Opinion
No. 53497-1-I
Filed: May 16, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County. Docket No. 02-2-09089-1. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 11/26/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Anita L Farris.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Dan Robert Young, Attorney at Law, 1000 2nd Ave Ste 3310, Seattle, WA 98104-1019.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Kenneth Edward Brewe, Attorney at Law, PO Box 488, Everett, WA 98206-0488.
Edwin Mattila and Melody Moseley were involved in a meretricious relationship that lasted nearly nine years. After the relationship ended, the parties petitioned for division of properties, assets, and debts acquired during the relationship. Both parties appeal the trial court's division of property. Because the trial court properly determined the date of the commencement of the meretricious relationship, properly characterized property as separate or relationship property, properly considered separate or relationship contributions to various properties, and attempted to divide the remaining relationship property equally, neither party has shown that the trial court's division was not just and equitable. Affirmed.
FACTS
Melody Moseley and Edwin Mattila met sometime in 1989 or 1990. At that time, Mattila owned several properties, including a house on 35th Avenue N.E. in Seattle, Washington (35th Avenue house). In February 1993, Moseley learned that Mattila was seeking to rent out a room in the 35th Avenue house. Moseley agreed to pay $150 rent per month and moved in on February 14, 1993.
Mattila purchased the property at 35th Avenue, tore down an existing house, and built a new house on the lot in 1978 or 1979. At trial, Mattila also owned various houses that he purchased with the intent of fixing them up for income: a house on 48th Avenue W. in Seattle, Washington, purchased in 1985; a house on 37th Avenue N.E. in Seattle, Washington, purchased in 1988; a house in Wenatchee, Washington, purchased in 1988 or 1989; and a house on 38th Avenue N.E. in Seattle, Washington, purchased prior to his relationship with Moseley. Mattila also owned a number of old cars, a dump truck, back hoe, trailer, and assorted old vehicles which he liked fixing up.
Some months later the parties began a romantic relationship, although the exact date of its commencement was contested. Mattila stated that he and Moseley began their sexual relationship in July 1993. Moseley stated that although she and Mattila began dating in July 1993, they did not become sexually intimate until September 1993, and that they did not begin living together as `husband and wife' until October 1993. The parties remained together until June 2002.
On August 28, 2002, Moseley filed a complaint requesting partition of a house at Chain Lake Road in Redmond, Washington (Chain Lake Road house) which was purchased during the relationship, and a portion of the sale proceeds from the 35th Avenue house, sold in 1999. Mattila denied that Moseley had any interest in the 35th Avenue house. He additionally requested reimbursement for his separate investments in property used by both, including his investments in a house purchased by Moseley at 21st Avenue N.E. in Seattle, Washington (21st Avenue house), division of relationship owned property, and equitable allocation of relationship debts. At trial, the parties focused on four real properties, and on contested items of personal property:
21st Avenue House
Moseley testified that she considered buying the 21st Avenue house in August 1993. Moseley stated that it was a `dump' and a `fixer,' but that Mattila encouraged her to purchase it after he drove by and viewed it. Moseley entered into a sales contract on August 27, 2003, agreeing to purchase the home for $65,000 and without any warranties as to its present condition. She obtained the down payment for the house by selling her car and obtaining a loan from her grandparents. Moseley was unable to do the repair work on the house, but Mattila volunteered to help fix up the house after her offer was accepted. Moseley stated that she intended to move into the house when the sale closed.
