Opinion
06 Civ. 7608 (DC).
February 20, 2008
STOLL, GLICKMAN BELLINA, LLP Attorneys for Plaintiff By: Leo Glickman, Esq. Brooklyn, New York
MICHAEL A. CARDOZO, Esq. Corporation Counsel of the City of New York Attorney for Defendants By: Elizabeth A. Wells, Esq. New York, New York
MEMORANDUM DECISION
In this civil rights case, plaintiff Sandra Morrison was involuntarily confined for psychiatric evaluation and treatment at the Elmhurst Hospital Center (the "Hospital") for fourteen days in November 2005. She brings this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, for damages against the City of New York, the Hospital, officials and doctors of the Hospital (in both their official and individual capacities), the New York City Administration for Children's Services, and certain "John Doe" defendants.
Defendants move to dismiss the first amended complaint (the "Complaint") pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted and the Complaint is dismissed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts
The following facts are drawn principally from the Complaint and the documents incorporated therein by reference. The factual allegations of the Complaint are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion. As defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, however, I also consider certain extrinsic materials in deciding whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See Phifer v. City of New York, 289 F.3d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 2002).
On November 9, 2005, Morrison was sitting outside a courtroom at the Family Court of the City of New York, Queens County, in Jamaica, New York. (Compl. ¶ 16). Morrison was a respondent in a child neglect proceeding, and she was waiting for her case to be called. (Id.; see Papamichail Decl. Ex. B). Something happened, and court officers took Morrison into custody. (See Compl. ¶ 16).
The case was called and proceeded before a Family Court judge. (11/9/05 Tr. 3). The court observed that Morrison apparently had a psychiatric episode — "she was praying[,] chanting and seemed quite distressed." (Id.). The court stated the following on the record:
The parties stipulated to the accuracy of the audible portions of two transcripts of proceedings in the Family Court on November 9, 2005 and November 23, 2005.
You were outside and you all observed better than my observation and hearing what was happening in the waiting room. (Inaudible) there appearances to be a (inaudible) hopefully temporary (inaudible) psychological level and fortunately we had asked the Mother to put the child in nursery in the Child Care Center and I thought it was important to get her an evaluation as soon as possible.
. . . I have made arrangements and signed [t]his order to transport the Mother to Elmhurst as a State Court the only hospital I can send her to is one of the City Hospitals only to the hospital in Queens. I issued an order for that evaluation. It is a court release only order. It's equivalent to a (inaudible) and I believe the date we came up with was Elmhurst needs a Wednesday for transportation, 23rd. . . .
(Id. 6).
Morrison was represented by counsel at the hearing and her cousin, Michele Brandson, was also present. (Id. 4-5). The court and Brandson had the following exchange:
JUDGE FRIEDMAN: What happened in the waiting room?
MS. BRANSON: Well, what happened in the waiting room she, she was praying and she goes to Church, she's a Christian, so the Church that they go to that's their religion they when they're in a deep spirit, you know —
JUDGE FRIEDMAN: It's a very emotional type of praying?
MS. BRANDSON: It's, it's that's the way they acted it out in that Church.
JUDGE FRIEDMAN: Okay.
MS. BRANDSON: Because Seven Year Evangelist is different because they don't do that but that's [their] religion.
JUDGE FRIEDMAN: Okay but one obviously she's not in Church she's in court so the court Officers had to ask her to speak softly or to stop I wasn't there I don't know exactly what happened and it was not appropriate what she was doing.
MS. BRANDSON: I understand because it's in the court.
JUDGE FRIEDMAN: And in fact I did go out to the door and I observed it myself because I wanted to do that if I'm going to send someone to a hospital I want to know with my own eyes see with my own eyes what's happening. But did you try to calm her down at all or say —
MS. BRANDSON: No I don't try to calm her down because it was not unusual for me to see her like that because that's the way they are in Church.
JUDGE FRIEDMAN: Do you think what she was doing was appropriate for court?
MS. BRANDSON: Well this (inaudible) in court but see —
JUDGE FRIEDMAN: What she does in Church is fine if that's the culture of that Church and that service that's fine. But do you think it made sense for her particularly after the Court Officers came over and said Ma'am you have to stop you're really causing a disruption you're whatever they said you're upsetting other people.
MS. BRANDSON: Well I can understand what the Court Officer was saying because you know it's in the court maybe you would like to (inaudible) and don't do things where and she was a bit loud so you know I can (inaudible).
(Id. 14-16).
