Opinion
No. 12 Civ. 8525 (CM)
11-04-2014
ABDEL-SHAHEED FARRAD MUHAMMAD (aka PAUL SIMMONS), Plaintiff, v. BUREAU CHIEF J. JENKINS, Bronx IV Division of Parole (DOCCS) for the State of New York; CHAIRWOMAN ANDREA EVANS, Division of Parole (DOCCS) for the State of New York, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
:
Plaintiff Abdel-Shaheed Farrad Muhammad ("Muhammad," aka Paul Simmons) proceeding pro se brings this civil rights action against Jarvis Jenkins, Bureau Chief of the Bronx IV Area Parole Office ("Jenkins"). Following the Court's previous Decision and Order (Docket #49), three causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remain: (1) First Amendment retaliation; (2) violation of Muhammad's free exercise and expressive association rights; and (3) religious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Currently before the Court is Docket #44, Muhammad's motion for a preliminary injunction. For the reasons stated below, not only is the motion DENIED, but Muhammad's prayer for injunctive relief is stricken.
Additionally, what is left of this case - a claim for damages against defendant Jenkins - is set for trial on December 15, 2014.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
The allegations in the complaint were discussed extensively in the Court's September 13, 2013 Decision and Order, in which I granted the motion of Chairwoman Andrea Evans to dismiss all claims against her and denied the motion of Bureau Chief J. Jenkins for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. In support of that motion, Jenkins offered very little. He has fleshed out the record considerably in his opposition to Muhammad's motion for a preliminary injunction.
Muhammad is currently serving a five-year term of post-release supervision following a November 29, 2010 conviction in the Supreme Court, Bronx County, for Burglary in the Second Degree. (See Jenkins First Decl., Ex. A.) Muhammad's post-release supervision began on January 10, 2011, the day he was released from prison. (See id.) By signing his Certificate of Release to Parole Supervision, Muhammad agreed to abide by the terms and conditions of his release, including a curfew, and any other special conditions imposed in writing by his parole officer. (See id.)
Muhammad was assigned to the Bronx IV Area Parole Office between July 21, 2011 and May 17, 2012, and again between August 9, 2012, and May 6, 2013. During that time Jenkins acted as his parole officer. (See Jenkins Second Decl. ¶ 3.) During the gap between May 17 and August 9, 2012, Muhammad was incarcerated at Rikers Island for violating the conditions of his supervised release. His release was ultimately revoked and restored. (See id. ¶ 3 n.1; Joseph Decl., Ex. A at 14.) On May 6, 2013, Muhammad was reassigned to the Manhattan IV Area Parole Office, where Yolanda Washington was his parole officer. (See Jenkins Second Decl. ¶ 3; Washington Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3.)
On March 22, 2011, before the events giving rise to this action occurred, Muhammad filed a separate civil rights action. See Muhammad v. Evans, No. 11-cv-2113 (S.D.N.Y.) (the "Related Action"). The operative complaint in the Related Action claimed that (1) Muhammad was released thirty days after his conditional release date; (2) his request to reside with a Muslim Imam upon conditional release was wrongly denied; (3) certain parole conditions relating to Muhammad's relationships, marriage, and cohabitation violated his constitutional rights; and (4) that he was assaulted by prison guards. The Related Action named as defendants various officials of the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"). On August 15, 2014, the Court dismissed the Related Action. See Mem. Decision and Order, Muhammad v. Evans, No. 11-cv-2113, Docket #118 (S.D.N.Y.).
The parole condition at issue in this lawsuit is Muhammad's curfew. Initially, Muhammad's curfew ran between 8:30 PM and 7:30 AM, seven days a week. (See Jenkins First Decl., Ex. B.) That curfew was later changed to run between 9:00 PM and 7:00 AM, seven days a week. (See id., Ex. C; Joseph Decl., Ex. A at 43.)
On December 16, 2011, Muhammad was arrested for and charged with several drug offenses. (See Jenkins First Decl., Exs. D, E.) Thereafter, his curfew was expanded to run between 8:00 PM and 7:00 AM, seven days a week. (See id., Ex. F.) Although Muhammad insists otherwise, the Court found in its earlier Decision and Order that Muhammad's curfew has not changed since then. (Decision and Order at 2-3.)