Mattila and his brother worked on the house for about three weeks prior to closing. Moseley paid for all materials. Mattila put in a kitchen counter and porch, installed a belly band around the house, repaired a broken drain, repaired a wall, repaired a rotted kitchen floor, rebuilt the carport, and cleaned up the yard. Mattila stated that he viewed this property as another project house, and stated that it was `basically for us' and it was `for our future.' Mattila said he agreed to work on the house with the expectation that he would get `something' out of it, that it was not gratuitous. However, Mattila admitted that he never communicated this expectation to Moseley. Mattila testified that the value of labor and materials he provided was between $10,000 and $17,000, but increased the value of the house from $65,000 to $105,000. He based his opinion on the purchase price and the house's appraisal prior to closing for $105,000, rather than on the home's original assessed value of $102,000. The sale closed on October 12, 1993. Moseley testified that after the closing, Mattila asked her not to move into the 21st Avenue house as she had planned. She agreed and remained with Mattila in the 35th Avenue house. In November 1993, the parties opened a joint bank account. Moseley testified that she primarily used this joint account, and that she deposited her paychecks and rent payments for the house on 21st Avenue into the account. She stated that Mattila did not deposit any money into this account until 1997. Moseley used the account to pay her mortgage, taxes and insurance on the 21st Avenue and to repay her grandparents' loan. Mattila also contributed work and labor to the 21st Avenue house after Moseley purchased the home, including installing a new roof, converting the house to gas, and installing a new hot water heater. He never gave Moseley any bills for this work, but testified as to estimates for the value of the work. Moseley testified that she secured a $20,000 second mortgage to pay for the roof, for converting the house to gas, and for installing the hot water heater. She stated that she paid for materials and paid Mattila $500 for the work. It was agreed at trial that the 21st Avenue house was worth $180,000 and had a net equity of $116,543.
Mattila provided a list of the work done at trial, but the list had no estimates of the value of the work done. Mattila testified that he installed a new roof ($5,500 labor), put in a new furnace and hot water heater and converted the house to gas ($4,000 labor), put in appliances ($525 labor and appliances), installed a new toilet and vanity ($180 labor), did asphalt work and brought in crushed rock ($200 labor), did yard work ($400 labor), and general maintenance.
At trial, Mattila contended that he was entitled to one-half of the equity in the 21st Avenue house, based on the meretricious relationship, the work he did and the house's overall appreciation, as well as the extra principal payments on the house and payments on Moseley's grandparents' loan made out of joint funds. Mattila alleged that these extra mortgage payments to the 21st Avenue house from joint funds in the joint account between September 2001 and April 2002 totaled $4,389. Mattila also alleged that the rental income from the 21st Avenue house was not sufficient to repay the loan from Moseley's grandparents, and that extra payments in the amount of $2,275 were made from joint funds from July 1994 through September 1996. Mattila admitted during trial testimony that while the relationship contributed funds and labor to the 21st Avenue house, he also contributed at least $20,000 from various accounts to the 35th Avenue house and his separately owned 37th Avenue house. He submitted an exhibit which showed various lines of credits and accounts, and various amounts deducted from these accounts on specific dates, but the exhibit did not list how the withdrawals were spent, who owned which account, or which properties the accounts were attached to.
35th Avenue House
On October 30, 1996, Mattila quit claimed his 35th Avenue house to himself and Moseley `in consideration of gift/no consideration.' Mattila stated that he signed the quitclaim deed on the advice of a real estate agent in order to obtain financing and a $100,000 down payment for a log house the two planned to purchase on Chain Lake Road in Redmond, Washington. The parties did not qualify for a conventional loan and Mattila testified that the only way they could buy a house was to use money from one of Mattila's properties. Mattila stated his only intent in signing the deed was to get money for the down payment, and that he did not intend to give Moseley a half interest in the 35th Avenue house.
Mattila never told Moseley that he was giving her an interest in his house, and the parties did not discuss the intent or effect of the quitclaim deed. Moseley stated that she was surprised to find her name on the deed. She admitted that Mattila told her that if he quitclaimed the 35th Avenue house to him and her, they could get a joint loan to buy the Chain Lake Road house. The deed was signed only after the parties had made an offer on the Chain Lake Road house, along with the paperwork for the down payment on the Chain Lake Road house. The parties did not have a conversation with each other at the time they signed the deed. However, both parties were obligated on the $100,000 loan against the 35th Avenue house. The 35th Avenue house was later sold on July 31, 1998, for $182,950. Mattila used some of the proceeds to pay off the $100,000 down payment loan for the Chain Lake Road house. After paying off the loan, the net proceeds from the sale of the house were $61,861.90. Mattila deposited $6,000 into their joint account so that Moseley could pay off her credit card debt. Mattila used the remaining funds to pay off credit card debt and deposited $10,000 into a credit union account for a second mortgage on another property. Moseley admitted that she never asked Mattila for any proceeds from the house, and did not declare any gain from the sale on her 1998 tax returns.
