Opinion
C/A No. 8:20-cv-03129-HMH-JDA
09-14-2020
Tavon Dorsett Morton, Plaintiff, v. Yates Brown, Matt Blackwell, Wesley McClinton, Greenwood Municipal, Greenwood Police Department, Greenwood Solicitor Office, Judge Miller, Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Tavon Dorsett Morton ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is a detainee at the Greenwood County Detention Center. He files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
The undersigned takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has a number of charges pending against him in the Greenwood County Court of General Sessions at case numbers 20201110107557, 20202350081897, 2020A2410200387, 2020A2410200388, 2020A2410200389, 2020A2410200390, 2020A2410200391, 2020A2410200392, 2020A2420100660, 2020A2420100661, 2020A2420101048, 2020A2420101049, and 2020A2420101050. See Greenwood County Eighth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenwood/ PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers) (last visited Sept. 3, 2020); see also Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'").
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff contends Defendants have violated the following rights: human rights, right of liberty, right to life, right to property, right to due process, real rights, right of use, right of privacy, right to travel, right of redemption, right of way, right of petition, right of action, right to equal protection of the law, right to be secure, rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and treason. [Id. at 10.]
Plaintiff makes numerous, similar allegations against each of the named Defendants. However, most of those allegations are cursory and non-specific. For example, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Greenwood Sheriffs Department, Greenwood Municipal, Greenwood Solicitor's Office, and the Greenwood Police Department have deprived him of his rights listed above by
swearing tortfeasors with very unclean hands treating [him] with misfe[a]sance and sham for retaliation as well as their own personal interest. Under color of law they are using hate speech, hate crimes, neglig[e]nce, sexual harassment, defamation actions, misconduct, hostile sexual harassment, unlawful imprison[ment], torture, racketeering, corrupt organization, rape, kidnapping and ransom, human trafficking, coercion, prurient, malicious prosecutions, extortion, libel as well as Rico and genocide to cause misleading judgment toward [him].[Id. at 11.] Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants McClinton and Blackwell
did use and abuse the Justice system as well as government powers to deprive or help deprive [him] of [his] rights . . . [by] unconstitutionally, uncivilized, unprofessional and unfair with very unclean hands, through forswearing, perjury, treating [him] with misfe[a]sance and sham for retaliation as well as their own personal interest. . . . [And by using] hate speech, hate crimes, Rico, hostile environment, sexual harassment, coercion, extortion, kidnapping, neglig[e]nce, misconduct,
torture, stalking, misprison, involunt[a]ry servitude, encroachment, enemy combatant, excessive force, discrimination and several others.[Id. at 12.] As to Defendants Miller and Griffith, Plaintiff alleges that they
willingly and intentionally with prejudice deprived and help deprive [him] of [his] rights . . . [by acting] unconstitutional, unprofessional as well as unfair through recuse, neg[ligence], hate speech, hate crime, discrimination, prejudice, Rico, unjust actions, unjust decisions, unjust dealings, conflict of laws, as well as misuse of judicial and government powers.[Id. at 13.] Plaintiff alleges that the conduct giving rise to his claims occurred on July 30, 2020, on Old Ninety-Six Highway, on July 31, 2020, in the Greenwood Municipal Court, on August 5, 2020, in the Abbeville Circuit Court, and on August 18, 2020, in the Greenwood Circuit Court. [Id. at 14.]
In addition to the above allegations, Plaintiff makes the following specific allegations giving rise to his claims. Plaintiff contends the Greenwood Police Department has been trying to convict him on bogus charges for the past three years. [Id. at 15.] Plaintiff contends that the criminal proceedings against him constitute malicious prosecution. [Id.] According to Plaintiff, a 911 call was made on May 3, 2020, regarding someone being shot in the leg. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that Defendant Blackwell of the Greenwood Police Department investigated the matter, but failed to conduct a proper investigation and did not interview relevant witnesses. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that Defendant Blackwell is seeking an unlawful conviction. [Id.] Although the allegations are not clear, Plaintiff appears to contend that the victim that was shot in the leg implicated him as the shooter, and he was charged with attempted murder. [Id. at 15-16.] Plaintiff contends that the victim later changed his statement, claiming Plaintiff was not the person who shot him. [Id. at 16.] However, the charge against Plaintiff was not dropped, and the police are continuing to prosecute him. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges that, on July 30, 2020, he was traveling in a vehicle when an unmarked patrol vehicle initiated a traffic stop. [Id. at 16-17.] According to Plaintiff, two men walked up to his car, dressed as officers with guns on their hips, and informed him that they saw his tire touch the yellow line. [Id. at 17.] Plaintiff contends that he did not do anything illegal and that the stop was just a lie and excuse for them to harass him and deprive him of his rights. [Id.] The officers informed Plaintiff that they had a warrant related to the shooting incident noted above. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he was jerked from his car and handcuffed. [Id. at 18.] Plaintiff claims he was the victim of an unreasonable search and seizure of his person and his car. [Id.] Plaintiff claims that the officers took property from his pockets and car, damaged his car, and seized his car. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he was imprisoned against his will and placed in involuntary servitude. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges that, on July 31, 2020, he was taken to a bond hearing in from of Judge Miller, who denied his bond. [Id. at 19.] Plaintiff contends the solicitors and officers made prejudicial, libelous, and perjured statements to the judge. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges that, on August 5, 2020, he appeared before Judge Griffith and was again subject to the deprivation of his civil right. [Id. at 19-20.] Plaintiff alleges that the shooting victim "admitted to filing a complaint with a mistake of facts or unintentional misunderstanding of facts" and provided a written and verbal statement regarding the same. [Id. at 20.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered mental anguish, emotional distress, mental cruelty, and humiliation. [Id. at 24.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have made him feel depressed, suicidal, less of a man, and look like less of a father to his kids and that they made him homeless, hurt his pride, made him want to give up on everything, and injured his business. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that he has been insulted, beaten, shot with a taser, strapped in a chair for hours, and fed inadequate food. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he feels pushed into a corner with no help or nowhere to go, is scared for his life, and has been discriminated against, lied on, and jumped on. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he feels sexually frustrated, emotionally discouraged, emotionally discarded, abandoned, and hated. [Id.] Plaintiff makes numerous other allegations, similar to those above, regarding his injuries. [Id. at 24-25.]
