Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-00242-C
2020-11-23
Amon Rweyemamu MTAZA, Petitioner, v. William BARR, et al., Respondents.
Amon Rweyemamu Mtaza, Anson, TX, pro se.
Amon Rweyemamu Mtaza, Anson, TX, pro se.
ORDER
SAM R. CUMMINGS, Senior United States District Judge
Petitioner Amon Rweyemamu Mtaza, an immigrant detainee in the Bluebonnet Detention Center (BBDC) proceeding pro se, filed an "Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Temporary Release in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic[ ]Pursuant to Fraihat v. ICE." The Motion was docketed and opened as a new Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner paid the $5.00 filing fee.
Petitioner asserts that the conditions of his confinement at BBDC are unconstitutionally dangerous because of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. He alleges that his detention is unlawful because the Respondents cannot protect him from exposure to COVID-19 in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. He asserts that is "not challeng[ing h]is underlying immigration or removal proceedings." (Doc. 2 at 6). He also "do[es] not seek corrective relief for the specific conditions of [h]is confinement." (Id. ). Instead, Petitioner requests that the Court direct ICE to release him to home confinement with an ankle monitor.
Respondent has not filed an Answer; however, as explained below, the Court finds that the emergency motion for temporary restraining order (TRO) must be DENIED and the petition should be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
A district court may summarily dismiss a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if it appears from the face of the petition that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Wottlin v. Fleming , 136 F.3d 1032, 1034 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary dismissal of Section 2241 petition); see also Rules 4 and 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
I. PETITIONER'S ALLEGATIONS
According to Petitioner, he is 45 years old and suffers from underlying health conditions including "kidney stones, Prediabetes, Glaucoma [LIPIDS], knees, Back pain, Peeing complications, Fatty liver, High Cholesterol [HYPERLIPIDEMIA ], and chronic hemorrhoid [all sic]." (Doc. 2 at 1). He is a noncitizen who was detained by ICE upon completion of an 87-month federal prison sentence for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft. (Doc. 2 at 25). He explains that he is appealing both the removal order and his criminal convictions. But for purposes of this motion, he does not contest the legal authority for his detention. Instead, he argues that the risk of exposure to COVID-19 in the detention center outweighs any legitimate governmental objective in his continued detention.
Petitioner asserts that he is medically vulnerable because of his preexisting health conditions which place him at a higher risk of complications from COVID-19. As a result, Petitioner argues that he must be released as a preventative measure to ensure his safety. He also claims that Respondents have not provided adequate medical care for his existing health conditions. He alleges that Respondents have refused to provide him with a specialized diet, laser eye surgery, or adequate treatment for his kidney stones and fatty liver. (Doc. 2 at 21). But, again, he does not seek any corrective action for these alleged deficiencies—he seeks only release.
Petitioner acknowledges that the BBDC has implemented additional measure to protect detainees and staff from infection. He states that staff have been educated about COVID-19 and that the facility has hand sanitizer, disinfection spray, soap, hot water, and gloves in every housing unit. But he asserts that despite these measures, he has struggled to comply with the recommended social distancing measures and personal hygiene because of the environment at BBDC, where he shares toilets, sinks, and showers, eats in communal spaces, and is in close contact with the many other detainees and officers around him. (Doc. 2 at 18). He alleges that the conditions at BBDC must be unsanitary because there are eight or nine dorms in quarantine. He states that he has not received information about the current rate of illness at the BBDC, but that "it does not look good at all." (Id. at 19).
See https://www.ice.gov/coronavirus (last visited Nov. 18, 2020) (reporting 5 active cases under monitoring or isolation among detainees at the BBDC).
Put simply, Petitioner argues that the government cannot guarantee his safety (Id. at 25) and he is entitled to immediate release because "it is not fair for [him] to live in suspense, fear or wondering[ ] what will happen if he contracts the Virus." (Id. at 24)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Temporary Restraining Order
A party seeking a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order must establish the four prerequisites for a restraining order, including (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his case; (2) a substantial threat that the failure to grant an injunctive order will result in irreparable injury; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunctive order might cause the defendant; and (4) that the order will not be adverse to the public interest. Women's Med. Ctr. v. Bell , 248 F.3d 411, 418-20 (5th Cir. 2001) ; Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc. , 600 F.2d 1184, 1187 (5th Cir. 1979). A failure to prove any of the four elements will result in the denial of injunctive relief. Enterprise Int'l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana , 762 F.2d 464, 472 (5th Cir. 1985). A federal court may issue a temporary restraining order without notice to the adverse party only if "specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A).