Chain Lake Road House
Sometime in 1994, Mattila and Moseley decided to purchase a log home together and looked at several log homes the next few years. The parties located the Chain Lake Road house. Both wanted to buy it and they made an offer in October 1996. At the same time the parties applied for a $100,000 down payment loan secured by the 35th Avenue house, they also applied for financing on the purchase price of the Chain Lake Road house. The parties received financing and the deed conveying the house to both of them was entered on December 3, 1996.
Mattila and Moseley moved into the Chain Lake Road house in March 1997, and rented out the 35th Avenue house. Of the $100,000 down payment loan, $72,000 was used for the down payment and the remainder used for closing costs, the first three payments on the loan, and to convert a shop/office on the property into an apartment. Mattila testified that all of the remaining payments on the $100,000 down payment loan were made out of the rental income from the 35th Avenue house, which he deposited into his separate account. Moseley testified that she never took any interest deductions on her federal income tax returns with respect to payments made on the $100,000 down payment loan secured by the 35th Avenue house. The first 11 months of payments on the mortgage for the Chain Lake Road house came out of the parties' joint bank account. After 1997, the payments were made from Mattila's separate bank account. Mattila testified that the original agreement between the parties was that Moseley would pay Mattila $600 per month for the mortgage, the amount she could afford. But in August 2001, Mattila agreed with Moseley that she could instead pay that amount as additional principal on the 21st Avenue house, so she could pay off the loan faster.
Personal Property Items
Moseley admitted that prior to her relationship with Mattila, he owned a house on 38th Avenue N.E. in Seattle, Washington (38th Avenue house). Sometime in 1999 or 2000, Mattila purchased a 30-foot strip of land adjacent to this house, purchasing it from a neighbor for $7,500. Mattila combined the strip of land with part of his adjacent parcel at 38th Avenue and sold the combined parcel in January 2001, for $127,500. Around the same time, Mattila purchased a 1955 Cameo truck for $8,500 with one of his credit cards. Mattila used the proceeds from the sale of the land on 38th Avenue to pay off two loans, and the credit card used to purchase the 1955 Cameo. Mattila testified that the vehicle was worth $8,500. Moseley contended that it was worth $10,000.
Moseley also testified regarding an antique corner cabinet that she had purchased during the parties' relationship for $75. The cabinet had previously belonged to Moseley's aunt, and Moseley purchased it from a person who was storing it in Montana. Moseley arranged for transportation of the cabinet to Washington and then paid $550 for its restoration. The parties agreed at the time of trial that the cabinet was worth $1,200.
Trial Court's Decision
After a bench trial, the trial court determined the parties had engaged in a long-term stable meretricious relationship by living together, pooling resources, and having a joint account. The court found that the parties began a dating relationship in July 1993, but the meretricious relationship did not begin until after Moseley had purchased the 21st Avenue house. The court emphasized that the house was purchased as a fixer-upper for Moseley to live in, it was placed entirely in Moseley's name, the parties had not established a joint account or pooled resources prior to the house closing, that Moseley decided to stay with Mattila in his home only after the property closed, and that the parties thereafter opened a joint account. The court noted that while cohabitation is often an indication of the existence of a meretricious relationship, `[t]he fact that two roommates become attracted to each other and begin a dating relationship or have sexual relations does not overnight turn that into a meretricious relationship.' The court found that `the parties had not finally made up their minds to be together long term and permanently until after the Seattle home [on 21st Avenue] closed[.]" Clerk's Papers at 53-54. The court also found that `Mr. Mattila's labor contributions, having occurred before the meretricious relationship began, were a gift to Ms. Moseley, as her boyfriend, for the purpose of increasing goodwill between the two of them. There is no community-like lien for labor and materials expended before closing.' Clerk's Papers at 41, Finding of Fact 1.2. The court granted the 21st Avenue house to Moseley, `free and clear of any liens, claims, interests, or encumbrances of Mr. Mattila.' Clerk's Papers at 45, Conclusion of Law 2.2.
With regard to the 35th Avenue house, the court found that Mattila obtained $100,000 from this property in October 1996, during the parties' meretricious relationship, as a down payment on the Chain Lake Road house. The court found that as part of the transaction `Mr. Mattila quit claimed a one-half interest in the Lake Forest Park property to Ms. Moseley. The Quit Claim Deed stated that the transfer was a gift with no consideration.' The court found that the property was subsequently sold and netted sale proceeds of $61,861, that the proceeds were spent by the parties during their relationship, and that Moseley had no right to be reimbursed. Clerk's Papers at 42, Finding of Facts 1.3.
