Opinion
C/A No. 0:19-628-BHH-PJG
03-30-2020
Jason Morin, Plaintiff, v. Andrew Saul, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This social security matter is before the court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 83.VII.02 (D.S.C.). The plaintiff, Jason Morin, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the defendant, Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), denying his claims for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the court concludes that the Commissioner's decision should be reversed and that the case should be remanded for further consideration as explained below.
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY GENERALLY
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) and (d)(5), as well as pursuant to the regulations formulated by the Commissioner, the plaintiff has the burden of proving disability, which is defined as an "inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a); see also Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1973). The regulations require the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to consider, in sequence:
(1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity;20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). If the ALJ can make a determination that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in this process, review does not proceed to the next step. Id.
(2) whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment;
(3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 ("the Listings"), and is thus presumptively disabled;
(4) whether the claimant can perform his past relevant work; and
(5) whether the claimant's impairments prevent him from doing any other kind of work.
The court observes that effective August 24, 2012, ALJs may engage in an expedited process which permits the ALJs to bypass the fourth step of the sequential process under certain circumstances. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(h).
Under this analysis, a claimant has the initial burden of showing that he is unable to return to his past relevant work because of his impairments. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. To satisfy this burden, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant has the residual functional capacity, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and impairments, to perform alternative jobs that exist in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); see also McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1983); Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 1981); Wilson v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 1980). The Commissioner may carry this burden by obtaining testimony from a vocational expert. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1983).
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
In June 2015, Morin applied for DIB, alleging disability beginning May 1, 2011. Morin's application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and he requested a hearing before an ALJ. A video hearing was held on October 19, 2017, at which Morin appeared and testified and was represented by Evan C. Bramhall, Esquire. The ALJ issued a decision on April 10, 2018 finding that Morin was not disabled from May 1, 2011 through June 30, 2015, the date last insured. (Tr. 17-26.)
Morin was born in 1972 and was forty-three years old on the date last insured. He has a high school education and past relevant work experience as a bartender and a delivery driver. (Tr. 192.) Morin alleged disability due to sciatic nerve damage, arthritis in his neck, protruding discs, depression, ADHD, and arthritis. (Tr. 191.)
In applying the five-step sequential process, the ALJ found that Morin had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of May 1, 2011 through his date last insured of June 30, 2015. The ALJ also determined that, through the date last insured, Morin's cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease, status post L5-S1 discectomy were severe impairments. However, the ALJ found that, through the date last insured, Morin did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the "Listings"). The ALJ further found that, through the date last insured, Morin retained the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c). The ALJ found that, through the date last insured, the record was not clear as to what constituted Morin's past relevant work, but that considering Morin's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Morin could have performed. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Morin was not disabled from May 1, 2011 through the date last insured of June 30, 2015.
The Appeals Council denied Morin's request for review on January 11, 2019, thereby making the decision of the ALJ the final action of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-6.) This action followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court may review the Commissioner's denial of benefits. However, this review is limited to considering whether the Commissioner's findings "are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard." Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Thus, the court may review only whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied. See Brown v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 873 F.3d 251, 267 (4th Cir. 2017); Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980). "Substantial evidence" means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; see also Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015). In reviewing the evidence, the court may not "undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]." Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; see also Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, even if the court disagrees with the Commissioner's decision, the court must uphold it if it is supported by substantial evidence. Blalock, 483 F.2d at 775.
ISSUES
Morin raises the following issues for this judicial review:
1. Did the Administrative Law Judge commit reversible error by failing to accord great weight to the opinions of Mr. Morin's treating physicians and examining physicians that he suffered physical and mental limitations so severe that he was disabled? [](Pl.'s Br., ECF No. 17.)
