Opinion
C. A. 4:23-5961-JD-KDW
04-23-2024
Rasheed Abdullah Muhammad, a.k.a. James Lee Johnson, Plaintiff, v. Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kaymani D. West United States Magistrate Judge
Rasheed Abdullah Muhammad (“Plaintiff”), an inmate incarcerated in the J. Reuben Long Detention Center, filed this action alleging a violation of his civil rights by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the Second Amended Complaint in this case.
I. Factual Background
On January 8, 2024, the court issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his Amended Complaint was subject to summary dismissal because he failed to allege sufficient factual allegations to state a claim. ECF No. 17. The order further advised Plaintiff he had until January 22, 2024, to file an amended complaint or otherwise cure the identified deficiencies in his pleadings. Id. Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on January 18, 2024. ECF No. 21.
Plaintiff brings this action for money damages against unnamed ATF agents pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff alleges on June 2, 2023, five or six unmarked SUVs pulled up to his job. ECF No. 21 at 5. Plaintiff claims one agent exited the vehicle and said he had a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest. Id. Plaintiff states the agent did not present him with a warrant, and despite repeatedly asking why he was being arrested, the agent never explained that to him. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff claims the agent cuffed him without reading him his Miranda rights. Id. at 6. Plaintiff says he was “dumbfounded and was never aware of such indictment.” Id.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed this Second Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Allison v. Kyle, 66 F.3d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1995).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Merriweather v. Reynolds, 586 F.Supp.2d 548, 554 (D.S.C. 2008). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff alleges his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was arrested by ATF agents who failed to provide him with a copy of his arrest warrant or read him his Miranda rights at the time of his arrest. ECF No. 21 at 5-6. Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient factual allegations to state a claim that his constitutional rights were violated. An arrest will not be characterized as unlawful simply because the arrestee was not shown an arrest warrant upon arrest. See Bickley v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, No. 7:99-CV-00347, 2000 WL 637345, at *6 (W.D. Va. Jan. 19, 2000) (citing United States v. Turcotte, 558 F.2d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 1977)); Lewis v. Nelson, 113 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 1997); see also, Smith v. Mercer, Civil Action No. 1:07-CV-1149-RWS, 2008 WL 1815591, at *3 (N.D.Ga. April 21, 2008) (explaining federal law does not require a defendant to be served with a copy of the arrest warrant at the time of the arrest). Although the Sixth Amendment provides that an arrestee must be informed of any charges brought against him, this right does not attach until the government has instituted a formal prosecution. See Kladis v. Brezek, 823 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 1987); see also, Bradley v. Extradition Corp. of America, 758 F.Supp. 1153, 1156 (W.D. La.1991) (holding an arrestee need not be told of the reason for the arrest until the prosecuting body institutes prosecution and must then inform defendant of charges). Addressing the agent's alleged failure to administer Plaintiff his Miranda rights, the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit any arrest or interrogation done without a Miranda warning. The Fifth Amendment prohibits only the use of information obtained as a result of custodial interrogation as evidence in a subsequent criminal trial. See Bowden v. Plyler, No. 3:10CV12-1-MU, 2010 WL 339027, at *1 (W.D. N.C. Jan. 22, 2010) (explaining that the failure to give Miranda warnings, which are a procedural safeguard rather than a right explicitly stated in the Fifth Amendment, does not create liability under § 1983); Neighbour v. Covert, 68 F.3d 1508, 1510 (2d Cir.1995) (“The remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion from evidence of any ensuing self-incriminating statements. The remedy is not a § 1983 action.).
To the extent Plaintiff is pursuing a claim against the ATF, this claim should also be summarily dismissed. Under the principle of sovereign immunity, individuals may not sue the United States or its agencies without their consent, see United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983), and “the United States has not waived sovereign immunity in suits claiming constitutional torts.” Reinbold v. Evers, 187 F.3d 348, 355 n.7 (4th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, as an agency of the United States, the ATF is entitled to sovereign immunity from Plaintiff's constitutional claims. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (declining to extend Bivens to permit suit against a federal agency); Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir.1996) (“Bivens did not abolish the doctrine of sovereign immunity of the United States.”). The undersigned recommends Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint be summarily dismissed.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
By order issued on January 8, 2024, the undersigned provided Plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his Amended Complaint. The undersigned warned Plaintiff if he failed to timely file a second amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed without leave for further amendment. As discussed herein, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint fails to correct the deficiencies, and like the Amended Complaint, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The undersigned recommends the court dismiss the Second Amended Complaint without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).