In addressing the Chain Lake Road house, the court found that it was intended to be a joint home owned by both parties, and stated that the parties wanted it to be a `we' home rather than Mattila's separate property. The court further found, based on the facts surrounding the purchase of the Chain Lake Road house and the language of the quit claim deed, that `[i]t was the intent of the parties that there be a gift to Ms. Moseley of at least the down payment [for the house on Chain Lake Road], obtained from the equity in Mr. Mattila's separate home [at 35th Avenue].' Clerk's Papers at 42, Finding of Fact 1.4. The court found the net equity of the Chain Lake Road house to be $129,200, and that the source of the payments made on the underlying obligation prior to separation was irrelevant, `as all income is income of the relationship.' Clerk's Papers at 42, Finding of Fact 1.4. The court awarded Mattila the Chain Lake Road house, subject to a judgment in favor of Moseley in the amount of $64,600. The court awarded Mattila his 38th Avenue, 48th Avenue, and Chelan properties. The court found that each party's properties roughly covered their expenses, and that the community labor expended on each of the parties' separate properties was probably roughly equal. The court thus denied any community-like liens against the separate properties. The court considered various contested items of personal property and awarded the corner cabinet claimed by Moseley to Mattila, `to equalize the value of personal property awarded to each party.' Clerk's Papers at 44, Finding of Fact 1.7 Although not specifically set forth in the court's findings and conclusions, both parties concede that the 1955 Cameo truck claimed by Mattila was characterized as relationship property and subsequently delivered to Moseley.
Both parties appeal. Mattila contests the trial court's decisions regarding the characterization of various properties as relationship property or separate property, and its conclusion that his alleged separate contributions to Moseley's separate or to relationship properties were `gifts' or were at least equal to contributions to his separate property. Moseley appeals the award of the antique corner cabinet to Mattila.
DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review
When a potentially meretricious relationship terminates, the trial court disposes of property acquired during the relationship by (1) determining the existence of a meretricious relationship; (2) evaluating the interest each party has in the property acquired during the relationship; and (3) making a just and equitable distribution of the property. In re Marriage of Pennington, 142 Wn.2d 592, 602, 14 P.3d 764 (2000) (citing Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wn.2d 339, 349, 898 P.2d 831 (1995)).
Both parties concede that a trial court's characterization of property in a meretricious relationship as community-like or separate is a question of law, and is reviewed de novo. In re Marriage of Chumbley, 150 Wn.2d 1, 5, 74 P.3d 129 (2003); In re Marriage of Skarbek, 100 Wn. App. 444, 447, 997 P.2d 447 (2000). In contrast, the trial court's findings of fact are entitled to deference and are reviewed to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence. Marriage of Pennington, 142 Wn.2d at 602-03; Gormley v. Robertson, 120 Wn. App. 31, 83 P.3d 1042, 1046 (2004). A trial court's distribution of property at the end of a meretricious relationship is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Meretricious Relationship of Sutton and Widner, 85 Wn. App. 487, 491, 933 P.2d 1069 (1997).
II. 21st Avenue House
Both parties conceded at trial that a meretricious relationship existed, but contested the point at which the relationship became meretricious. Mattila asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the parties' meretricious relationship began after Moseley purchased the house on 21st Avenue, such that the property was Moseley's separate property. Mattila claims on appeal that if the house is Moseley's separate property, he is entitled to reimbursements made from his separate and community funds for the house.