For his relief, Plaintiff seeks $50,000 in actual damages, $1,000,000 in general damages, and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. [Id. at 26.] Plaintiff also requests that the charges pending against him be dismissed. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, this Court is charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Amended Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). "A claim has 'facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). As noted, although the court must liberally construe the pro se complaint, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; see also Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that, although the court must liberally construe the pro se complaint, a plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements to state a claim); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723-74 (4th Cir.1989) (dismissing complaint dismissed because it "failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion"). While Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the complaint, he must allege facts that support a claim for relief. Bass v. DuPont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal because certain Defendants are entitled to dismissal, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under § 1983, and this Court should abstain from considering this action pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine.
Defendants entitled to dismissal
Defendants Greenwood Municipal, Greenwood Police Department, Greenwood Solicitors Office, Judge Miller, and Judge Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., are each entitled to summary dismissal from this action. Specifically, as explained below, Defendants are not persons under § 1983 or are entitled to immunity.
Defendants Greenwood Municipal and Greenwood Police Department
First, Greenwood Municipal and Greenwood Police Department cannot be sued under § 1983 because they are not persons. Brooks v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 6:18-cv-0632-MBS-KFM, 2018 WL 2470746, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 20, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 2461897 (D.S.C. June 1, 2018); see also Harden v. Green, 27 F. App'x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a "person"). These Defendants are either a building or facility or group of individuals in a building. However, inanimate objects, such as buildings, facilities, and grounds, do not act under color of state law. Thus, these Defendants are not "persons" subject to suit under § 1983.
Defendants Greenwood Solicitor's Office and Yates Brown
Plaintiff sues the Greenwood County Solicitor's Office and Yates Brown, a Greenwood County Solicitor. [Doc. 1 at 8.] As an initial matter, the Greenwood County Solicitor's Office is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 & n. 55 (1978); See Rhodes v. Seventh Circuit Solicitor's Office, No. 9:09-cv-1863-JFA-BM, 2009 WL 2588487, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2009).
Further, even if the Greenwood Solicitor's Office could be construed as a "person" under § 1983, it would be entitled to prosecutorial immunity, as would any individual solicitor or assistant solicitor within that office, including Defendant Yates Brown. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that prosecutors, when acting within the scope of their duties, have absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for alleged civil rights violations committed in the course of proceedings that are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Id. at 430. For example, when a prosecutor "prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding," "appears in court to present evidence in support of a search warrant application," or conducts a criminal trial, bond hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pretrial "motions" hearings, absolute immunity applies. Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 341-45.
In South Carolina, regional prosecutors are called Solicitors and Assistant Solicitors. See S.C. CONST Art. V, § 24; S.C. Code § 1-7-310. As noted by the cases cited above, such prosecutors are protected by immunity for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings.
Here, the alleged wrongful conduct of Defendants Greenwood Solicitor's Office and Yates Brown is intricately related to the judicial process and to the prosecution of the State's case against Plaintiff. Therefore, these Defendants have absolute immunity from suit. See Dowdle v. Skinner, No. 6:12-cv-3253-DCN, 2013 WL 5771199, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 24, 2013); Rhodes, 2009 WL 2588487, at *3 ("Even if the . . . Solicitor's Office could be construed as [a] 'person[ ]' under § 1983, . . . [the] Solicitor's Office would be entitled to prosecutorial immunity, as would any individual Solicitor or Assistant Solicitor within that office.").