According to the complaint, Muhammad is a follower of the Nation of Islam (the "Nation"). The Nation has at least two mosques in New York City. Muhammad prefers to worship at Muhammad's Mosque No. 7 ("Mosque No. 7"), located in Manhattan, where he lives. (Pl. Dep. Tr. at 201-02.)
At some point in 2012, the Nation allegedly issued a "New Order of Registration", which required all of the Nation's registered believers, including Muhammad, to reregister through the "Form 4 Process." (Compl. § III.C.) To complete the process, Muhammad was required to attend "FY Orientation" classes every Monday night at Mosque No. 7, between 7:00 PM and 10:00 PM. The classes ran later than Muhammad's curfew. (Pl. Dep. Tr. at 157-158.) These classes were allegedly not available at any other time, and had to be completed "all at once," over 60-90 days, without interruption. (Id. at 157-59.)
Muhammad claims that individuals who do not complete the Form 4 Process cannot be accepted by the Nation as registered believers. The complaint alleges that non-acceptance will deprive Muhammad of certain "religious entitlements," (Compl. § III.C), which Muhammad described in a subsequent filing as (1) "forfeiture" of his "Office or Position"; (2) "forfeiture[]" of "The right to participate in or attend the functions of the Mosque"; and (3) "Suspension, or expulsion from registered membership in the Mosque." (Pl. Affirmation at 2-3, Docket #44.)
At his deposition, Muhammad testified that he was an "advanced member" of the Nation, and that he was required to take classes from 7:00 PM to 10:00 PM on Wednesday and Friday nights in addition to the aforementioned classes on Monday nights. (Pl. Dep. Tr. at 161.) Muhammad also testified that he could not "volunteer for the prison ministry" unless he took a Thursday evening class. (Id. 201.) In other words, Muhammad wanted to be out in violation of his curfew four nights every week.
DOCCS records indicate that, as early as December, 2011, Muhammad asked that his curfew be reduced so that he could attend classes at Mosque No. 7. (Joseph Decl., Ex. A at 29.) The complaint alleges that, on March 13, 2012, Muhammad presented Jenkins with letters signed by two Nation officials. (Compl. § III.C.) The letters asked that Jenkins reduce Muhammad's curfew so that he could attend the FY Orientation classes. (Id.) Muhammad claims he received no response to the letters. (Pl. Dep. Tr. 182-83.)
On April 12, 2012, Muhammad claims that Jenkins met with Muhammad and his wife. (Compl. § III.C.) According to Muhammad, Jenkins "made it clear" that the Related Action (which was still pending at that time) "was a problem" and that he was "going to retaliate in his own way" as "a tit-for-tat for [Muhammad's] lawsuit." (Compl. § III.C.) Jenkins allegedly retaliated in two ways.
First, Jenkins allegedly moved the beginning of Muhammad's curfew back from 9:00 PM to 8:00 PM. As noted above, the evidence in the record indicates that Muhammad's curfew began to start at 8:00 PM shortly after his December 2011 arrest on drug charges - four months before Muhammad and his wife allegedly met with Jenkins. (See Jenkins First Decl., Ex. F; Decision and Order at 2-3.)
Second, Jenkins allegedly told Muhammad he could not worship at Mosque No. 7 or interact with other Nation members who attended that Mosque. (Compl. § III.C.) Muhammad has described the precise language Jenkins used in several different ways:
1. "I don't give a damn about your religious rights. Find yourself another Mosque and some other Muslims and if you make a complaint it will come to me and I will still deny it." (Compl. § III.C.)
2. "Find another Mosque and worship somewhere else. And I don't care who you complain to because the report will come to me and I will still ban you from attending your Mosque." (Id.)
3. "You cannot attend any Mosque if we are dealing with Muhammad Mosque No. 7, and you must find another group of Muslims, because you won't go there." (Pl. Dep. Tr. at 183; see id. at 146.)The substance of each statement was that Muhammad was being cut off from Mosque No. 7 and his fellow congregants.