The court issued an "Order Directing Emergency Evaluation" (the "Order"), which provided in part as follows:
This Court has jurisdiction over the petition and Sandra Morrison is a person within the jurisdiction of this Court; and
Sandra Morrison, a person before the court, has or may have a mental illness which is likely to result in serious harm to himself or herself or others based upon the following evidence presented: respondent continued to have an outburst in the waiting area after being told by Court Officers to calm down.
NOW, therefore, it is
ORDERED that Sandra Morrison is remanded to HHC/Elmhurst Hospital, a hospital specified in section 9.39(a) of the Mental Hygiene Law, for a determination by the director of such hospital or program whether such person should be retained therein pursuant to such section; and it is further
ORDERED that the proceeding is adjourned to 11/23/2005; and it is further
ORDERED that Court Release only.
(Papamichail Decl. Ex. B).
A copy of the Order was received by the Hospital and included in Morrison's medical records. (Papamichail Decl. ¶ 8 Ex. B). Morrison arrived at the Hospital on November 9, 2005. At 2:30 p.m., a doctor signed a certification representing that he had examined Morrison and found reasonable cause to believe that she had a:
MENTAL ILLNESS FOR WHICH IMMEDIATE OBSERVATION, CARE AND TREATMENT IN A MENTAL HOSPITAL IS APPROPRIATE AND WHICH IS LIKELY TO RESULT IN SERIOUS HARM TO HIMSELF OR HERSELF OR OTHERS.
(PX C at NYC 0013). The certification explained the circumstances under which Morrison had been brought to the Hospital:
References to "PX" are to exhibits submitted as part of plaintiff's opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss. The exhibits are Bates-stamped and page references are to the Bates numbers.
42 year old female with unknown psych history court remanded for psych eval secondary to uncooperative and religiously preoccupied behavior.
(Id.). The same day, the doctor certified that he had given a copy of a Notice of Status and Rights (the "Notice") to Morrison; the Notice advised Morrison that she would be examined by another physician within 48 hours of the time of her admission, and that if the second physician confirmed the first physician's findings, she could be kept in the Hospital for up to 15 days. (Id. at NYC 0015). The Notice also advised Morrison that she (or someone acting for her) could make a written request for a court hearing that would "take place as soon as possible within 5 days." (Id.). The Notice further provided that the Mental Hygiene Legal Service was available to provide her with advice and representation, and it reiterated her right to a court hearing. (Id.).
The next morning, on November 10, 2005, another Hospital doctor certified that she had observed and examined Morrison and that reasonable cause existed to believe that Morrison was suffering from a mental illness for which immediate care and treatment in a hospital was appropriate and which was likely to result in serious harm to herself or others. (Id. at NYC 0014).
Morrison remained at Elmhurst, involuntarily, until November 23, 2005, when she was brought back to court. (Compl. ¶ 17; see 11/23/05 Tr. 5-6). A new attorney appeared for Morrison, and, in response to the court's inquiry, Morrison confirmed that she had retained the new lawyer and was no longer being represented by the former attorney. (11/23/05 Tr. 5). The court noted that the Hospital had recommended that Morrison be discharged, and thus the court determined that Morrison "is going to be released today." (Id. 6-7). In fact, Morrison was released that day. (See Compl. ¶¶ 2, 17).
Morrison never appealed the Order. Nor did she ask an attorney (or anyone else) to return to the Family Court to seek reconsideration of the Order. Nor did she exercise her right under the Mental Hygiene Law, as she had been advised by the Notice, to request a court hearing.
B. Prior Proceedings
Morrison commenced this action on September 21, 2006. Defendants answered on December 7, 2006. The parties thereafter commenced discovery. During the course of discovery, defendants raised the issue of whether, in light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the action. At a pretrial conference on August 10, 2007, I set a schedule for Morrison to file an amended complaint and for defendants to move to dismiss.
Morrison filed the Complaint on August 23, 2007, asserting ten causes of action: 42 U.S.C. § 1983, municipal and supervisory liability, false imprisonment, medical malpractice, negligence, malicious prosecution, assault, battery, constitutional tort, and respondeat superior.
This motion followed.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, in general, federal district courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to review final judgments of the state courts. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-83 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1923). That is because, among federal courts, only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from state court judgments. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; see 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
There are limited exceptions, including, for example, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Recently, the Supreme Court clarified the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, holding that it is "confined" to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Construing Exxon Mobil, the Second Circuit has held that four requirements must be met forRooker-Feldman to apply:
First, the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court. Second, the plaintiff must "complain of injuries caused by [a] state-court judgment[.]" Third, the plaintiff must "invit[e] district court review and rejection of [that] judgment." Fourth, the state-court judgment must have been "rendered before the district court proceedings commenced". . . .Hoblock v. Albany County Board of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted and quoting Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. at 284).