2. Did the Administrative Law Judge commit reversible error by (A) selectively extracting isolated evidence from the record which was unfavorable to Mr. Morin rather than consider the entire record in context; and (B) failing to liberally construe the Social Security Act in his favor? []
3. Did the Administrative Law Judge commit reversible error by giving little weight to Mr. Morin's testimony regarding his pain, impairments, and functional limitations? []
4. Did the Administrative Law Judge commit reversible error by failing to call a vocation[al] expert to testify concerning the vocational aspects of this case? []
5. Did the Administrative Law Judge meet its duty to show that specific jobs are available in the economy that Mr. Morin could perform? []
DISCUSSION
The court notes that numerous social security regulations and social security rulings (SSRs) have changed effective March 27, 2017. However, these changes specifically state that they are applicable to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513, 404.1527. Because the instant claim was filed before that time, all references in the instant Report and Recommendation are to the prior versions of the regulations and SSRs in effect at the time Morin's application for benefits was filed, unless otherwise specified.
Morin raises numerous issues for this judicial review, and some of Morin's allegations of error appear to overlap. For the reasons that follow, the court is constrained to recommend that this matter be remanded for further consideration by the ALJ. Upon careful review of the parties' arguments, the ALJ's decision as a whole, and the record in this matter, the court finds that remand is warranted because, in evaluating the evidence, it is unclear whether the ALJ properly considered all the evidence presented, thereby frustrating meaningful review.
Importantly, a claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") is "the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations" and is determined by assessing all of the relevant evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In assessing residual functional capacity, an ALJ should scrutinize "all of the relevant medical and other evidence." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). Social Security Ruling 96-8p further requires an ALJ to reference the evidence supporting his conclusions with respect to a claimant's residual functional capacity. Further, "remand may be appropriate . . . where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant's capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful review." Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013)) (alterations in original); see also Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 188 (4th Cir. 2016).
As part of an ALJ's RFC determination, he assesses the medical opinion evidence. Rendering review of this matter difficult is that the ALJ discounted opinions from four different treating or examining sources and instead gave great weight to the opinion of one of the state agency record reviewers who found Morin could perform medium work. One of Morin's arguments is that the ALJ erred in failing to give great weight to the opinion evidence from Dr. Rita Robinson, NP Demerise Minor, Dr. Nicole Edwards, and Dr. Alexandra Witherspoon, who were all examining or treating sources during the course of Morin's treatment with the Department of Veterans Affairs.
The law applicable to Morin's applications provides that regardless of the source, the Commissioner will evaluate every medical opinion received. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Typically, the Social Security Administration accords greater weight to the opinion of treating medical sources because treating physicians are best able to provide "a detailed, longitudinal picture" of a claimant's alleged disability. See id. However, "the rule does not require that the testimony be given controlling weight." Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Instead, a treating physician's opinion is evaluated and weighed "pursuant to the following non-exclusive list: (1) whether the physician has examined the applicant, (2) the treatment relationship between the physician and the applicant, (3) the supportability of the physician's opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record, and (5) whether the physician is a specialist." Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 654 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). Any other factors that may support or contradict the opinion should also be considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(6). In the face of "persuasive contrary evidence," the ALJ has the discretion to accord less than controlling weight to such an opinion. Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). Further, "if a physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight." Id. (quoting Craig, 76 F.3d at 590).
Moreover, with regard to a nurse practitioner, such as Ms. Minor, the applicable regulation states that she is not an "acceptable medical source," but rather is considered an "other source." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a), (d)(1). These other sources do not command controlling weight in the same manner as acceptable medical sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d). Although other sources cannot provide evidence to establish an impairment, evidence from other sources, such as nurse practitioners, may be used to show the severity of the claimant's impairments and how it affects his ability to work. Id.; cf. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a)(7) (eff. Oct. 15, 2018) (including licensed advanced practice nurses as acceptable medical sources for impairments within their licensed scope of practice only "with respect to claims filed . . . on or after March 27, 2017"). Further, the reviewing court should leave untouched an ALJ's decision regarding weight afforded a medical opinion unless the ALJ failed to give sufficient reason for the weight afforded. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). In weighing these opinions, the ALJ is instructed to apply the same factors applicable to treating medical sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1). Importantly, more weight is generally given to the opinions of an examining source than a non-examining one. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The regulations acknowledge that "not every factor for weighing opinion evidence will apply in every case because the evaluation of an opinion from a medical source who is not an acceptable medical source or from a nonmedical source depends on the particular facts in each case." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1).