A. Characterization of 21st Avenue House
A meretricious relationship may exist where both parties cohabitate with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not exist. Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 346. Factors to consider in determining whether a meretricious relationship exists include: continuous cohabitation, duration of the relationship, purposes of the relationship, pooling of resources and services for joint projects, and the intent of the parties. Id. The property owned by each party prior to the meretricious relationship is not before the court for distribution. Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 349-50. Cohabitation was clearly present here. However, the court noted that a sexual relationship between roommates does not alone support the existence of a meretricious relationship, and found that `the parties had not finally made up their minds to be together long term and permanently until after the Seattle home [on 21st Avenue] closed[.]' Clerk's Papers at 54. The court supported this conclusion by noting that the home was purchased by Moseley in her name as a `fixer-upper,' and that Moseley intended on living in it when it was finished, and that she did not change her mind until Mattila asked her, after the house closed, to stay with him. The court also found no pooling of resources by the parties until they opened a joint account, the month after the house closed and Moseley had agreed to remain with Mattila. The findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Mattila nevertheless asserts that Moseley intended to live with him prior to the closing of the 21st Avenue house. He points out that the 21st Avenue house did not close until October 12, 1993, but that Moseley said `yes' to her attorney's question that she did not decide to live with Mattila until `sometime after the closing on October 7 of 1993.' Report of Proceedings at 103. However, the fact that Moseley's attorney mistook or misstated the date of the home's closing does not change the fact that Moseley clearly stated that she changed her plans to move into the 21st Avenue house `[a]fter the closing.' Report of Proceedings at 102-03. Mattila also argues that there was pooling of resources prior to the closing of the house on 21st Avenue, as indicated by his labor and material contributions made to the house to help it close and his intent that it was for his and Moseley's future. The cases that Mattila cites to support his argument discuss the expenditure of community funds on separate properties where a relationship, either marital or meretricious, has already been established. None of them address whether contributions made to a separate property can be indicative of pooling of resources in order to establish the existence a meretricious relationship. See, e.g., Elam v. Elam, 97 Wn.2d 811, 816-17, 650 P.2d 213 (1982); Lindemann v. Lindemann, 92 Wn. App. 64, 73, 960 P.2d 966 (1998); In re Marriage of Pearson-Maines, 70 Wn. App. 860, 855 P.2d 1210 (1993). See also Max L. Wells Trust v. Grand Central Sauna Hot Tub Co., 62 Wn. App. 593, 604, 815 P.2d 284 (1991).
Mattila has not shown that the trial court erred in concluding that a meretricious relationship did not exist until after the home closed, after Moseley agreed to continuous cohabitation, and after the parties pooled resources in a joint account. Thus, we conclude that the court did not err in finding that the house was Moseley's separate property.
B. Mattila's Contributions to 21st Avenue House Mattila claimed that he contributed between $10,000 and $17,000 towards the 21st Avenue house before it closed, and that the trial court erred in finding that these contributions, having occurred before the relationship, `were a gift to Ms. Moseley, as her boyfriend, for the purpose of increasing goodwill between the two of them.' Clerk's Papers at 41, Finding of Fact 1.2. Mattila has not cited any authority that contributions made from separate property, to separate property, before the commencement of a relationship are not gifts. Thus, he has not shown that the court erred.Mattila also argues that he should be awarded reimbursement for the work he contributed to the 21st Avenue house after the house closed, or that the relationship should have been reimbursed for the extra funds used to make payments on the 21st Avenue house and associated loan by Moseley's grandparents. He asserts that the trial court erred in finding that `[t]o the extent that any community labor went into Ms. Moseley's property initially, over the nine year relationship, Mr. Mattila spent at least that much time working on his own houses. The community liens against each party's properties, to the extent they could be found, are equal.' Clerk's Papers at 43-44, Finding of Fact 1.6.
Mattila testified that he did work on the 21st Avenue house after it closed, including installing a new roof and putting in a new furnace and converting the house to gas. He estimated the value of his labor for these items to be $9,500. Moseley testified that she secured a $20,000 second mortgage to pay for these items and that she paid Mattila $500 for the work, which he accepted. The trial court did not err in not allowing a community-like lien for these amounts.
Mattila estimated the value of the remaining work that he completed on the 21st Avenue house to be about $1,305. Mattila also claims that despite Moseley's testimony to the contrary, the rents on the 21st Avenue house were insufficient to pay the mortgage, insurance, and tax costs. Mattila asserts that additional funds to cover expenses came from the joint account, and that the joint account paid additional money on the loan from Moseley's grandparents. After reviewing the evidence and arguments by both parties that various separate properties had benefited from community funds, the court specifically found, `I don't believe either party has presented sufficient reliable evidence to prove, even by a preponderance, what the increase in the value to these properties was due to any efforts of the meretricious relationship. There is inadequate evidence for the Court to find as to that.' Clerk's Papers at 66 (oral decision, incorporated by reference). To the extent that Mattila or the community may have contributed un-reimbursed labor to Moseley's property that may have increased its value, the trial court found that community contributions to Moseley's property and Mattila's property `is probably roughly equal' and refused to reimburse either party or the community for the expenditures.