Ultimately, Muhammad asserts, he lost his status as a believer in the Nation because he was unable to attend the classes. (Compl. § III.C.) Muhammad contends that he attempted suicide, relapsed into substance abuses, and became "mentally, emotionally and spiritually damaged" as a result of his loss of believer status. (Id.)
II. Procedural Background
Muhammad filed the instant complaint on November 19, 2012, (Compl. at 1), naming as defendants Jenkins and Chairwoman Andrea Evans ("Evans"), who was Chairwoman of the Division of Parole. (Id. § I.B.) Muhammad asserted claims for First Amendment retaliation, religious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and interference with his free exercise of religion and expressive association rights under the First Amendment. He also asserted correlate claims under the New York State Constitution. (Id. § II.B.)
The complaint seeks damages of $1.4 million from the defendants. Muhammad also asked for an injunction "order[ing] Parole to issue a public apology to the Nation of Islam for the discriminatory practices of ASO Jenkins," and also ordering that "Parole be barred from denying [Muhammad's] access and attendance at . . . Mosque No. #7 in Harlem or any other Nation of Islam Mosques, services, events or observances/classes in the US." Muhammad also asked that the injunction "prohibit[] ASO Jenkins or any member of Parole from retaliating." (Id. § V.)
As noted above, defendants moved to dismiss most of Muhammad's claims and Jenkins moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. (Docket #17.) In his response, Muhammad reiterated his request for a preliminary injunction. (Docket #44.)
In its Decision and Order of September 13, 2013, the Court granted Evans' motion to dismiss and granted Jenkins motion for dismissal or summary judgment in part. The Court held that Muhammad's state law claims were barred under New York Correction Law § 24, because he either lacked standing to bring them or because they had to be brought in the New York Court of Claims. (Decision and Order at 10-11.) The Court further held that Muhammad's claims for damages against both Jenkins and Evans in their official capacities were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Id. at 11.) Muhammad's claims against Evans were dismissed because Muhammad failed to allege that Evans was personally involved in any violation of his constitutional rights. (Id. at 12-13.)
The Court denied Jenkins' motion for summary judgment. It noted that there was a disputed issue of material fact about the circumstances under which Jenkins had denied Muhammad's request for a curfew reduction. Accepting as true the facts in Muhammad's complaint (as required on a motion for dismissal on the ground of qualified immunity, see Stephenson v. Doe, 332 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2003)), the Court held that Muhammad had stated plausible claims for each of the alleged constitutional violations. (Decision and Order at 17-19.)
Finally, the Court held Muhammad's motion for a preliminary injunction in abeyance. A movant bears a heavy to burden to obtain a preliminary injunction, particularly if the injunction would alter the status quo. (Id. at 19-20.) Although the Court expressed the view that Muhammad might not carry his burden, it noted that Jenkins had failed to controvert any of Muhammad's allegations and, indeed, had responded to the motion in cursory fashion. (Id. at 21-22.) Jenkins was ordered to submit a proper response to the motion. (Id. at 22).
That was the absolutely correct strategy on a motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. It was not the correct strategy for opposing a motion for a preliminary injunction.
Jenkins submitted that response. (See Docket #58.) Muhammad's motion is ripe for decision.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
"A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 2013). Where a movant seeks a preliminary injunction that would alter the status quo, the likelihood of success standard is heightened. In that case, the movant must show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Id. Here, the heightened standard applies. The injunction Muhammad seeks would alter the status quo by forcing DOCCS to change the conditions of his supervised release.
II. Muhammad Has Not Satisfied the Requirements for a Preliminary Injunction
A. Muhammad Has Not Shown a Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits
To make out a prima facie First Amendment retaliation claim, the plaintiff must allege the following: "(1) that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action." Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Muhammad alleges that Jenkins retaliated against him for filing a civil rights lawsuit (the Related Action). Such a filing is protected speech. See Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2009). The Second Circuit has "defined 'adverse action' objectively, as retaliatory conduct that would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising constitutional rights." Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d at 381 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). "[T]his objective test applies even where a particular plaintiff was not himself subjectively deterred." Id.
