider opening the judgment on the basis of the child's independent interest. Such consideration would have been pointless if the family support magistrate lacked the authority to open the judgment on best interest grounds.
It is clear that a court has the inherent authority to open a judgment for good cause, independent of any statutory basis for doing so.
The authority to open and vacate a judgment is within the inherent power of the trial courts . . . A motion to open and vacate should be granted when the court, acting reasonably, finds good cause to do so.Paddock v. Paddock, 22 Conn.App. 367, 372, 577 A.2d 1087 (1990). See also Yaremich v. Lam, 71 Conn.App. 650, 803 A.2d 369 (2002). The rescission period established by General Statutes § 46b-172(a)(2) limits the grounds for opening judgment that may be asserted belatedly by the parties to an acknowledgment of paternity. It does not limit the court's inherent authority. The principles established under Connecticut case law require the conclusion that, in addition to the grounds enumerated in the statute, a court has the authority to open a judgment of paternity on the independent grounds that to do so is in the best interest of the child.
2. Were the grounds of best interest of the child properly raised in the present case?
Having concluded that the best interest of the child is a potential independent ground to open a judgment of paternity represented by an acknowledgment of paternity, the next question is whether it was proper for the magistrate to apply the grounds of the child's best interest under the circumstances and procedural status of this case.
Murphy's motion to open the acknowledgment of paternity included allegations of fraud, duress and mistake. The motion also included a passing reference to the effect that it was in the child's best interest to allow for the establishment of an appropriate biological father, but Murphy did not allege the minor's best interest as a separate ground for opening the judgment and clearly pursued his motion at the hearing on the statutory grounds of fraud, duress and/or mistake. In any event, it is questionable whether Murphy, as a party seeking a finding that he was not Kareem's father, had standing to assert the child's best interest as grounds for opening the judgment.
As the State argues in its reply brief, Murphy may lack standing to assert the child's rights particularly where his and the child's interests are or may be adverse to each other. Similarly, the attorney appointed for the child for purposes of this appeal argues that public policy considerations should preclude a party who is seeking to end his legal role as the parent from raising the ground of the child's best interest. Although no case law was cited or found in support of these arguments, the court finds merit in them.
If the minor child in the present matter had been represented by a court-appointed attorney, the attorney for the child could have sought to open the judgment of paternity under the principles of Ragin . However, no such attorney had been appointed at that time. In the absence of a motion to open by the child, and presented only with a motion to open filed by an acknowledged father who did not (and perhaps could not) claim the best interest of the child as grounds to open the judgment, the issue becomes whether the magistrate had the authority to raise the issue sua sponte .
The court has found no Connecticut authority that directly addresses this question, nor have the briefs of the parties cited any. However, it is well established that decisions about the custody and parenting of minors are measured by the standard of the best interest of the child. Yontef v. Yontef, 185 Conn. 275, 285, 440 A.2d 899 (1981). The importance of the child's best interest has been specifically acknowledged in matters of paternity:
[T]hese cases are difficult to address, given the many emotional and financial competing interests of the parties. However no issue is more compelling than what is in the best interests of the child . . . Perhaps the most profound legal decision that can be made during the life of a child is the determination (or subsequent termination) of paternity . . . Tamara D. v. Scott N., 15 F.S.M.D., October 29, 2001 Waterbury Superior Court (Colella, F.S.M.).Colonghi v. Arcarese, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. FA-13-4016846-S (January 10, 2014, Quinn, J.T.R.) .
In the present case, the magistrate was presented with a motion to open the judgment of paternity by a party, the acknowledged father, who had standing to pursue the motion. There was a court-appointed guardian ad litem, but at the time of the hearing there was no counsel for the minor child who might have joined in the motion or presented legal arguments in support of it. Under the circumstances, the court cannot conclude that it was error for the magistrate, sua sponte, to consider the best interest of the child in connection with the motion to open judgment. The procedural posture of the case did not preclude the magistrate, as a matter of law, from considering what has been consistently recognized as one of the most important factors in paternity matters.
For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the magistrate, especially in the absence of an attorney for the child with the ability to file a motion to open, had authority to open the judgment of paternity on the basis of the child's best interest sua sponte .
The court declines to hold that the acknowledged father seeking to disavow his paternity could seek to open the judgment of paternity solely on the grounds of the child's best interest after the rescission period had expired.
3. Did the family support magistrate act properly in the present case when he found it to be in the child's best interest to open the judgment of paternity?
Having concluded that it was permissible for the magistrate to consider the best interest of the child as an independent ground to open the judgment represented by the acknowledgment of paternity, the court turns to the issue of whether he properly applied that ground to open the judgment under the circumstances of this case.
It is clear from the record that the magistrate's determination that it was in Kareem's best interest to open the judgment rested on one overriding factor: the child's inherent interest in an accurate determination of paternity, as confirmed by Ragin . In his written decision, the sole basis cited by the magistrate for his conclusion that it was in the best interest of the child to open the judgment was the child's " fundamental and independent right and compelling interest in an accurate determination of paternity."