Mattila has not shown on appeal that these findings were in error. At the end of a marriage or meretricious relationship, each party is entitled to "`the increase in value during the marriage of his or her separately owned property, except to the extent to which the other spouse can show that the increase was attributable to community contributions.'" Lindemann, 92 Wn. App. at 69 (quoting Marriage of Elam, 97 Wn.2d at 816). The community may be equitably entitled to reimbursement for the contributions that caused the increase in value if the court is persuaded by direct and positive evidence that the increase in value of separate property is attributable to community labor or funds. Lindemann, 92 Wn. App. at 70. A court may offset any right of reimbursement to the relationship against a reciprocal benefit received by the relationship. Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 351. There was no testimony at trial that the value of the house increased solely due to Mattila's labor and improvements or relationship contributions. Mattila also admitted during trial that while the relationship contributed funds and labor to the 21st Avenue house, he contributed at least $20,000 from various accounts to the 35th Avenue house and his separately owned 37th Avenue house. Mattila provided the court with a list of the amounts and dates of various credit card cash advances. He asserts that these advances were used to pay off separate and community debts, but he has not shown that these advances did not include community-like funds paid to his separate properties. Thus, Mattila did not, at trial or on appeal, illustrate that the community-like contributions to Moseley's separate properties either increased the value of the property or were not equal to the community-like contributions to his separate properties. He has not shown that the trial court erred in finding that community contributions to both parties' separate properties were about equal, and then refusing to allow an equitable lien on the 21st Avenue house.
Mattila argues in responsive briefing that Moseley could not rely on his June 12, 2003 deposition to support her argument that community contributions to Mattila's separate property were equal to community contributions to the 21st Avenue house because, although the deposition was published to the trial court, he was not cross-examined on the deposition with regard to community expenditures made to his separate properties. Mattila has cited no rule to support his proposition. Further, his trial testimony illustrates he admitted that he spent at least $20,000 during the relationship on the 35th Avenue house and his separate property at 37th Avenue. Thus, we did not need to rely on the deposition testimony in reviewing the trial court's decision.
III. 35th Avenue House A. Quitclaim Deed
Mattila argues that the trial court erred in finding that his issuance of a quitclaim deed on the 35th Avenue house, which listed both Mattila and Moseley as owners, for the purpose of financing the down payment for the Chain Lake Road house, indicated Mattila's intent `that there be a gift to Ms. Moseley of at least the down-payment, separate down payment from the 35th [Avenue] home[.]' Clerk's Papers at 55. Mattila asserts that he had not intended to give Moseley any interest in the 35th Avenue house, despite the quit claim deed.
Spouses may change their separate property into community property or their community property into separate property. Marriage of Hurd, 69 Wn. App. 38, 51, 848 P.2d 185 (1993). `However, to recognize any such agreement, our courts have required some evidence in writing of the mutual intention of the parties to change the character of the property.' Marriage of Hurd, 69 Wn. App. at 51. If evidence of a writing evidencing mutual intent is presented, it is presumed the separate property was converted to community property and clear and convincing proof must be shown to rebut the presumption. In re Marriage of Shannon, 55 Wn. App. 137, 140, 777 P.2d 8 (1989). Here, the trial court properly found that the quit claim deed, which stated that Mattila quit claimed the house to Moseley and himself `in consideration of gift/no consideration,' was the writing evidencing an intent to transfer Mattila's separate property to relationship property. Mattila's claim that he had no such intent is not clear and convincing proof sufficient to rebut the presumption. Although Moseley indicated she was surprised to find her name on the quit claim deed, Mattila did not tell Moseley that he was not actually conveying her a half-interest in the 35th Avenue house, or that doing so was solely for purposes of financing the Chain Lake Road house. A loan was taken out against the 35th Avenue property in the names of both parties.
