Opinion
June 1, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Demarest, J.).
Ordered that the orders are affirmed, with one bill of costs.
Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion by denying that branch of their motion which was for leave to amend the complaint to include additional allegations enlarging the time period of the defendants' alleged negligence. While CPLR 3025 provides that leave to amend a pleading shall be freely granted, leave to amend is not to be granted upon the mere request of a party without a proper basis (see, Wieder v. Skala, 168 A.D.2d 355). Rather, it is incumbent upon the movant to make "some evidentiary showing that the claim can be supported]" (Cushman Wakefield v. John David, Inc., 25 A.D.2d 133, 135). In determining whether to grant leave, a court must examine the underlying merit of the proposed claims, since to do otherwise would be wasteful of judicial resources (see, McKiernan v. McKiernan, 207 A.D.2d 825). Here, the only affidavits submitted in support of the plaintiffs' motion are from their attorneys, who clearly lack personal knowledge of the underlying facts of this tort action (see, Frost v. Monter, 202 A.D.2d 632, 633; Mathiesen v. Mead, 168 A.D.2d 736, 737). Moreover, the proposed amended complaint is not verified by a party (see, Frost v. Monter, supra), but rather by the plaintiffs' attorneys (see, CPLR 3020 [d] [3]). Considering, as well, the plaintiffs' failure to proffer any adequate explanation for the delay in seeking this amendment to the complaint, the potential prejudice to the defendants' case, and the plaintiffs' failure to set forth any new or additional facts to support the amendment, the motion was properly denied (see, Frost v. Monter, supra; Mathiesen v. Mead, supra).
We have considered the plaintiffs' remaining contention and find it to be without merit (see, Caffee v. Arnold, 104 A.D.2d 352).
Bracken, J. P., Copertino, Joy and McGinity, JJ., concur.