As part of the ALJ's considerations of the opinion evidence, the ALJ specifically considered the challenged opinions, as well as the other evidence in the record. He first observed that on June 5, 2013, Ms. Minor, a nurse practitioner, and Dr. Robinson, an internist, opined that Morin's "severe pain prevented him from maintaining full employment." (Tr. 23) (citing Tr. 293). The ALJ gave these opinions little weight, finding that the sources did not explain the basis for their opinions and the opinions were on an issue reserved for the Commissioner. The ALJ further found that they were inconsistent with the evidence, including
a neurosurgical examination by W. B. Naso, MD, on June 24, 2013 . . . [which] showed normal upper and lower extremity bulk and tone with 5/5 strength throughout, including grips, except for 4/5 right lower extremity strength that may have been secondary to pain; normal 2+ reflexes except for a diminished 1/4 right ankle jerk; no clonus; no gross dysmetria; and no gait ataxia. This examination did not support Ms. Minor's and Dr. Robinson's opinion earlier that month. Although Dr. Naso later observed an antalgic gait, he described it as steady, and the claimant exhibited at least greater-than-antigravity strength throughout (5F).(Tr. 23-24.)
The ALJ further observed that in April and May 2013, Morin's physical examinations "showed normal 2+ knee/patellar and ankle/Achilles deep tendon reflexes (DTRs)." (Tr. 24) (citing Tr. 670, 694). The ALJ also considered an opinion from Dr. Edwards, a family medicine resident physician, that was issued following Morin's compensation and pension examination in July 2013 with the Department of Veterans Affairs. Dr. Edwards reported that Morin's thoracolumbar condition impacted Morin's ability to work and found that Morin was not able to stand or walk longer than five minutes and had trouble bending, stooping, reaching, and changing positions from sitting to standing. Dr. Edwards also opined that Morin's lumbar disc disease and peripheral neuropathy from lumbar radiculopathy rendered Morin unable to maintain physical employment but would not affect sedentary employment. (Tr. 24) (citing Tr. 355-76, 1073-94). The ALJ agreed with Dr. Edwards's opinion that Morin's lumbar radiculopathy would not affect his ability to engage in sedentary work; however, the ALJ gave little weight to the rest of Dr. Edwards's opinion because it was largely inconsistent with Dr. Naso's examination and it was dated before Morin's L5-S1 discectomy, after which Morin experienced improvement.
The ALJ explained that a July 2013 cervical MRI showed degenerative stenosis, and in August 2013, Morin "underwent uncomplicated right L5 hemilaminectomy, S1 foraminotomy, and L5-S1 microdiscetomy performed by Dr. Naso for L5-S1 disc herniation and was satisfactorily fitted for a lumbar corset thereafter." (Tr. 24) (citing Tr. 713-23). The ALJ also observed that "[p]ostoperatively, [Morin] seemed to be doing fairly well although still with some right groin pain, but he was taking Ibuprofen as needed. Physical examination showed good strength in both upper and lower extremities, a steady gait, and a well-healed incision." (Tr. 24) (citing Tr. 724-25).