Defendants Miller and Griffith
Plaintiff sues Judge Miller, a Greenwood municipal judge, and Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., a Circuit Court judge. [Doc. 1 at 8.] It is well settled that judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions unless they acted have in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351-64 (1978); see also Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that if a challenged judicial act was unauthorized by law, the judge still has immunity from a suit seeking damages). Whether an act is judicial or non-judicial relates to the nature of the act, such as whether it is a function normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Immunity applies even when the judge's acts were in error, malicious, or in excess of his authority. Id. at 12-13. Absolute immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
Here, Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants Miller and Griffith relate to their judicial actions. Thus, because the alleged misconduct of Defendants Miller and Griffith arose out of their judicial actions, judicial immunity squarely applies and should bar this lawsuit against them.
Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal
Further, the Complaint as a whole is subject to summary dismissal as Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief that is plausible and because the Court should abstain pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine.
Failure to state a claim
Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert that Plaintiff was subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure and malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment . The Fourth Amendment guarantees, among other protections, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Section 1983 provides a damages remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) ("§ 1983 allow[s] a plaintiff to seek money damages from government officials who have violated his Fourth Amendment rights."). Although "[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement officers from making unreasonable seizures, and seizure of an individual effected without probable cause is unreasonable," Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996), Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support a claim for relief as explained below.
To establish a Fourth Amendment claim, "Plaintiff must make a showing of a lack of probable cause for the issuance of the warrants for his arrest." Williams v. Sims, No. 3:10-cv-862-CMC, 2012 WL 4322085, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 20, 2012). To successfully challenge the probable cause statement in a warrant, the party challenging the warrant must "make a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly or intentionally, or with reckless disregard of the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit," Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978), or the party must show that the affiant omitted from the affidavit "material facts with the intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading," Miller v. Prince George's Cty., Md., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth." Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. "Reckless disregard" can be established by evidence that an officer acted "with a high degree of awareness of [a statement's] probable falsity," that is, "when viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported." Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, other than his bald assertion that he was searched and arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that he was arrested without probable cause. Instead, Plaintiff appears to allege that he was arrested after a traffic stop based on the arresting officer's determination that he had violated a traffic law and because he had an active warrant for his arrest. Plaintiff does not allege that the officer's arrest was improper for any reason other than that the arrest was not related to the officer's reason for the initial stop. On the other hand, Plaintiff alleges that an active warrant for his arrest had been issued, although Plaintiff appears to contend that the warrant was improper because he is innocent of the conduct related to the reason for the warrant. Based on these allegations, and because Plaintiff concedes that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant, he has failed to allege facts showing that he was arrested without probable cause. Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that the arrest warrant lacked probable cause. Simply put, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing the arresting officer lacked probable cause to search or arrest him. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief for an unconstitutional search or seizure.
Similarly, to the extent Plaintiff asserts a claim for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, he has failed to state a claim for relief. "[A] § 1983 claim for damages due to false imprisonment is akin to a malicious prosecution claim." McCormick v. Wright, No. 2:10-cv-00033-RBH, 2010 WL 565303, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2010); Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 2000) ("What is conventionally referred to as a '§ 1983 malicious prosecution' action is nothing more than a § 1983 claim arising from a Fourth Amendment violation."). "To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor." Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012). Thus, one element of a false imprisonment or malicious prosecution claim is that the criminal proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff's favor. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 392 (2007); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff has not alleged that the state criminal charges against him have been resolved in his favor, and a false imprisonment or malicious prosecution claim appears to be premature. Therefore, with respect to a Fourth Amendment false arrest or malicious prosecution claim, Plaintiff has failed to allege a claim on which relief may be granted.
Abstention under Younger
Additionally, the Complaint as a whole is subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff's claims are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert that Defendants have violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights in relation to his ongoing criminal proceedings in the state court. Granting Plaintiff's requested relief, however, would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin Plaintiff's pending state court proceedings. Indeed, Plaintiff specifically asks that this Court dismiss the charges pending against him in the state court. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings "except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances." Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations and to dismiss the pending charges against him; thus, the first element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: "[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as Plaintiff can raise his constitutional claims in the state court.
A ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court proceedings against Plaintiff and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, 'whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'") (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can raise his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from hearing this action. See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 247 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that "when a district court abstains from a case based on Younger, it should typically dismiss the case with prejudice; not on the merits").
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend because amendment would be futile. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015); Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend pursuant to Goode because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018); Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018) (declining to give plaintiff leave to amend because it would be futile for plaintiff to amend his complaint against the defendants being dismissed), aff'd, 766 F. App'x 1 (4th Cir. 2019). Here, Plaintiff's state criminal charges remain pending at this time, and he is able to raise the issues complained of herein with the state court. Further, dismissal without leave to amend is proper because Defendants are not persons subject to suit or are immune from suite under § 1983, and Plaintiff would be unable to allege facts to show that these Defendants are proper Defendants in such an action.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge September 14, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).