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction, so they must "affirmatively ascertain subject-matter jurisdiction before adjudicating a suit." Nianga v. Wolfe , 435 F. Supp. 3d 739, 743 (N.D. Tex. 2020). "A party seeking a TRO cannot establish a ‘substantial likelihood of success on the merits’ of his claim if the court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim altogether." Id.
B. Habeas Corpus
A petitioner may seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). Habeas only exists to "grant relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody and it cannot be used properly for any other purpose." Pierre v. United States , 525 F.2d 933, 935–36 (5th Cir. 1976). "Simply stated, habeas is not available to review questions unrelated to the cause of detention." Id. at 935. "The Fifth Circuit follows a bright-line rule: ‘If a favorable determination ... would not automatically entitle [the detainee] to accelerated release, ... the proper vehicle is a [civil rights] suit.’ " Sacal-Micha v. Longoria , 449 F.Supp.3d 656, 662 (S.D.Tex. 2020) (quoting Carson v. Johnson , 112 F.3d 818, 820–21 (5th Cir. 1997) ).
If a petitioner's allegations do not entitle him to accelerated release, they are not cognizable in a habeas action. Schipke v. Van Buren , 239 F. App'x 85, 86 (5th Cir. 2007). And even if a petitioner proves that his conditions of confinement amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, he is not entitled to release from an otherwise lawful imprisonment or detention. Cook v. Hanberry , 592 F.2d 248, 249 (5th Cir. 1979). Even unconstitutional conditions that create a risk of serious physical injury, illness, or death do not warrant release. Spencer v. Bragg , 310 F. App'x 678, 679 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Carson , 112 F.3d at 820–21 ). The proper relief from unconstitutional conditions of confinement would be to enjoin the unlawful practices that make the conditions intolerable. See Cook , 592 F.2d at 249.
A demand for release does not convert a conditions-of-confinement claim into a proper habeas request. See Springer v. Underwood , No. 3:19-CV-1433, 2019 WL 3307220, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 28, 2019) rec. accepted , 2019 WL 3306130 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 22, 2019). In sum, "allegations that challenge the fact or duration of confinement are properly brought in habeas petitions, while allegations that challenge rules, customs, and procedures affecting conditions of confinement are properly brought in civil rights actions." Schipke , 239 F. App'x at 85–86 (citing Spina v. Aaron , 821 F.2d 1126, 1127-28 (5th Cir. 1987) ).
It is well established in the Fifth Circuit that a detainee is not entitled to habeas relief if he raises civil rights claims related to the conditions of his confinement. Sanchez v. Brown , No. 3:20-CV-00832, 2020 WL 2615931 at *12 (N.D. Tex. May 22, 2020) (collecting cases). In fact, many district courts in this circuit have already applied this logic to conditions-of-confinement claims related to the COVID-19 pandemic. See Cureno Hernandez v. Mora , 467 F.Supp.3d 454, 463–64 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (collecting cases).
C. Civil Rights Claims
As an immigrant detainee, Petitioner's constitutional rights equate to those of a pretrial detainee and stem from the due process protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Edwards v. Johnson , 209 F.3d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 2000). There is no constitutionally significant distinction between the rights of pretrial detainees and convicted inmates to basic human needs such as reasonable safety and medical care. Hare v. City of Corinth , 74 F.3d 633, 643 (5th Cir. 1996). Officials "must provide humane conditions of confinement ... and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates." Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).
