Opinion
C. A. 9:21-03260-BHH-MHC
12-13-2021
Andrew Michael Moser, Plaintiff, v. Major Vaughn, Chad McBride, A. Belk, T. Kerr, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge
This is a civil action filed by Plaintiff, Andrew Michael Moser, a pretrial detainee at the Anderson County Detention Center. In the event a limitations issue arises, Plaintiff shall have the benefit of the holding in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (prisoner's pleading was filed at the moment of delivery to prison authorities for forwarding to the district court). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
In the Court's Order dated November 3, 2021 (ECF No. 9), Plaintiff was given the opportunity to bring his case into proper form by providing the specific item specified in the Order. The Order also gave Plaintiff notice to amend the Complaint and advised him of pleading deficiencies. See ECF No. 9. Plaintiff failed to bring his case into proper form or to respond to the Order in any way. He has not filed an amended complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
In his Complaint, Plaintiff appears to allege that his constitutional rights were violated because the Anderson County Detention Center, where he is detained, is a fire hazard and is unsanitary and overcrowded. He also appears to allege that he was subjected to deliberate indifference as to his medical needs. Additionally, Plaintiff may be attempting to assert claims under South Carolina law for malpractice and negligence. ECF No. 1 at 4. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that from June to September 2021, he contracted staph infections, rashes, multiple illnesses, and COVID-19; he had breathing problems because of mold at the facility; and he did not receive any medical care for these conditions. Plaintiff also claims that there is no sprinkler system in the jail, the building is not “in code or ordinance, ” there is mold and mildew in the facility, the ventilation in the building is poor, and the facility is overcrowded. Id. at 5-7. He appears to request injunctive relief. Id. at 5.
In a cover letter submitted with his Complaint (ECF No. 1-2), Plaintiff requests that his Complaint be filed with two other complaints as a class action. Plaintiff may not represent other inmates in a class action and may not litigate on behalf of other persons. See Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (a pro se prisoner cannot be an advocate for others in a class action); see also Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 625-626 (4th Cir. 1981) (a prisoner's suit is “confined to redress for violation of his own personal rights and not one by him as a knight-errant for all prisoners”).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se Complaint is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
1. Failure to State a Claim Against the Named Defendants
This action is subject to summary dismissal because the pleadings fail to provide any specific facts to support a claim that any of the named Defendants violated Plaintiff's federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (requiring, to avoid dismissal, “ ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests'” (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))). Although the “liberal pleading requirements” of Rule 8(a) only require a “short and plain” statement of the claim, a plaintiff must “offer more detail ... than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted); see also White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1989) (district court did not abuse discretion by dismissing plaintiff's complaint which “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion”).
2. Supervisory Liability
Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff may be attempting to bring claims against Defendants based on a theory of supervisory liability, such claims are subject to summary dismissal. To state a § 1983 claim for supervisory liability, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that [his or her] subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference
to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices”; and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to establish supervisory liability as to any of the Defendants.
3. Medical Claims
To the extent that Plaintiff may be attempting to assert claims concerning his medical treatment, such claims should be summarily dismissed because he has not named the person(s) who allegedly failed to provide medical treatment for any of his serious medical needs and has not stated a claim against any named Defendant. To assert a claim under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, Plaintiff must allege that he had a serious medical need, and that officials knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994); Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209-11 (4th Cir. 2017). An official acts with deliberate indifference if he had actual knowledge of the detainee's serious medical needs and the related risks, but nevertheless disregarded these risks. See Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 236 (4th Cir. 2016).
Because Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at all relevant times, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to his claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The analysis, however, remains the same. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239 (1983); but see Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397-398, 400-401 (2015) (holding that the test for excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment differs from the test for excessive force claims brought by convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment). Therefore, Eighth Amendment cases are instructive in analyzing pretrial detainees' claims of deliberate indifference.
Additionally, a claim that Defendants were negligent or committed malpractice as to Plaintiff's medical care does not state claim actionable under § 1983. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328-36 (1986) (explaining a claim of negligence is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). A claim of deliberate medical indifference requires more than a showing of mere negligence, Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06, and “more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Further, if Plaintiff's claim is merely a disagreement as to the proper treatment to be received, such an allegation does not in and of itself state a constitutional violation. See Smart v. Villar, 547 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1976); Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F.Supp. 351, 353 (D. Kan. 1986).
4. Conditions of Confinement
To the extent that Plaintiff may be attempting to assert claims concerning his conditions of confinement at the Anderson County Detention Center, such claims should be summarily dismissed because he has not named the person(s) who allegedly were deliberately indifferent as to the alleged conditions and has not stated a claim against any named Defendant. The Fourteenth Amendment proscribes incarcerating a pretrial detainee in conditions that “amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Conditions constitute punishment when there is “an ‘expressed intent' to punish” or “a lack of a reasonable relationship ‘to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, from which a punitive intent may be inferred.” Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988)). “To demonstrate that conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment, [an inmate] must (1) establish that prison officials acted with ‘deliberate indifference' and (2) prove extreme deprivations of basic human needs or ‘serious or significant' pain or injury.” Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)). To show that the conditions deprived him of a basic human need, a plaintiff must allege officials failed to provide him with humane conditions of confinement, such as “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and [taking] reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 832.
5. State Law Claims
To the extent that Plaintiff may be attempting to allege claims, such as negligence or malpractice, under South Carolina law, such claims should be dismissed. As Plaintiff fails to state any federal claim, only the state law claims would remain, and federal courts are allowed to hear and decide state-law claims only in conjunction with federal-law claims, through the exercise of “supplemental jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C. §1367; Wisconsin Dep't of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998). Of course, a district court may have jurisdiction of a civil action “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000...and is between - (1) citizens of different States...”. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. However, Plaintiff has not alleged complete diversity of the parties. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-374 (1978) (Complete diversity of parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same State as any party on the other side). Here, Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens of South Carolina. See ECF No. 1 at 2-3.
Thus, there is no complete diversity and Plaintiff may not bring his claims pursuant to § 1332. As Plaintiff has asserted no valid federal claim and there is no diversity jurisdiction, this Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ; see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Tigrett v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 626 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's dismissal of state law claims when no federal claims remained in the case); Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants”).
6. Failure to Bring Case into Proper Form
Additionally, it should be noted that Plaintiff has failed to bring this case into proper form. In the Court's Order dated November 3, 2021, Plaintiff was given the opportunity to bring his case into proper form by providing a fully completed summons form listing all Defendants and their addresses. Plaintiff was specifically warned that the failure to provide the necessary document within the timetable set forth in the Order would subject the case to dismissal. See ECF No. 9.
The time to bring this case into proper form has now lapsed, and Plaintiff has failed to provide a response to the proper form Order, or to contact the Court in any way. Thus, in the alternative, it is recommended that this action be dismissed in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 41. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95-96 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that district court's dismissal following an explicit and reasonable warning was not an abuse of discretion).
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IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint without issuance and service of process.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that, where the district court has already afforded a litigant with an opportunity to amend, the district court has the discretion to either afford another opportunity to amend or can “dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order.” Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 Fed.Appx. 280, 281 (4th Cir. 2018); see also Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605 (4th Cir. 2020); Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 of United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 10 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1993). As noted above, Plaintiff was advised of material defects in his complaint, see ECF No. 9, but he failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise cure the defects in his Complaint.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).