The court observed and weighed the testimony of the witnesses and was entitled to make credibility determinations regarding that testimony. Such determinations are solely within the province of the finder of fact. Kinder v. Mangan, 57 Wn. App. 840, 846, 790 P.2d 652 (1990). It appears that the trial court did not believe Mattila's contention that his intent in signing the deed was not to convey an interest to Moseley. Because Mattila has not rebutted the presumption created by the quit claim deed, the court did not err in concluding that the deed indicated that Mattila had quit-claimed a half-interest in the property to Moseley and also evidenced an intent that there be a gift to Moseley of `at least' the $100,000 down payment toward the Chain Lake Road house. There was no abuse of discretion.
B. Separate Expenditures to Community-Like Properties
Mattila also argues that the trial court erred in failing to reimburse Mattila for expenditures allegedly made from Mattila's separate properties or assets toward community-like properties. These expenditures included the $62,000 paid toward the Chain Lake Road house after the sale of the 35th Avenue house, and various debts allegedly incurred by Mattila for the benefit of the relationship.
As discussed above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Moseley had a one-half interest in the 35th Avenue house. Further, even if Moseley only had an interest in the $100,000 down payment secured by the 35th Avenue house, Mattila's subsequent sale of the house and investment of the proceeds into the Chain Lake Road house converted those funds into relationship property. A spouse's use of his or her separate funds to purchase property in the name of the other spouse, absent any other explanation, permits a presumption that the transaction was intended as a gift. Marriage of Hurd, 69 Wn. App. at 51. There is insufficient evidence to show that Mattila did not intend the sale proceeds to be a gift to the community. Thus, the court did not err in failing to reimburse Mattila for the $62,000 in sale proceeds from the 35th Avenue house which was paid toward the Chain Lake Road house, and instead distributing to each one-half of the net value of the Chain Lake Road house.
Mattila also asserts that he incurred a large amount of debt during the relationship and that he used cash advances on various lines of credit, presumably tied to his various parcels of property, to cover his expenses and payments on his separate properties as well as to make contributions to the relationship. Debt incurred during a relationship for community-like purposes is considered community-like debt. Debt incurred for separate purposes remains separate. Marriage of Hurd, 69 Wn. App. at 54-55. As discussed above, Mattila's list of the credit advance amounts and dates does not document which amounts were used for community-like purposes, and which were used for the upkeep of his multiple separate properties. Thus, the court also did not err in not reimbursing Mattila or the community for these debts.
IV. Various Personal Property Items
Mattila finally asserts that the trial court erred in distributing as community property a 1955 Cameo truck purchased by Mattila during the relationship. There is a rebuttable presumption that any property acquired during the meretricious relationship belongs to both parties as relationship property, and this presumption can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 351. The truck was purchased with a credit card, the balance of which was paid in part by the sale of a lot purchased during the relationship. Mattila has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the purchase and sale of a lot during the relationship for $7,500, which later resulted in the purchase of a vehicle for $8,500, somehow prevented either from being classified by the trial court as relationship property. The trial court did not err. Similarly, Moseley argues that the trial court erred in awarding to Mattila an antique corner cabinet `to equalize the value of the personal property awarded to each party[.]' Mattila asserts that Moseley's first argument that the cabinet was her separate property, because it was given to her by her aunt, is frivolous because the cabinet was actually purchased by Moseley during the relationship. Moseley agrees in responsive briefing that the cabinet was relationship property but argues that the trial court should have awarded the cabinet to her because it once belonged to Moseley's aunt and because Moseley was sentimentally attached to it. Although this argument is novel, it is not entirely frivolous and might apply where it was obvious that a court had favored one party's attachment to property over another's, such that the resulting distribution was unjust and inequitable. Attorney fees are not warranted pursuant to RAP 18.9(a) for a frivolous cross-appeal. However, Moseley has not shown that the trial court erred in awarding the cabinet to Mattila in an attempt to equalize the property distribution between the two parties, or that the result was unjust.
After determining the proper characterization of property at the end of a meretricious relationship as either separate property or relationship property, the trial court is required only to make a just and equitable distribution of the property. Marriage of Pennington, 142 Wn.2d at 602. A trial court's distribution of property at the end of a meretricious relationship is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Sutton and Widner, 85 Wn. App. at 491. Because the trial court properly characterized the property and attempted to give each party an equal interest in the property, it cannot be said that the division was not just and equitable.
Affirmed.
APPELWICK and COX, JJ., concur.