Unlike convicted prisoners, civil detainees are entitled to be free from conditions that amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). However, not all discomforts associated with detention amount to punishment in the constitutional sense, even restrictions that the detainee would not experience if he were released. Id. at 540, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Courts should not underestimate the difficulties of operating a detention center. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 326, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 182 L.Ed.2d 566 (2012) (citing Turner v. Safley , 482 U.S. 78, 84–85, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) ). "A detention facility's protocols for isolating individuals, controlling the movement of its staff and detainees, and providing medical care are part and parcel of the conditions in which the facility maintains custody over detainees." Sacal-Micha , 449 F.Supp.3d at 663.
"[T]he fact that ICE may be unable to ... fully guarantee [Petitioner's] safety does not amount to a violation of his constitutional rights and does not warrant his release." Sacal-Micha , 449 F.Supp.3d at 665–66. "[T]he incidence of diseases or infections, standing alone, [cannot] imply unconstitutional confinement conditions, since any densely populated residence may be subject to outbreaks." Shepherd v. Dallas Cty. , 591 F.3d 445, 454 (5th Cir. 2009). "Rather, a detainee challenging jail conditions must demonstrate a pervasive pattern of serious deficiencies in providing for his basic human needs; any lesser showing cannot prove punishment in violation of the detainee's Due Process rights." Id. This requires a showing that either "serious injury and death [a]re the inevitable results of the [institution's] gross inattention to the needs of inmates with chronic illness," id. , or that a specific rule or policy "caused ... extreme suffering or resulted in adverse medical outcomes serious enough to establish a constitutional violation." Cadena v. El Paso County , 946 F.3d 717, 728 (5th Cir. 2020).
III. DISCUSSION
Petitioner attached a declaration made under penalty of perjury to his petition. But he has not demonstrated an immediate risk of irreparable injury, loss, or damage. Additionally, the facts that he alleges do not show that he is entitled to the relief he seeks. He seeks habeas relief, but his claims are not cognizable under the habeas corpus statute. As a pro se litigant, Petitioner is entitled to liberal construction of his pleadings. But even if the Court construed Petitioner's motion as a civil rights complaint, Petitioner has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. As a result, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claim and he is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy he seeks.
The Court notes that Petitioner relies on a preliminary injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Central District of California. See Fraihat v. U.S. Imm. and Customs Enforcement , 445 F.Supp.3d 709 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (appeal pending in USCA No. 20-55634). There, the district court provisionally certified a class of higher risk immigration detainees. However, the court did not order that the detainees be released. Rather, the court required the defendants to identify high-risk detainees and to conduct individualized custody determinations on a case-by-case basis. Here, Petitioner asks the Court to greatly expand the already extraordinary remedy granted by the California court without any basis for the expansion.
Petitioner's primary argument focuses on the conditions of his confinement unrelated to the fact or duration of his detention. Under well-established Fifth Circuit precedent, his conditions-of-confinement claim is not cognizable in a habeas petition. Additionally, even if Petitioner could prove that his conditions of confinement are unconstitutionally dangerous, that fact would not invalidate an otherwise lawful detention. He would not automatically be entitled to release; rather, the proper remedy would be an injunction to correct the unsafe practices or conditions. Moreover, Petitioner's demand for release and his conclusory assertion that release is the only acceptable remedy in this case do not convert what should be a civil rights claim into a proper habeas claim. As a result, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider his claims in a habeas context. Thus, Petitioner has failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on his habeas claim and his emergency motion for TRO must be denied.
Finally, Petitioner has failed to allege facts that demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his civil rights claims. He has not shown a pervasive pattern of serious deficiencies in providing for his basic human needs. Petitioner relies primarily on the fact of the pandemic, which he acknowledges is a threat to everyone—both in detention and in the free world. He has failed to allege any facts that show either that serious injury or death are the inevitable results of the BBDC's failings or that any policy has caused extreme suffering or resulted in adverse medical outcomes serious enough to establish a constitutional violation. As a result, Petitioner has failed to show a likelihood of success on his claim that the conditions of his confinement at the BBDC violate his due process rights. Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to the emergency relief he seeks.
This finding is limited to the analysis of Petitioner's request for an emergency TRO and does not prejudice his right to refile his claims in the context of a civil-rights complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
As a result, the emergency motion for TRO is DENIED and this habeas corpus petition is DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
All relief not expressly granted is DENIED and any pending motions are DENIED.