The ALJ next considered an opinion from Dr. Witherspoon, a family medicine physician, that was issued following Morin's compensation and pension examination in December 2013 opining that Morin "was unable to stand or walk greater than 10 minutes, bend, stoop, or sit for long periods." (Tr. 24) (citing Tr. 307-29). The ALJ gave Dr. Witherspoon's opinion little weight. Specifically, the ALJ found that although Morin's thoracolumbar condition impacted Morin's ability to work, the restrictions opined "were inconsistent with the longitudinal medical evidence, including the contemporaneous examination she conducted, which showed 5/5 ankle plantar flexion and dorsiflexion and great toe extension bilaterally, normal 2+ ankle DTRs bilaterally, normal L2-S1 sensation bilaterally, and negative straight leg raise bilaterally." (Tr. 24) (citing Tr. 324-25). The ALJ further found Dr. Witherspoon's opined limitations to be inconsistent with Morin's lumbar X-rays taken four days before Dr. Witherspoon's opinion, which showed degenerative disc disease but satisfactory alignment, and inconsistent with Dr. Naso's examinations and assessments discussed above. (Tr. 24) (citing Tr. 456, 735).
The ALJ stated that the last evidence in the record prior to Morin's date last insured was from February 2015 and included a lumbar MRI showing disc protrusions, a bone density test showing lumbar and hip osteopenia, and routine laboratory studies. (Tr. 24) (citing Tr. 545, 550, 736, 737). The ALJ also considered and summarized the medical evidence after Morin's date last insured; however, he found that the evidence did not support greater limitations as of Morin's date last insured. (Tr. 25.)
The ALJ considered the opinion evidence from the state agency record reviewers who determined that through Morin's date last insured he could perform medium work. The ALJ gave the initial consultant's opinion great weight, finding it was "the most consistent with the foregoing longitudinal evidence, especially Dr. Naso's pre-and-postoperative examinations and assessments and essentially unchanged laboratory findings in lumbar X-rays and MRI." (Tr. 25.) The ALJ gave little weight to the disability assessment by the Department of Veterans Affairs and little weight to Morin's subjective reports.
The second reviewer affirmed the opinion of the initial reviewer but also found that there was insufficient evidence to evaluate the claim.
As an initial matter, it was not automatically reversible error to credit the opinions of the state agency reviewers over Morin's examining and treating sources. See Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345-46 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding that the testimony of a non-examining physician can constitute substantial evidence when it is consistent with the record); Stanley v. Barnhart, 116 F. App'x 427, 429 (4th Cir. 2004) (disagreeing with the argument that the ALJ improperly gave more weight to residual functional capacity assessments of non-examining state agency physicians over those of examining physicians and finding that the ALJ properly considered evidence provided by those physicians in context of other medical and vocational evidence); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513a(b)(1) ("Administrative law judges are not required to adopt any prior administrative medical findings, but they must consider this evidence according to §§ [404.1520b, 404.1520c, 404.1527], as appropriate, because our Federal or State agency medical or psychological consultants are highly qualified and experts in Social Security disability evaluation.").
Although the ALJ's opinion on its face appears to be well supported, upon closer examination of the record, the court is unable to determine whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. For example, one of the reasons offered by the ALJ to discount several of the opinions is an examination by Dr. W. B. Naso on June 24, 2013 that the ALJ suggests contains relatively normal findings. However, a May 2013 MRI of Morin's lumbar spine revealed degenerative disc disease at the L5-S1 level and to a much lesser degree at the L4-5 level. It also showed "inferior extension of a large extruded disk fragment into the right lateral aspect of the central spinal canal at and just below the level of the L5-S1 interspace" and that this fragment "compresses the right anterolateral surface of the thecal sac and compresses the right S1 nerve root." (Tr. 247.) Further, a July 31, 2013 MRI of Morin's cervical spine revealed degenerative stenosis, and as argued by Morin it specifically "revealed annular bulging, small posterior vertebral body bony spurs, and ligamentum flavum thickening in mild concentric central canal stenosis at the C5-6 level and central canal stenosis at the C6-7 level due to annular bulging" and "Morin's degenerative stenosis 'involve[d] the intervertebral nerve root canals at the C5-6 level bilaterally and at the C6-7 level on the right' " as well as the right C7-T1 intervertebral nerve root canals. (Pl.'s Br. at 6, ECF No. 17 at 6) (citing Tr. 244). Moreover, a little over a month after Dr. Naso's examination, the ALJ observed that Morin underwent surgery for his back pain. Dr. Naso performed an "uncomplicated right L5 hemilaminectomy, S1 foraminotomy, and L5-S1 microdiscectomy . . . for L5-S1 disc herniation and [Morin] was satisfactorily fitted for a lumbar corset." (Tr. 24.) The ALJ also found following surgery Morin was doing fairly well. However, following an examination in December 2013, another examining source, Dr. A. S. Witherspoon, found that Morin was unable to stand or walk greater than ten minutes. The ALJ discounted this opinion, finding it was inconsistent with a few of Dr. Witherspoon's findings during the examination; however, review of Dr. Witherspoon's complete examination findings appears to provide some support for her opinion, such as reduced range of motion of the lumbar spine as well as a functional loss and functional impairment of the thoracolumbar spine. (See generally Tr. 307-29.) There are also references through the record as to Morin's use of or need for cane. (See, e.g., Tr. 282 (ordering Morin a cane for a large herniated nucleus pulposus of the lumbar spine); Tr. 315 (Dr. Witherspoon indicating that Morin constantly uses a cane as a normal mode of locomotion)). Additionally, weighing in favor of these opinions is that fact that four examining or treating sources offered similar and substantially consistent opinions.
In summary, upon review of the ALJ's decision and the record, the court is unable to determine whether the ALJ's decision to discount the above opinions is supported by substantial evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); cf. Mastro, 270 F.3d at 178 (stating that "if a physician's opinion is not supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less weight") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Even considering the ALJ's decision in its entirety, it is unclear that the ALJ properly considered all of the evidence in discounting these opinions, and in determining that Morin remains capable of performing medium work. Therefore, the court is constrained to agree with Morin that the ALJ's consideration of the evidence appears to be selective and frustrates meaningful review. See, e.g., Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636-37 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding remand may be appropriate when the courts are left to guess at how the ALJ arrived at the conclusions and meaningful review is frustrated); see also Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189 (remanding where the ALJ failed to "build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion") (citation omitted). Moreover, Morin has directed the court to substantial records that arguably support these opinions, and it is unclear whether the ALJ properly considered all of this evidence. See Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 869 (4th Cir. 2017) ("An ALJ has the obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply cherrypick facts that support a finding of nondisability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability finding.") (quoting Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010)). Similarly, the ALJ's cursory evaluation of and explanation regarding the weight given to the opinions of the state agency record reviewers renders the court unable to discern why the ALJ determined the initial reviewer's opinion that Morin could perform medium work was entitled to greater weight than the opinions from examining or treating physicians. Moreover, where, as here, the record appears to contain conflicting medical evidence, it is the purview of the ALJ to first consider and weigh the evidence, and resolve the conflict. See Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 (stating that the court may not "undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]"); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that it is the ALJ's responsibility, not the court's, to determine the weight of evidence and resolve conflicts of evidence). Therefore, the court is constrained to recommend that this matter be remanded for further consideration of this opinion evidence.
Accordingly, the court expresses no opinion as to whether further consideration of the opinion evidence by the ALJ should necessarily lead to a finding that the opinions at issue are entitled to additional weight or that Morin is ultimately entitled to benefits. Further analysis and discussion may well not change the ALJ's conclusion on this point.
In light of the court's recommendation that this matter be remanded for further consideration, the court need not address Morin's remaining arguments, as they may be rendered moot on remand. See Boone v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 203, 211 n.19 (3d Cir. 2003) (remanding on other grounds and declining to address claimant's additional arguments). Moreover, if necessary, Morin may present his remaining arguments concerning the ALJ's alleged errors on remand.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that the Commissioner's decision be reversed pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and that the case be remanded to the Commissioner for further consideration as discussed above. March 30, 2020
Columbia, South Carolina
/s/_________
Paige J. Gossett
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).