B. Application
Here, there is no dispute as to the first and fourth requirements: Morrison "lost" in state court, as the Family Court issued the Order against her, and the Order was rendered before the instant case was commenced. The parties disagree, however, as to whether the second and third requirements are met. I hold that they are.
The Complaint itself clearly demonstrates that Morrison is seeking relief for injuries caused by the Order. The Complaint asserts that Morrison's "claim arises from an incident commencing on November 9, 2005 in which Officers and/or employees of the Queens County Family Court unlawfully caused plaintiff to be held in custody and transported to Elmhurst Hospital Center against her will, and was held there unlawfully for 14 days against her will." (Compl. ¶ 2). All of these actions were directly the result of the Order — it was because of the Order that Morrison was taken into custody, transported to the Hospital, and held there for fourteen days. Indeed, the Order made it clear that Morrison could not be released without the Family Court's approval. The Order explicitly provided: "Court Release Only."
Likewise, it is clear that Morrison is asking this Court to review and reject the Order. For Morrison to prevail, she must demonstrate that the Order was unlawful. If the Order was valid, then Morrison cannot complain about the actions that flowed directly from the Order.
Morrison argues that she is not challenging the Order, but only the actions of the court officers and Hospital personnel. This argument fails in light of language in Hoblock that is virtually on all fours with this case. There, the Second Circuit wrote:
Can a federal plaintiff avoid Rooker-Feldman simply by clever pleading — by alleging that actions taken pursuant to a court order violate his rights without ever challenging the court order itself? Surely not. In the child-custody example . . ., if the state has taken custody of a child pursuant to a state judgment, the parent cannot escape Rooker-Feldman simply by alleging in federal court that he was injured by the state employees who took his child rather than by the judgment authorizing them to take the child. The example shows that in some circumstances, federal suits that purport to complain of injury by individuals in reality complain of injury by state-court judgments.
. . . [A] federal suit complains of injury from a state-court judgment, even if it appears to complain only of a third party's actions, when the third party's actions are produced by a state-court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it. Where a state-court judgment causes the challenged third-party action, any challenge to that third-party action is necessarily the kind of challenge to the state judgment that only the Supreme Court can hear.422 F.3d at 88.
Here, instead of state employees taking a child into custody pursuant to a state court judgment in a child custody case, state employees took a parent into custody pursuant to a state court judgment in a child neglect case. As in the Second Circuit's example in Hoblock, the state employees' actions here were "produced" by the Order. It is the Order that caused Morrison's injuries and it is the Order that Morrison really is seeking to challenge. See Phillips v. City of New York, 453 F. Supp. 2d 690, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (observing that "[t]he key inquiry is the source of the injury," and holding that claims alleging due process violations arising from child's removal from custody of parents were barred by Rooker-Feldman).
Morrison also argues that her claims are not barred byRooker-Feldman because the doctors at the Hospital had an independent duty, under the Mental Hygiene Law, to determine whether she really was an immediate threat to herself and others, and that the doctors' failings in this respect were an independent cause of her injuries. The argument is rejected, for it is merely more, in the Second Circuit's words, "clever pleading."
Morrison was at the Hospital only because of the Order — she was "remanded" there by the Family Court. Moreover, the doctors at the Hospital were confronted with a court order that explicitly provided that Morrison could be released only by the court. In essence, Morrison suggests that the doctors should have returned, on their own initiative, to the Family Court to ask for Morrison's release. The suggestion is not reasonable. Morrison herself never asked for a court hearing, as she was permitted to do under the Mental Hygiene Law. She never appealed the Order or asked the Family Court to reconsider the Order.
Nor can Morrison suggest that she was unable to challenge the Order because she was confined at the Hospital. She had a lawyer representing her at the November 9, 2005 hearing, and her cousin was present as well. Hence, both her lawyer and a family member were aware that she had been remanded to the Hospital, and either one could have taken steps to seek her release. Moreover, as the transcript of the November 23, 2005 hearing shows, Morrison was in communication with her family while she was at the Hospital — she retained a new lawyer and discharged her former lawyer while she was hospitalized, as her new lawyer was present at the hearing on November 23rd. If Morrison, her two lawyers, and her family took no steps to challenge her confinement or seek her release, the Hospital doctors could hardly have been expected to return to Family Court — on their own initiative in the face of the Order — to ask for her release.
Under these circumstances, even assuming the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was not a bar to Morrison's claims, the individual defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g.,Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1996).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion is granted on the grounds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. The Complaint is dismissed, without costs or fees, with prejudice to re-filing in federal court, but without prejudice to Morrison's state court remedies.SO ORDERED.