Other than the genetic evidence proving that Murphy was not the child's biological father, little or no other evidence about the child's best interest was presented at the hearing. There was conflicting testimony about the nature and extent of Murphy's recent relationship with Kareem, and the magistrate made no factual findings about that relationship. There was minimal evidence about the identity of the child's actual biological father, and that evidence tended to cast doubt on whether his identity could ever be determined with accuracy. This was not a case where a known biological father was waiting in the wings to be judicially declared the legal father upon the opening of a prior judgment of paternity.
Murphy and Muhammad gave conflicting testimony about the extent of Murphy's continuing relationship with the child. The magistrate clearly found Muhammad to be the more credible witness on the issue of whether Murphy knew when he signed the acknowledgment of paternity that he was not the biological father. However, there is no indication of which party was found more credible on the issue of the extent of Murphy's relationship with the child.
Likewise, the court-appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) for the child was able to shed little light on the issue of the child's best interest, other than to comment on the evidence presented at the hearing. The GAL stated that his own review of the matter had been hindered by the inclement winter weather which had prevented him from meeting with the child (a meeting which he felt would have been of little value anyway due to Kareem's young age). He further limited his review because of his belief, based on prior discussions with the parties, that they intended to proceed on an agreement that the acknowledgment should be opened. Whether or not the agreement was sufficient reason to limit the GAL's inquiry into the best interests of Kareem, the agreement did not materialize at the time of the hearing. Yet the scope of the GAL's review remained limited.
While the right to an accurate determination of paternity is the foundation for the child's standing in a paternity matter, it is not the only factor for a court to consider in determining whether it is in the child's best interest to open a judgment of paternity.
There are a number of factors to consider in analyzing the best interests of minor children in the context of a motion to open a paternity determination. Such factors may include:
" (1) the genetic information available . . . (2) the past relationship of the [child to the legally established] father . . . (3) the child's future interests in knowing her parental biology . . . (4) the child's [potential] emotional and financial support from her biological father . . . (5) any potential harm that the child may . . . suffer by disturbing the paternity judgment, including loss of parental relationship and loss of financial support." Weaver v. Solone, 20 S.M.D. 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 63, 2006 Ct.Sup. 16477, Judicial District of Waterbury, (Wihbey, F.S.M., Sept. 7, 2006).Colonghi v. Arcarese, supra .
The minor's right to an accurate determination of paternity confers standing on the child, but it is only the beginning of the inquiry about the minor's best interest, not the beginning and the end. In evaluating whether it is in a child's best interest to open a judgment of paternity, a court must base its decision on all relevant factors, including those enumerated in Colonghi to the extent applicable.
Of course, it was proper for the magistrate to consider the results of the genetic testing which ruled out Murphy as the biological father. But the record does not indicate that the magistrate considered other factors that might be pertinent to the issue of determining the best interest of the child. Moreover, it does not appear that adequate evidence was presented to the magistrate to allow for the appropriate consideration of such factors. The evidence at the hearing on the motion focused largely on Murphy's fraud claim. It is clear that Muhammad came to the hearing unprepared to address at least one issue relating to the best interest of the child, i.e. the nature and extent of the relationship between the child and Murphy, indicating that she would have brought other witnesses and evidence had she known their importance. The magistrate himself expressed concern about the level of information presented to him and upon which he had to base his decision. As noted, the child was not represented by a court-appointed attorney, although an attorney has since been appointed for Kareem for purposes of this appeal.
Tr. 63, February 24, 2015.
" THE COURT:. . . And I'm uneasy and--maybe in some of the investigation that was done here." Tr. 65, February 24, 2015.
Thus, the participants at the hearing included Murphy, who prosecuted his motion primarily on the basis of his fraud claim; Muhammad, who was understandably unprepared to present all of the evidence at her disposal about the nature of the child's relationship with Murphy, which might have impacted the court's evaluation of the child's best interest; and a guardian ad litem whose inquiry into the matter was, by his own admission, quite limited. Under all the circumstances, the court concludes that sufficient evidence was not presented to the magistrate at the hearing regarding the various factors affecting the best interest of the child. See Mensah v. Mensah, 145 Conn.App. 644, 75 A.3d 92 (2013). As a result, the magistrate based his decision on the only factor which was the subject of sufficient evidence, namely the genetic test results which excluded Murphy as the biological father. It may well be that evidence about other pertinent factors would have caused the magistrate to reach the same conclusion, but he should have had the benefit of such evidence before deciding that it was in the best interest of the minor child to open the judgment.
For the foregoing reasons, as to the final question raised by this appeal the court concludes that it was an error of law for the magistrate to open the judgment of paternity based solely on the results of genetic testing, without sufficient evidence as to other factors affecting the best interests of the child.
The two captioned cases are remanded to the family support magistrate for the purpose of further proceedings in accordance with this decision, including further hearing on the motion to open the judgment of paternity for the purpose of considering the best interest of the child. The attorney for the minor child appointed for purposes of this appeal shall be afforded the opportunity to participate fully in such further hearing.
SO ORDERED.