For a prisoner, "To assess a free exercise claim, a court must determine (1) whether the practice asserted is religious in the person's scheme of beliefs, and whether the belief is sincerely held; (2) whether the challenged practice of prison officials infringes upon the religious belief; and (3) whether the challenged practice of the prison officials furthers some legitimate penological objective." Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 591 n.9 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir. 1988)). The same considerations apply in the parole context. See Bostic v. Jackson, No. 04-cv-676, 2008 WL 1882696, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2008) (citing Baker v. Welch, No. 03-cv-2267, 2003 WL 22901051, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2003)). The freedom of "'expressive association' . . . protects the right of individuals to associate for purposes of engaging in activities protected by the First Amendment, such as . . . the exercise of religion." Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 996 (2d Cir. 1997).
Finally, "In order for [a plaintiff] to state an equal protection claim, [he] must allege that [he was] intentionally discriminated against on the basis of [his] religion." People United for Children, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 F. Supp. 2d 275, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Muhammad has not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits for a simple reason: Jenkins denies that nearly all of the events alleged in the complaint ever took place. Of course, Jenkins' statements are not presumed to be true simply because Jenkins is a law enforcement officer. But Muhammad's statements are not presumed to be true either on a motion for a preliminary injunction. (Decision and Order at 21.)
Jenkins claims that he never received the March 13, 2012 letters in which Nation officials requested a reduction of Muhammad's curfew. (Jenkins Second Decl. ¶ 6.) Jenkins similarly claims he never met with Jenkins or his wife on April 12, 2012, the date on which the complained-of statements were allegedly made. (Id.) The "chrono record" - a log in which parole officers track each interaction with parolees - contains no record of any meeting on that date. (Joseph Decl., Ex. A at 20-21.)
Jenkins concedes that Muhammad could not go to Mosque (or almost anywhere else) during curfew hours. But Jenkins denies that he otherwise forbade Muhammad from attending his preferred religious activities or from associating with adherents of his religion. (Jenkins Second Decl. ¶ 5.) He also denies ever telling Muhammad that he should find another Mosque or another group of Muslims with whom to worship. (Id.) Jenkins states that he never retaliated against Muhammad for filing the Related Action, marrying, cohabiting, Muhammad's religion, or anything else. (Id.)
If the trier of fact believed Jenkins rather than Muhammad, Jenkins would be entitled to judgment in his favor - not because he is qualifiedly immune from suit, but because he did nothing wrong.
In his second declaration, Jenkins admits that he denied Muhammad's request for a curfew modification. (Id. ¶ 7.) But Jenkins claims that he lawfully denied the request because Muhammad had tested positive for drugs and had been recently arrested. (Id.) The chrono record is consistent with Jenkins' explanation. An entry for December 29, 2011, states that Muhammad's "Request for curfew extension was denied due to the fact that [he] has been arrested and tested positive for drugs." (Joseph Decl., Ex. A at 29.) Another entry for the same date notes that Muhammad was "concerned that [DOCCS was] preventing him from practicing his religion." (Id.) Jenkins explained, however, that Muhammad "can go to the Mosque during his non curfew hours." (Id.)
Other entries in the chrono record also cast doubt on Muhammad's claim that religious hostility motivated Jenkins' acts. On August 16, 2012, the chrono record shows that Muhammad was granted permission to attend Ramadan services before his curfew was lifted in the morning. (Id. at 11.) Later entries from November 16, 2012 indicate that Muhammad was admonished for missing counseling appointments to attend Mosque, but that he was free to schedule his religious observance around those meetings. (Id. at 3-4.)
If Jenkins' statements are true, then Muhammad is unlikely to succeed on any of his claims. To succeed a First Amendment retaliation claim, Muhammad would need to show that Jenkins' actions "were motivated or substantially caused by [Muhammad's]" "protected" conduct. Dorsett v. Cnty. of Nassau, 732 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2013). Muhammad's only allegations suggesting a retaliatory motive concern Jenkins' statements at the April 12, 2012 meeting. But Jenkins denies that this meeting ever took place. Jenkins' declaration, buttressed as it is by the lack of any mention in the chrono record that there was any such meeting, provides a plausible alternative explanation for Jenkins' decision to deny a curfew reduction: that Muhammad had violated a number of conditions of his supervised release and needed to be confined to quarters for a longer period. The fact that the curfew was changed within weeks of his arrest on new drug charges is additional evidence that Jenkins did not act in retaliation.
To succeed on his equal protection claim, Muhammad would need to show that Jenkins intentionally discriminated against him. But the only alleged statements that raise any inference of intentional discrimination occurred at the same April 12, 2012 meeting - the one that Jenkins insists never happened. Indeed, entries in the chrono record stating that Muhammad could attend Mosque if he scheduled it around his parole appointments rebut any inference of discrimination. And Jenkins himself denies any discriminatory motive.
Finally, Muhammad has not shown that he is substantially likely to succeed on his free exercise claim, because it is at least reasonably likely that his curfew "furthers some legitimate penological objective." Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir. 1988). Preventing Muhammad from breaking the law and monitoring his behavior during a period of readjustment between incarceration and full freedom are clearly legitimate penological objectives. The Court's previous Decision and Order noted that Muhammad had a "checkered history as a parolee," replete with violations of parole conditions. (Decision and Order at 20-21 (citing examples).) The state argues that it cannot monitor Muhammad's activities when he is not on curfew - that is why it extended the length of Muhammad's curfew after he engaged in questionable behavior. If DOCCS allowed Muhammad to stay out after curfew in order to attend classes - in effect, shortened his curfew - his parole officer would have no way to make sure that Muhammad was actually attending services or classes at the Mosque, rather than using his extended free time to pursue other, possibly illegal, pursuits. Jenkins' fears in this regard are not misplaced: Muhammad was, after all, arrested for possessing drugs while on parole, and he admitted at his deposition that he was in fact selling drugs. (Pl. Dep. Tr. at 103.)
For all these reasons, Muhammad has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. That alone compels denial of his motion.
But there is more.
B. The Public Interest Would Be Disserved by Issuing an Injunction
In general, states impose conditions of release "to insure that the state-created parole system serves the public-interest purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence." Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979). New York has a particular interest in monitoring individuals on supervised release because parolees are particularly likely to commit criminal offenses; supervision helps reduce recidivism and promotes reintegration. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 853 (2006); United States v. Massey, 461 F.3d 177, 179 (2d Cir. 2006).
Muhammad admitted that he dealt drugs during his supervised release. The chrono record reveals that he also used drugs, (Joseph Decl., Ex. A at 20; Decision and Order at 20), and that he may have committed other crimes, notably criminal trespass or larceny. (Joseph Decl., Ex. A at 5, 18). Furthermore, Muhammad lied to his parole officers to the degree that Jenkins felt he simply could not trust anything Muhammad said. (Jenkins Second Decl. ¶ 4; see, e.g., Joseph Decl., Ex. A at 35, 37; id., Ex. B at 22.)
The public has an interest in preventing Muhammad's illegal activities. Given Muhammad's track record, Jenkins could not be confident that Muhammad would refrain from committing more crimes if he were given the opportunity to do so. Because Muhammad had lied before, it was reasonable for Jenkins to suspect that Muhammad might lie about going to Mosque during a reduced curfew. A curfew - though an imperfect mechanism - would serve the public's interest in preventing more illegal activity, simply by ensuring that Muhammad was at home, where someone could monitor him.
C. Muhammad Has Not Shown a Substantial Risk of Irreparable Harm
"Alleged violations of constitutional rights are commonly considered irreparable injuries for the purposes of a preliminary injunction. Furthermore, an ongoing constitutional violation more closely resembles irreparable injury than does a constitutional violation that was suffered in the past and which can be remedied only by money damages." Hardy v. Fischer, 701 F. Supp. 2d 614, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
Jenkins contends that Muhammad's injuries are speculative and conjectural, rather than actual and imminent because Jenkins no longer supervises Muhammad's parole. (See Jenkins Second Decl. ¶ 1; Washington Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3.) That task now falls to Yolanda Washington. (See Washington Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3.) For her part, Washington claims that that Muhammad "has always been free to go to any place of worship, including his Mosque" and "to associate with anyone from his Mosque" while she has acted as his parole officer. (Id. ¶ 4.) The only exception is that Muhammad must seek approval for activities that conflict with his curfew, to which requests Washington states she would be "receptive." (Id.)
Jenkins' argument is persuasive. Muhammad seeks to enjoin DOCCS parole officers from retaliating against him. But the only acts of retaliation alleged in the complaint concern Jenkins, not Washington. Muhammad also seeks to enjoin DOCCS from prohibiting him from attending Mosque No. 7 and interacting with the other members of the Nation. But only Jenkins, not Washington, allegedly ordered such a sweeping prohibition. Muhammad himself admits Washington is "Not yet" part of the lawsuit. (Pl. Dep. Tr. at 140.)
There is, however, one alleged constitutional violation that is potentially ongoing: Washington continues to enforce Muhammad's 8:00 PM curfew, (Washington Decl. ¶ 4), and Muhammad's complaint could be read to claim that the curfew itself, or at least the failure to reduce the curfew, interferes with his free exercise rights (a difficult argument for him to make, since no allegation in the complaint suggests that Washington (who is not mentioned) would not be receptive to an occasional modification of his curfew).
But if Muhammad wants to enjoin Washington from enforcing his curfew, that raises a very different problem. In general, a court can only enjoin persons over whom it has jurisdiction - in other words, the parties. Visual Sciences, Inc. v. Integrated Commc'ns Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1981). Under FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2), the Court also has authority to enjoin the "parties' officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys" and "other persons who are in active concert or participation" with them.
Washington is not named as a defendant. Nor is DOCCS or the State of New York. Neither Washington nor DOCCS falls into one of the other categories against which the court could issue an injunction under FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2). Jenkins is an agent of DOCCS. Washington is another DOCCS agent. As the Second Circuit has explained "the servant does not control the principal. If the court does not have jurisdiction over the principal, it is not easy to see why the court should have the power to bind her through an order directed against her servant." Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Reinert & Duree, P.C., 191 F.3d 297, 304 (2d Cir. 1999). In analogous circumstances, where prisoners have sought injunctive relief against prison officials, but are subsequently transferred to different non-party officials, courts have held that they lacked power to enjoin the new officials or the state as a whole. See Porter v. Goord, No. 04-cv-506F, 2009 WL 1449024, at *1-2 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2009); Sumpter v. Skiff, No. 05-cv-0868, 2006 WL 3453416, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006) aff'd, 260 F. App'x 350 (2d Cir. 2008).
For the reasons explained above, Muhammad is not entitled to a preliminary injunction against Jenkins.
D. Because Jenkins No Longer Supervises Him, Muhammad's Prayer for Injunctive Relief Is Stricken
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Court has no basis to enter an injunction against anyone - that goes for permanent as well as preliminary relief. Issuing an injunction against Jenkins, the only party defendant, would be pointless, since he is no longer Muhammad's parole officer. Furthermore, it is far too late to amend the complaint in this overly-old action to add any new parties. Therefore, the prayer for injunctive relief is STRICKEN. This case will proceed to trial on Muhammad's constitutional claims against Jenkins and the jury will decide whether Muhammad is entitled to any damages from his former parole officer.
Discovery is long since over. (Docket #48.) This case has been on my docket for far too long. The only way to end the matter is to bring it to trial. Accordingly, the parties are directed to report for jury selection and trial on Monday, December 15 at 9:30 AM. Each side must submit to the court a list of witnesses, a list of exhibits and a copy of each proposed exhibit, and a short, plain statement of the issues to be tried; this is due on November 26, 2014. Proposed voir dire questions and requests to charge (if any) are due December 10, 2014.
I am not prepared to extend the trial date; any party who fails to appear will have judgment taken against him.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Muhammad's deferred motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. Dated: November 4, 2014
/s/_________
U.S.D.J. BY ECF TO ALL COUNSEL; BY FIRST CLASS MAIL TO PLAINTIFF AT:
4 East 107th Street, Apt. # 5H
New York, NY 10029